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9 Maryland opinions name it 2 courts 2009–2020 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Maryland courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Fordgreen2 sentences2017Roy v. Dackman, 445 Md. 23, 42-43 , 124 A.3d 169 (2015) (citation omitted); see also Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Ford, 433 Md. 426, 478 , 71 A.3d 105 (2013). 2017Roy v. Dackman, 445 Md. 23, 42-43 , 124 A.3d 169 (2015) (citation omitted); see also Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Ford, 433 Md. 426, 478 , 71 A.3d 105 (2013). | 2 | 2 |
McGrath v. Stategreen1 sentence2020In Monoker v. State, The Court of Appeals stated that fundamental fairness is “[o]ne of the most basic considerations in all our decisions . . . in meting out punishment for a crime.” Monoker v. State, 321 Md. 214, 223 (1990); see also McGrath, 356 Md. at 25 . | 1 | 1 |
Monoker v. Stategreen1 sentence2020In Monoker v. State, The Court of Appeals stated that fundamental fairness is “[o]ne of the most basic considerations in all our decisions . . . in meting out punishment for a crime.” Monoker v. State, 321 Md. 214, 223 (1990); see also McGrath, 356 Md. at 25 . | 1 | 1 |
Ellicott MacHine Corporation, Incorporated v. John Holland Party Limitedgreen1 sentence2017See Ellicott, 995 F.2d at 479-80 (holding that Maryland's exercise of personal jurisdiction “would not comport with traditional notions of 'fair play and substantial justice[,]’ in part, because litigating in Maryland would "impose a heavy burden” on the Australian defendant and witnesses who were located primarily in Australia, and because "[njearly all aspects of the contract took place in Australia and principally affected Australian interests” (citations omitted)). | 1 | 1 |
Oregon Waste Systems, Inc. v. Department of Environmental Quality of Ore.green2 sentences2011Waste, 511 U.S. at 103, 114 S.Ct. 1345 ). 2011Waste, 511 U.S. at 103, 114 S.Ct. 1345 ). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Maryland. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Roy v. Dackman
green
2 sentences2017Roy v. Dackman, 445 Md. 23, 42-43 , 124 A.3d 169 (2015) (citation omitted); see also Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Ford, 433 Md. 426, 478 , 71 A.3d 105 (2013). 2017Roy v. Dackman, 445 Md. 23, 42-43 , 124 A.3d 169 (2015) (citation omitted); see also Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Ford, 433 Md. 426, 478 , 71 A.3d 105 (2013). | 2 | 2017–2017 |
Fulton Corp. v. Faulkner
green
2 sentences2011Turning to the third prong of the doctrine, we consider whether the State has shown that “the events on which the *160 interstate and intrastate taxes are imposed [are] substantially equivalent.” Fulton, 516 U.S. at 333 , 116 S.Ct. 848 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Or. 2011Turning to the third prong of the doctrine, we consider whether the State has shown that “the events on which the *160 interstate and intrastate taxes are imposed [are] substantially equivalent.” Fulton, 516 U.S. at 333 , 116 S.Ct. 848 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Or. | 2 | 2009–2011 |
CSR, Ltd. v. Taylor
green
2 sentences2017As the Court of Appeals explained in CSR Ltd., once we have determined that the defendant’s contacts with Maryland do not satisfy the " ‘purposeful availment’ requirement, thus attaining sufficient minimum contacts with the State,” we need not move on to the third prong of the analysis to "consider whether the exercise of personal jurisdiction would be constitutionally reasonable[.]” 411 Md. at 493 , 983 A.2d 492 ; cf. Daimler, 134 S.Ct. at 762 n.20 ("When a coiporation is genuinely at home in the forum State, ... any second-set inquiry would be superfluous,”), Nevertheless, in this case, appl 2017As the Court of Appeals explained in CSR Ltd., once we have determined that the defendant’s contacts with Maryland do not satisfy the " ‘purposeful availment’ requirement, thus attaining sufficient minimum contacts with the State,” we need not move on to the third prong of the analysis to "consider whether the exercise of personal jurisdiction would be constitutionally reasonable[.]” 411 Md. at 493 , 983 A.2d 492 ; cf. Daimler, 134 S.Ct. at 762 n.20 ("When a coiporation is genuinely at home in the forum State, ... any second-set inquiry would be superfluous,”), Nevertheless, in this case, appl | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Yorke v. State
green
2 sentences2017The test is “whether, if [the convicting] jury had the benefit of the newly discovered evidence as well as the evidence that was before them, would there be ‘a substantial or significant possibility that the result would have been different?’” Yonga v. State, 446 Md. 183, 211 , 130 A.3d 486 (2016) (quoting Yonga, 221 Md.App. at 69 , 108 A.3d 448 ) (internal quotation marks omitted). “ ‘[T]he substantial or significant possibility standard falls between “proba *431 ble,” which is less demanding than “beyond a reasonable doubt,” and “might” which is less stringent than probable.’” McGhie v. Stat 2017The test is “whether, if [the convicting] jury had the benefit of the newly discovered evidence as well as the evidence that was before them, would there be ‘a substantial or significant possibility that the result would have been different?’” Yonga v. State, 446 Md. 183, 211 , 130 A.3d 486 (2016) (quoting Yonga, 221 Md.App. at 69 , 108 A.3d 448 ) (internal quotation marks omitted). “ ‘[T]he substantial or significant possibility standard falls between “proba *431 ble,” which is less demanding than “beyond a reasonable doubt,” and “might” which is less stringent than probable.’” McGhie v. Stat | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Yonga v. State
green
2 sentences2017The test is “whether, if [the convicting] jury had the benefit of the newly discovered evidence as well as the evidence that was before them, would there be ‘a substantial or significant possibility that the result would have been different?’” Yonga v. State, 446 Md. 183, 211 , 130 A.3d 486 (2016) (quoting Yonga, 221 Md.App. at 69 , 108 A.3d 448 ) (internal quotation marks omitted). “ ‘[T]he substantial or significant possibility standard falls between “proba *431 ble,” which is less demanding than “beyond a reasonable doubt,” and “might” which is less stringent than probable.’” McGhie v. Stat 2017The test is “whether, if [the convicting] jury had the benefit of the newly discovered evidence as well as the evidence that was before them, would there be ‘a substantial or significant possibility that the result would have been different?’” Yonga v. State, 446 Md. 183, 211 , 130 A.3d 486 (2016) (quoting Yonga, 221 Md.App. at 69 , 108 A.3d 448 ) (internal quotation marks omitted). “ ‘[T]he substantial or significant possibility standard falls between “proba *431 ble,” which is less demanding than “beyond a reasonable doubt,” and “might” which is less stringent than probable.’” McGhie v. Stat | 1 | 2017–2017 |
McGhie v. State
green
2 sentences2017The test is “whether, if [the convicting] jury had the benefit of the newly discovered evidence as well as the evidence that was before them, would there be ‘a substantial or significant possibility that the result would have been different?’” Yonga v. State, 446 Md. 183, 211 , 130 A.3d 486 (2016) (quoting Yonga, 221 Md.App. at 69 , 108 A.3d 448 ) (internal quotation marks omitted). “ ‘[T]he substantial or significant possibility standard falls between “proba *431 ble,” which is less demanding than “beyond a reasonable doubt,” and “might” which is less stringent than probable.’” McGhie v. Stat 2017The test is “whether, if [the convicting] jury had the benefit of the newly discovered evidence as well as the evidence that was before them, would there be ‘a substantial or significant possibility that the result would have been different?’” Yonga v. State, 446 Md. 183, 211 , 130 A.3d 486 (2016) (quoting Yonga, 221 Md.App. at 69 , 108 A.3d 448 ) (internal quotation marks omitted). “ ‘[T]he substantial or significant possibility standard falls between “proba *431 ble,” which is less demanding than “beyond a reasonable doubt,” and “might” which is less stringent than probable.’” McGhie v. Stat | 1 | 2017–2017 |
World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson
green
1 sentence2017As the Court of Appeals explained in CSR Ltd., once we have determined that the defendant’s contacts with Maryland do not satisfy the " ‘purposeful availment’ requirement, thus attaining sufficient minimum contacts with the State,” we need not move on to the third prong of the analysis to "consider whether the exercise of personal jurisdiction would be constitutionally reasonable[.]” 411 Md. at 493 , 983 A.2d 492 ; cf. Daimler, 134 S.Ct. at 762 n.20 ("When a coiporation is genuinely at home in the forum State, ... any second-set inquiry would be superfluous,”), Nevertheless, in this case, appl | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Daimler AG v. Bauman
green
1 sentence2017As the Court of Appeals explained in CSR Ltd., once we have determined that the defendant’s contacts with Maryland do not satisfy the " ‘purposeful availment’ requirement, thus attaining sufficient minimum contacts with the State,” we need not move on to the third prong of the analysis to "consider whether the exercise of personal jurisdiction would be constitutionally reasonable[.]” 411 Md. at 493 , 983 A.2d 492 ; cf. Daimler, 134 S.Ct. at 762 n.20 ("When a coiporation is genuinely at home in the forum State, ... any second-set inquiry would be superfluous,”), Nevertheless, in this case, appl | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Jackson v. State
green
1 sentence2017Substantial Possibility of a Different Result The third prong of the analysis “involves a determination regarding the impact of the evidence.” Jackson, 216 Md.App. at 366 , 86 A.3d 97 . | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Hawes v. State
green
1 sentence2017Substantial Possibility of a Different Result The third prong of the analysis “involves a determination regarding the impact of the evidence.” Jackson, 216 Md.App. at 366 , 86 A.3d 97 . | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz
green
2 sentences2017As the Court of Appeals explained in CSR Ltd., once we have determined that the defendant’s contacts with Maryland do not satisfy the " ‘purposeful availment’ requirement, thus attaining sufficient minimum contacts with the State,” we need not move on to the third prong of the analysis to "consider whether the exercise of personal jurisdiction would be constitutionally reasonable[.]” 411 Md. at 493 , 983 A.2d 492 ; cf. Daimler, 134 S.Ct. at 762 n.20 ("When a coiporation is genuinely at home in the forum State, ... any second-set inquiry would be superfluous,”), Nevertheless, in this case, appl 2017As the Court of Appeals explained in CSR Ltd., once we have determined that the defendant’s contacts with Maryland do not satisfy the " ‘purposeful availment’ requirement, thus attaining sufficient minimum contacts with the State,” we need not move on to the third prong of the analysis to "consider whether the exercise of personal jurisdiction would be constitutionally reasonable[.]” 411 Md. at 493 , 983 A.2d 492 ; cf. Daimler, 134 S.Ct. at 762 n.20 ("When a coiporation is genuinely at home in the forum State, ... any second-set inquiry would be superfluous,”), Nevertheless, in this case, appl | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Sam Yonga v. State
green
2 sentences2017The test is “whether, if [the convicting] jury had the benefit of the newly discovered evidence as well as the evidence that was before them, would there be ‘a substantial or significant possibility that the result would have been different?’” Yonga v. State, 446 Md. 183, 211 , 130 A.3d 486 (2016) (quoting Yonga, 221 Md.App. at 69 , 108 A.3d 448 ) (internal quotation marks omitted). “ ‘[T]he substantial or significant possibility standard falls between “proba *431 ble,” which is less demanding than “beyond a reasonable doubt,” and “might” which is less stringent than probable.’” McGhie v. Stat 2017The test is “whether, if [the convicting] jury had the benefit of the newly discovered evidence as well as the evidence that was before them, would there be ‘a substantial or significant possibility that the result would have been different?’” Yonga v. State, 446 Md. 183, 211 , 130 A.3d 486 (2016) (quoting Yonga, 221 Md.App. at 69 , 108 A.3d 448 ) (internal quotation marks omitted). “ ‘[T]he substantial or significant possibility standard falls between “proba *431 ble,” which is less demanding than “beyond a reasonable doubt,” and “might” which is less stringent than probable.’” McGhie v. Stat | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Walpert, Smullian & Blumenthal, P.A. v. Katz
green
2 sentences2016Id. at 684-92 , 762 A.2d 582 . 2016Id. at 684-92 , 762 A.2d 582 . | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Weisner v. Board of Education
green
2 sentences2010The Court of Appeals previously held that this provision was not an effective waiver of the defense in tort actions because the third prong of the test was not met, i.e., the legislation did not give these boards power “ 'to raise money for the purpose ol paying damages,' ” nor " ‘to pay a judgment against them.' ” Weisner v. Bd. of Educ., 237 Md. 391, 394 , 206 A.2d 560 (1965) (quoting Weddle v. Bd. of Sch. 2010The Court of Appeals previously held that this provision was not an effective waiver of the defense in tort actions because the third prong of the test was not met, i.e., the legislation did not give these boards power “ 'to raise money for the purpose ol paying damages,' ” nor " ‘to pay a judgment against them.' ” Weisner v. Bd. of Educ., 237 Md. 391, 394 , 206 A.2d 560 (1965) (quoting Weddle v. Bd. of Sch. | 1 | 2010–2010 |
State Ex Rel. Weddle v. Board of County School Commissioners
green
2 sentences2010Comm’rs, 94 Md. 334, 343 , 51 A. 289 (1902)). [ 17] 17. 2010Comm’rs, 94 Md. 334, 343 , 51 A. 289 (1902)). [ 17] 17. | 1 | 2010–2010 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.