exceptions to the general rule in Idaho

1987Exceptions to that general rule arise when there appears a causal connection, and those exceptions to the “going and coming” rule in Idaho are found in Eriksen v. Nez Perce County, 72 Idaho 1 , 235 P.2d 736 (1951): Among the exceptions to the general rule will be found incidents where the employee is on the employer’s premises in the vicinity of the actual situs of his employment; where going or returning in some transportation facility furnished by the employer; when transversing the only means of ingress or egress, whether furnished by the employer or by some other party and used with the kn

1987Exceptions to that general rule arise when there appears a causal connection, and those exceptions to the “going and coming” rule in Idaho are found in Eriksen v. Nez Perce County, 72 Idaho 1 , 235 P.2d 736 (1951): Among the exceptions to the general rule will be found incidents where the employee is on the employer’s premises in the vicinity of the actual situs of his employment; where going or returning in some transportation facility furnished by the employer; when transversing the only means of ingress or egress, whether furnished by the employer or by some other party and used with the kn

1992The trial court admitted evidence of his escape from a “confinement facility.” This Court first noted that, “[ejscape or flight is one of the exceptions to the general rule prohibiting evidence of other crimes.” Id. at 814 , 718 P.2d at 1252 (citing State v. Hargraves, 62 Idaho 8 , 107 P.2d 854 (1940)).

1992The trial court admitted evidence of his escape from a “confinement facility.” This Court first noted that, “[ejscape or flight is one of the exceptions to the general rule prohibiting evidence of other crimes.” Id. at 814 , 718 P.2d at 1252 (citing State v. Hargraves, 62 Idaho 8 , 107 P.2d 854 (1940)).

2000Pitkin, 112 Idaho at 507 , 733 P.2d at 728 , citing Eriksen v.. Nez Perce County, 72 Idaho 1 , 235 P.2d 736 (1951).

2000Pitkin, 112 Idaho at 507 , 733 P.2d at 728 , citing Eriksen v.. Nez Perce County, 72 Idaho 1 , 235 P.2d 736 (1951).

1987See also Diffendaffer v. Clifton, supra; Jaynes v. Potlatch Forests, Inc., 75 Idaho 297 , 271 P.2d 1016 (1954).

1987See also Diffendaffer v. Clifton, supra; Jaynes v. Potlatch Forests, Inc., 75 Idaho 297 , 271 P.2d 1016 (1954).

1978The same rule was announced in Gregory v. Padilla, 379 P.2d 951 (Alaska 1963), in which the Supreme Court of Alaska approved the following jury instruction: Where the property has a value for use, or usable value, which exceeds the amount represented by the lawful rate of interest, or where the interest would be inadequate compensation, the prevailing party is entitled ... to the usable value of the property, estimated by the ordinary market price of the use of such property, even though such usable value exceeds the value of the property and such usable value will constitute the measure of da

1978The same rule was announced in Gregory v. Padilla, 379 P.2d 951 (Alaska 1963), in which the Supreme Court of Alaska approved the following jury instruction: Where the property has a value for use, or usable value, which exceeds the amount represented by the lawful rate of interest, or where the interest would be inadequate compensation, the prevailing party is entitled ... to the usable value of the property, estimated by the ordinary market price of the use of such property, even though such usable value exceeds the value of the property and such usable value will constitute the measure of da

1978The same court, in an earlier case, Thomas v. First National Bank of Tecumseh, 32 Okl. 115 , 121 P. 272 (1912), stated: One of the exceptions to the general rule, as to the measure of damage, for the wrongful taking and conversion of personal property, is where the property so taken has a distinct `usable value'; and horses, broken and trained to do work, would have, under ordinary circumstances, such `usable value,' and where such property has been wrongfully taken by one, and detained from another, such other has the right to recover as damages the reasonable value of the use of such propert

1978The court in Warren went on to determine that jewelry, which had been successfully replevied by an estate administrator from one claiming the jewelry as a gift, had no “usable value” and that, therefore, the administrator was entitled to interest on the jewelry’s value. -The same court, in an earlier case, Thomas v. First National Bank of Tecumseh, 32 Okl. 115 , 121 P. 272 (1912), stated: One of the exceptions to the general rule, as to the measure of damage, for the wrongful taking and conversion of personal property, is where the property so taken has a distinct ‘usable value’; and horses, b

1978The same court, in an earlier case, Thomas v. First National Bank of Tecumseh, 32 Okl. 115 , 121 P. 272 (1912), stated: One of the exceptions to the general rule, as to the measure of damage, for the wrongful taking and conversion of personal property, is where the property so taken has a distinct `usable value'; and horses, broken and trained to do work, would have, under ordinary circumstances, such `usable value,' and where such property has been wrongfully taken by one, and detained from another, such other has the right to recover as damages the reasonable value of the use of such propert

1978The same court, in an earlier case, Thomas v. First National Bank of Tecumseh, 32 Okl. 115 , 121 P. 272 (1912), stated: One of the exceptions to the general rule, as to the measure of damage, for the wrongful taking and conversion of personal property, is where the property so taken has a distinct `usable value'; and horses, broken and trained to do work, would have, under ordinary circumstances, such `usable value,' and where such property has been wrongfully taken by one, and detained from another, such other has the right to recover as damages the reasonable value of the use of such propert

1971The United States Supreme Court in Bountiful Brick Co. v. Giles, 276 U.S. 154 , 48 S.Ct. 221 , 72 L.Ed. 507 (1928), stated the exception in this manner: “ * * * And employment includes not only the actual doing of the work, but a reasonable margin of time and space necessary to be used in passing to and from the place where the work is to be done.

1971The United States Supreme Court in Bountiful Brick Co. v. Giles, 276 U.S. 154 , 48 S.Ct. 221 , 72 L.Ed. 507 (1928), stated the exception in this manner: “ * * * And employment includes not only the actual doing of the work, but a reasonable margin of time and space necessary to be used in passing to and from the place where the work is to be done.

1971State v. Eubanks, 86 Idaho 32, 37 , 383 P.2d 342 (1963).

1971State v. Eubanks, 86 Idaho 32, 37 , 383 P.2d 342 (1963).

1905Ency. of Law, 2d ed., 400, 440; 3 Washburn on Real Property, 6th ed., see. 1914; Schuler v. Ford, ante, p. 739, 80 Pac. 219 .) To this rule, as to most all other general rules, there are exceptions, but no reason has been called to our attention why this case should come under any of the exceptions to the general rule and the doctrine of es-toppel be applied to the grantee named in the general deed of conveyance.