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12 New Mexico opinions name it 2 courts 1992–2024 3 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by New Mexico courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Seal Ex Rel. Seal v. Carlsbad Independent School Districtgreen2 sentences1999Dist., 116 N.M. 101, 104 , 860 P.2d 743, 746 (1993). {19} The third prong requires analysis of the source of the harm, specifically: does the risk of harm flow from the activity itself when carried out in an ordinary expected manner or does the harm result from the negligence of a particular actor? 1999Dist., 116 N.M. 101, 104 , 860 P.2d 743, 746 (1993). {19} The third prong requires analysis of the source of the harm, specifically: does the risk of harm flow from the activity itself when carried out in an ordinary expected manner or does the harm result from the negligence of a particular actor? | 1 | 1 |
Wilson v. Gillisgreen2 sentences1999Defendants can still argue Kidde-Fenwal’s liability to the jury in regard to the faulty fire-suppression system, see Wilson v. Gillis, 105 N.M. 259, 261 , 731 P.2d 955, 957 (Ct.App.1986), and must demonstrate to the court why a sanction short of dismissal is inadequate. {17} The third prong of the analysis requires the court to balance the degree of fault of the spoliator’s conduct against the magnitude of prejudice to the non-spoliating party, and to levy a sanction accordingly. 1999Defendants can still argue Kidde-Fenwal’s liability to the jury in regard to the faulty fire-suppression system, see Wilson v. Gillis, 105 N.M. 259, 261 , 731 P.2d 955, 957 (Ct.App.1986), and must demonstrate to the court why a sanction short of dismissal is inadequate. {17} The third prong of the analysis requires the court to balance the degree of fault of the spoliator’s conduct against the magnitude of prejudice to the non-spoliating party, and to levy a sanction accordingly. | 1 | 1 |
Enriquez v. Cochrangreen2 sentences1999See Enriquez, 1998-NMCA-157, ¶ 97 , 126 N.M. 196 , 967 P.2d 1136 . 1999See Enriquez, 1998-NMCA-157, ¶ 97 , 126 N.M. 196 , 967 P.2d 1136 . | 1 | 1 |
Doyle v. Ohiogreen2 sentences1998See also Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 618 , 96 S.Ct. 2240 , 49 L.Ed.2d 91 (1976) (use of defendant’s post-Miranda silence to impeach explanation subsequently offered at trial held violation of due process.) Nevertheless, the prosecutor’s statements, while found by the trial court to be improper and to warrant the declaration of a mistrial, did not satisfy the test set forth in Breit so as to implicate Defendant’s double jeopardy rights under Article II, Section 15 of the New Mexico Constitution. {12} Specifically, Defendant failed to affirmatively establish the third prong of the test in Breit 1998See also Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 618 , 96 S.Ct. 2240 , 49 L.Ed.2d 91 (1976) (use of defendant’s post-Miranda silence to impeach explanation subsequently offered at trial held violation of due process.) Nevertheless, the prosecutor’s statements, while found by the trial court to be improper and to warrant the declaration of a mistrial, did not satisfy the test set forth in Breit so as to implicate Defendant’s double jeopardy rights under Article II, Section 15 of the New Mexico Constitution. {12} Specifically, Defendant failed to affirmatively establish the third prong of the test in Breit | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in New Mexico. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Computer One, Inc. v. Grisham & Lawless P.A.
green
2 sentences2013The relevant dispute was over the third prong of claim 13 preclusion: whether the malpractice claim was the “same claim” as the fee request. 14 Computer One, Inc., 2008-NMSC-038, ¶¶ 32-36 . 2013Computer One, Inc., 2008-NMSC-038, ¶ 32-36 . | 4 | 2013–2013 |
Lessard v. Coronado Paint & Decorating Center, Inc.
green
2 sentences2023As well, because “the only evidence regarding the 4 reasons for [the employee]’s actions at the time of the accident was his testimony 5 that he was driving home,” this Court concluded that his conduct “arose entirely 6 from this ‘external, independent and personal motive.’” Id. (quoting UJI 13-407(2)). 7 This Court affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment because the 8 employee had not satisfied the third prong of the test. 2023Id. 9 {17} In this case, the district court concluded that the third prong failed as a matter 10 of law because “the undisputed facts establish that at the time the accident 11 occurred, . . . | 2 | 2023–2023 |
Valdez v. Yates Petroleum Corp.
green
2 sentences2024It “asks whether the risk of harm flows from the activity itself when carried out in an ordinary expected manner or whether the harm results from the negligence of a particular actor.” Valdez v. Yates Petroleum Corp., 2007-NMCA-038 , ¶ 8 141 N.M. 381 , 155 P.3d 786 (alterations, internal quotation marks, and citation omitted). 2024It “asks whether the risk of harm flows from the activity itself when carried out in an ordinary expected manner or whether the harm results from the negligence of a particular actor.” Valdez v. Yates Petroleum Corp., 2007-NMCA-038 , ¶ 8 141 N.M. 381 , 155 P.3d 786 (alterations, internal quotation marks, and citation omitted). | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Weitz v. Lovelace Health System, Inc.
green
1 sentence2009For these reasons, we agree with the court in Weitz that imposing a duty to control in this context is unworkable. 214 F.3d at 1182 . {35} Finally, under the third prong of the test, we find that under these circumstances, the potential consequences of imposing a duty to third parties on health care providers is significant. | 1 | 2009–2009 |
Cauble v. Beals
green
2 sentences1992In fact, in Cauble, the supreme court refused to apply the doctrine of equitable estoppel against a landowner when the third prong of the test — the requirement of knowledge of the real facts — was not met. 96 N.M. at 445-46 , 631 P.2d at 1313-14 . 4. 1992In fact, in Cauble, the supreme court refused to apply the doctrine of equitable estoppel against a landowner when the third prong of the test — the requirement of knowledge of the real facts — was not met. 96 N.M. at 445-46 , 631 P.2d at 1313-14 . 4. | 1 | 1992–1992 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.