28 Indiana opinions name it 2 courts 1885–2020 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Indiana courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Medvid v. Stategreen2 sentences1999In Dockery v. State, 644 N.E.2d 573, 579 (Ind.1994), our supreme court noted that: One of the exceptions to the general rule against the admissibility of character evidence, including evidence of prior bad acts, arose when a defendant specifically placed character in issue by raising the defense of entrapment_ [Citation omitted]. [Medvid v. State, 172 Ind.App. 27, 30 , 359 N.E.2d 274, 276 (1977)] (“To establish [that the government merely afforded the defendant an opportunity to satisfy his criminal intent] it is proper for the state to present evidence of prior crimes from which the jury migh 1999In Dockery v. State, 644 N.E.2d 573, 579 (Ind.1994), our supreme court noted that: One of the exceptions to the general rule against the admissibility of character evidence, including evidence of prior bad acts, arose when a defendant specifically placed character in issue by raising the defense of entrapment_ [Citation omitted]. [Medvid v. State, 172 Ind.App. 27, 30 , 359 N.E.2d 274, 276 (1977)] (“To establish [that the government merely afforded the defendant an opportunity to satisfy his criminal intent] it is proper for the state to present evidence of prior crimes from which the jury migh | 2 | 2 |
PSI Energy, Inc. v. Robertsgreen1 sentence2006Moreover, our supreme court has recently held that "in the absence of negligent selection of the contractor, an employee of the contractor has no claim against the principal based solely on the five exceptions to the general rule of nonliability for acts of the contractor." PSI Energy, Inc. v. Roberts, 829 N.E.2d 943 953 (Ind.2005) (emphasis added). | 1 | 1 |
Dockery v. Stategreen2 sentences1999In Dockery v. State, 644 N.E.2d 573, 579 (Ind.1994), our supreme court noted that: One of the exceptions to the general rule against the admissibility of character evidence, including evidence of prior bad acts, arose when a defendant specifically placed character in issue by raising the defense of entrapment_ [Citation omitted]. [Medvid v. State, 172 Ind.App. 27, 30 , 359 N.E.2d 274, 276 (1977)] (“To establish [that the government merely afforded the defendant an opportunity to satisfy his criminal intent] it is proper for the state to present evidence of prior crimes from which the jury migh 1999In Dockery v. State, 644 N.E.2d 573, 579 (Ind.1994), our supreme court noted that: One of the exceptions to the general rule against the admissibility of character evidence, including evidence of prior bad acts, arose when a defendant specifically placed character in issue by raising the defense of entrapment. . . . [Citation omitted]. [ Medvid v. State, 172 Ind.App. 27, 30 , 359 N.E.2d 274, 276 (1977)] ("To establish [that the government merely afforded the defendant an opportunity to satisfy his criminal intent] it is proper for the state to present evidence of prior crimes from which the ju | 1 | 1 |
Hardin v. Stategreen2 sentences1994See Hardin, 611 N.E.2d at 128 ; Byrd v. State (1992), Ind., 593 N.E.2d 1183, 1184-85 ; Penley, 506 N.E.2d at 808 . [6] *579 One of the exceptions to the general rule against the admissibility of character evidence, including evidence of prior bad acts, arose when a defendant specifically placed character at issue by raising the defense of entrapment. 1994Hardin, 611 N.E.2d at 131 ("In instances where entrapment is presented as a defense, the state may introduce evidence of the defendant's character to rebut the defense."); Allen v. State (1988), Ind., 518 N.E.2d 800, 802 ("It was not error to admit evidence of appellant's prior convictions once he indicated an intention to use an entrapment defense."); Medvid, 172 Ind. App. at 30 , 359 N.E.2d at 276 ("To establish [that the government merely afforded the defendant an opportunity to satisfy his criminal intent] it is proper for the state to present evidence of prior crimes from which the jury m | 1 | 1 |
Allen v. Stategreen1 sentence1994Hardin, 611 N.E.2d at 131 ("In instances where entrapment is presented as a defense, the state may introduce evidence of the defendant's character to rebut the defense."); Allen v. State (1988), Ind., 518 N.E.2d 800, 802 ("It was not error to admit evidence of appellant's prior convictions once he indicated an intention to use an entrapment defense."); Medvid, 172 Ind. App. at 30 , 359 N.E.2d at 276 ("To establish [that the government merely afforded the defendant an opportunity to satisfy his criminal intent] it is proper for the state to present evidence of prior crimes from which the jury m | 1 | 1 |
Burns v. Stategreen1 sentence1986See, Burns v. State (1970), 260 N.E.2d 559 . | 1 | 1 |
Gears v. Stategreen2 sentences1939The exceptions to the general rule cannot be stated with categorical precision, but generally speaking, evidence of other crimes is competent to prove the specific crime charged, when it tends to establish (1) motive; (2) intent; (8) the absence of mistake or accident; (4) a common scheme or plan embracing the commission of two or more crimes so related to each other that proving of one tends to establish the others; (5) the identity of the person charged with the commission of the crime on trial.” In the case of Gears v. State (1981), 203 Ind. 380, 382, 383, 384 , 180 N. E. 585 , this court f 1939The exceptions to the general rule cannot be stated with categorical precision, but generally speaking, evidence of other crimes is competent to prove the specific crime charged, when it tends to establish (1) motive; (2) intent; (8) the absence of mistake or accident; (4) a common scheme or plan embracing the commission of two or more crimes so related to each other that proving of one tends to establish the others; (5) the identity of the person charged with the commission of the crime on trial.” In the case of Gears v. State (1981), 203 Ind. 380, 382, 383, 384 , 180 N. E. 585 , this court f | 1 | 1 |
| Jenney Electric Co. v. Branhamgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Hodges v. Truaxgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Indiana. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Royse v. Leaming
neutral
2 sentences1962This constitutes one of the exceptions to the general rule upon the subject of hearsay evidence. 1 Greenleaf Ev., section 147; Royse, Exr. v. Leaming, 72 Ind. 182 . “ ‘Mr. Greenleaf, Vol. 1, section 148, in discussing the admissibility of this class of evidence, says: “The ground upon which this evidence is received, is the extreme improbability of its falsehood. 1898This constitutes one of the exceptions to the general rule upon the subject of hearsay evidence. 1 Greenleaf Ev., section 147; Royse, Exr., v. Leaming, 72 Ind. 182 . | 3 | 1890–1962 |
State v. Smithers
green
2 sentences1977Vale v. Louisiana (1970), 399 U.S. 30 , 90 S. Ct. 1969 , 26 L.Ed.2d 409 ; Smith v. State (1971), 256 Ind. 603 , 271 N.E.2d 133 ; State v. Smithers (1971), 256 Ind. 512 , 269 N.E.2d 874 .” (Emphasis added). 1977Vale v. Louisiana (1970), 399 U.S. 30 , 90 S. Ct. 1969 , 26 L.Ed.2d 409 ; Smith v. State (1971), 256 Ind. 603 , 271 N.E.2d 133 ; State v. Smithers (1971), 256 Ind. 512 , 269 N.E.2d 874 .” (Emphasis added). | 2 | 1974–1977 |
Smith v. State
green
2 sentences1977Vale v. Louisiana (1970), 399 U.S. 30 , 90 S. Ct. 1969 , 26 L.Ed.2d 409 ; Smith v. State (1971), 256 Ind. 603 , 271 N.E.2d 133 ; State v. Smithers (1971), 256 Ind. 512 , 269 N.E.2d 874 .” (Emphasis added). 1977Vale v. Louisiana (1970), 399 U.S. 30 , 90 S. Ct. 1969 , 26 L.Ed.2d 409 ; Smith v. State (1971), 256 Ind. 603 , 271 N.E.2d 133 ; State v. Smithers (1971), 256 Ind. 512 , 269 N.E.2d 874 .” (Emphasis added). | 2 | 1974–1977 |
Vale v. Louisiana
green
2 sentences1977Vale v. Louisiana (1970), 399 U.S. 30 , 90 S. Ct. 1969 , 26 L.Ed.2d 409 ; Smith v. State (1971), 256 Ind. 603 , 271 N.E.2d 133 ; State v. Smithers (1971), 256 Ind. 512 , 269 N.E.2d 874 .” (Emphasis added). 1977Vale v. Louisiana (1970), 399 U.S. 30 , 90 S. Ct. 1969 , 26 L.Ed.2d 409 ; Smith v. State (1971), 256 Ind. 603 , 271 N.E.2d 133 ; State v. Smithers (1971), 256 Ind. 512 , 269 N.E.2d 874 .” (Emphasis added). | 2 | 1974–1977 |
Bagley v. Insight Communications Co., LP
green
1 sentence2020Bagley, 658 N.E.2d at 586 (citing Perry v. N. Ind. Pub. | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Johnson v. Johnson
green
2 sentences2017Juatrice claims that none of the exceptions to the general rule are applicable and relies on Johnson v. Johnson, 653 N.E.2d 512 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995). 2017In particular, she notes a portion of the opinion stating, “We believe that the legislature did not intend for trial courts to retain jurisdiction over dissolution actions following the death of one of the parties for the purpose of resolving property matters between the parties and their successors in interest.” Id. at 516 . | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Red Roof Inns, Inc. v. Purvis
green
2 sentences2008The plaintiff sought to impose liability on Red Roof by means of one of the exceptions to the general rule that a principal is not liable for the negligence of an independent contractor; that exception being “where the act to be performed will probably cause injury to others unless due precaution is taken.” 691 N.E.2d at 1344 . 2008We held that "[t]he nature of the roofing project in this case did not create the type of danger so as to create a non-delegable duty in Red Roof on the basis that the act to be performed would probably cause harm to others.” Id. at 1347 . | 1 | 2008–2008 |
Hochstetler v. Elkhart County Highway Department
green
1 sentence2008Id. | 1 | 2008–2008 |
Moberly v. Day
green
1 sentence2008In applying the ten-factor analysis set forth by our Supreme Court in Moberly v. Day, 757 N.E.2d 1007 (Ind.2001), to determine whether an individual should be treated as an independent contractor or an employee, we concluded that the trial court properly determined that Martin was operating the truck as an independent contractor. | 1 | 2008–2008 |
Lannan v. State
green
1 sentence1999While the above rule was announced prior to our adoption of Fed.R.Evid. 404(b) in Lannan v. State, 600 N.E.2d 1334 (Ind.1992), this court has recently observed that a defendant who raised the defense of entrapment had affirmatively asserted a claim of contrary intent which triggered the exception to Evid. | 1 | 1999–1999 |
Winkler v. V.G. Reed & Sons, Inc.
green
1 sentence1996Reed & Sons, Inc. (1994), Ind., 638 N.E.2d 1228 , were applicable to the present case. | 1 | 1996–1996 |
Byrd v. State
green
1 sentence1994See Hardin, 611 N.E.2d at 128 ; Byrd v. State (1992), Ind., 593 N.E.2d 1183, 1184-85 ; Penley, 506 N.E.2d at 808 . [6] *579 One of the exceptions to the general rule against the admissibility of character evidence, including evidence of prior bad acts, arose when a defendant specifically placed character at issue by raising the defense of entrapment. | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Penley v. State
green
1 sentence1994See Hardin, 611 N.E.2d at 128 ; Byrd v. State (1992), Ind., 593 N.E.2d 1183, 1184-85 ; Penley, 506 N.E.2d at 808 . [6] *579 One of the exceptions to the general rule against the admissibility of character evidence, including evidence of prior bad acts, arose when a defendant specifically placed character at issue by raising the defense of entrapment. | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Kerlin v. State
green
2 sentences1993Sink is consistent with language adopted by the Supreme Court in Lanzan from the dissenting opinion in Kerlin v. State (1970), 255 Ind. 420 , 265 N.E.2d 22 . 1993Sink is consistent with language adopted by the Supreme Court in Lanzan from the dissenting opinion in Kerlin v. State (1970), 255 Ind. 420 , 265 N.E.2d 22 . | 1 | 1993–1993 |
Tata v. State
green
2 sentences1988Tata v. State (1986), Ind., 486 N.E.2d 1025 . 1988Tata v. State (1986), Ind., 486 N.E.2d 1025 . | 1 | 1988–1988 |
Agnello v. United States
green
2 sentences1977And such searches are held unlawful notwithstanding facts unquestionably showing probable cause.’ Agnello v. United States (1925), 269 U.S. 20, 33 , 46 S.Ct. 4, 6 , 70 L.Ed. 145 .” *430 Ludlow also reaffirmed the principle that the State has the burden of establishing a warrantless seizure to have been conducted legally: “Since it was conceded here that the search and seizure of the drugs was conducted without a search warrant, the burden rested with the State to demonstrate that the police action fell within one of the exceptions to the general rule requiring a warrant. 1977And such searches are held unlawful notwithstanding facts unquestionably showing probable cause.’ Agnello v. United States (1925), 269 U.S. 20, 33 , 46 S.Ct. 4, 6 , 70 L.Ed. 145 .” *430 Ludlow also reaffirmed the principle that the State has the burden of establishing a warrantless seizure to have been conducted legally: “Since it was conceded here that the search and seizure of the drugs was conducted without a search warrant, the burden rested with the State to demonstrate that the police action fell within one of the exceptions to the general rule requiring a warrant. | 1 | 1977–1977 |
Meeks v. State
green
2 sentences1975In Ward v. State (1965), 246 Ind. 374, 384 , 205 N.E.2d 148, 154 , the Supreme Court was able to state that “. . . the law is well settled that evidence regarding other sex offenses similar to that charged is admissible.” Abruptly, in Meeks v. State (1968), 249 Ind. 659 , 234 N.E.2d 629 , the court declared that Larmar, supra, proceeded too far and did not fit within any of the exceptions to the general rule excluding prior offenses. 1975In Ward v. State (1965), 246 Ind. 374, 384 , 205 N.E.2d 148, 154 , the Supreme Court was able to state that “. . . the law is well settled that evidence regarding other sex offenses similar to that charged is admissible.” Abruptly, in Meeks v. State (1968), 249 Ind. 659 , 234 N.E.2d 629 , the court declared that Larmar, supra, proceeded too far and did not fit within any of the exceptions to the general rule excluding prior offenses. | 1 | 1975–1975 |
Ward v. State
green
2 sentences1975In Ward v. State (1965), 246 Ind. 374, 384 , 205 N.E.2d 148, 154 , the Supreme Court was able to state that “. . . the law is well settled that evidence regarding other sex offenses similar to that charged is admissible.” Abruptly, in Meeks v. State (1968), 249 Ind. 659 , 234 N.E.2d 629 , the court declared that Larmar, supra, proceeded too far and did not fit within any of the exceptions to the general rule excluding prior offenses. 1975In Ward v. State (1965), 246 Ind. 374, 384 , 205 N.E.2d 148, 154 , the Supreme Court was able to state that “. . . the law is well settled that evidence regarding other sex offenses similar to that charged is admissible.” Abruptly, in Meeks v. State (1968), 249 Ind. 659 , 234 N.E.2d 629 , the court declared that Larmar, supra, proceeded too far and did not fit within any of the exceptions to the general rule excluding prior offenses. | 1 | 1975–1975 |
Sears v. Carpenter
green
1 sentence1971Freeman (1905), 165 Ind. 369 , 74 N. E. 244 . “. . . | 1 | 1971–1971 |
Evans v. State ex rel. Freeman
green
1 sentence1971Freeman (1905), 165 Ind. 369 , 74 N. E. 244 . “. . . | 1 | 1971–1971 |
Loveless v. State
green
2 sentences1967Among these are cases where a crime has certain peculiar characteristics connected with its commission so that it very reasonably identifies the person involved in the commission. . . .” Quoting with authority from Loveless v. State (1960), 240 Ind. 534 , 166 N. E. 2d 864 . *268 The opinion concludes by stating that since these other crimes only show that the appellant previously committed armed robbery and are void of peculiar characteristics connected with the crime at issue, they do not fit into any one of the exceptions to the general rule. 1967Among these are cases where a crime has certain peculiar characteristics connected with its commission so that it very reasonably identifies the person involved in the commission. . . .” Quoting with authority from Loveless v. State (1960), 240 Ind. 534 , 166 N. E. 2d 864 . *268 The opinion concludes by stating that since these other crimes only show that the appellant previously committed armed robbery and are void of peculiar characteristics connected with the crime at issue, they do not fit into any one of the exceptions to the general rule. | 1 | 1967–1967 |
Helwig v. Jordan
green
1 sentence1955In Helwig v. Jordan (1876), 53 Ind. 21 , the court adopted the following declaration in 1 Wilson Superior Court Rep. 447: “One who erects a nuisance and after-wards . . . leases his real estate, receiving rent therefor and knowing, or having reason to believe, that the use of the property for the purpose for which it is leased will prove to be injurious to the property of others, or become a nuisance, will be liable to an action for an injury resulting therefrom.” The admission made in Deller v. Hofferberth (1891), 127 Ind. 414 , 26 N. E. 889 , serves to further reveal the line of the court’s | 1 | 1955–1955 |
Deller v. Hofferberth
neutral
2 sentences1955In Helwig v. Jordan (1876), 53 Ind. 21 , the court adopted the following declaration in 1 Wilson Superior Court Rep. 447: “One who erects a nuisance and after-wards . . . leases his real estate, receiving rent therefor and knowing, or having reason to believe, that the use of the property for the purpose for which it is leased will prove to be injurious to the property of others, or become a nuisance, will be liable to an action for an injury resulting therefrom.” The admission made in Deller v. Hofferberth (1891), 127 Ind. 414 , 26 N. E. 889 , serves to further reveal the line of the court’s 1955In Helwig v. Jordan (1876), 53 Ind. 21 , the court adopted the following declaration in 1 Wilson Superior Court Rep. 447: “One who erects a nuisance and after-wards . . . leases his real estate, receiving rent therefor and knowing, or having reason to believe, that the use of the property for the purpose for which it is leased will prove to be injurious to the property of others, or become a nuisance, will be liable to an action for an injury resulting therefrom.” The admission made in Deller v. Hofferberth (1891), 127 Ind. 414 , 26 N. E. 889 , serves to further reveal the line of the court’s | 1 | 1955–1955 |
| Zimmerman v. State neutral | 1 | 1939–1939 |
| Little v. Koerner neutral | 1 | 1914–1914 |
| Kerstetter v. Raymond green | 1 | 1911–1911 |
| Board of Commissioners v. Gibson green | 1 | 1911–1911 |
| Dobbins v. McNamara green | 1 | 1892–1892 |
| Reno v. Tyson green | 1 | 1889–1889 |
| Hough v. Railway Co. green | 1 | 1885–1885 |
| Indiana Car Co. v. Parker green | 1 | 1885–1885 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.