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18 Michigan opinions name it 2 courts 1995–2026 5 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Michigan courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
People v. VanderVlietgreen2 sentences2020To be admissible at trial, the prosecution must establish the following: First, that the evidence be offered for a proper purpose under Rule 404(b); second, that it be relevant under Rule 402 as enforced through Rule 104(b); third, that the probative value of the evidence is not substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice; fourth, that the trial court may, upon request, provide a limiting instruction to the jury. [People v VanderVliet, 444 Mich 52, 55 ; 508 NW2d 114 (1993), amended 445 Mich 1205 (1994).] MRE 403 governs the third prong of the test established in VanderVliet, 444 Mich at 74 - 2020The third prong of the test for admissibility of other-acts evidence under VanderVliet, 444 Mich at 55 , questions whether, although relevant, the evidence should be still be excluded under MRE 403 because the probative value of the evidence is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. | 1 | 5 |
McCORMICK v. CARRIERgreen2 sentences2026While defendants’ motion recited the general law for recovery of noneconomic damages in a third-party automobile negligence case, their actual argument for summary disposition of this claim focused solely on the third prong of the test for a compensable threshold injury set forth in McCormick v Carrier, 487 Mich 180, 195 ; 795 NW2d 517 (2010), and later codified at MCL 500.3135(5): that plaintiffs could not establish a question of material fact that any asserted impairment “affects the injured person’s general ability to lead his or her normal life, meaning it has had an influence on some of t 2026While defendants’ motion recited the general law for recovery of noneconomic damages in a third-party automobile negligence case, their actual argument for summary disposition of this claim focused solely on the third prong of the test for a compensable threshold injury set forth in McCormick v Carrier, 487 Mich 180, 195 ; 795 NW2d 517 (2010), and later codified at MCL 500.3135(5): that plaintiffs could not establish a question of material fact that any asserted impairment “affects the injured person’s general ability to lead his or her normal life, meaning it has had an influence on some of t | 1 | 1 |
Adair v. Stategreen2 sentences2018In analyzing the third prong under the doctrine of res judicata, “Michigan courts employ the broad, pragmatic same transaction test,” which looks at “whether the claims in the instant case arose as part of the same transaction as did [the plaintiff’s] claims in the original action.” Garrett, 314 Mich App at 442 , quoting Adair, 470 Mich at 123-125 (quotation marks omitted). 2018“Under the transactional test, a claim is viewed in factual terms and considered coterminous with the transaction, regardless of the number of substantive theories, or variant forms of relief flowing from those theories, that may be available to the plaintiff[.]” Garrett, 314 Mich App at 442 , quoting Adair, 470 Mich at 124 (quotation marks omitted; alteration in original). | 1 | 1 |
Oberlies v. Searchmont Resort, Incgreen2 sentences2016Finally, under the third prong of the test, “defendant’s activities must be substantially connected with Michigan to make the exercise of jurisdiction over the defendant reasonable.” Oberlies, 246 Mich App at 433 (quotation marks and citations omitted). 2016Finally, under the third prong of the test, “defendant’s activities must be substantially connected with Michigan to make the exercise of jurisdiction over the defendant reasonable.” Oberlies, 246 Mich App at 433 (quotation marks and citation omitted). | 1 | 1 |
Caterpillar, Inc v. Department of Treasurygreen1 sentence2007Thus, a tax violates the third prong of the test “if it is facially discriminatory, has a discriminatory purpose, or has the effect of unduly burdening interstate commerce.” Caterpillar, supra at 422 (emphasis in original). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Michigan. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
People v. Carines
green
2 sentences2025Id. 2025Id. | 3 | 2025–2025 |
People v. Starr
green
2 sentences2018VanderVliet, 444 Mich at 70-72 ; People v Starr, 457 Mich 490, 498 ; 577 NW2d 673 (1998). 2018VanderVliet, 444 Mich at 70-72 ; People v Starr, 457 Mich 490, 498 ; 577 NW2d 673 (1998). | 2 | 2018–2018 |
Wayne County v. Britton Trust
green
1 sentence2021Finally, with respect to the third prong of the test, “[t]his Court examines the objective visible facts to determine whether intention to make the article a permanent accession to the realty exists.” Id. at 619 . | 1 | 2021–2021 |
People v. Gipson
green
1 sentence2020“Unfair prejudice may exist where there is a danger that the evidence will be given undue or preemptive weight by the jury or where it would be inequitable to allow use of the evidence.” People v Gipson, 287 Mich App 261, 263 ; 787 NW2d 126 (2010), quoting People v Blackston, 481 Mich 451, 462 ; 751 NW2d 408 (2008). | 1 | 2020–2020 |
People v. Brown
green
1 sentence2020“Unfair prejudice may exist where there is a danger that the evidence will be given undue or preemptive weight by the jury or where it would be inequitable to allow use of the evidence.” People v Gipson, 287 Mich App 261, 263 ; 787 NW2d 126 (2010), quoting People v Blackston, 481 Mich 451, 462 ; 751 NW2d 408 (2008). | 1 | 2020–2020 |
People v. Blackston
green
2 sentences2020“Unfair prejudice may exist where there is a danger that the evidence will be given undue or preemptive weight by the jury or where it would be inequitable to allow use of the evidence.” People v Gipson, 287 Mich App 261, 263 ; 787 NW2d 126 (2010), quoting People v Blackston, 481 Mich 451, 462 ; 751 NW2d 408 (2008). 2020“Unfair prejudice may exist where there is a danger that the evidence will be given undue or preemptive weight by the jury or where it would be inequitable to allow use of the evidence.” People v Gipson, 287 Mich App 261, 263 ; 787 NW2d 126 (2010), quoting People v Blackston, 481 Mich 451, 462 ; 751 NW2d 408 (2008). | 1 | 2020–2020 |
People v. Keyes
neutral
1 sentence2019Jones applied for leave to our Supreme Court, which remanded the matter for our consideration as on leave granted and directed us to consider: (1) whether the prosecutor breached an agreement with the defendant to take no position regarding a specific sentence within a sentencing range when the prosecutor recommended a sentence “at the top end of his Guidelines,” and, if so, (2) whether the error violates due process and requires resentencing. [People v Jones, 503 Mich 884 (2018).] II Jones now seeks resentencing before a different judge.1 The prosecution counters by arguing that defense couns | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Garrett v. Washington
green
2 sentences2018In analyzing the third prong under the doctrine of res judicata, “Michigan courts employ the broad, pragmatic same transaction test,” which looks at “whether the claims in the instant case arose as part of the same transaction as did [the plaintiff’s] claims in the original action.” Garrett, 314 Mich App at 442 , quoting Adair, 470 Mich at 123-125 (quotation marks omitted). 2018“Under the transactional test, a claim is viewed in factual terms and considered coterminous with the transaction, regardless of the number of substantive theories, or variant forms of relief flowing from those theories, that may be available to the plaintiff[.]” Garrett, 314 Mich App at 442 , quoting Adair, 470 Mich at 124 (quotation marks omitted; alteration in original). | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Monat v. State Farm Insurance
green
1 sentence2014Monat, 469 Mich at 684-685 . 3 Because we conclude that all three prongs of the collateral estoppel doctrine have been satisfied, we hold that the doctrine bars the relitigation of whether the residence was covered under the Auto-Owners policy. 4 B. | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Hermann v. Haney
neutral
2 sentences2004While a court may engage in a so-called objective analysis to determine whether the impairment affects the person's general ability to lead his normal life, this endeavor is made with the understanding that a person's subjective normal life is the relevant frame of reference. [3] Curiously, the majority finds support for these factors in Hermann v. Haney, 98 Mich.App. 445 , 296 N.W.2d 278 (1980), and DiFranco v. Pickard, 427 Mich. 32 , 398 N.W.2d 896 (1986). [4] The majority poses the following question which I believe is indicative of the difference between the majority and the dissent in thi 2004While a court may engage in a so-called objective analysis to determine whether the impairment affects the person's general ability to lead his normal life, this endeavor is made with the understanding that a person's subjective normal life is the relevant frame of reference. [3] Curiously, the majority finds support for these factors in Hermann v. Haney, 98 Mich.App. 445 , 296 N.W.2d 278 (1980), and DiFranco v. Pickard, 427 Mich. 32 , 398 N.W.2d 896 (1986). [4] The majority poses the following question which I believe is indicative of the difference between the majority and the dissent in thi | 1 | 2004–2004 |
DiFranco v. Pickard
red
2 sentences2004While a court may engage in a so-called objective analysis to determine whether the impairment affects the person's general ability to lead his normal life, this endeavor is made with the understanding that a person's subjective normal life is the relevant frame of reference. [3] Curiously, the majority finds support for these factors in Hermann v. Haney, 98 Mich.App. 445 , 296 N.W.2d 278 (1980), and DiFranco v. Pickard, 427 Mich. 32 , 398 N.W.2d 896 (1986). [4] The majority poses the following question which I believe is indicative of the difference between the majority and the dissent in thi 2004While a court may engage in a so-called objective analysis to determine whether the impairment affects the person's general ability to lead his normal life, this endeavor is made with the understanding that a person's subjective normal life is the relevant frame of reference. [3] Curiously, the majority finds support for these factors in Hermann v. Haney, 98 Mich.App. 445 , 296 N.W.2d 278 (1980), and DiFranco v. Pickard, 427 Mich. 32 , 398 N.W.2d 896 (1986). [4] The majority poses the following question which I believe is indicative of the difference between the majority and the dissent in thi | 1 | 2004–2004 |
Reardon v. Department of Mental Health
green
1 sentence1998Because the public building exception applies only where the physical condition of the building itself causes the injury, the government’s duty is to “maintain safe public buildings, but not necessarily safety in public buildings.” Reardon, supra at 417 . | 1 | 1998–1998 |
Astoria Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Solimino
green
2 sentences1995The critical issue disputed in this case is whether the commission’s civil rights determination fulfills the third prong of the test; that is, whether the Legislature, in enacting the Civil Rights Act, intended to abrogate the traditional rules of preclusion. 4 Because the rules of preclusion are a judicial creation, Howell v Vito’s Truck ing & Excavating Co, 386 Mich 37 ; 191 NW2d 313 (1971), the presumption of preclusion will not apply " 'when a statutory purpose to the contrary is evident.’ ” Astoria Federal S & L Ass’n v Solimino, 501 US 104, 108 ; 111 S Ct 2166 ; 115 L Ed 2d 96 (1991), qu 1995The critical issue disputed in this case is whether the commission’s civil rights determination fulfills the third prong of the test; that is, whether the Legislature, in enacting the Civil Rights Act, intended to abrogate the traditional rules of preclusion. 4 Because the rules of preclusion are a judicial creation, Howell v Vito’s Truck ing & Excavating Co, 386 Mich 37 ; 191 NW2d 313 (1971), the presumption of preclusion will not apply " 'when a statutory purpose to the contrary is evident.’ ” Astoria Federal S & L Ass’n v Solimino, 501 US 104, 108 ; 111 S Ct 2166 ; 115 L Ed 2d 96 (1991), qu | 1 | 1995–1995 |
Isbrandtsen Co. v. Johnson
green
2 sentences1995The critical issue disputed in this case is whether the commission’s civil rights determination fulfills the third prong of the test; that is, whether the Legislature, in enacting the Civil Rights Act, intended to abrogate the traditional rules of preclusion. 4 Because the rules of preclusion are a judicial creation, Howell v Vito’s Truck ing & Excavating Co, 386 Mich 37 ; 191 NW2d 313 (1971), the presumption of preclusion will not apply " 'when a statutory purpose to the contrary is evident.’ ” Astoria Federal S & L Ass’n v Solimino, 501 US 104, 108 ; 111 S Ct 2166 ; 115 L Ed 2d 96 (1991), qu 1995The critical issue disputed in this case is whether the commission’s civil rights determination fulfills the third prong of the test; that is, whether the Legislature, in enacting the Civil Rights Act, intended to abrogate the traditional rules of preclusion. 4 Because the rules of preclusion are a judicial creation, Howell v Vito’s Truck ing & Excavating Co, 386 Mich 37 ; 191 NW2d 313 (1971), the presumption of preclusion will not apply " 'when a statutory purpose to the contrary is evident.’ ” Astoria Federal S & L Ass’n v Solimino, 501 US 104, 108 ; 111 S Ct 2166 ; 115 L Ed 2d 96 (1991), qu | 1 | 1995–1995 |
Howell v. Vito's Trucking and Excavating Co.
green
2 sentences1995The critical issue disputed in this case is whether the commission’s civil rights determination fulfills the third prong of the test; that is, whether the Legislature, in enacting the Civil Rights Act, intended to abrogate the traditional rules of preclusion. 4 Because the rules of preclusion are a judicial creation, Howell v Vito’s Truck ing & Excavating Co, 386 Mich 37 ; 191 NW2d 313 (1971), the presumption of preclusion will not apply " 'when a statutory purpose to the contrary is evident.’ ” Astoria Federal S & L Ass’n v Solimino, 501 US 104, 108 ; 111 S Ct 2166 ; 115 L Ed 2d 96 (1991), qu 1995The critical issue disputed in this case is whether the commission’s civil rights determination fulfills the third prong of the test; that is, whether the Legislature, in enacting the Civil Rights Act, intended to abrogate the traditional rules of preclusion. 4 Because the rules of preclusion are a judicial creation, Howell v Vito’s Truck ing & Excavating Co, 386 Mich 37 ; 191 NW2d 313 (1971), the presumption of preclusion will not apply " 'when a statutory purpose to the contrary is evident.’ ” Astoria Federal S & L Ass’n v Solimino, 501 US 104, 108 ; 111 S Ct 2166 ; 115 L Ed 2d 96 (1991), qu | 1 | 1995–1995 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.