exceptions to the general rule in Oklahoma

1980As this Court pointed out in Roulston, supra, at 869 , the exceptions to the general rule of inadmissibility of evidence of other crimes should be used with the “utmost caution” and doubts as to admissibility should be “resolved in favor of the defendant.” According to the State, Reames’ testimony was “proper in that it corroborated the victim’s identification of the accused.” While Reames’ testimony fails to support the victim’s identification of the accused as the person who held up the convenience store at 7:15 p. m. on January 13, it does refute the appellant’s claim that he was at the con

1980As this Court pointed out in Roulston, supra, at 869 , the exceptions to the general rule of inadmissibility of evidence of other crimes should be used with the "utmost caution" and doubts as to admissibility should be "resolved in favor of the defendant." According to the State, Reames' testimony was "proper in that it corroborated the victim's identification of the accused." While Reames' testimony fails to support the victim's identification of the accused as the person who held up the convenience store at 7:15 p.m. on January 13, it does refute the appellant's claim that he was at the conc

1973In Jones v. State, Okl.Cr., 321 P.2d 432, 442 (1958), this Court approved the introduction of evidence concerning other purchases of paregoric, as being part of the res gestae; and cited the exceptions to the general rule which prohibits the introduction of evidence of other crimes, as found in State v. Rule, 1914, 11 Okl.Cr. 237 , 144 P. 807 ; Michelin v. State, 66 Okl.Cr. 241 , 90 P.2d 1081 ; and Roulston v. State, Okl.Cr., 307 P.2d 861 .

1973In Jones v. State, Okl.Cr., 321 P.2d 432, 442 (1958), this Court approved the introduction of evidence concerning other purchases of paregoric, as being part of the res gestae; and cited the exceptions to the general rule which prohibits the introduction of evidence of other crimes, as found in State v. Rule, 1914, 11 Okl.Cr. 237 , 144 P. 807 ; Michelin v. State, 66 Okl.Cr. 241 , 90 P.2d 1081 ; and Roulston v. State, Okl.Cr., 307 P.2d 861 .

2006There, the Supreme Court applied the exception to the American Rule recognized in City Nat’l Bank & Trust Co. v. Owens, 1977 OK 86 , 565 P.2d 4 , and affirmed an award of prevailing party attorney fees to the defendant where the plaintiffs action was deemed “onerous.” The Court reiterated: ... one of the exceptions to the general rule recognized at common law and in modern practice, is the court’s inherent equitable power to award attorney fees regardless of the fact that an award is not authorized by statute or contract, whenever overriding considerations, such as oppressive behavior on the p

1978Such allowances in the absence of statute or some agreement expressly authorizing the same, cannot be sustained.” (Citations omitted.) We believe the Supreme Court took a long needed new look at attorney’s fees assessed as costs in litigation when in 1977 in the case of City National Bank & Trust Company v. Owens, 565 P.2d 4 (Okl.), after reviewing the so-called American rule governing the award of attorney’s fees to the prevailing party, held as follows at p. 8: As stated above, one of the exceptions to the general rule recognized at common law and in modern practice, is the court’s inherent

1976These exceptions were restated in Moulton v. State, Okl.Cr., 476 P.2d 366 (1970), wherein, we stated: “. . .

1972The exceptions to the general rule concerning the introduction of evidence of other possible crimes are set forth in Moulton v. State, Okl.Cr., 476 P. 2d 366 (1970).

1973In Jones v. State, Okl.Cr., 321 P.2d 432, 442 (1958), this Court approved the introduction of evidence concerning other purchases of paregoric, as being part of the res gestae; and cited the exceptions to the general rule which prohibits the introduction of evidence of other crimes, as found in State v. Rule, 1914, 11 Okl.Cr. 237 , 144 P. 807 ; Michelin v. State, 66 Okl.Cr. 241 , 90 P.2d 1081 ; and Roulston v. State, Okl.Cr., 307 P.2d 861 .

1958Then in 1939 Judge Barefoot in Michelin v. State, 66 Okl.Cr. 241 , 90 P.2d 1081 , cited by the Attorney General, reviewed the intervening cases; and recently (1957) Judge Nix in Roulston v. State, Okl.

1973In Jones v. State, Okl.Cr., 321 P.2d 432, 442 (1958), this Court approved the introduction of evidence concerning other purchases of paregoric, as being part of the res gestae; and cited the exceptions to the general rule which prohibits the introduction of evidence of other crimes, as found in State v. Rule, 1914, 11 Okl.Cr. 237 , 144 P. 807 ; Michelin v. State, 66 Okl.Cr. 241 , 90 P.2d 1081 ; and Roulston v. State, Okl.Cr., 307 P.2d 861 .

1958Then in 1939 Judge Barefoot in Michelin v. State, 66 Okl.Cr. 241 , 90 P.2d 1081 , cited by the Attorney General, reviewed the intervening cases; and recently (1957) Judge Nix in Roulston v. State, Okl.

2006Dean Bailey Olds at ¶ 15, 32 P.3d at 820 , quoting Owens, 1977 OK 86 at ¶ 15, 565 P.2d 4 .

1983Johnson v. State, 554 P.2d 51 (Okl.Cr.1976).

1977Plaintiff relies on Ward v. Continental Insurance Corporation, 165 Okl. 20 , 24 P.2d 654 (1933), as being one of the exceptions to the general rule.

1977Plaintiff relies on Ward v. Continental Insurance Corporation, 165 Okl. 20 , 24 P.2d 654 (1933), as being one of the exceptions to the general rule.

1974In dealing with a similar proposition in English v. State, Okl.Cr., 480 P.2d 279 , this Court stated: “In the instant case, the state contends that said evidence was offered to show a common scheme or plan, which is one of the exceptions to the general rule.

1968Notwithstanding the persuasive argument presented on behalf of the State, we are of the opinion that the rule enunciated in Koontz v. State, 10 Okl.Cr. 553 , 139 P. 842 , and cited many times with approval in this and many other jurisdictions, is controlling in the instant case.

1968Notwithstanding the persuasive argument presented on behalf of the State, we are of the opinion that the rule enunciated in Koontz v. State, 10 Okl.Cr. 553 , 139 P. 842 , and cited many times with approval in this and many other jurisdictions, is controlling in the instant case.

1961“Just as the professional bank robber uses habitually certain methods in his course of criminal conduct, so the sexual pervert, as a general rule, confines himself to a certain limited line, a certain habitual form of sexual degeneracy, from which he rarely, if ever, departs; and those methods that he habitually employs leave their in-dicia, their footprints, or finger marks, their traces, in one form or another, of his personal criminal identity.” In Rhine v. State, Okl.Cr., 336 P.2d 913 , we said, in the body of the opinion, that among the exceptions to the general rule against the introduct

1959In Thomas v. First National Bank of Tecumseh, 32 Okl. 115 , 121 P. 272 , the following is set forth in the second paragraph of the syllabus: "One of the exceptions to the general rule, as to the measure of damage, for the wrongful taking and conversion of personal property, is where the property so taken has a distinct `usable value'; and horses, broken and trained to do work, would have, under ordinary circumstances, such `usable value,' and where such property has been wrongfully taken by one, and detained from another, such other has the right to recover as damages the reasonable value of t

1959In Thomas v. First National Bank of Tecumseh, 32 Okl. 115 , 121 P. 272 , the following is set forth in the second paragraph of the syllabus: “One of the exceptions to the general rule, as to the measure of damage, for the wrongful taking and conversion of personal property, is where the property so taken has a distinct ‘usable value’; and horses, broken and trained to do work, would have, under ordinary circumstances, such ‘usable value,’ and where such property has been wrongfully taken by one, and detained from another, such other has the right to recover as damages the reasonable value of t

1959In Thomas v. First National Bank of Tecumseh, 32 Okl. 115 , 121 P. 272 , the following is set forth in the second paragraph of the syllabus: "One of the exceptions to the general rule, as to the measure of damage, for the wrongful taking and conversion of personal property, is where the property so taken has a distinct `usable value'; and horses, broken and trained to do work, would have, under ordinary circumstances, such `usable value,' and where such property has been wrongfully taken by one, and detained from another, such other has the right to recover as damages the reasonable value of t

1959In Thomas v. First National Bank of Tecumseh, 32 Okl. 115 , 121 P. 272 , the following is set forth in the second paragraph of the syllabus: “One of the exceptions to the general rule, as to the measure of damage, for the wrongful taking and conversion of personal property, is where the property so taken has a distinct ‘usable value’; and horses, broken and trained to do work, would have, under ordinary circumstances, such ‘usable value,’ and where such property has been wrongfully taken by one, and detained from another, such other has the right to recover as damages the reasonable value of t

1953“So, in this case, you are instructed that under the law, the employees of the defendant railway company were not required to assist the plaintiff with her luggage at the time she proceeded to alight from the train, unless you further believe and find she belonged to the exceptions to the general rule, that is, that she was ill, or of great age, or had some infirmity which rendered her unable to help herself, or had asked for assistance.” It is contended that such instruction was erroneous under the rule in Dickinson v. Tucker, 74 Okl. 43 , 176 P. 949, 950 , wherein syllabus three states: “Whe

1953“So, in this case, you are instructed that under the law, the employees of the defendant railway company were not required to assist the plaintiff with her luggage at the time she proceeded to alight from the train, unless you further believe and find she belonged to the exceptions to the general rule, that is, that she was ill, or of great age, or had some infirmity which rendered her unable to help herself, or had asked for assistance.” It is contended that such instruction was erroneous under the rule in Dickinson v. Tucker, 74 Okl. 43 , 176 P. 949, 950 , wherein syllabus three states: “Whe

1932Dec. 49 . * * * If they sprang out of the principal fact, tended to explain it, were voluntary and spontaneous, and made at a time so near it as to preclude the idea of deliberate design, they may be regarded as contemporaneous and admissible in evidence. * * Johnson v. State, 58 P. 761, 763 , 8 Wyo. 494 .” We are not unmindful that “almost every general rule has its exceptions,” and having-very carefully reviewed nearly all eases cited by defendants in support of their contentions, we are convinced the holding of the courts cited in said cases are based upon the exceptions to the general rule

1932Dec. 49 . * * * If they sprang out of the principal fact, tended to explain it, were voluntary and spontaneous, and made at a time so near it as to preclude the idea of deliberate design, they may be regarded as contemporaneous and admissible in evidence. * * Johnson v. State, 58 P. 761, 763 , 8 Wyo. 494 .” We are not unmindful that “almost every general rule has its exceptions,” and having-very carefully reviewed nearly all eases cited by defendants in support of their contentions, we are convinced the holding of the courts cited in said cases are based upon the exceptions to the general rule

1932Time and space will not permit a technical analysis of all the cases cited by defendants in support- of their contentions, but, in order to show the inapplicability of the cases cited by defendants, we call attention to tbe first ease cited by them, to wit, Smith v. Territory, 11 Okla. 669 , 69 P. 805 .

1932Time and space will not permit a technical analysis of all the cases cited by defendants in support- of their contentions, but, in order to show the inapplicability of the cases cited by defendants, we call attention to tbe first ease cited by them, to wit, Smith v. Territory, 11 Okla. 669 , 69 P. 805 .

1930Sternberger v. McGovern, 66 N. Y. 12 ; Haffey v. Lynch, 143 N. Y. 241 , 38 N. E. 298 .

1930Sternberger v. McGovern, 66 N. Y. 12 ; Haffey v. Lynch, 143 N. Y. 241 , 38 N. E. 298 .

1925Counsel for defendants, in support of the judgment of the trial court in their favor, contend that the case at bar fails within the general exception that the agent may act as an agent of both parties and may receive compensation from both parties where the interests of the two principals are not conflicting, as where the agent has no llscretion in reference to the transaction. *300 In support of this contention counsel for de.endants cite Kondos et al. v. Mouser, 61 Okla. 168 , 166 Pac. 707 , wherein the following rule is annouced: “One may act as agent for both parties where the interests of

1921He acted with full knowledge, and he is bound by his act.” Wlhile we agree with counsel in very much that U'ey have said- in support of the general rule stated, yet we -heartily concur in the exceptions to the general rule as announced in 14 Cyc. 588 in the following language: “But where the corporation at the time of the making of the note and the transfer of the stock was insolvent, the maker thereof may set up -by way of defense a fraudulent representation of the corporation and a want of consideration against the receiver as well as against the corporation — ” citing in support thereof, Li