Already have an account? Sign in instead.
You stay signed in for 30 days on this browser.
Continue with Google Continue with MicrosoftNo account yet? Create a free one.
We sent a six-digit code.
It expires in ten minutes, works once, and only in this browser. Five wrong tries void it. Send another code.
Your account is live and the Cloudflare checks are off for this browser.
11 Kentucky opinions name it 2 courts 1994–2021 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Kentucky courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
United States v. Windsorgreen2 sentences2014See United States v. Windsor, — U.S.-, 133 S.Ct. 2675, 2686 , 186 L.Ed.2d 808 (2013) (quoting Deposit Guaranty Nat. 2014See United States v. Windsor, — U.S.-, 133 S.Ct. 2675, 2686 , 186 L.Ed.2d 808 (2013) (quoting Deposit Guaranty Nat. | 1 | 1 |
Sanders v. Commonwealthgreen1 sentence2010As the trial court found, and as the testimony from the post-trial hearing supports, Nabb was merely a casual acquaintance with the family, not a friend. “[A] casual acquaintance [is] not the close relationship needed to imply bias on the part of the juror.” Sanders v. Commonwealth, 89 S.W.3d 380, 388 (Ky.2002); see also Flatten v. Quarterman, 570 F.3d 595, 602 (5th Cir.2009) (“Texas law requires more than the existence of a casual acquaintance with the victim of a crime or the victim’s family to make a prospective juror subject to challenge for cause. | 1 | 1 |
Hatten v. Quartermangreen1 sentence2010As the trial court found, and as the testimony from the post-trial hearing supports, Nabb was merely a casual acquaintance with the family, not a friend. “[A] casual acquaintance [is] not the close relationship needed to imply bias on the part of the juror.” Sanders v. Commonwealth, 89 S.W.3d 380, 388 (Ky.2002); see also Flatten v. Quarterman, 570 F.3d 595, 602 (5th Cir.2009) (“Texas law requires more than the existence of a casual acquaintance with the victim of a crime or the victim’s family to make a prospective juror subject to challenge for cause. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Kentucky. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Goben v. Commonwealth
green
2 sentences2017Goben, 503 S.W.3d at 914 . 2017Gob_en, 503 S.W.3d at 914 . | 3 | 2017–2017 |
Sallee v. GTE South, Inc.
green
2 sentences2021The court cited Sallee, holding that Johnson “was not injured by the risk she was called upon to engage, but by a risk different in both kind and character.” Id. 839 S.W.2d at 279 . 2021The court cited Sallee, holding that Johnson “was not injured by the risk she was called upon to engage, but by a risk different in both kind and character.” Id. 839 S.W.2d at 279 . | 2 | 2018–2021 |
Strickler v. Greene
green
2 sentences2021The evidence satisfies the first two prongs of the Strickler v. Greene[, 527 U.S. 263 , 119 S.Ct. 1936 , 144 L.Ed.2d 286 (1999),] test because it was useful to discredit Bolin and was erroneously withheld; nevertheless, [Pettway] fails to satisfy the third prong of the inquiry as he was not substantially prejudiced by the Commonwealth’s failure to timely turn over the Bolin interview information. -7- Goben [v. Commonwealth], 503 S.W.3d [890,] 914 [(Ky. 2016)]. 2017 WL 2591813 , at *3-4. 2021The evidence satisfies the first two prongs of the Strickler v. Greene[, 527 U.S. 263 , 119 S.Ct. 1936 , 144 L.Ed.2d 286 (1999),] test because it was useful to discredit Bolin and was erroneously withheld; nevertheless, [Pettway] fails to satisfy the third prong of the inquiry as he was not substantially prejudiced by the Commonwealth’s failure to timely turn over the Bolin interview information. -7- Goben [v. Commonwealth], 503 S.W.3d [890,] 914 [(Ky. 2016)]. 2017 WL 2591813 , at *3-4. | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Comair, Inc. v. Lexington-Fayette Urban County Airport Corp.
green
1 sentence2015Appellants contend that UKMC does not satisfy the two-prong test set forth in Kentucky Center for the Arts Corp. v. Berns, 801 S.W.2d 827 (Ky.1990), or the third prong of the analysis established in Comair, Inc. v. Lexington-Fayette Urban County Airport Corp., 295 S.W.3d 91 (Ky.2009), and is therefore not entitled to immunity. | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Van Arsdale v. Caswell
green
2 sentences2006Although we find the trial court's order to be somewhat unclear as to the issue, Castner-Knott submits, and we agree, that the court concluded — relying on Van Arsdale v. Caswell, supra — that dismissing a criminal complaint without prejudice is the same as "filing away" a complaint. 2006Although we find the trial court’s order to be somewhat unclear as to the issue, Castner-Knott submits, and we agree, that the court concluded — relying on Van Arsdale v. Caswell, supra — that dismissing a criminal complaint without prejudice is the same as “filing away” a complaint. | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Lemon v. Kurtzman
red
2 sentences1994The third prong of the test used in Lemon v. Kurtzman to strike the statute is that “the statute must not foster ‘an excessive government entanglement with religion.’ ” 403 U.S. at 613 , 91 S.Ct. at 2111 . 1994The third prong of the test used in Lemon v. Kurtzman to strike the statute is that “the statute must not foster ‘an excessive government entanglement with religion.’ ” 403 U.S. at 613 , 91 S.Ct. at 2111 . | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.