third prong test in New Jersey

2015If we had been required to engage in a contract impairment analysis, the third prong to that analysis— whether the State’s action that substantially impaired the contract “is reasonable and necessary to serve an important public purpose,” U.S. Trust Co., supra, 431 U.S. at 25 , 97 S.Ct. at 1519 , 52 L.Ed.2d at 112 — would have required annual incursions by the Judiciary into second-guessing spending priorities and perhaps even revenue-raising considerations in recurring years.

2015If we had been required to engage in a contract impairment analysis, the third prong to that analysis— whether the State’s action that substantially impaired the contract “is reasonable and necessary to serve an important public purpose,” U.S. Trust Co., supra, 431 U.S. at 25 , 97 S.Ct. at 1519 , 52 L.Ed.2d at 112 — would have required annual incursions by the Judiciary into second-guessing spending priorities and perhaps even revenue-raising considerations in recurring years.

2020Whether the City can create a citizen oversight board at all, and whether it can do so in the form it has enacted, arises under the third prong of the test: “whether any delegation of power to municipalities has been preempted by other State statutes dealing with the same subject matter.” See 83 N.J. at 225-26 . (pp. 23-36) 3.

2019The third prong of the test of enforceability of noncompete agreements "requires the reviewing court to analyze the public's broad concern in fostering competition, creativity, and ingenuity." Maw, 179 N.J. at 447 (citing Ingersoll-Rand Co., 110 N.J. at 63-34 ).

2019The third prong of the test of enforceability of noncompete agreements "requires the reviewing court to analyze the public's broad concern in fostering competition, creativity, and ingenuity." Maw, 179 N.J. at 447 (citing Ingersoll-Rand Co., 110 N.J. at 63-34 ).

2018R.F., 217 N.J. at 186 ; see also W.Z., 173 A-0390-16T5 7 N.J. at 130.

2016As to the third prong of that test, a reviewing court must “balance the interests of the public employees and the public employer,” id. at 404-05 , 443 A.2d 187 , and will hold that negotiation is permitted “on a subject that intimately and directly affects the work and welfare of public employees unless such negotiated agreement would significantly interfere with the determination of governmental policy,” id. at 404 , 443 A.2d 187 .

2016As to the third prong of that test, a reviewing court must “balance the interests of the public employees and the public employer,” id. at 404-05 , 443 A.2d 187 , and will hold that negotiation is permitted “on a subject that intimately and directly affects the work and welfare of public employees unless such negotiated agreement would significantly interfere with the determination of governmental policy,” id. at 404 , 443 A.2d 187 .

2011Princeton University Press, supra, 35 N.J. 209 , 172 A.2d 420 (1961), dealt with the activities conducted at a university press that was argued to be operating for the moral and mental improvement of men, women and children, and Kimberley School v. Town of Montclair, 2 N.J. 28 , 65 A.2d 500 (1949), concerned the operations of a school seeking exempt status under a similar exemption for educational institutions, which contained the same third prong requirement as that here.

2011Princeton University Press, supra, 35 N.J. 209 , 172 A.2d 420 (1961), dealt with the activities conducted at a university press that was argued to be operating for the moral and mental improvement of men, women and children, and Kimberley School v. Town of Montclair, 2 N.J. 28 , 65 A.2d 500 (1949), concerned the operations of a school seeking exempt status under a similar exemption for educational institutions, which contained the same third prong requirement as that here.

2011Princeton University Press, supra, 35 N.J. 209 , 172 A.2d 420 (1961), dealt with the activities conducted at a university press that was argued to be operating for the moral and mental improvement of men, women and children, and Kimberley School v. Town of Montclair, 2 N.J. 28 , 65 A.2d 500 (1949), concerned the operations of a school seeking exempt status under a similar exemption for educational institutions, which contained the same third prong requirement as that here.

2011Princeton University Press, supra, 35 N.J. 209 , 172 A.2d 420 (1961), dealt with the activities conducted at a university press that was argued to be operating for the moral and mental improvement of men, women and children, and Kimberley School v. Town of Montclair, 2 N.J. 28 , 65 A.2d 500 (1949), concerned the operations of a school seeking exempt status under a similar exemption for educational institutions, which contained the same third prong requirement as that here.

2007After establishing the requisite interest in the subject matter, a party “seeking access ... must ‘establish that the balance of its interest in disclosure against the public interest in maintaining confidentiality weighs in favor of disclosure.’ ” Id. at 50 , 689 A.2d 702 (quoting Home News v. Dep’t of Health, 144 N.J. 446, 454 , 677 A.2d 195 (1996)).

2007After establishing the requisite interest in the subject matter, a party “seeking access ... must ‘establish that the balance of its interest in disclosure against the public interest in maintaining confidentiality weighs in favor of disclosure.’ ” Id. at 50 , 689 A.2d 702 (quoting Home News v. Dep’t of Health, 144 N.J. 446, 454 , 677 A.2d 195 (1996)).

2007After establishing the requisite interest in the subject matter, a party “seeking access ... must ‘establish that the balance of its interest in disclosure against the public interest in maintaining confidentiality weighs in favor of disclosure.’ ” Id. at 50 , 689 A.2d 702 (quoting Home News v. Dep’t of Health, 144 N.J. 446, 454 , 677 A.2d 195 (1996)).

2007After establishing the requisite interest in the subject matter, a party “seeking access ... must ‘establish that the balance of its interest in disclosure against the public interest in maintaining confidentiality weighs in favor of disclosure.’ ” Id. at 50 , 689 A.2d 702 (quoting Home News v. Dep’t of Health, 144 N.J. 446, 454 , 677 A.2d 195 (1996)).

2006As for the third prong of the test, if the Section 6 allocation was not fair, Delmarva could apply for a modification of that calculation under N.J.S.A. 54:10A-8 (“Section 8”), which provides: If it shall appear to the commissioner [Director of the Division of Taxation] that an allocation factor determined pursuant to section G does not properly reflect the activity, business, receipts, capital, entire net worth or entire net income of a taxpayer reasonably attributable to the State, he may adjust it by: (a) excluding one or more of the factors therein; (b) including one or more other factors,

2006As for the third prong of the test, if the Section 6 allocation was not fair, Delmarva could apply for a modification of that calculation under N.J.S.A. 54:10A-8 (“Section 8”), which provides: If it shall appear to the commissioner [Director of the Division of Taxation] that an allocation factor determined pursuant to section G does not properly reflect the activity, business, receipts, capital, entire net worth or entire net income of a taxpayer reasonably attributable to the State, he may adjust it by: (a) excluding one or more of the factors therein; (b) including one or more other factors,

2005Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333, 343 , 97 S.Ct. 2434, 2442 , 53 L.Ed. 2d 383 (1977). [2] The judge stated: The association, however, has not satisfied the third prong of the test, which requires that neither the claim asserted, nor the relief requested require the individual participation of the members of the lawsuit.

2005Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333, 343 , 97 S.Ct. 2434, 2442 , 53 L.Ed. 2d 383 (1977). [2] The judge stated: The association, however, has not satisfied the third prong of the test, which requires that neither the claim asserted, nor the relief requested require the individual participation of the members of the lawsuit.

2003The established test for determining whether a party is a beneficiary of the works of a charity has two prongs.- The first is that the institution pleading the immunity, at the time in question, “was engaged in the performance of the charitable objectives it was organized to advance.” Anasiewicz v. Sacred Heart Church, 74 N.J.Super. 532, 536 , 181 A.2d 787 (App.Div.), certif. denied, 38 N.J. 305 , 184 A.2d 419 (1962).

2003The established test for determining whether a party is a beneficiary of the works of a charity has two prongs.- The first is that the institution pleading the immunity, at the time in question, “was engaged in the performance of the charitable objectives it was organized to advance.” Anasiewicz v. Sacred Heart Church, 74 N.J.Super. 532, 536 , 181 A.2d 787 (App.Div.), certif. denied, 38 N.J. 305 , 184 A.2d 419 (1962).

2003The established test for determining whether a party is a beneficiary of the works of a charity has two prongs.- The first is that the institution pleading the immunity, at the time in question, “was engaged in the performance of the charitable objectives it was organized to advance.” Anasiewicz v. Sacred Heart Church, 74 N.J.Super. 532, 536 , 181 A.2d 787 (App.Div.), certif. denied, 38 N.J. 305 , 184 A.2d 419 (1962).

2003The established test for determining whether a party is a beneficiary of the works of a charity has two prongs.- The first is that the institution pleading the immunity, at the time in question, “was engaged in the performance of the charitable objectives it was organized to advance.” Anasiewicz v. Sacred Heart Church, 74 N.J.Super. 532, 536 , 181 A.2d 787 (App.Div.), certif. denied, 38 N.J. 305 , 184 A.2d 419 (1962).

2002Id. at 11, 12, 695 A. 2d 654 .

2002Id. at 11, 12, 695 A.2d 654 .

2001Stephens, supra, 122 F.3d at 176 .

2001Stephens, supra, 122 F.3d at 176 .

1999In granting summary judgment to defendants, the motion judge concluded that plaintiff failed to satisfy the third prong of the test pronounced in Maher v. New Jersey Transit R.O., 125 N.J. 455, 480 , 593 A. 2d 750 (1991), which requires that a plaintiff alleging discriminatory harassment demonstrate he had been required to labor under conditions unreasonably different from his co-employees.

1999In granting summary judgment to defendants, the motion judge concluded that plaintiff failed to satisfy the third prong of the test pronounced in Maher v. New Jersey Transit R.O., 125 N.J. 455, 480 , 593 A. 2d 750 (1991), which requires that a plaintiff alleging discriminatory harassment demonstrate he had been required to labor under conditions unreasonably different from his co-employees.