exceptions to the general rule in California

1961The facts regarding the other transactions were simply evidentiary facts introduced for the purpose of being considered, together with all of the other evidence in the ease, upon the question of criminal knowledge and intent; and though the jury may have entertained some reasonable doubt as to some of the other transactions, or some of the other items of evidence, which tend to prove guilty knowledge or intent, if, notwithstanding that fact, and having considered the evidentiary facts, doubtful and otherwise, they were convinced beyond a reasonable doubt of the ultimate fact of guilty knowledg

1961The facts regarding the other transactions were simply evidentiary facts introduced for the purpose of being considered, together with all of the other evidence in the ease, upon the question of criminal knowledge and intent; and though the jury may have entertained some reasonable doubt as to some of the other transactions, or some of the other items of evidence, which tend to prove guilty knowledge or intent, if, notwithstanding that fact, and having considered the evidentiary facts, doubtful and otherwise, they were convinced beyond a reasonable doubt of the ultimate fact of guilty knowledg

2025“Under the peculiar risk doctrine, a person who hires an independent contractor to perform work that is inherently dangerous can be held liable for tort damages when the contractor’s negligent performance of the work causes injuries to others.” (Privette, supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 691 .) A peculiar risk is “neither a risk that is abnormal to the type of work done, nor a risk that is abnormally great.” (Id. at p. 695.) “Rather, it is a special and recognizable danger inherent in the work itself, arising either from the nature or the location of the work to be done, and against which a reasonable p

2025“Under the peculiar risk doctrine, a person who hires an independent contractor to perform work that is inherently dangerous can be held liable for tort damages when the contractor’s negligent performance of the work causes injuries to others.” (Privette, supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 691 .) A peculiar risk is “neither a risk that is abnormal to the type of work done, nor a risk that is abnormally great.” (Id. at p. 695.) “Rather, it is a special and recognizable danger inherent in the work itself, arising either from the nature or the location of the work to be done, and against which a reasonable p

2025“Under the peculiar risk doctrine, a person who hires an independent contractor to perform work that is inherently dangerous can be held liable for tort damages when the contractor’s negligent performance of the work causes injuries to others.” (Privette, supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 691 .) A peculiar risk is “neither a risk that is abnormal to the type of work done, nor a risk that is abnormally great.” (Id. at p. 695.) “Rather, it is a special and recognizable danger inherent in the work itself, arising either from the nature or the location of the work to be done, and against which a reasonable p

2025“Under the peculiar risk doctrine, a person who hires an independent contractor to perform work that is inherently dangerous can be held liable for tort damages when the contractor’s negligent performance of the work causes injuries to others.” (Privette, supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 691 .) A peculiar risk is “neither a risk that is abnormal to the type of work done, nor a risk that is abnormally great.” (Id. at p. 695.) “Rather, it is a special and recognizable danger inherent in the work itself, arising either from the nature or the location of the work to be done, and against which a reasonable p

2025“Under the peculiar risk doctrine, a person who hires an independent contractor to perform work that is inherently dangerous can be held liable for tort damages when the contractor’s negligent performance of the work causes injuries to others.” (Privette, supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 691 .) A peculiar risk is “neither a risk that is abnormal to the type of work done, nor a risk that is abnormally great.” (Id. at p. 695.) “Rather, it is a special and recognizable danger inherent in the work itself, arising either from the nature or the location of the work to be done, and against which a reasonable p

2025“Under the peculiar risk doctrine, a person who hires an independent contractor to perform work that is inherently dangerous can be held liable for tort damages when the contractor’s negligent performance of the work causes injuries to others.” (Privette, supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 691 .) A peculiar risk is “neither a risk that is abnormal to the type of work done, nor a risk that is abnormally great.” (Id. at p. 695.) “Rather, it is a special and recognizable danger inherent in the work itself, arising either from the nature or the location of the work to be done, and against which a reasonable p

1971Neiman specifically stated that his clients were incapacitated “for a period exceeding 100 days after the accident,” while plaintiffs themselves did not so declare, limiting themselves to the less specific statement that they “received serious injuries . . . and were hospitalized.” In Camp v. Ortega, 209 Cal.App.2d 275, 281-282 [ 25 Cal.Rptr. 837 ] (likewise mentioned in Tammen) the court referred to the exceptions to the general rule that the unimpeached and uncontradicted testimony of a witness may not be arbitrarily disregarded; such exceptions include omissions in a witness’ account of a p

1967In Lohman v. Lohman, 29 Cal.2d 144, 149 [5] [ 173 P.2d 657 ], we held that “a trial judge is not required to accept as true the sworn testimony of a witness, even in the absence of evidence directly contradicting it, and this rule applies to an affidavit.” The general rule is that “the unimpeached and uncontradicted testimony of a witness, not inherently improbable, cannot be arbitrarily disregarded and should be accepted as true by the trier of fact. [Citations.] The above rule, however, is subject to many exceptions, firmly established in the decisions.” (Camp v. Ortega, 209 Cal.App.2d 275,

1946As said in People v. Albertson, 23 Cal.2d 550, 577 [ 145 P.2d 7 ]: "The trial court, however, should be guided by the rule that such proof is to be received with 'extreme caution,' and if its connection with the crime charged is not clearly perceived, the doubt is to be resolved in favor of the accused, instead of suffering the minds of the jurors to be prejudiced by an independent fact, carrying with it no proper evidence of the particular guilt." (See, also, People v. Glass, 158 Cal. 650 [ 112 P. 281 ]; People v. Lane, 100 Cal. 379, 387-390 [ 34 P. 856 ]; People v. Darby, 64 Cal.App.2d 25 [

1946As said in People v. Albertson, 23 Cal.2d 550, 577 [ 145 P.2d 7 ]: "The trial court, however, should be guided by the rule that such proof is to be received with 'extreme caution,' and if its connection with the crime charged is not clearly perceived, the doubt is to be resolved in favor of the accused, instead of suffering the minds of the jurors to be prejudiced by an independent fact, carrying with it no proper evidence of the particular guilt." (See, also, People v. Glass, 158 Cal. 650 [ 112 P. 281 ]; People v. Lane, 100 Cal. 379, 387-390 [ 34 P. 856 ]; People v. Darby, 64 Cal.App.2d 25 [

2024The denial of a petition that the trial court has no jurisdiction over “does not affect a defendant’s substantial rights and is therefore not appealable under section 1237, subdivision (b).” (King, supra, 77 Cal.App.5th at p. 639; see People v. Fuimaono (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 132, 135 ; People v. Turrin (2009) 176 Cal.App.4th 1200, 1208 ; People v. Chlad (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 1719 , 1725–1726; see also People v. Loper (2015) 60 Cal.4th 1155, 1159 [“The right to appeal is statutory only, and a party may not appeal a trial court’s judgment, order or ruling unless such is expressly made appealable

2024The denial of a petition that the trial court has no jurisdiction over “does not affect a defendant’s substantial rights and is therefore not appealable under section 1237, subdivision (b).” (King, supra, 77 Cal.App.5th at p. 639; see People v. Fuimaono (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 132, 135 ; People v. Turrin (2009) 176 Cal.App.4th 1200, 1208 ; People v. Chlad (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 1719 , 1725–1726; see also People v. Loper (2015) 60 Cal.4th 1155, 1159 [“The right to appeal is statutory only, and a party may not appeal a trial court’s judgment, order or ruling unless such is expressly made appealable

2023(See People v. Flores (2003) 30 Cal.4th 1059, 1064 .) As relevant here, courts have recognized that under former section 1170, 5 subdivision (d) (now § 1172.1, subd. (a)(1)),3 “the trial court retains jurisdiction to recall a sentence in a criminal matter and to resentence the defendant notwithstanding the pendency of an appeal.” (Nelms, at p. 1472; see also Portillo v. Superior Court (1992) 10 Cal.App.4th 1829, 1835 [explaining that the statute “provides a specific scheme for the trial court to exercise jurisdiction for a limited time after it normally would have lost jurisdiction”].) None of

2022Co. (1958) 49 Cal.2d 695, 699 [“There is no necessity to make findings on an order made after a motion has been ruled upon.”]; Weil & Brown, Cal. Practice Guide: Civil Procedure Before Trial (The Rutter Group 2022) ¶ 9:251, p. 9(I)-145 [“With a few exceptions [citation], findings of fact are not required in connection with law and motion rulings.”].) Caron provides no legal authority or cogent argument indicating a vexatious litigant proceeding is one of the uncommon situations in which a court must identify the reasons or factual findings supporting its law and motion ruling.

2016(See People v. Jones (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 216, 236-244 [defendant established 13 ineffective assistance of counsel at first suppression hearing where defense counsel failed to locate potential eyewitnesses and failed to engage investigator].) Here, however, defendant did not properly invoke in the trial court any of the exceptions to the general rule against relitigating suppression motions.

2013As set forth above, the introductory clause of section 56041 explicitly excepts from the reach of the statute “those pupils meeting residency requirements for school attendance specified in subdivision (a) of Section 48204.” That provision lists the exceptions to the general rule that children between the ages of six and 18 must attend school in the school district in which the residence of their parent or guardian is located. 2 (See Katz v. Los Gatos-Saratoga Joint Union High School Dist. (2004) 117 Cal.App.4th 47, 57-58 [ 11 Cal.Rptr.3d 546 ].) In accordance with *188 those exceptions, secti

2013As set forth above, the introductory clause of section 56041 explicitly excepts from the reach of the statute “those pupils meeting residency requirements for school attendance specified in subdivision (a) of Section 48204.” That provision lists the exceptions to the general rule that children between the ages of six and 18 must attend school in the school district in which the residence of their parent or guardian is located. 2 (See Katz v. Los Gatos-Saratoga Joint Union High School Dist. (2004) 117 Cal.App.4th 47, 57-58 [ 11 Cal.Rptr.3d 546 ].) In accordance with *188 those exceptions, secti

2013(Nibbi Brothers, Inc. v. Home Federal Sav. & Loan Assn. (1988) 205 Cal.App.3d 1415, 1423 [ 253 Cal.Rptr. 289 ].) They arise “(1) where a party holds himself out to be specially qualified and the other party is so situated that he may reasonably rely upon the former’s superior knowledge; (2) where the opinion is by a fiduciary or other trusted person; (3) where a party states his opinion as an existing fact or as implying facts which justify a belief in the truth of the opinion. [Citation.]” (Borba v. Thomas (1977) 70 Cal.App.3d 144, 152 [ 138 Cal.Rptr. 565 ].) But in an earlier published rulin

2013(Nibbi Brothers, Inc. v. Home Federal Sav. & Loan Assn. (1988) 205 Cal.App.3d 1415, 1423 [ 253 Cal.Rptr. 289 ].) They arise “(1) where a party holds himself out to be specially qualified and the other party is so situated that he may reasonably rely upon the former’s superior knowledge; (2) where the opinion is by a fiduciary or other trusted person; (3) where a party states his opinion as an existing fact or as implying facts which justify a belief in the truth of the opinion. [Citation.]” (Borba v. Thomas (1977) 70 Cal.App.3d 144, 152 [ 138 Cal.Rptr. 565 ].) But in an earlier published rulin