exceptions to the general rule in Kentucky

1982Jones v. Commonwealth, 303 Ky. 666 , 198 S.W.2d 969 (1947).

1982Jones v. Commonwealth, 303 Ky. 666 , 198 S.W.2d 969 (1947).

2021The Missouri Supreme Court recognized this distinction in Farmers’ Mutual Fire and Lightning Insurance Company v. Crowley, 354 Mo. 649 , 190 S.W.2d 250 (1945), where it found inapplicable the exceptions to the general rule that a remainderman is not entitled to the insurance proceeds from a policy taken out by the life tenant for his own benefit.

2021The Missouri Supreme Court recognized this distinction in Farmers’ Mutual Fire and Lightning Insurance Company v. Crowley, 354 Mo. 649 , 190 S.W.2d 250 (1945), where it found inapplicable the exceptions to the general rule that a remainderman is not entitled to the insurance proceeds from a policy taken out by the life tenant for his own benefit.

2019Jur. 2d Mortgages § 452 (May 2019 update) (citing Monetary Funding Group, Inc. v. Pluchino, 867 A.2d 841 (Conn. App. 2005); Fifth Third Bank v. Hopkins, 894 N.E.2d 65 (Ohio App. 2008)). 15 Blum, supra FN 13 (citing Hopkins, 894 at 65).

2019Jur. 2d Mortgages § 452 (May 2019 update) (citing Monetary Funding Group, Inc. v. Pluchino, 867 A.2d 841 (Conn. App. 2005); Fifth Third Bank v. Hopkins, 894 N.E.2d 65 (Ohio App. 2008)). 15 Blum, supra FN 13 (citing Hopkins, 894 at 65).

2018We held in Kirschner that the statute represented a codification of the common law and construed “intentionally inflicted” as meaning “inflicted by willful, wanton, or reckless conduct.” Id. at 842 .5 among the exceptions to the general rule of no affirmative duty.

2018Such persons or entities generally do have a non-delegable, affirmative duty to protect their invitees from unreasonably dangerous conditions on the premises however those dangerous conditions came to be.” 523 S.W.3d at 426 (citations omitted). 5 As a codification of the common law, we held that the statutory standard comports with the standard set forth in Chesser v. Louisville Country Club, 339 S.W.2d 194 (Ky. 1960): “‘[t]he possessor of premises owes no duty to ... a trespasser to keep 6 Since the legislature has declared the policy, as interpreted by Kirschner, that liability may attach on

2002This exception was adopted by the California Supreme Court in Ray v. Alad Corp., 19 Cal.3d 22 , 136 Cal.Rptr. 574 , 560 P.2d 3 (1977).

2002This exception was adopted by the California Supreme Court in Ray v. Alad Corp., 19 Cal.3d 22 , 136 Cal.Rptr. 574 , 560 P.2d 3 (1977).

1950Section 596 of the Civil Code of Practice provides: “The party producing a witness is not allowed to impeach his credit by evidence of bad character, unless it was indispensable that the party should produce him; but he may contradict him by other evidence, and by showing that he has made statements different from his present testimony.” A clear analysis and construction of Section 596 of the Code may be found in Harvey v. Commonwealth, 287 Ky. 92 , 152 S. W. 2d 282 , which sets out definitely the exceptions to the general rule against impeachment of one’s own witness.

1950Section 596 of the Civil Code of Practice provides: “The party producing a witness is not allowed to impeach his credit by evidence of bad character, unless it was indispensable that the party should produce him; but he may contradict him by other evidence, and by showing that he has made statements different from his present testimony.” A clear analysis and construction of Section 596 of the Code may be found in Harvey v. Commonwealth, 287 Ky. 92 , 152 S. W. 2d 282 , which sets out definitely the exceptions to the general rule against impeachment of one’s own witness.

1949Jones v. Commonwealth, 303 Ky. 666 , 198 S. W. 2d 969 ; Hickey v. Commonwealth, 185 Kv. 570, 215 S. W. 431 .

1941But, if as alleged in the petition and indicated by the proof, the corporation was insolvent and its assets had been appropriated by its officer stockholders who had voluntarily brought about its dissolution, the case is well within the exceptions to the general rule pointed out in the case* of Louisville & Nashville Railroad Company v. Nield, 186 Ky. 17 , 216 S. W. 62 , in which the authorities are cited and discussed.

1941But, if as alleged in the petition and indicated by the proof, the corporation was insolvent and its assets had been appropriated by its officer stockholders who had voluntarily brought about its dissolution, the case is well within the exceptions to the general rule pointed out in the case* of Louisville & Nashville Railroad Company v. Nield, 186 Ky. 17 , 216 S. W. 62 , in which the authorities are cited and discussed.

1934Kirby v. Commonwealth, 206 Ky. 535 , 267 S. W. 1094 ; Sneed v. Commonwealth, 236 Ky. 838 , 34 S. W. (2d) 724 .

1934Kirby v. Commonwealth, 206 Ky. 535 , 267 S. W. 1094 ; Sneed v. Commonwealth, 236 Ky. 838 , 34 S. W. (2d) 724 .

1934Kirby v. Commonwealth, 206 Ky. 535 , 267 S. W. 1094 ; Sneed v. Commonwealth, 236 Ky. 838 , 34 S. W. (2d) 724 .

1934Kirby v. Commonwealth, 206 Ky. 535 , 267 S. W. 1094 ; Sneed v. Commonwealth, 236 Ky. 838 , 34 S. W. (2d) 724 .

1931This is one of the exceptions to the general rule that a party cannot impeach his own witness.” Norwood v. Kenfield, 30 Cal. 393 ; Fairly v. Fairly, 38 Miss. 280 ; Jackson v. Leek, 12 Wend.

1931This is one of the exceptions to the general rule that a party cannot impeach his own witness.” Norwood v. Kenfield, 30 Cal. 393 ; Fairly v. Fairly, 38 Miss. 280 ; Jackson v. Leek, 12 Wend.

1925In Moore v. Commonwealth, 188 Ky. 505 , the rule embodying the exceptions relied upon by the Commonwealth was copied from Clary v. Commonwealth, 163 Ky. 48 , as follows: “When one is being tried for a crime the relevancy of the proof of other crimes of which he has been guilty is only in cases where a crime has been proven and proof of -some other crime is necessary to identity the accused as the person who committe'd the crime proven, as above stated; or where it is necessary to show 'guilty knowledge in the accused it is relevant to prove that at another time and place, not too remote, the a

1925In Moore v. Commonwealth, 188 Ky. 505 , the rule embodying the exceptions relied upon by the Commonwealth was copied from Clary v. Commonwealth, 163 Ky. 48 , as follows: “When one is being tried for a crime the relevancy of the proof of other crimes of which he has been guilty is only in cases where a crime has been proven and proof of -some other crime is necessary to identity the accused as the person who committe'd the crime proven, as above stated; or where it is necessary to show 'guilty knowledge in the accused it is relevant to prove that at another time and place, not too remote, the a

1924Burns v. Commonwealth, 198 Ky. 319 , 248 S. W. 848 .

1924Burns v. Commonwealth, 198 Ky. 319 , 248 S. W. 848 .

1920This court, in the case ol Gambrell v. Commonwealth, 130 Ky. 513 , said that “A conspiracy is almost necessarily established by the welding into one chain of a number of links each in itself inconclusive and insufficient to prove the conspiracy, but, when connected and examined as a whole, sufficient to show it, ’ ’ and furthermore said in substance that all acts and declarations of either of the conspirators before accomplishing the object of the conspiracy and after it was formed, was, in law, the act of all of them.

1919And along the same line the case of Morris v. Commonwealth, 129 Ky. 294 , referred to by appellant, in which it will be found that the court while admitting that as a general rule it is not often permissible, in order to show intent, to introduce evidence of ether and distinct crimes, yet admits that where said crimes are so interwoven with the crime under trial that it cannot well be separated from it in the introduction of relevant and competent evidence, then it is admissible, and immediately following the quotation in appellant’s brief the court states: “The exceptions to the general rule

1912Cutter v. People, 184 Ill., 395 ; State v. Sipult, 17 Iowa, 575 ; Voght v. State, 145 Ind., 12 ; State v. Bumgardener, 7 Baxter (Tenn.), 163; Bishop’s Criminal Procedure, sections 317-126.

1912Cutter v. People, 184 Ill., 395 ; State v. Sipult, 17 Iowa, 575 ; Voght v. State, 145 Ind., 12 ; State v. Bumgardener, 7 Baxter (Tenn.), 163; Bishop’s Criminal Procedure, sections 317-126.

1912Cutter v. People, 184 Ill., 395 ; State v. Sipult, 17 Iowa, 575 ; Voght v. State, 145 Ind., 12 ; State v. Bumgardener, 7 Baxter (Tenn.), 163; Bishop’s Criminal Procedure, sections 317-126.

1909In Stroud v. Commonwealth, 19 S .W. 976, 14 Ky. Law Rep. 179 , the court, in considering a question like this, said: “Whatever is said by a party to the occurrence or a coadjutor, in eases of homicide, is competent to show the character or quality of the act; but the statement of a bystander, who is in no way acting in concert with the parties to the transaction, does not constitute a part of the1 res geste.” In Bradshaw v. Commonwealth, 10 Bush 576 , the court, in holding evidence of this character incompetent, said: “It is clearly hearsay, and does not fall within any of the exceptions to th