109 Ohio opinions name it 3 courts 1990–2026 21 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Ohio courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Nerogreen2 sentences2024“Under this standard, a slight deviation from the text of the rule is permissible; so long as the totality of the circumstances indicates that ‘the defendant subjectively understands the implications of his plea and the rights he is waiving,’ the plea may be upheld.” State v. Clark, 119 Ohio St.3d 239 , 2008-Ohio-3748 , ¶ 31, quoting State v. Nero, 56 Ohio St.3d 106, 108 (1990). {¶17} Mr. Jackson signed a written plea of guilt along with his attorney. 2024“However, if the trial judge imperfectly explained nonconstitutional rights such as the right to be informed of the maximum possible penalty and the effect of the plea, a substantial- compliance rule applies.” Id. at ¶ 31, citing Griggs at ¶ 12. {¶8} To substantially comply with Crim.R. 11, “a slight deviation from the text of the rule is permissible; so long as the totality of the circumstances indicates that ‘the defendant subjectively understands the implications of his plea and the rights he is waiving . . . .’” Clark at ¶ 31 , quoting State v. Nero, 56 Ohio St.3d 106, 108 (1990). | 24 | 70 |
In re Miamisburg Train Derailment Litigationgreen2 sentences1997See, e.g., In re Miamisburg, 68 Ohio St.3d at 260 , 626 N.E.2d at 90 . 1997See, e.g., In re Miamisburg, 68 Ohio St.3d at 260 , 626 N.E.2d at 90 . | 4 | 4 |
State v. Clarkgreen2 sentences2024“Under this standard, a slight deviation from the text of the rule is permissible; so long as the totality of the circumstances indicates that ‘the defendant subjectively understands the implications of his plea and the rights he is waiving,’ the plea may be upheld.” State v. Clark, 119 Ohio St.3d 239 , 2008-Ohio-3748 , ¶ 31, quoting State v. Nero, 56 Ohio St.3d 106, 108 (1990). {¶17} Mr. Jackson signed a written plea of guilt along with his attorney. 2023Cuyahoga No. 90616, 2008- Ohio-4876. “‘“Under this standard, a slight deviation from the text of the rule is permissible; so long as the totality of the circumstances indicates that ‘the defendant subjectively understands the implications of his plea and the rights he is waiving,’ the plea may be upheld.’’’” Id., quoting State v. Clark, 119 Ohio St.3d 239 , 2008- Ohio-3748, 893 N.E.2d 462, ¶ 31 , quoting State v. Nero, 56 Ohio St.3d 106, 108 , 564 N.E.2d 474 (1990). | 2 | 28 |
Jenkins v. James B. Day & Co.green2 sentences1997See, also, Jenkins, 69 Ohio St.3d at 545 , 634 N.E.2d at 1001 (“If a federal statute contains an express preemption clause, matters beyond the reach of the express clause are not preempted. * * * Since the FHSA [Federal Hazardous Substances Act, Section 1261 et seq., Title 15, U.S.Code] contains a preemption clause, we examine the text of that clause to determine if Congress intended for appellee’s claims to be preempted in the context of the FHSA.”). 1997See, also, Jenkins, 69 Ohio St.3d at 545 , 634 N.E.2d at 1001 (“If a federal statute contains an express preemption clause, matters beyond the reach of the express clause are not preempted. * * * Since the FHSA [Federal Hazardous Substances Act, Section 1261 et seq., Title 15, U.S.Code] contains a preemption clause, we examine the text of that clause to determine if Congress intended for appellee’s claims to be preempted in the context of the FHSA.”). | 2 | 2 |
State v. Stewartgreen2 sentences2018Cuyahoga No. 103813, 2016-Ohio-5709, ¶ 46 , citing Veney at ¶ 14-17. {¶13} “Substantial compliance means that under the totality of the circumstances the defendant subjectively understands the implications of his plea and the rights he is waiving.” State v. Nero, 56 Ohio St.3d 106, 108 , 564 N.E.2d 474 (1990), citing State v. Stewart, 51 Ohio St.2d 86, 92 , 364 N.E.2d 1163 (1977). “[A] slight deviation from the text of the rule is permissible; so long as the totality of the circumstances indicates that ‘the defendant subjectively understands the implications of his plea and the rights he is wa 2018Cuyahoga No. 103813, 2016-Ohio-5709, ¶ 46 , citing Veney at ¶ 14-17. {¶13} “Substantial compliance means that under the totality of the circumstances the defendant subjectively understands the implications of his plea and the rights he is waiving.” State v. Nero, 56 Ohio St.3d 106, 108 , 564 N.E.2d 474 (1990), citing State v. Stewart, 51 Ohio St.2d 86, 92 , 364 N.E.2d 1163 (1977). “[A] slight deviation from the text of the rule is permissible; so long as the totality of the circumstances indicates that ‘the defendant subjectively understands the implications of his plea and the rights he is wa | 1 | 9 |
Morning View Care Center-Fulton v. Ohio Department of Human Servicesgreen2 sentences2019Baroni v. Colletti, 130 Ohio St.3d 208 , 2011-Ohio-5351 , 957 N.E.2d 13 , ¶ 18, quoting Morning View Care Ctr.–Fulton v. Ohio Dept. of Human Servs., 148 Ohio App.3d 518 , 2002-Ohio-2878 , 774 N.E.2d 300, ¶ 36 (10th Dist.). {¶16} Thus, when interpreting a statute, courts first look to the text of the rule, “reading words and phrases in context and construing them according to the rules of grammar and common usage.” State ex rel. 2019Baroni v. Colletti, 130 Ohio St.3d 208 , 2011-Ohio-5351 , 957 N.E.2d 13 , ¶ 18, quoting Morning View Care Ctr.–Fulton v. Ohio Dept. of Human Servs., 148 Ohio App.3d 518 , 2002-Ohio-2878 , 774 N.E.2d 300, ¶ 36 (10th Dist.). {¶16} Thus, when interpreting a statute, courts first look to the text of the rule, “reading words and phrases in context and construing them according to the rules of grammar and common usage.” State ex rel. | 1 | 4 |
Freightliner Corp. v. Myrickgreen2 sentences1997See, also, Jenkins, 69 Ohio St.3d at 545 , 634 N.E.2d at 1001 (“If a federal statute contains an express preemption clause, matters beyond the reach of the express clause are not preempted. * * * Since the FHSA [Federal Hazardous Substances Act, Section 1261 et seq., Title 15, U.S.Code] contains a preemption clause, we examine the text of that clause to determine if Congress intended for appellee’s claims to be preempted in the context of the FHSA.”). {¶ 33} However, following Cipollone, and subsequent to our decisions in In re Miamisburg and its progeny, the United States Supreme Court decide 1997See, also, Jenkins, 69 Ohio St.3d at 545 , 634 N.E.2d at 1001 (“If a federal statute contains an express preemption clause, matters beyond the reach of the express clause are not preempted. * * * Since the FHSA [Federal Hazardous Substances Act, Section 1261 et seq., Title 15, U.S.Code] contains a preemption clause, we examine the text of that clause to determine if Congress intended for appellee’s claims to be preempted in the context of the FHSA.”). {¶ 33} However, following Cipollone, and subsequent to our decisions in In re Miamisburg and its progeny, the United States Supreme Court decide | 1 | 2 |
Schmidt v. Patriot Concrete, L.L.C.green2 sentences2026The text of this rule encompasses “intrinsic fraud, such as attaching a materially false affidavit to [a] . . . motion for summary judgment,” and “extrinsic fraud, such as persuading the [opposing party] . . . not to defend their case by falsely promising to voluntarily dismiss the action.” Id. at ¶ 14. {¶17} In turn, the “catchall provision” in Civ.R. 60(B)(5) “reflect[s] the inherent power of a court to relieve a person from the unjust operation of a judgment.” Schmidt v. Patriot Concrete, LLC, 2025-Ohio-428, ¶ 27 (3d Dist.), quoting Caruso-Ciresi, Inc. v. Lohman, 5 Ohio St.3d 64, 66 (1983). 2026The text of this rule encompasses “intrinsic fraud, such as attaching a materially false affidavit to [a] . . . motion for summary judgment,” and “extrinsic fraud, such as persuading the [opposing party] . . . not to defend their case by falsely promising to voluntarily dismiss the action.” Id. at ¶ 14. {¶17} In turn, the “catchall provision” in Civ.R. 60(B)(5) “reflect[s] the inherent power of a court to relieve a person from the unjust operation of a judgment.” Schmidt v. Patriot Concrete, LLC, 2025-Ohio-428, ¶ 27 (3d Dist.), quoting Caruso-Ciresi, Inc. v. Lohman, 5 Ohio St.3d 64, 66 (1983). | 1 | 1 |
Roubanes-Luke v. Roubanesgreen1 sentence2026Civ.R. 60(B)(5) is available “only in those extraordinary and unusual cases where the moving party demonstrates substantial grounds warranting relief from judgment.” Souders at ¶ 18 (3d Dist.), quoting Luke at ¶ 22. | 1 | 1 |
Souders v. U.S. Bank Natl. Assn.green2 sentences2026Civ.R. 60(B)(5) is available “only in those extraordinary and unusual cases where the moving party demonstrates substantial grounds warranting relief from judgment.” Souders at ¶ 18 (3d Dist.), quoting Luke at ¶ 22 . 2026Civ.R. 60(B)(5) is available “only in those extraordinary and unusual cases where the moving party demonstrates substantial grounds warranting relief from judgment.” Souders at ¶ 18 (3d Dist.), quoting Luke at ¶ 22. | 1 | 1 |
Caruso-Ciresi, Inc. v. Lohmangreen2 sentences2026The text of this rule encompasses “intrinsic fraud, such as attaching a materially false affidavit to [a] . . . motion for summary judgment,” and “extrinsic fraud, such as persuading the [opposing party] . . . not to defend their case by falsely promising to voluntarily dismiss the action.” Id. at ¶ 14. {¶17} In turn, the “catchall provision” in Civ.R. 60(B)(5) “reflect[s] the inherent power of a court to relieve a person from the unjust operation of a judgment.” Schmidt v. Patriot Concrete, LLC, 2025-Ohio-428, ¶ 27 (3d Dist.), quoting Caruso-Ciresi, Inc. v. Lohman, 5 Ohio St.3d 64, 66 (1983). 2026The text of this rule encompasses “intrinsic fraud, such as attaching a materially false affidavit to [a] . . . motion for summary judgment,” and “extrinsic fraud, such as persuading the [opposing party] . . . not to defend their case by falsely promising to voluntarily dismiss the action.” Id. at ¶ 14. {¶17} In turn, the “catchall provision” in Civ.R. 60(B)(5) “reflect[s] the inherent power of a court to relieve a person from the unjust operation of a judgment.” Schmidt v. Patriot Concrete, LLC, 2025-Ohio-428, ¶ 27 (3d Dist.), quoting Caruso-Ciresi, Inc. v. Lohman, 5 Ohio St.3d 64, 66 (1983). | 1 | 1 |
Myers v. Wadegreen1 sentence2025Additionally, courts, including this Court, have routinely held that, “[a]lleged violations of the Rules of Superintendence are not a basis for reversal.” PTJWE Consulting, LLC v. Sun Color Corp., 2023-Ohio-4193, ¶ 14 (5th Dist.), quoting Myers v. Wade, 2017-Ohio-8833, ¶ 22 (10th Dist.); In the Matter of the Guardianship of Bernie, 2019-Ohio-334, ¶ 27 (12th Dist.) (Superintendence Rules are administrative directives only and do not provide grounds for reversal); In re Guardianship of Hyde, 2024-Ohio-1878, ¶ 24 (1st Dist.) (Rules of Superintendence do not provide grounds for reversal). {¶26} Ev | 1 | 1 |
PTJWE Consulting, L.L.C. v. Sun Color Corp.green1 sentence2025Additionally, courts, including this Court, have routinely held that, “[a]lleged violations of the Rules of Superintendence are not a basis for reversal.” PTJWE Consulting, LLC v. Sun Color Corp., 2023-Ohio-4193, ¶ 14 (5th Dist.), quoting Myers v. Wade, 2017-Ohio-8833, ¶ 22 (10th Dist.); In the Matter of the Guardianship of Bernie, 2019-Ohio-334, ¶ 27 (12th Dist.) (Superintendence Rules are administrative directives only and do not provide grounds for reversal); In re Guardianship of Hyde, 2024-Ohio-1878, ¶ 24 (1st Dist.) (Rules of Superintendence do not provide grounds for reversal). {¶26} Ev | 1 | 1 |
In re Guardianship of Berniegreen1 sentence2025Additionally, courts, including this Court, have routinely held that, “[a]lleged violations of the Rules of Superintendence are not a basis for reversal.” PTJWE Consulting, LLC v. Sun Color Corp., 2023-Ohio-4193, ¶ 14 (5th Dist.), quoting Myers v. Wade, 2017-Ohio-8833, ¶ 22 (10th Dist.); In the Matter of the Guardianship of Bernie, 2019-Ohio-334, ¶ 27 (12th Dist.) (Superintendence Rules are administrative directives only and do not provide grounds for reversal); In re Guardianship of Hyde, 2024-Ohio-1878, ¶ 24 (1st Dist.) (Rules of Superintendence do not provide grounds for reversal). {¶26} Ev | 1 | 1 |
In re Guardianship of Hydegreen1 sentence2025Additionally, courts, including this Court, have routinely held that, “[a]lleged violations of the Rules of Superintendence are not a basis for reversal.” PTJWE Consulting, LLC v. Sun Color Corp., 2023-Ohio-4193, ¶ 14 (5th Dist.), quoting Myers v. Wade, 2017-Ohio-8833, ¶ 22 (10th Dist.); In the Matter of the Guardianship of Bernie, 2019-Ohio-334, ¶ 27 (12th Dist.) (Superintendence Rules are administrative directives only and do not provide grounds for reversal); In re Guardianship of Hyde, 2024-Ohio-1878, ¶ 24 (1st Dist.) (Rules of Superintendence do not provide grounds for reversal). {¶26} Ev | 1 | 1 |
State ex rel. Lamp v. J.A. Croson Co.green1 sentence2024Croson Co., 75 Ohio St.3d 77, 79-80 (1996) (“While we are normally obligated to defer to the commission’s interpretation of its own rules, we will not defer when the commission’s interpretation implicitly adds language to the text of the rule.”). {¶ 42} Where the commission’s factual determination is supported by some evidence, it has not abused its discretion and this court must uphold the decision. | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Jenkinsgreen | 1 | 1 |
Black-Clawson Co. v. Evattgreen1 sentence2023Not only would this practice result in unnecessary delay and a waste of resources, but such a practice is not required by the express language of Juv.R. 11. {¶ 17} As a general rule, courts must consider the text of a rule as a whole rather than "'pick[ing] out one sentence and disassociat[ing] it from the context.'" Jacobson v. Kaforey, 149 Ohio St.3d 398 , 2016-Ohio-8434, ¶ 9 , quoting Black-Clawson Co. v. Evatt, 139 Ohio St. 100, 104 (1941). | 1 | 1 |
| Black v. United Statesgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Lester v. Leuckgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Delaware v. Van Arsdallgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Marks v. C.P. Chemical Co.green | 1 | 1 |
| Mastran v. Urichichgreen | 1 | 1 |
| City of Eastlake v. Lorenzogreen | 1 | 1 |
| Val-Land Farms, Inc. v. Third National Bank In Knoxvillegreen | 1 | 1 |
| Melvin Moss v. Parks Corporation, (Two Cases)green | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Ohio. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State ex rel. Steele v. Morrissey
green
2 sentences2019Steele v. Morrissey, 103 Ohio St.3d 355 , 2004-Ohio-4960 , 815 N.E.2d 1107, ¶ 21 . 2019Steele v. Morrissey, 103 Ohio St.3d 355 , 2004-Ohio-4960 , 815 N.E.2d 1107, ¶ 21 . | 4 | 2017–2019 |
State ex rel. Baroni v. Colletti
green
2 sentences2019Baroni v. Colletti, 130 Ohio St.3d 208 , 2011-Ohio-5351 , 957 N.E.2d 13 , ¶ 18, quoting Morning View Care Ctr.–Fulton v. Ohio Dept. of Human Servs., 148 Ohio App.3d 518 , 2002-Ohio-2878 , 774 N.E.2d 300, ¶ 36 (10th Dist.). {¶16} Thus, when interpreting a statute, courts first look to the text of the rule, “reading words and phrases in context and construing them according to the rules of grammar and common usage.” State ex rel. 2019Baroni v. Colletti, 130 Ohio St.3d 208 , 2011-Ohio-5351 , 957 N.E.2d 13 , ¶ 18, quoting Morning View Care Ctr.–Fulton v. Ohio Dept. of Human Servs., 148 Ohio App.3d 518 , 2002-Ohio-2878 , 774 N.E.2d 300, ¶ 36 (10th Dist.). {¶16} Thus, when interpreting a statute, courts first look to the text of the rule, “reading words and phrases in context and construing them according to the rules of grammar and common usage.” State ex rel. | 4 | 2017–2019 |
State v. Griggs
green
2 sentences2020“Consequently, in cases involving the trial court’s explanation of the effect of a guilty plea, we must only engage in ‘a substantial compliance analysis.’” Id., quoting State v. Griggs, 103 Ohio St.3d 85 , 2004-Ohio-4415 , ¶ 12. 3 {¶7} “Under this standard, a slight deviation from the text of the rule is permissible; so long as the totality of the circumstances indicates that the defendant subjectively understands the implications of h[er] plea and the rights [s]he is waiving, the plea may be upheld.” (Internal quotations and citation omitted.) State v. Clark, 119 Ohio St.3d 239 , 2008-Ohio-3 2017Under the substantial compliance standard, “a slight deviation from the text of the rule is permissible,” provided that, “under the totality of the circumstances,” “the defendant subjectively understands the implicationsof his plea and the rights he is waiving.” Clark at ¶ 31; State v. Nero, 56 Ohio St.3d 106, 108 , 564 N.E.2d 474 (1990). {¶15} Generally, the “failure to comply with nonconstitutional rights will not invalidate a plea unless the defendant thereby suffered prejudice.” State v. Griggs, 103 Ohio St.3d 85 , 2004-Ohio-4415 , 814 N.E.2d 51 , ¶ 12. | 3 | 2008–2020 |
State v. Phillips, Ca2008-05-126 (3-30-2009)
green
2 sentences2017Butler No. CA2008-05-126, 2009-Ohio-1448, ¶ 13 , citing Clark, 2008-Ohio-3748 at ¶ 31. {¶ 16} This court has previously found that "the registration and notification requirements set forth in R.C. 2014Butler No. CA2008-05-126, 2009-Ohio-1448, ¶ 13 , citing Clark, 2008-Ohio-3748 at ¶ 31. {¶ 12} When the trial court does not substantially comply with Crim.R. 11 in regards to a nonconstitutional right, the reviewing court must determine whether the trial court partially complied or failed to comply with the rule. | 2 | 2014–2017 |
State v. Drake
neutral
2 sentences2015Cuyahoga No. 98640, 2013-Ohio-1984, ¶ 5 , citing Stewart, supra. {¶15} Under the substantial compliance standard, “a slight deviation from the text of the rule is permissible; so long as the totality of the circumstances indicates that the defendant subjectively understands the implications of his plea and the rights he is waiving, the plea may be upheld.” State v. Nero, 56 Ohio St.3d 106, 108 , 564 N.E.2d 474 (1990). 2013No. 98640, 2013-Ohio-1984, ¶ 5 , citing Stewart, 51 Ohio St.2d 86 , 364 N.E.2d 1163 . {¶10} Under the substantial compliance standard, “a slight deviation from the text of the rule is permissible; so long as the totality of the circumstances indicates that ‘the defendant subjectively understands the implications of his plea and the rights he is waiving,’ the plea may be upheld.” State v. Nero, 56 Ohio St.3d 106, 108 , 564 N.E.2d 474 (1990). | 2 | 2013–2015 |
State v. Caplinger
green
2 sentences2011As stated by this court, “the statutory right to receive the plea notification of postrelease control under R.C. 2943.032 is similar to the nonconstitutional notifications of Crim.R. 11(C)(2) and therefore subject to the substantial-compliance standard.” State v. Jones, Cuyahoga App. No. 94607, 2011-Ohio-1918, ¶6 . {¶ 20} “Under this standard, a slight deviation from the text of the rule is permissible, so long as the totality of the circumstances indicates that ‘the defendant subjectively understands the implications of his plea and the rights he is waiving,’ the plea may be upheld.” Clark at 2011As stated by this court, “the statutory right to receive the plea notification of postrelease control under R.C. 2943.032 is similar to the nonconstitutional notifications of Crim.R. 11(C)(2) and therefore subject to the substantial-compliance standard.” State v. Jones, Cuyahoga App. No. 94607, 2011-Ohio-1918, ¶6 . {¶ 20} “Under this standard, a slight deviation from the text of the rule is permissible, so long as the totality of the circumstances indicates that ‘the defendant subjectively understands the implications of his plea and the rights he is waiving,’ the plea may be upheld.” Clark at | 2 | 2011–2011 |
State v. Jones
neutral
2 sentences2011As stated by this court, “the statutory right to receive the plea notification of postrelease control under R.C. 2943.032 is similar to the nonconstitutional notifications of Crim.R. 11(C)(2) and therefore subject to the substantial-compliance standard.” State v. Jones, Cuyahoga App. No. 94607, 2011-Ohio-1918, ¶6 . {¶ 20} “Under this standard, a slight deviation from the text of the rule is permissible, so long as the totality of the circumstances indicates that ‘the defendant subjectively understands the implications of his plea and the rights he is waiving,’ the plea may be upheld.” Clark at 2011“Likewise, the statutory right to receive the plea notification of postrelease control under R.C. 2943.032 is similar to the nonconstitutional notifications of Crim.R. 11(C)(2) and therefore subject to the substantial-compliance standard.” (Citations omitted.) State v. Jones, Cuyahoga App. No. 94607, 2011-Ohio-1918, ¶6 . {¶ 9} “Under this standard, a slight deviation from the text of the rule is permissible, so long as the totality of the circumstances indicates that “‘the defendant subjectively understands the implications of his plea and the rights he is waiving,” the plea may be upheld.’” C | 2 | 2011–2011 |
United States v. Olano
green
2 sentences2001Olano, 507 U.S. at 732 , 113 S.Ct. at 1776 , 123 L.Ed.2d at 518 . 2001Olano, 507 U.S. at 732 , 113 S.Ct. at 1776 , 123 L.Ed.2d at 518 . | 2 | 2001–2001 |
Felix v. Ganley Chevrolet, Inc. (Slip Opinion)
green
2 sentences2024(The interpretation of a federal rule "is appropriate and persuasive authority in interpreting a similar Ohio rule." Felix v. Ganley Chevrolet, Inc., 145 Ohio St.3d 329 , 2015-Ohio-3430, ¶ 24 .) It is apparent from the text of the rule and the notes that the supplementation duty applies mostly to new information—"information thereafter acquired," as Civ.R. 26(E) puts it. 2024(The interpretation of a federal rule "is appropriate and persuasive authority in interpreting a similar Ohio rule." Felix v. Ganley Chevrolet, Inc., 145 Ohio St.3d 329 , 2015-Ohio-3430, ¶ 24 .) It is apparent from the text of the rule and the notes that the supplementation duty applies mostly to new information—"information thereafter acquired," as Civ.R. 26(E) puts it. | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Dalton v. Ohio Dept. Rehab. & Corr.
green
1 sentence2024Dalton, 2014-Ohio-2658, at ¶ 38 . | 1 | 2024–2024 |
State ex rel. Henry v. McMonagle
green
1 sentence2023Cuyahoga No. 90616, 2008- Ohio-4876. “‘“Under this standard, a slight deviation from the text of the rule is permissible; so long as the totality of the circumstances indicates that ‘the defendant subjectively understands the implications of his plea and the rights he is waiving,’ the plea may be upheld.’’’” Id., quoting State v. Clark, 119 Ohio St.3d 239 , 2008- Ohio-3748, 893 N.E.2d 462, ¶ 31 , quoting State v. Nero, 56 Ohio St.3d 106, 108 , 564 N.E.2d 474 (1990). | 1 | 2023–2023 |
State v. Veney
green
2 sentences2023Under this rule, a slight deviation from the text of the rule or otherwise imperfect explanation of nonconstitutional rights will not invalidate a no-contest plea so long as the totality of the circumstances indicate that “ ‘the defendant subjectively understands the implications of his plea.’ ” State v. Clark, 120 Ohio St.3d 176 , 2008-Ohio-5200 , 897 N.E.2d 621, ¶ 32 , citing Nero at 108 . {¶12} At the first hearing, the trial court advised Schuster that “a no contest plea, as long as the City reads facts into the record that constitute a violation of Ohio law, I’m likely to find you guilty 2023Under this rule, a slight deviation from the text of the rule or otherwise imperfect explanation of nonconstitutional rights will not invalidate a no-contest plea so long as the totality of the circumstances indicate that “ ‘the defendant subjectively understands the implications of his plea.’ ” State v. Clark, 120 Ohio St.3d 176 , 2008-Ohio-5200 , 897 N.E.2d 621, ¶ 32 , citing Nero at 108 . {¶12} At the first hearing, the trial court advised Schuster that “a no contest plea, as long as the City reads facts into the record that constitute a violation of Ohio law, I’m likely to find you guilty | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Jacobson v. Kaforey (Slip Opinion)
green
2 sentences2023Not only would this practice result in unnecessary delay and a waste of resources, but such a practice is not required by the express language of Juv.R. 11. {¶ 17} As a general rule, courts must consider the text of a rule as a whole rather than "'pick[ing] out one sentence and disassociat[ing] it from the context.'" Jacobson v. Kaforey, 149 Ohio St.3d 398 , 2016-Ohio-8434, ¶ 9 , quoting Black-Clawson Co. v. Evatt, 139 Ohio St. 100, 104 (1941). 2023Not only would this practice result in unnecessary delay and a waste of resources, but such a practice is not required by the express language of Juv.R. 11. {¶ 17} As a general rule, courts must consider the text of a rule as a whole rather than "'pick[ing] out one sentence and disassociat[ing] it from the context.'" Jacobson v. Kaforey, 149 Ohio St.3d 398 , 2016-Ohio-8434, ¶ 9 , quoting Black-Clawson Co. v. Evatt, 139 Ohio St. 100, 104 (1941). | 1 | 2023–2023 |
| State v. Callaghan green | 1 | 2022–2022 |
| State v. Johnson green | 1 | 2020–2020 |
| State v. Mugrage neutral | 1 | 2019–2019 |
| State v. Jordan green | 1 | 2018–2018 |
| State v. Engle green | 1 | 2017–2017 |
| State v. Tutt green | 1 | 2016–2016 |
| State v. C.J. green | 1 | 2009–2009 |
| State v. CJ green | 1 | 2009–2009 |
| State v. Buckley Powder Co. green | 1 | 2006–2006 |
| Howland v. Purdue Pharma L.P. green | 1 | 2006–2006 |
| Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc. green | 1 | 1997–1997 |
| Sorin v. Board of Education green | 1 | 1990–1990 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.