10 Arizona opinions name it 2 courts 1955–2011 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Arizona courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Mid Kansas Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n of Wichita v. Dynamic Development Corp.green2 sentences2011See 167 Ariz. at 129 , 804 P.2d at 1317 . ¶ 12 The Lutzes argue that the exceptions to the general rule of merger stated in Mid Kansas do not apply because this case involves a lease, not a mortgage or deed of trust. 2011See 167 Ariz. at 129 , 804 P.2d at 1317 . ¶ 12 The Lutzes argue that the exceptions to the general rule of merger stated in Mid Kansas do not apply because this case involves a lease, not a mortgage or deed of trust. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Garciagreen2 sentences2010Relying, in part, on State v. Garcia, he maintains that because the Yuma Acts purportedly were committed before the charged offenses, they were not intrinsic, but were, as the court in Garcia described the other acts in that ease, “discrete offenses, identical to but occurring at different times than the ones charged.” 200 Ariz. 471, ¶ 33 , 28 P.3d 327, 333 (App.2001). 2010Relying, in part, on State v. Garcia, he maintains that because the Yuma Acts purportedly were committed before the charged offenses, they were not intrinsic, but were, as the court in Garcia described the other acts in that ease, “discrete offenses, identical to but occurring at different times than the ones charged.” 200 Ariz. 471, ¶ 33 , 28 P.3d 327, 333 (App.2001). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Wilkinsongreen2 sentences2007As stated in Wilkinson , "[o]ur conclusion that the restitution statutes encompass only damages directly caused by the criminal conduct involved not only remains faithful to the statutory language, but also prevents the restitution statutes from conflicting with the right to a civil jury trial preserved by Arizona Constitution Article 2, Section 23." Wilkinson, 202 Ariz. at 29, ¶ 11 , 39 P.3d at 1133 (emphasis added). 2007As stated in Wilkinson , "[o]ur conclusion that the restitution statutes encompass only damages directly caused by the criminal conduct involved not only remains faithful to the statutory language, but also prevents the restitution statutes from conflicting with the right to a civil jury trial preserved by Arizona Constitution Article 2, Section 23." Wilkinson, 202 Ariz. at 29, ¶ 11 , 39 P.3d at 1133 (emphasis added). | 1 | 1 |
Stokes v. Stokesgreen2 sentences2007See Stokes v. *692 Stokes, 143 Ariz. 590, 592 , 694 P.2d 1204, 1206 (App.1984) ("The exceptions to the general rule operate only where the facts of a particular case so warrant and the question is one of substantive law presenting no dispute as to the facts.") Having said that, the constitutional argument that the dissent makes here holds no sway. ¶ 25 The Arizona Constitution expressly provides that a victim has a right "[t]o receive prompt restitution from the person or persons convicted of the criminal conduct that caused the victim's loss or injury." Ariz. Const. art. 2, § 2.1(A)(8). 2007See Stokes v. *692 Stokes, 143 Ariz. 590, 592 , 694 P.2d 1204, 1206 (App.1984) ("The exceptions to the general rule operate only where the facts of a particular case so warrant and the question is one of substantive law presenting no dispute as to the facts.") Having said that, the constitutional argument that the dissent makes here holds no sway. ¶ 25 The Arizona Constitution expressly provides that a victim has a right "[t]o receive prompt restitution from the person or persons convicted of the criminal conduct that caused the victim's loss or injury." Ariz. Const. art. 2, § 2.1(A)(8). | 1 | 1 |
United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Frohmillergreen2 sentences1991United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Frohmiller, 71 Ariz. 377, 380 , 227 P.2d 1007, 1009 (1951) (quoting 15 Am.Jur. 1991United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Frohmiller, 71 Ariz. 377, 380 , 227 P.2d 1007, 1009 (1951) (quoting 15 Am.Jur. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Arizona. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Rubens v. Costello
green
2 sentences1990Id. 1984Id. | 2 | 1984–1990 |
People v. Byrnes
green
2 sentences1986He cites People v. Byrnes, 27 Cal.App. 79 , 148 P. 944 (1915) in support of such proposition. 1986He cites People v. Byrnes, 27 Cal.App. 79 , 148 P. 944 (1915) in support of such proposition. | 2 | 1962–1986 |
Zinermon v. Burch
green
1 sentence1991Id. | 1 | 1991–1991 |
Daniels v. State
green
2 sentences1962For, as stated in Daniels v. State, 243 Ala. 675, 681 , 11 So. 2d 756, 761 , certiorari denied, 319 U.S. 755 , 63 S.Ct. 1168 , 87 L.Ed. 1708 (1943): “ * * * where a crime has been committed * * * . in a peculiar or unusual manner, evidence of recent similar acts or crimes by the accused committed by the same means or in the same manner are provable to identify the accused as an inference from the similarity of method.” (Emphasis supplied.) Defendant also contends that any past conduct on the part of the defendant must in fact have been criminal or tend directly to prove the defendant guilty of 1962For, as stated in Daniels v. State, 243 Ala. 675, 681 , 11 So. 2d 756, 761 , certiorari denied, 319 U.S. 755 , 63 S.Ct. 1168 , 87 L.Ed. 1708 (1943): “ * * * where a crime has been committed * * * . in a peculiar or unusual manner, evidence of recent similar acts or crimes by the accused committed by the same means or in the same manner are provable to identify the accused as an inference from the similarity of method.” (Emphasis supplied.) Defendant also contends that any past conduct on the part of the defendant must in fact have been criminal or tend directly to prove the defendant guilty of | 1 | 1962–1962 |
Robinson v. Alabama
green
1 sentence1962For, as stated in Daniels v. State, 243 Ala. 675, 681 , 11 So. 2d 756, 761 , certiorari denied, 319 U.S. 755 , 63 S.Ct. 1168 , 87 L.Ed. 1708 (1943): “ * * * where a crime has been committed * * * . in a peculiar or unusual manner, evidence of recent similar acts or crimes by the accused committed by the same means or in the same manner are provable to identify the accused as an inference from the similarity of method.” (Emphasis supplied.) Defendant also contends that any past conduct on the part of the defendant must in fact have been criminal or tend directly to prove the defendant guilty of | 1 | 1962–1962 |
Regan v. King
green
1 sentence1962For, as stated in Daniels v. State, 243 Ala. 675, 681 , 11 So. 2d 756, 761 , certiorari denied, 319 U.S. 755 , 63 S.Ct. 1168 , 87 L.Ed. 1708 (1943): “ * * * where a crime has been committed * * * . in a peculiar or unusual manner, evidence of recent similar acts or crimes by the accused committed by the same means or in the same manner are provable to identify the accused as an inference from the similarity of method.” (Emphasis supplied.) Defendant also contends that any past conduct on the part of the defendant must in fact have been criminal or tend directly to prove the defendant guilty of | 1 | 1962–1962 |
Serrano v. Industrial Commission
green
2 sentences1955The commission contends that after Serrano v. Industrial Commission, 75 Ariz. 326 , 256 P.2d 709 , the court expressly excluded the idea of "time" as being the test, but that the test was whether he was being compensated for travel, and whether the accident occurred as a risk incidental to the travel, while petitioner contends that the Serrano case, supra, does not apply to these facts because after the Serrano decision was handed down the parties foresaw the possibility of liability under their then existing contract so they amended the agreement whereby the possibility of liability was elimi 1955The commission contends that after Serrano v. Industrial Commission, 75 Ariz. 326 , 256 P.2d 709 , the court expressly excluded the idea of "time" as being the test, but that the test was whether he was being compensated for travel, and whether the accident occurred as a risk incidental to the travel, while petitioner contends that the Serrano case, supra, does not apply to these facts because after the Serrano decision was handed down the parties foresaw the possibility of liability under their then existing contract so they amended the agreement whereby the possibility of liability was elimi | 1 | 1955–1955 |
Butler v. Industrial Commission
green
2 sentences1955This rule was set out by Justice Lockwood in the case of Butler v. Industrial Commission, 50 Ariz. 516 , 73 P.2d 703, 705 , as follows: "It is of course the general rule in compensation cases, subject to a few exceptions, that a man does not enter an employment until he reaches the place where the work of his employer is to be carried on, and similarly, when he has finished all the work required by his duties and leaves the place of business of his employer to go to his own home, he has left the employment, and that an accident which may occur to him on his way to or from his work is not in th 1955This rule was set out by Justice Lockwood in the case of Butler v. Industrial Commission, 50 Ariz. 516 , 73 P.2d 703, 705 , as follows: "It is of course the general rule in compensation cases, subject to a few exceptions, that a man does not enter an employment until he reaches the place where the work of his employer is to be carried on, and similarly, when he has finished all the work required by his duties and leaves the place of business of his employer to go to his own home, he has left the employment, and that an accident which may occur to him on his way to or from his work is not in th | 1 | 1955–1955 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.