third prong test in Alabama

2005In Duren , the Supreme Court held that the defendant had met the third prong of the test, the most difficult one: "His undisputed demonstration that a large discrepancy occurred not just occasionally but in every weekly venire for a period of a year manifestly indicates that the cause of the under representation was systematic—that is, inherent in the particular jury selection process utilized." Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. at 366 , 99 S.Ct. at 669 .

2005In Duren , the Supreme Court held that the defendant had met the third prong of the test, the most difficult one: "His undisputed demonstration that a large discrepancy occurred not just occasionally but in every weekly venire for a period of a year manifestly indicates that the cause of the under representation was systematic—that is, inherent in the particular jury selection process utilized." Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. at 366 , 99 S.Ct. at 669 .

2005Thus, we conclude that Land's argument on this issue is without merit.' " Ex parte Land, 678 So.2d at 244 .

1997Thus, we conclude that Land's argument on this issue is without merit." Ex parte Land, 678 So.2d at 244 .

1997The defendant's final argument is that the trial court erred by allowing testimony concerning the results of DNA testing into evidence, because, he says, the State had failed to establish that the DNA laboratory in Mobile, where the testing was done, used generally accepted testing techniques and had performed its tests without error, as *Page 193 required by the third prong of the test stated in Ex parte Perry , 586 So.2d 242 (Ala. 1991).

1995Second, was there error in the performance or interpretation of the tests?" Ex parte Perry , 586 So.2d at 250 .

1999In Complete Auto, the United States Supreme Court overruled its earlier decision in Spector Motor Service, Inc. v. O'Connor, 340 U.S. 602 , 71 S.Ct. 508 , 95 L.Ed. 573 (1951), and held that a taxing jurisdiction can require those engaged in interstate commerce to pay their fair share of the jurisdiction's tax burden.

1999In Complete Auto, the United States Supreme Court overruled its earlier decision in Spector Motor Service, Inc. v. O'Connor, 340 U.S. 602 , 71 S.Ct. 508 , 95 L.Ed. 573 (1951), and held that a taxing jurisdiction can require those engaged in interstate commerce to pay their fair share of the jurisdiction's tax burden.

1999Townsend contends that Mobile's Ordinance No. 34-082, as applied to himself and his employer, violates the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution. *834 He first argues that the imposition of a minimum or "flat tax" for the privilege of conducting business in the City of Mobile "discriminates against interstate commerce." More specifically, he argues that Ordinance No. 34-082 fails to satisfy the third prong of the test set out by the United States Supreme Court in Complete Auto Transit v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274 , 97 S.Ct. 1076 , 51 L.Ed.2d 326 (1977).

1999Townsend contends that Mobile's Ordinance No. 34-082, as applied to himself and his employer, violates the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution. *834 He first argues that the imposition of a minimum or "flat tax" for the privilege of conducting business in the City of Mobile "discriminates against interstate commerce." More specifically, he argues that Ordinance No. 34-082 fails to satisfy the third prong of the test set out by the United States Supreme Court in Complete Auto Transit v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274 , 97 S.Ct. 1076 , 51 L.Ed.2d 326 (1977).