text instruction in California

2026But compared to “stray[ing] from the language of form instructions . . . [i]t is hardly preferable for a judge to merely repeat for a jury the text of an instruction it has already indicated it doesn’t understand.” (Thompkins, supra, 195 Cal.App.3d at p. 253 .) Instead, the trial judge should “thoughtfully consider[] the jury’s inquiry, clarif[y] it if necessary, stud[y] the applicable legal principles, and respond[] to the jury in as simple and direct a manner as possible.” (Id. at p. 253.) We agree wholeheartedly, and in our view such is the teaching of Beardslee, where our Supreme Court ack

2018The erroneous response After a jury retires to deliberate, "[s]ection 1138 imposes upon the court a duty to provide the jury with the information the jury desires on points of law." ( People v. Smithey (1999) 20 Cal.4th 936 , 985, 86 Cal.Rptr.2d 243 , 978 P.2d 1171 .) "Where the original instructions are themselves full and complete, the court has discretion under section 1138 to determine what additional explanations are sufficient to satisfy the jury's request for information." ( People v. Beardslee (1991) 53 Cal.3d 68 , 97, 279 Cal.Rptr. 276 , 806 P.2d 1311 ( Beardslee ).) Although "comment

2022Thus, “ ‘[w]hen a jury asks a question after retiring for deliberation, “[Penal Code] [s]ection 1138 imposes upon the court a duty to provide the jury with information the jury desires on points of law.” [Citation.] But “[t]his does not mean the court must 37. always elaborate on the standard instructions.” ’ ” (People v. Lua (2017) 10 Cal.App.5th 1004, 1016 , first bracketed insertion added.) Rather, if “ ‘the original instructions are themselves full and complete, the court has discretion … to determine what additional explanations are sufficient to satisfy the jury’s request for information

2021Thus, “ ‘[w]hen a jury asks a question after retiring for deliberation, “. . . [s]ection 1138 imposes upon the court a duty to provide the jury with 26 information the jury desires on points of law.” [Citation.] But “[t]his does not mean the court must always elaborate on the standard instructions.” ’ ” (People v. Lua (2017) 10 Cal.App.5th 1004, 1016 (Lua).) Rather, if “ ‘the original instructions are themselves full and complete, the court has discretion . . . to determine what additional explanations are sufficient to satisfy the jury’s request for information.’ ” (Dykes, supra, 46 Cal.4th a

2022Thus, “ ‘[w]hen a jury asks a question after retiring for deliberation, “[Penal Code] [s]ection 1138 imposes upon the court a duty to provide the jury with information the jury desires on points of law.” [Citation.] But “[t]his does not mean the court must 37. always elaborate on the standard instructions.” ’ ” (People v. Lua (2017) 10 Cal.App.5th 1004, 1016 , first bracketed insertion added.) Rather, if “ ‘the original instructions are themselves full and complete, the court has discretion … to determine what additional explanations are sufficient to satisfy the jury’s request for information

2021Thus, “ ‘[w]hen a jury asks a question after retiring for deliberation, “. . . [s]ection 1138 imposes upon the court a duty to provide the jury with 26 information the jury desires on points of law.” [Citation.] But “[t]his does not mean the court must always elaborate on the standard instructions.” ’ ” (People v. Lua (2017) 10 Cal.App.5th 1004, 1016 (Lua).) Rather, if “ ‘the original instructions are themselves full and complete, the court has discretion . . . to determine what additional explanations are sufficient to satisfy the jury’s request for information.’ ” (Dykes, supra, 46 Cal.4th a

2026But compared to “stray[ing] from the language of form instructions . . . [i]t is hardly preferable for a judge to merely repeat for a jury the text of an instruction it has already indicated it doesn’t understand.” (Thompkins, supra, 195 Cal.App.3d at p. 253 .) Instead, the trial judge should “thoughtfully consider[] the jury’s inquiry, clarif[y] it if necessary, stud[y] the applicable legal principles, and respond[] to the jury in as simple and direct a manner as possible.” (Id. at p. 253.) We agree wholeheartedly, and in our view such is the teaching of Beardslee, where our Supreme Court ack

2026But compared to “stray[ing] from the language of form instructions . . . [i]t is hardly preferable for a judge to merely repeat for a jury the text of an instruction it has already indicated it doesn’t understand.” (Thompkins, supra, 195 Cal.App.3d at p. 253 .) Instead, the trial judge should “thoughtfully consider[] the jury’s inquiry, clarif[y] it if necessary, stud[y] the applicable legal principles, and respond[] to the jury in as simple and direct a manner as possible.” (Id. at p. 253.) We agree wholeheartedly, and in our view such is the teaching of Beardslee, where our Supreme Court ack

2017“The purpose of the full text requirement is to provide sufficient information so that registered voters can intelligently evaluate whether to sign the initiative petition and to avoid confusion.” (Ibid.) As is true of the full text requirement applicable to referendum petitions (§ 9238, formerly § 4052), “the statute’s underlying *186 purpose [is] minimizing the possibility prospective signers may misunderstand the purpose of a petition.” (Nelson v. Carlson (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 732, 740 [ 21 Cal.Rptr.2d 485 ].) Although technical deficiencies in a petition will not invalidate the petition if

2017“The purpose of the full text requirement is to provide sufficient information so that registered voters can intelligently evaluate whether to sign the initiative petition and to avoid confusion.” (Ibid.) As is true of the full text requirement applicable to referendum petitions (§ 9238, formerly § 4052), “the statute’s underlying *186 purpose [is] minimizing the possibility prospective signers may misunderstand the purpose of a petition.” (Nelson v. Carlson (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 732, 740 [ 21 Cal.Rptr.2d 485 ].) Although technical deficiencies in a petition will not invalidate the petition if

2018The erroneous response After a jury retires to deliberate, "[s]ection 1138 imposes upon the court a duty to provide the jury with the information the jury desires on points of law." ( People v. Smithey (1999) 20 Cal.4th 936 , 985, 86 Cal.Rptr.2d 243 , 978 P.2d 1171 .) "Where the original instructions are themselves full and complete, the court has discretion under section 1138 to determine what additional explanations are sufficient to satisfy the jury's request for information." ( People v. Beardslee (1991) 53 Cal.3d 68 , 97, 279 Cal.Rptr. 276 , 806 P.2d 1311 ( Beardslee ).) Although "comment

2018The erroneous response After a jury retires to deliberate, "[s]ection 1138 imposes upon the court a duty to provide the jury with the information the jury desires on points of law." ( People v. Smithey (1999) 20 Cal.4th 936 , 985, 86 Cal.Rptr.2d 243 , 978 P.2d 1171 .) "Where the original instructions are themselves full and complete, the court has discretion under section 1138 to determine what additional explanations are sufficient to satisfy the jury's request for information." ( People v. Beardslee (1991) 53 Cal.3d 68 , 97, 279 Cal.Rptr. 276 , 806 P.2d 1311 ( Beardslee ).) Although "comment

2019(Lin, supra, 176 Cal.App.4th at p. 417 .) The Elections Code requires "the 'text' of the ordinance being challenged, not the inclusion of additional information a conscientious voter might want to know before signing the petition." (Ibid.; We Care-Santa Paula v. Herrera (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 387, 390-391 (We Care) [initiative to amend general plan land use element was not required to attach any portion of the general plan].) 9 Lin is instructive on the parameters of the full text requirement.

2017(Id. at pp. 104-105.) Proponents, on the other hand, place heavy reliance on We Care, supra, 139 Cal.App.4th 387 , in which the court held that the failure to include in an initiative petition the text of the land use element of the city’s general plan, to which reference was made in the petition, did not cause the petition to violate the full text requirement.

2017However, because the measure incorporates provisions of the management plan without stating or attaching those provisions, the registrar contends the petition does not comply with the full text requirement for the same reasons that the petition was held not to comply in Mervyn’s v. Reyes (1998) 69 Cal.App.4th 93 [ 81 Cal.Rptr.2d 148 ] (Mervyn’s).

2017However, because the measure incorporates provisions of the management plan without stating or attaching those provisions, the registrar contends the petition does not comply with the full text requirement for the same reasons that the petition was held not to comply in Mervyn’s v. Reyes (1998) 69 Cal.App.4th 93 [ 81 Cal.Rptr.2d 148 ] (Mervyn’s).

2022Thus, “ ‘[w]hen a jury asks a question after retiring for deliberation, “[Penal Code] [s]ection 1138 imposes upon the court a duty to provide the jury with information the jury desires on points of law.” [Citation.] But “[t]his does not mean the court must 37. always elaborate on the standard instructions.” ’ ” (People v. Lua (2017) 10 Cal.App.5th 1004, 1016 , first bracketed insertion added.) Rather, if “ ‘the original instructions are themselves full and complete, the court has discretion … to determine what additional explanations are sufficient to satisfy the jury’s request for information

2021Thus, “ ‘[w]hen a jury asks a question after retiring for deliberation, “. . . [s]ection 1138 imposes upon the court a duty to provide the jury with 26 information the jury desires on points of law.” [Citation.] But “[t]his does not mean the court must always elaborate on the standard instructions.” ’ ” (People v. Lua (2017) 10 Cal.App.5th 1004, 1016 (Lua).) Rather, if “ ‘the original instructions are themselves full and complete, the court has discretion . . . to determine what additional explanations are sufficient to satisfy the jury’s request for information.’ ” (Dykes, supra, 46 Cal.4th a

2019He has not repeated this argument on appeal. 12 In summary, the purpose of the full text requirement is "to make sure that prospective signers have adequate information about the substance of a proposed [law] to make an informed decision about whether to sign the referendum petition." (Defend Bayview, supra, 167 Cal.App.4th at p. 858 .) "In all but the most extreme situations, this purpose is fulfilled by construing the 'text' to include the language of the ordinance itself, plus any documents attached as exhibits or expressly incorporated by reference." (Lin, supra, 176 Cal.App.4th at p. 419

2009And in Defend Bayview, supra, 167 Cal.App.4th at pages 849, 856-858, a referendum petition was properly rejected where it did not include the redevelopment plan that was adopted by the challenged ordinance and expressly incorporated by reference.

2017(Id. at p. 737; accord, Billig v. Voges (1990) 223 Cal.App.3d 962, 968 [ 273 Cal.Rptr. 91 ].) The omission of the best management practices with which the proposed initiative would compel compliance frustrates the purpose of the full text rule and therefore invalidates the petition.

2017(Id. at p. 737; accord, Billig v. Voges (1990) 223 Cal.App.3d 962, 968 [ 273 Cal.Rptr. 91 ].) The omission of the best management practices with which the proposed initiative would compel compliance frustrates the purpose of the full text rule and therefore invalidates the petition.

2016You are to be governed only by the instruction in its final wording.” Even if we did not assume that the jury understood that the written instructions were controlling, we would find no reasonable likelihood that the jury misunderstood the requirements for proof of the felony-murder special circumstance. ‘“When an appellate court addresses a claim of jury misinstruction, it must assess the instructions as a whole, viewing the challenged instruction in context with other instructions, in order to determine if there was a reasonable likelihood the jury applied the challenged instruction in an im

2016You are to be governed only by the instruction in its final wording.” Even if we did not assume that the jury understood that the written instructions were controlling, we would find no reasonable likelihood that the jury misunderstood the requirements for proof of the felony-murder special circumstance. ‘“When an appellate court addresses a claim of jury misinstruction, it must assess the instructions as a whole, viewing the challenged instruction in context with other instructions, in order to determine if there was a reasonable likelihood the jury applied the challenged instruction in an im

2026You can pretty much ignore the title.” As defense counsel later conceded, the court was correct in telling the jury to “disregard the title.” (See People v. Torres (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 1131, 1147, fn. 11 .) In any event, Salazar fails to explain how the text of the instruction without its title made it easier for the jury to convict him on that charge.

2022(Mangano v. Verity, Inc. (2009) 179 Cal.App.4th 217, 222, fn. 6 [contention unsupported by substantive argument or citation to authority deemed abandoned].) Instead, Kenton points to other purported technical defects in the notification including its failure to correctly list Hilja’s address and the address of the trust’s principal place of administration as called for in section 16061.7, subdivision (g).

2022Applicable Law “The rules governing a trial court’s obligation to give jury instructions without request by either party are well established. ‘Even in the absence of a request, a trial court must instruct on general principles of law that are . . . necessary to the jury’s understanding of the case.’ [Citations.] That obligation comes into play when a statutory term ‘does not have a plain, unambiguous meaning,’ has a ‘particular and restricted meaning’ [citation], or has a technical meaning peculiar to the law or an area of law [citation].” (People v. Roberge (2003) 29 Cal.4th 979, 988 .) “A w

2022Applicable Law “The rules governing a trial court’s obligation to give jury instructions without request by either party are well established. ‘Even in the absence of a request, a trial court must instruct on general principles of law that are . . . necessary to the jury’s understanding of the case.’ [Citations.] That obligation comes into play when a statutory term ‘does not have a plain, unambiguous meaning,’ has a ‘particular and restricted meaning’ [citation], or has a technical meaning peculiar to the law or an area of law [citation].” (People v. Roberge (2003) 29 Cal.4th 979, 988 .) “A w

2021(Lua, supra, 10 Cal.App.5th at p. 1016 .) As Franklin explained, however, the abuse-of-discretion standard of review applies only to “the decision to provide [or not provide] further instructions in response to an inquiry.” (People v. Franklin, supra, 21 Cal.App.5th at p. 887, fn. 4 .) “If a supplemental instruction is given, . . . its correctness presents a question of law that we review de novo.” (Ibid.; see People v. Posey (2004) 32 Cal.4th 193, 218 .) In determining whether the trial court correctly instructed the jury, “the question is whether there is a ‘reasonable likelihood’ that the j

2021(Lua, supra, 10 Cal.App.5th at p. 1016 .) As Franklin explained, however, the abuse-of-discretion standard of review applies only to “the decision to provide [or not provide] further instructions in response to an inquiry.” (People v. Franklin, supra, 21 Cal.App.5th at p. 887, fn. 4 .) “If a supplemental instruction is given, . . . its correctness presents a question of law that we review de novo.” (Ibid.; see People v. Posey (2004) 32 Cal.4th 193, 218 .) In determining whether the trial court correctly instructed the jury, “the question is whether there is a ‘reasonable likelihood’ that the j

2021(See, e.g., People v. Harper (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 1413, 1419, fn. 4 [“an argument raised in . . . perfunctory fashion is waived”].) Accordingly, we address in the text the claim that Smith properly preserved in the trial court and on appeal, i.e., her claim of Doyle error. 30 Smith’s interview at the police station shortly after she was arrested because the interview contained statements that Smith made after invoking her right to counsel.

2021(Aledamat, supra, 8 Cal.5th at 15 [“‘No reasonable jury that made all of these findings could have failed to find’ that defendant used the box cutter in a way that is capable of causing or likely to cause death or great bodily injury”].) Just as important, though, defendant’s position is undermined by the text of the instruction itself, which expressly told the jury it must find exactly what defendant now supposes it did not, and by the arguments of counsel that focused the jury on the need to find the knife was capable and likely of causing death or great bodily injury as defendant himself us