third prong test in Connecticut

2025The defendant could not prevail on his alternative, unpreserved claim that § 53a-217 (a) (4) (A) was unconstitutionally vague as applied to him, the defendant having failed to demonstrate the existence of a constitutional violation under the third prong of the test set forth in State v. Golding ( 213 Conn. 233 ), as modified by In re Yasiel R. ( 317 Conn. 773 ).

2023The defendant could not prevail on his unpreserved claim that the trial court had violated his constitutional rights to confront and cross-exam- ine his accusers and to present a defense by precluding defense counsel from cross-examining R about R’s pending criminal charges, the defen- dant having failed to demonstrate the existence of a constitutional viola- tion under the third prong of the test for review of unpreserved constitutional claims set forth in State v. Golding ( 213 Conn. 233 ), as modified by In re Yasiel R. ( 317 Conn. 773 ): The defendant’s claim on appeal was premised on the

1999In Forsham v. Harris, 445 U.S. 169 , 180 (1980), the United States Supreme Court held: "[In the absence of] extensive, detailed and virtually day to day supervision [an entity cannot be considered subject to sufficient regulation to qualify as a public agency]. . . ." Similarly, our Appellate Court, in Hallas v. Freedom of Information Commission, 18 Conn. App. 291 , 296 (1989), speaks of an entity which is required to "operate under direct, pervasive and continuous regulatory control." In the present case, the plaintiff is a private corporation with locations nationwide.

1996In Forsham v. Harris, 445 U.S. 169 , 180 (1980), the court held: "[In the absence of] extensive, detailed and virtually day to day supervision [an entity cannot be considered subject to sufficient regulation to qualify as a public agency] . . ." CCM is a voluntary association.

2013With regard to the third prong of the test, “the decisive question is whether the defendant was informed of the charges with sufficient precision to be able to prepare an adequate defense.” State v. Tanzella, 226 Conn. 601, 608 , 628 A.2d 973 (1993). “[T]he constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation entitles the defendant to insist the indictment apprise him of the crime charged with such reasonable certainty that he can make his defense and protect himself after judgment against prosecution on the same charge.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Gr

2013With regard to the third prong of the test, “the decisive question is whether the defendant was informed of the charges with sufficient precision to be able to prepare an adequate defense.” State v. Tanzella, 226 Conn. 601, 608 , 628 A.2d 973 (1993). “[T]he constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation entitles the defendant to insist the indictment apprise him of the crime charged with such reasonable certainty that he can make his defense and protect himself after judgment against prosecution on the same charge.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Gr

2013Thus, it is entirely proper for a court to permit an amendment or a substitute information merely to amplify or to correct the time of the commission of the offense when time is not a material ingredient of the crime charged.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Ramos, 176 Conn. 275, 276-77 , 407 A.2d 952 (1978).

2013Thus, it is entirely proper for a court to permit an amendment or a substitute information merely to amplify or to correct the time of the commission of the offense when time is not a material ingredient of the crime charged.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Ramos, 176 Conn. 275, 276-77 , 407 A.2d 952 (1978).

2012"The determination *578 of whether a party qualifies as a lost volume seller involves questions of fact to be resolved according to the circumstances of each case." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., at 560, 833 A.2d 891 .

2005The defendants focus on the third strand of this test for “unfairness” in arguing that, to satisfy this third prong of the inquiry, the injury must not only be substantial but “also must not be outweighed by any countervailing benefits to consumers or competition that the practice produces . . . .” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Williams Ford, Inc. v. Hartford Courant Co., 232 Conn. 559, 592 , 657 A.2d 212 (1995).

2005The defendants focus on the third strand of this test for “unfairness” in arguing that, to satisfy this third prong of the inquiry, the injury must not only be substantial but “also must not be outweighed by any countervailing benefits to consumers or competition that the practice produces . . . .” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Williams Ford, Inc. v. Hartford Courant Co., 232 Conn. 559, 592 , 657 A.2d 212 (1995).

2003Specifically, the defendant argues that the court, in considering his objection to the state’s use of a peremptory challenge against a black venireperson, failed to apply the third prong of the test set forth in Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 , 106 S. Ct. 1712 , 90 L.

2003Specifically, the defendant argues that the court, in considering his objection to the state’s use of a peremptory challenge against a black venireperson, failed to apply the third prong of the test set forth in Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 , 106 S. Ct. 1712 , 90 L.

2000The statistical decision theory model “explains the probability that the disparity between the percentages of [the recognizable group] in the [general] population . . . and [the recognizable group] in the qualified pool and source list is a result of random chance.” Ramseur v. Beyer, 983 F.2d 1215, 1232 (3d Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 508 U.S. 947 , 113 S. Ct. 2433 , 124 L.

2000The statistical decision theory model “explains the probability that the disparity between the percentages of [the recognizable group] in the [general] population . . . and [the recognizable group] in the qualified pool and source list is a result of random chance.” Ramseur v. Beyer, 983 F.2d 1215, 1232 (3d Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 508 U.S. 947 , 113 S. Ct. 2433 , 124 L.

2000The statistical decision theory model “explains the probability that the disparity between the percentages of [the recognizable group] in the [general] population . . . and [the recognizable group] in the qualified pool and source list is a result of random chance.” Ramseur v. Beyer, 983 F.2d 1215, 1232 (3d Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 508 U.S. 947 , 113 S. Ct. 2433 , 124 L.

1999In Forsham v. Harris, 445 U.S. 169 , 180 (1980), the United States Supreme Court held: "[In the absence of] extensive, detailed and virtually day to day supervision [an entity cannot be considered subject to sufficient regulation to qualify as a public agency]. . . ." Similarly, our Appellate Court, in Hallas v. Freedom of Information Commission, 18 Conn. App. 291 , 296 (1989), speaks of an entity which is required to "operate under direct, pervasive and continuous regulatory control." In the present case, the plaintiff is a private corporation with locations nationwide.

1999L. 67412 (Conn.Super. 1998), quoting Murray v. Bridgeport Hospital, 40 Conn. Sup. 56 (1984) (emphasis in original).

1999With respect to the third prong of the test, the Ohio Supreme Court has stated: "In order for a plaintiff to recover lost profits in a breach of contract action, the amounts of lost profits, as well as their existence, must be demonstrated with reasonable certainty." AFG, Inc. v. Great Lakes Heat Treating Co. , 51 Ohio St.3d 177 , 181 , 555 N.E.2d 634 (1990).

1999With respect to the third prong of the test, the Ohio Supreme Court has stated: "In order for a plaintiff to recover lost profits in a breach of contract action, the amounts of lost profits, as well as their existence, must be demonstrated with reasonable certainty." AFG, Inc. v. Great Lakes Heat Treating Co. , 51 Ohio St.3d 177 , 181 , 555 N.E.2d 634 (1990).

1996There are sufficient allegations to meet the third prong of the test for piercing the corporate veil. "[O]n a motion to strike the plaintiff's allegations must be taken in his favor, not to his detriment." Schmidt v. Yardney Electric Corp., 4 Conn. App. 69 , 75 , 492 A.2d 512 (1985).

1996There are sufficient allegations to meet the third prong of the test for piercing the corporate veil. "[O]n a motion to strike the plaintiff's allegations must be taken in his favor, not to his detriment." Schmidt v. Yardney Electric Corp., 4 Conn. App. 69 , 75 , 492 A.2d 512 (1985).

1992State v. Nardini, 187 Conn. 513, 525 , 447 A.2d 396 (1982) .

1992State v. Nardini, 187 Conn. 513, 525 , 447 A.2d 396 (1982) .

1992The injury required by the third prong of the test must be substantial, must not be outweighed by countervailing benefits to consumers or competition, and "must be an injury that consumers themselves could not reasonably have avoided." A-G Foods, Inc. v. Pepperidge Farm Inc., 216 Conn. 200 , 216 , 579 A.2d 69 (1990).

1992The injury required by the third prong of the test must be substantial, must not be outweighed by countervailing benefits to consumers or competition, and "must be an injury that consumers themselves could not reasonably have avoided." A-G Foods, Inc. v. Pepperidge Farm Inc., 216 Conn. 200 , 216 , 579 A.2d 69 (1990).