text rule in Oklahoma

2012The text of the instruction is accompanied by a specific argument relating to Dr. Barnes' rendering of post-surgical treatment without disclosing the removed prostate did not have cancer. 15 In Oklahoma, "[elonsent to medical treatment, to be effective, should stem from an understanding decision based on adequate information about treatment, the available alternatives, and the collateral risks." Scott v. Bradford, 1979 OK 165, ¶ 10 , 606 P.2d 554, 556-7 .

2012The text of the instruction is accompanied by a specific argument relating to Dr. Barnes' rendering of post-surgical treatment without disclosing the removed prostate did not have cancer. 15 In Oklahoma, "[elonsent to medical treatment, to be effective, should stem from an understanding decision based on adequate information about treatment, the available alternatives, and the collateral risks." Scott v. Bradford, 1979 OK 165, ¶ 10 , 606 P.2d 554, 556-7 .

2004In addition, Tanique, Inc., generally alleged "unjustified, non-privileged, and unexcused interference with the contracts Tanique had with its customers" and specifically averred "the Defendants herein maliciously interfered with [Tanique's] business, inducing members and users of Ta-nique, Inc., to break their contracts ... and never return because of [the Defendant's statements about] the unsavory and illegal nature of Tanique, Inc.'s business." $84 This third claim sufficiently alleges legal wrongs for defamation, Continental Casualty Co. v. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co., 860 F.2d 970 (10

2004In addition, Tanique, Inc., generally alleged "unjustified, non-privileged, and unexcused interference with the contracts Tanique had with its customers" and specifically averred "the Defendants herein maliciously interfered with [Tanique's] business, inducing members and users of Ta-nique, Inc., to break their contracts ... and never return because of [the Defendant's statements about] the unsavory and illegal nature of Tanique, Inc.'s business." $84 This third claim sufficiently alleges legal wrongs for defamation, Continental Casualty Co. v. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co., 860 F.2d 970 (10

2004In addition, Tanique, Inc., generally alleged "unjustified, non-privileged, and unexcused interference with the contracts Tanique had with its customers" and specifically averred "the Defendants herein maliciously interfered with [Tanique's] business, inducing members and users of Ta-nique, Inc., to break their contracts ... and never return because of [the Defendant's statements about] the unsavory and illegal nature of Tanique, Inc.'s business." $84 This third claim sufficiently alleges legal wrongs for defamation, Continental Casualty Co. v. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co., 860 F.2d 970 (10

1978For these reasons, it is not surprising that there seems to be no case on record in which the employer owned the truck but the driver was held to be an independent contractor.” Although not cited in the decision, this court recognized and applied the text rule in Dodd v. Rush, Okl, 406 P.2d 261 (1965).

1968Co. v. Housel, 169 Okl. 112 , 35 P.2d 966 , at p. 967, wherein this text rule appears (1 R.C.L. 207): “The expression ‘outstanding and open account’ has a well-defined and well-understood meaning.

1967In Anthony v. Covington, 187 Okl. 27 , 100 P.2d 461 , the text rule above quoted is recognized, subject however, to the requirement that it is combined negligence of the owner and operator which fastens liability upon the owner.

1967In Anthony v. Covington, 187 Okl. 27 , 100 P.2d 461 , the text rule above quoted is recognized, subject however, to the requirement that it is combined negligence of the owner and operator which fastens liability upon the owner.

1966A sound statement of the rule appears in Apodaca v. Hernandez, 61 N.M. 449 , 302 P.2d 177 : “ * * * And where the original entry or occupation is permissive the statute of limitation will not begin to run until an adverse holding is declared and notice of such change is brought to the knowledge of the owner, and, for this purpose, mere possession is not enough. * * *» Essentially the same rule was announced in Friend v. Holcombe, 196 Okl. 111 , 162 P.2d 1008 , in syllabus. 2: “A mere permissive use of a way over the land of another, however long indulged in, will not ripen into an easement.” P

1966A sound statement of the rule appears in Apodaca v. Hernandez, 61 N.M. 449 , 302 P.2d 177 : “ * * * And where the original entry or occupation is permissive the statute of limitation will not begin to run until an adverse holding is declared and notice of such change is brought to the knowledge of the owner, and, for this purpose, mere possession is not enough. * * *» Essentially the same rule was announced in Friend v. Holcombe, 196 Okl. 111 , 162 P.2d 1008 , in syllabus. 2: “A mere permissive use of a way over the land of another, however long indulged in, will not ripen into an easement.” P

1966The text states the rule in § 139(d), supra, and the decision in Manor v. Liles, supra, appears in the annotations showing this Court's adoption of the rule.

1966The text states the rule in § 139(d), supra, and the decision in Manor v. Liles, supra, appears in the annotations showing this Court’s adoption of the rule.

1966“Possession under a license or an agreement granting the right of occu *630 pancy is not. adverse; the license or agreement precludes the possibility of a claim of adverse possession. * * * ” The text rule had been applied consistently by this Court in Thomas v. Morgan, 113 Okl. 212 , 240 P. 735 , 43 A.L.R. 934 ; Nokes v. Padgett, Okl., 262 P.2d 423 .

1966A sound statement of the rule appears in Apodaca v. Hernandez, 61 N.M. 449 , 302 P.2d 177 : “ * * * And where the original entry or occupation is permissive the statute of limitation will not begin to run until an adverse holding is declared and notice of such change is brought to the knowledge of the owner, and, for this purpose, mere possession is not enough. * * *» Essentially the same rule was announced in Friend v. Holcombe, 196 Okl. 111 , 162 P.2d 1008 , in syllabus. 2: “A mere permissive use of a way over the land of another, however long indulged in, will not ripen into an easement.” P

1966A sound statement of the rule appears in Apodaca v. Hernandez, 61 N.M. 449 , 302 P.2d 177 : “ * * * And where the original entry or occupation is permissive the statute of limitation will not begin to run until an adverse holding is declared and notice of such change is brought to the knowledge of the owner, and, for this purpose, mere possession is not enough. * * *» Essentially the same rule was announced in Friend v. Holcombe, 196 Okl. 111 , 162 P.2d 1008 , in syllabus. 2: “A mere permissive use of a way over the land of another, however long indulged in, will not ripen into an easement.” P

1966“Possession under a license or an agreement granting the right of occu *630 pancy is not. adverse; the license or agreement precludes the possibility of a claim of adverse possession. * * * ” The text rule had been applied consistently by this Court in Thomas v. Morgan, 113 Okl. 212 , 240 P. 735 , 43 A.L.R. 934 ; Nokes v. Padgett, Okl., 262 P.2d 423 .

1966“Possession under a license or an agreement granting the right of occu *630 pancy is not. adverse; the license or agreement precludes the possibility of a claim of adverse possession. * * * ” The text rule had been applied consistently by this Court in Thomas v. Morgan, 113 Okl. 212 , 240 P. 735 , 43 A.L.R. 934 ; Nokes v. Padgett, Okl., 262 P.2d 423 .

1965The text rule is supported by numerous cases cited in footnote 20, p. 491, including the Herbel case, supra, wherein the Kansas Court *81 collected an impressive array of authority ( 228 P.2d at p. 936 ), and quoted extensively from Leather Manufacturers’ Bank v. Morgan, 117 U.S. 96 , 6 S.Ct. 657 , 29 L.Ed. 811 , and Glassell Development Co. v. Citizens’ Nat.

1965The text rule is supported by numerous cases cited in footnote 20, p. 491, including the Herbel case, supra, wherein the Kansas Court *81 collected an impressive array of authority ( 228 P.2d at p. 936 ), and quoted extensively from Leather Manufacturers’ Bank v. Morgan, 117 U.S. 96 , 6 S.Ct. 657 , 29 L.Ed. 811 , and Glassell Development Co. v. Citizens’ Nat.

1965The text rule is supported by numerous cases cited in footnote 20, p. 491, including the Herbel case, supra, wherein the Kansas Court *81 collected an impressive array of authority ( 228 P.2d at p. 936 ), and quoted extensively from Leather Manufacturers’ Bank v. Morgan, 117 U.S. 96 , 6 S.Ct. 657 , 29 L.Ed. 811 , and Glassell Development Co. v. Citizens’ Nat.

1965The text rule is supported by numerous cases cited in footnote 20, p. 491, including the Herbel case, supra, wherein the Kansas Court *81 collected an impressive array of authority ( 228 P.2d at p. 936 ), and quoted extensively from Leather Manufacturers’ Bank v. Morgan, 117 U.S. 96 , 6 S.Ct. 657 , 29 L.Ed. 811 , and Glassell Development Co. v. Citizens’ Nat.

1965But, in McKinney, etc. v. Frodsham et al., 57 Wash.2d 126 , 356 P.2d 100 , the same court reconsidered the question and noted the text rule contemplated defects discoverable by “factory-type inspection” by a new car dealer, which would be unjustified in terms of the possibility of latent defects.

1965But, in McKinney, etc. v. Frodsham et al., 57 Wash.2d 126 , 356 P.2d 100 , the same court reconsidered the question and noted the text rule contemplated defects discoverable by “factory-type inspection” by a new car dealer, which would be unjustified in terms of the possibility of latent defects.

1965Bank of Los Angeles, 191 Cal. 375 , 216 P. 1012 , 28 A.L.R. 1427 .

1965Bank of Los Angeles, 191 Cal. 375 , 216 P. 1012 , 28 A.L.R. 1427 .

1965Jur., Municipal Corporations, Sec. 572, and the rule announced in City of Muskogee v. Hancock, 58 Okl. 1 , 158 P. 622 , and later decisions to be discussed, plaintiff concludes that the damaging of his property resulted from a public use.

1965Jur., Municipal Corporations, Sec. 572, and the rule announced in City of Muskogee v. Hancock, 58 Okl. 1 , 158 P. 622 , and later decisions to be discussed, plaintiff concludes that the damaging of his property resulted from a public use.

1964Workmen’s Compensation § 271: “ * * * An operation on the face of an employee who has suffered serious disfigurement from his injury, in order that the face be rendered less repulsive, is within the purview of a statute requiring the furnishing of such medical and surgical treatment as may be reasonably required to cure and relieve from the effects of the injury.” The case of Los Angeles County v. Industrial Accident Commission, 202 Cal. 437 , 261 P. 295 , is cited as disclosing application of the text rule.

1964Workmen’s Compensation § 271: “ * * * An operation on the face of an employee who has suffered serious disfigurement from his injury, in order that the face be rendered less repulsive, is within the purview of a statute requiring the furnishing of such medical and surgical treatment as may be reasonably required to cure and relieve from the effects of the injury.” The case of Los Angeles County v. Industrial Accident Commission, 202 Cal. 437 , 261 P. 295 , is cited as disclosing application of the text rule.

1926Under the holdings of this court, the text of the instruction did not constitute error, for in Muskogee v. Yahola Sand Co., 60 Okla. 196 , 159 Pac. 898 , syllabus paragraph 1, it is said; “Prospective profits, proximately resulting from the breach of a contract, are recoverable in an action for damages, whore the amount thereof is not contingent and speculative, but can be measured with reasonable certainty.” ■So far as the wording of the instruction is concerned in being a departure from ihe text of section 5976, -supra, we think the contemplation of the statute, as construed, is that damages

1926Under the holdings of this court, the text of the instruction did not constitute error, for in Muskogee v. Yahola Sand Co., 60 Okla. 196 , 159 Pac. 898 , syllabus paragraph 1, it is said; “Prospective profits, proximately resulting from the breach of a contract, are recoverable in an action for damages, whore the amount thereof is not contingent and speculative, but can be measured with reasonable certainty.” ■So far as the wording of the instruction is concerned in being a departure from ihe text of section 5976, -supra, we think the contemplation of the statute, as construed, is that damages