exceptions to the general rule in Alabama

1974But for a collection of these authorities, see Weatherspoon v. State, 36 Ala. App. 392 , 56 So.2d 793 ." The trial judge was thoroughly familiar with the exceptions to the general rule, and in his oral charge to the jury, he was careful in limiting the effect of the testimony of the other rape victim and the seventeen-year old girl.

1974But for a collection of these authorities, see Weatherspoon v. State, 36 Ala. App. 392 , 56 So.2d 793 ." The trial judge was thoroughly familiar with the exceptions to the general rule, and in his oral charge to the jury, he was careful in limiting the effect of the testimony of the other rape victim and the seventeen-year old girl.

2008Consequently, the Court in Ex parte Health-South reformulated the statement of the exceptions to the general rule requiring expert testimony. 851 So.2d at 38 .

2008Consequently, the Court in Ex parte Health-South reformulated the statement of the exceptions to the general rule requiring expert testimony. 851 So.2d at 38 .

2005Although that Court stated the general rule that “a reviewing court determines the correctness of a trial court’s ruling ‘as of the time when it was made and according to what the record shows was before the lower court at that time,’ ” 468 So.2d at 899 , it went on, however, to identify one of the exceptions to the general rule “when the ruling is on a preliminary question or pretrial determination of the admissibility of evidence.” 468 So.2d at 899 .

2005Although that Court stated the general rule that “a reviewing court determines the correctness of a trial court’s ruling ‘as of the time when it was made and according to what the record shows was before the lower court at that time,’ ” 468 So.2d at 899 , it went on, however, to identify one of the exceptions to the general rule “when the ruling is on a preliminary question or pretrial determination of the admissibility of evidence.” 468 So.2d at 899 .

1989Then, in Bowden v. State , 538 So.2d 1226 (Ala. 1988), we clarified our position with regard to the Anonymous decision, when we stated: "We begin by pointing out that, as demonstrated by this Court's decisions in Anonymous and Ex parte Cofer, supra , there is no longer any basis for the view that, in the prosecution of sex crimes, the Alabama courts will be more liberal in their extensions of the exceptions to the general rule of exclusion.

1988We begin by pointing out that, as demonstrated by this Court's decisions in Anonymous and Ex parte Cofer, supra , there is no longer any basis for the view that, in the prosecution of sex crimes, the Alabama courts will be more liberal in their extensions of the exceptions to the general rule of exclusion.

1986"In Deep v. State, 414 So.2d 141, 147 (Ala.Cr.App.1982), this court reiterated what Judge Harris so definitively stated in Summers v. State, 348 So.2d 1126 (Ala.Cr.App.), cert. denied, 348 So.2d 1136 (Ala.1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1070 , 98 S.Ct. 1253 , 55 L.Ed.2d 773 (1978), as follows: "`The constitutional right of an accused to demand the nature and cause of the accusation against him is not a technical right, but is fundamental and essential to the guaranty that no person shall be deprived of his liberty except by due process of law, nor be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense. "

1982In Deep v. State, 414 So.2d 141, 147 (Ala. Cr.App.1982), this court reiterated what Judge Harris so definitively stated in Summers v. State, 348 So.2d 1126 (Ala.Cr.App.), cert. denied, 348 So.2d 1136 (Ala.1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1070 , 98 S.Ct. 1253 , 55 L.Ed.2d 773 (1978) as follows: "The constitutional right of an accused to demand the nature and cause of the accusation against him is not a technical right, but is fundamental and essential to the guaranty that no person shall be deprived of his liberty except by due process of law, nor be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense.

1986"In Deep v. State, 414 So.2d 141, 147 (Ala.Cr.App.1982), this court reiterated what Judge Harris so definitively stated in Summers v. State, 348 So.2d 1126 (Ala.Cr.App.), cert. denied, 348 So.2d 1136 (Ala.1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1070 , 98 S.Ct. 1253 , 55 L.Ed.2d 773 (1978), as follows: "`The constitutional right of an accused to demand the nature and cause of the accusation against him is not a technical right, but is fundamental and essential to the guaranty that no person shall be deprived of his liberty except by due process of law, nor be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense. "

1982In Deep v. State, 414 So.2d 141, 147 (Ala. Cr.App.1982), this court reiterated what Judge Harris so definitively stated in Summers v. State, 348 So.2d 1126 (Ala.Cr.App.), cert. denied, 348 So.2d 1136 (Ala.1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1070 , 98 S.Ct. 1253 , 55 L.Ed.2d 773 (1978) as follows: "The constitutional right of an accused to demand the nature and cause of the accusation against him is not a technical right, but is fundamental and essential to the guaranty that no person shall be deprived of his liberty except by due process of law, nor be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense.

1986"In Deep v. State, 414 So.2d 141, 147 (Ala.Cr.App.1982), this court reiterated what Judge Harris so definitively stated in Summers v. State, 348 So.2d 1126 (Ala.Cr.App.), cert. denied, 348 So.2d 1136 (Ala.1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1070 , 98 S.Ct. 1253 , 55 L.Ed.2d 773 (1978), as follows: "`The constitutional right of an accused to demand the nature and cause of the accusation against him is not a technical right, but is fundamental and essential to the guaranty that no person shall be deprived of his liberty except by due process of law, nor be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense. "

1982In Deep v. State, 414 So.2d 141, 147 (Ala. Cr.App.1982), this court reiterated what Judge Harris so definitively stated in Summers v. State, 348 So.2d 1126 (Ala.Cr.App.), cert. denied, 348 So.2d 1136 (Ala.1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1070 , 98 S.Ct. 1253 , 55 L.Ed.2d 773 (1978) as follows: "The constitutional right of an accused to demand the nature and cause of the accusation against him is not a technical right, but is fundamental and essential to the guaranty that no person shall be deprived of his liberty except by due process of law, nor be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense.

1986"In Deep v. State, 414 So.2d 141, 147 (Ala.Cr.App.1982), this court reiterated what Judge Harris so definitively stated in Summers v. State, 348 So.2d 1126 (Ala.Cr.App.), cert. denied, 348 So.2d 1136 (Ala.1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1070 , 98 S.Ct. 1253 , 55 L.Ed.2d 773 (1978), as follows: "`The constitutional right of an accused to demand the nature and cause of the accusation against him is not a technical right, but is fundamental and essential to the guaranty that no person shall be deprived of his liberty except by due process of law, nor be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense. "

1982In Deep v. State, 414 So.2d 141, 147 (Ala. Cr.App.1982), this court reiterated what Judge Harris so definitively stated in Summers v. State, 348 So.2d 1126 (Ala.Cr.App.), cert. denied, 348 So.2d 1136 (Ala.1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1070 , 98 S.Ct. 1253 , 55 L.Ed.2d 773 (1978) as follows: "The constitutional right of an accused to demand the nature and cause of the accusation against him is not a technical right, but is fundamental and essential to the guaranty that no person shall be deprived of his liberty except by due process of law, nor be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense.

1972Blackman v. Johnson, 35 Ala. 252 .

1886They do not fall within any of the exceptions to the general rule of the inadmissibility of hearsay evidence. — Blackman v. Johnson, 35 Ala. 252 ; Vicksburg & Mer.

1938Humes v. O’Bryan & Washington, 74 Ala. 64 .

1930Humes v. O’Bryan, 74 Ala. 64 ; Trammell v. Hudmon, 78 Ala. 222 .” I am therefore of the opinion that, the trial court committed reversible error in sustaining the objection to let the witness Hall testify as to the declarations of Amanda Knox as above referred to and discussed and Justices GARDNER, THOMAS, BOULDIN, BROWN, and BOOSTER concur.

1930Thomas v. State [ 20 Ala. App. 128 ] 101 So. 93 ; 22 R.

1930Thomas v. State [ 20 Ala. App. 128 ] 101 So. 93 ; 22 R.

2004Whitten v. Whitten , 592 So.2d at 186 .

2004Whitten v. Whitten, 592 So.2d at 186 .

1993Citing Jones v. State , 580 So.2d 97 (Ala.Cr.App. 1991), the majority concludes that the "other exception" into which the collateral crime evidence in this case fits is the "common plan, scheme, or design" exception.

1993Citing Jones v. State, 580 So.2d 97 (Ala.Cr.

1991The exceptions to the general rule of inadmissibility of evidence of subsequent repairs were noted by this court in Banner Welders, Inc. v. Knighton , 425 So.2d 441 (Ala. 1982), where we stated: "Generally, evidence of subsequent repairs is not admissible to establish negligence, although it may be admissible to show identity of ownership, to show control of the locus, to contradict or impeach a witness, or to lessen the weight of an expert opinion.

1989Then, in Bowden v. State , 538 So.2d 1226 (Ala. 1988), we clarified our position with regard to the Anonymous decision, when we stated: "We begin by pointing out that, as demonstrated by this Court's decisions in Anonymous and Ex parte Cofer, supra , there is no longer any basis for the view that, in the prosecution of sex crimes, the Alabama courts will be more liberal in their extensions of the exceptions to the general rule of exclusion.

1988As the majority recognizes, "there is authority, perhaps even a modern trend, that supports the view that, in a prosecution for a sex crime, evidence of similar collateral sexual misconduct is admissible for the purpose of showing that the accused has the propensity to commit the sex crime for which he is charged." The majority, citing Anonymous v. State, 507 So.2d 972 (Ala. 1987), and Ex parte Cofer, 440 So.2d 1121 (Ala.1983), nevertheless concludes that, "there is no longer any basis for the view that, in the prosecution of sex crimes, the Alabama courts will be more liberal in their extensi

1988As the majority recognizes, "there is authority, perhaps even a modern trend, that supports the view that, in a prosecution for a sex crime, evidence of similar collateral sexual misconduct is admissible for the purpose of showing that the accused has the propensity to commit the sex crime for which he is charged." The majority, citing Anonymous v. State , 507 So.2d 972 (Ala. 1987), and Ex parte Cofer , 440 So.2d 1121 (Ala. 1983), nevertheless concludes that, "there is no longer any basis for the view that, in the prosecution of sex crimes, the Alabama courts will be more liberal in their exte

1981Bobo v. State , 56 Ala. App. 622 , 324 So.2d 336 (1975); McDonald v. State , 57 Ala. App. 529 , 329 So.2d 583 (1975), cert. denied, 295 Ala. 410 , 329 So.2d 596 , cert. denied, 429 U.S. 834 , 97 S.Ct. 99 , 50 L.Ed.2d 99 (1976); Pope v. State , Ala.Cr.App., 365 So.2d 369 (1978).

1981Bobo v. State , 56 Ala. App. 622 , 324 So.2d 336 (1975); McDonald v. State , 57 Ala. App. 529 , 329 So.2d 583 (1975), cert. denied, 295 Ala. 410 , 329 So.2d 596 , cert. denied, 429 U.S. 834 , 97 S.Ct. 99 , 50 L.Ed.2d 99 (1976); Pope v. State , Ala.Cr.App., 365 So.2d 369 (1978).

1981Bobo v. State , 56 Ala. App. 622 , 324 So.2d 336 (1975); McDonald v. State , 57 Ala. App. 529 , 329 So.2d 583 (1975), cert. denied, 295 Ala. 410 , 329 So.2d 596 , cert. denied, 429 U.S. 834 , 97 S.Ct. 99 , 50 L.Ed.2d 99 (1976); Pope v. State , Ala.Cr.App., 365 So.2d 369 (1978).

1981Bobo v. State , 56 Ala. App. 622 , 324 So.2d 336 (1975); McDonald v. State , 57 Ala. App. 529 , 329 So.2d 583 (1975), cert. denied, 295 Ala. 410 , 329 So.2d 596 , cert. denied, 429 U.S. 834 , 97 S.Ct. 99 , 50 L.Ed.2d 99 (1976); Pope v. State , Ala.Cr.App., 365 So.2d 369 (1978).

1981Bobo v. State , 56 Ala. App. 622 , 324 So.2d 336 (1975); McDonald v. State , 57 Ala. App. 529 , 329 So.2d 583 (1975), cert. denied, 295 Ala. 410 , 329 So.2d 596 , cert. denied, 429 U.S. 834 , 97 S.Ct. 99 , 50 L.Ed.2d 99 (1976); Pope v. State , Ala.Cr.App., 365 So.2d 369 (1978).

1981Bobo v. State , 56 Ala. App. 622 , 324 So.2d 336 (1975); McDonald v. State , 57 Ala. App. 529 , 329 So.2d 583 (1975), cert. denied, 295 Ala. 410 , 329 So.2d 596 , cert. denied, 429 U.S. 834 , 97 S.Ct. 99 , 50 L.Ed.2d 99 (1976); Pope v. State , Ala.Cr.App., 365 So.2d 369 (1978).

1981Bobo v. State , 56 Ala. App. 622 , 324 So.2d 336 (1975); McDonald v. State , 57 Ala. App. 529 , 329 So.2d 583 (1975), cert. denied, 295 Ala. 410 , 329 So.2d 596 , cert. denied, 429 U.S. 834 , 97 S.Ct. 99 , 50 L.Ed.2d 99 (1976); Pope v. State , Ala.Cr.App., 365 So.2d 369 (1978).

1981Bobo v. State , 56 Ala. App. 622 , 324 So.2d 336 (1975); McDonald v. State , 57 Ala. App. 529 , 329 So.2d 583 (1975), cert. denied, 295 Ala. 410 , 329 So.2d 596 , cert. denied, 429 U.S. 834 , 97 S.Ct. 99 , 50 L.Ed.2d 99 (1976); Pope v. State , Ala.Cr.App., 365 So.2d 369 (1978).

1981Bobo v. State , 56 Ala. App. 622 , 324 So.2d 336 (1975); McDonald v. State , 57 Ala. App. 529 , 329 So.2d 583 (1975), cert. denied, 295 Ala. 410 , 329 So.2d 596 , cert. denied, 429 U.S. 834 , 97 S.Ct. 99 , 50 L.Ed.2d 99 (1976); Pope v. State , Ala.Cr.App., 365 So.2d 369 (1978).

1977The testimony is classed as a collective fact.” See also Madison v. State, 40 Ala.App. 62 , 109 So.2d 749 .

1977The testimony is classed as a collective fact.” See also Madison v. State, 40 Ala.App. 62 , 109 So.2d 749 .

1977The court went on to say “skid marks [on] the road or highway were made at the time of the impact and the witness may not testify as to the speed of the vehicle simply by observing these local conditions and viewing the damage to the vehicles.” In our judgment, the facts in the present case are distinguishable from those decided in Jowers v. Dauphin, supra. In Holt v. State, 26 Ala.App. 223 , 157 So. 449 , a case whose facts parallel those in the case at bar, this court said: “. . . [A] witness not present at the time of the accident, but, arriving immediately afterwards, examined the road and

1977The court went on to say “skid marks [on] the road or highway were made at the time of the impact and the witness may not testify as to the speed of the vehicle simply by observing these local conditions and viewing the damage to the vehicles.” In our judgment, the facts in the present case are distinguishable from those decided in Jowers v. Dauphin, supra. In Holt v. State, 26 Ala.App. 223 , 157 So. 449 , a case whose facts parallel those in the case at bar, this court said: “. . . [A] witness not present at the time of the accident, but, arriving immediately afterwards, examined the road and