exceptions to the general rule in Pennsylvania

1929For nearly three-quarters of a century, since the decision in Blymire v. Boistle, 6 Watts, 182 , the decisions of this court have uniformly recognized and enforced the exceptions whenever the facts of a case required it.’ In Adams v. Kuehn, 119 Pa. 76, 85 , Mr. Justice Williams, delivering the opinion, says: ‘Where one person enters into a contract with another to pay money to a third, or to deliver some valuable thing, and such third party is the only party interested in the payment or the delivery, he can release the promisor from performance or compel performance by suit.’ He then notes som

1918For nearly three-quarters of a century, since the decision in Blymire v. Boistle, 6 Watts 182 , the decisions of this court have uniformly recognized and enforced, the exceptions whenever the facts of a case required it.” In Adams v. Kuehn, 119 Pa. 76, 85 , Mr. Justice Williams, delivering the opinion, says: “Where one person enters into a contract with another to pay money to a third, or to deliver some valuable thing, and such third party is the only party interested in the payment or the delivery, he can release the promisor from performance or compel performance by suit.” He then notes som

1929For nearly three-quarters of a century, since the decision in Blymire v. Boistle, 6 Watts, 182 , the decisions of this court have uniformly recognized and enforced the exceptions whenever the facts of a case required it.’ In Adams v. Kuehn, 119 Pa. 76, 85 , Mr. Justice Williams, delivering the opinion, says: ‘Where one person enters into a contract with another to pay money to a third, or to deliver some valuable thing, and such third party is the only party interested in the payment or the delivery, he can release the promisor from performance or compel performance by suit.’ He then notes som

1918For nearly three-quarters of a century, since the decision in Blymire v. Boistle, 6 Watts 182 , the decisions of this court have uniformly recognized and enforced, the exceptions whenever the facts of a case required it.” In Adams v. Kuehn, 119 Pa. 76, 85 , Mr. Justice Williams, delivering the opinion, says: “Where one person enters into a contract with another to pay money to a third, or to deliver some valuable thing, and such third party is the only party interested in the payment or the delivery, he can release the promisor from performance or compel performance by suit.” He then notes som

1907They cannot possibly stand together; one or the otlier must fall, as in Martin v. Berens, 67 Pa. 459 , which is an affidavit of defense case, and in which the exceptions to the general rule are exhaustively stated.

1900In Martin v. Berens, 67 Pa. 459 , Mr. Justice Williams exhaustively stated the exceptions to the general rule excluding parol evidence, and including amongst them cases, where it was offered; “ to rebut a presumption or equity,” citing Bank v. Fordyce, 9 Pa. 275 ; Musselman v. Stoner, 31 Pa. 265 , also “ to supply deficiencies in the written agreement,” citing Miller v. Fichthorn, 31 Pa. 252 ; Chalfant v. Williams, 35 Pa. 212 .

2025TCOO at 5-6 (citing, inter alia, Dorsey, 591 A.2d at 718-19 ).

2025Carbis Walker, 930 A.2d at 577 ; see also Appellant’s Brief at 13-19 (unnumbered); Appellees’ Brief at 2-5.

2025Since none of the exceptions to the general rule of deferral are present here, Appellant’s allegations of ineffective assistance – none of which have been proven at a hearing – “are not properly before us on this direct appeal.” Watson, 310 A.3d at 313 ; see also Commonwealth v. Rosenthal, 233 A.3d 880, 887 (Pa. Super. 2020) (“we may not consider the ineffective assistance claim raised by Appellant in this direct appeal” where none of the exceptions to the general rule of deferral apply).

2019The exceptions to the general rule can be found at Johnson , 8 A.3d at 322 , fn 1 .

2017Id.

2005He asks that we remand his case to the trial court “with instructions to conduct an evidentiary hearing so that Appellant’s claim of [IAC] may be reviewed on direct appeal.” Id. ¶ 13 Appellant cites no case, and we have found none, where an appellant, alleging an IAC claim of arguable merit, has invoked Pa.R.A.P. 1701(b)(4) after filing his direct appeal, in order to petition the trial court for completion of the record via an evidentiary hearing so that his IAC claim can be fully reviewed on direct appeal.

2001Lockwood, supra; Kiley, supra at 506, 645 A.2d at 186 ; Snyder v. Harmon, 522 Pa. 424 , 562 A.2d 307 (1989); Love v. City of Philadelphia, 518 Pa. 370 , 543 A.2d 531 (1988).

2001Lockwood, supra; Kiley, supra at 506, 645 A.2d at 186 ; Snyder v. Harmon, 522 Pa. 424 , 562 A.2d 307 (1989); Love v. City of Philadelphia, 518 Pa. 370 , 543 A.2d 531 (1988).

2001Lockwood, supra; Kiley, supra at 506, 645 A.2d at 186 ; Snyder v. Harmon, 522 Pa. 424 , 562 A.2d 307 (1989); Love v. City of Philadelphia, 518 Pa. 370 , 543 A.2d 531 (1988).

2001Lockwood, supra; Kiley, supra at 506, 645 A.2d at 186 ; Snyder v. Harmon, 522 Pa. 424 , 562 A.2d 307 (1989); Love v. City of Philadelphia, 518 Pa. 370 , 543 A.2d 531 (1988).

1995Some of the exceptions *338 recognized by this court for the admission of such evidence “include, but are not limited to, 1) motive; 2) intent; ...” Id. at 19 , 645 A.2d at 819 . 10 Appellant contends that the challenged evidence falls within none of the exceptions to the general rule concerning the admissibility of other crimes evidence.

1995Some of the exceptions *338 recognized by this court for the admission of such evidence “include, but are not limited to, 1) motive; 2) intent; ...” Id. at 19 , 645 A.2d at 819 . 10 Appellant contends that the challenged evidence falls within none of the exceptions to the general rule concerning the admissibility of other crimes evidence.

1994Until Smith, the only exception to the general rule was that espoused by Oregon v. Kennedy and Commonwealth v. Simons [ 514 Pa. 10 , 522 A.2d 537 (1987)].

1994Until Smith, the only exception to the general rule was that espoused by Oregon v. Kennedy and Commonwealth v. Simons [ 514 Pa. 10 , 522 A.2d 537 (1987)].

1993Setley v. Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board, 69 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. 241, 451 A.2d 10 (1982). 3 In support of his petition, Claimant presented his own testimony and that of his wife.

1993Setley v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board, 69 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. 241, 451 A.2d 10 (1982). [3] In support of his petition, Claimant presented his own testimony and that of his wife.

1991Gallagher v. Bureau of Correction, 118 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. 516, 545 A.2d 981 (1988), petition for allowance of appeal denied, 520 Pa. 620 , 554 A.2d 511 (1989).

1985Husak v. Derkel Incorporated, 234 Pa. Super. 452 , 341 A.2d 174 (1975).

1985Husak v. Derkel Incorporated, 234 Pa. Super. 452 , 341 A.2d 174 (1975).

1976Although we do not necessarily agree that in all cases such summary procedures would constitute reversible error requiring the remanding of a case for the purpose of taking additional evidence, it is clear that here the Board’s conclusion that additional testimony was needed was certainly not a decision that would invoke any of the exceptions to the general rule forbidding interlocutory appeals. 2 See Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board v. E-C Apparatus Corp., 20 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 128 , 339 A.2d 899 (1975).

1976Although we do not necessarily agree that in all cases such summary procedures would constitute reversible error requiring the remanding of a case for the purpose of taking additional evidence, it is clear that here the Board’s conclusion that additional testimony was needed was certainly not a decision that would invoke any of the exceptions to the general rule forbidding interlocutory appeals. 2 See Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board v. E-C Apparatus Corp., 20 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 128 , 339 A.2d 899 (1975).

1974In support of their position that the facts of the case under consideration fall within one of the exceptions to the general rule, both appellee and the court below rely heavily upon our decision in Sustrik v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corporation, 413 Pa. 324 , 197 A.2d 44 (1964).

1974In support of their position that the facts of the case under consideration fall within one of the exceptions to the general rule, both appellee and the court below rely heavily upon our decision in Sustrik v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corporation, 413 Pa. 324 , 197 A.2d 44 (1964).

1972The courts consistently have held in cases in which a. contract of employment provided for the employe to be furnished with transportation to and from work or where the employe agreed to work only on the condi tion that transportation was provided, that the employe was within the scope of his employment while in the course of his travels: Campagna v. Ziskind, 287 Pa. 403 , 135 Atl. 124 (1926); Dunn v. Trego et al., 279 Pa. 518 , 124 Atl. 174 (1924); Knorr v. Central Railroad of New Jersey, 268 Pa. 172 , 110 Atl. 797 (1920).

1972The courts consistently have held in cases in which a. contract of employment provided for the employe to be furnished with transportation to and from work or where the employe agreed to work only on the condi tion that transportation was provided, that the employe was within the scope of his employment while in the course of his travels: Campagna v. Ziskind, 287 Pa. 403 , 135 Atl. 124 (1926); Dunn v. Trego et al., 279 Pa. 518 , 124 Atl. 174 (1924); Knorr v. Central Railroad of New Jersey, 268 Pa. 172 , 110 Atl. 797 (1920).

1972The courts consistently have held in cases in which a. contract of employment provided for the employe to be furnished with transportation to and from work or where the employe agreed to work only on the condi tion that transportation was provided, that the employe was within the scope of his employment while in the course of his travels: Campagna v. Ziskind, 287 Pa. 403 , 135 Atl. 124 (1926); Dunn v. Trego et al., 279 Pa. 518 , 124 Atl. 174 (1924); Knorr v. Central Railroad of New Jersey, 268 Pa. 172 , 110 Atl. 797 (1920).

1972The courts consistently have held in cases in which a. contract of employment provided for the employe to be furnished with transportation to and from work or where the employe agreed to work only on the condi tion that transportation was provided, that the employe was within the scope of his employment while in the course of his travels: Campagna v. Ziskind, 287 Pa. 403 , 135 Atl. 124 (1926); Dunn v. Trego et al., 279 Pa. 518 , 124 Atl. 174 (1924); Knorr v. Central Railroad of New Jersey, 268 Pa. 172 , 110 Atl. 797 (1920).