Already have an account? Sign in instead.
You stay signed in for 30 days on this browser.
Continue with Google Continue with MicrosoftNo account yet? Create a free one.
We sent a six-digit code.
It expires in ten minutes, works once, and only in this browser. Five wrong tries void it. Send another code.
Your account is live and the Cloudflare checks are off for this browser.
72 Texas opinions name it 4 courts 1881–2025 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Texas courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
In Re Warren Dowling WHITCOMB, NCMgreen2 sentences2009See, e.g. , In re Whitcomb , 35 S.W.3d 220 (Tex. App.--Corpus Christi 2000, no pet.); cf. Haas v. Dodson , 589 S.W.2d 193 (Tex. App.--Waco 1979, no writ) (an order appointing two coguardians of the estate who do not fall within the exceptions to the general rule of having a single guardian is void); St. 2007See, e.g., In re Whitcomb, 35 S.W.3d 220 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 2000, no pet.); cf. Haas v. Dodson, 589 S.W.2d 193 (Tex.App.-Waco 1979, no writ) (an order appointing two coguardians of the estate who do not fall within the exceptions to the general rule of having a single guardian is void); St. | 3 | 3 |
Teague v. Lanegreen2 sentences2020See Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 307 (1989). 2018See Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 307 (1989). | 2 | 2 |
Truly v. Austingreen2 sentences2019See Truly v. Austin, 744 S.W.2d 934 , 936–37 (Tex. 1988) (discussing exceptions to general rule that express contract bars recovery under theory of quantum meruit). 6 November 2014 email from Karedia to him was not a contract.9 Further, although Karedia had a copy of Kam’s drawings, Karedia testified that he obtained the drawings from Hardt, and Kam did not provide controverting evidence. 9 During direct examination, Kam testified: In May of 2014 on or about May 14th, I got a call from Tony Hardt and he said he was a contractor for the Boomers in Liberty Hill. 2016See id. (mentioning exceptions to general rule if (1) plaintiff partially performs an express contract but, because of defendant’s breach, is prevented from completing the contract, (2) plaintiff partially performs an express contract that is unilateral in nature, or (3) plaintiff provides labor or materials under a construction contract and satisfies certain requirements). | 2 | 2 |
Abbott v. Stategreen2 sentences2014See Abbot v. State, 271 S.W.3d 694, 697 (Tex. Crim. 2012See Abbot v State, 271 S.W. 3d 694, 697 (Tex. Crim. | 2 | 2 |
Weinstein v. Bradfordgreen2 sentences2014One of the exceptions to the general rule is when a claim is “capable of repetition, yet evading review.” The United States Supreme Court has said that “the ‘capable of repetition but evading review’ doctrine [is] limited to the situation where two elements combine: (1) the challenged action was in its duration too short to be fully litigated prior to its cessation or expiration, and (2) there was a reasonable expectation that the same complaining party would be subjected to the same action again.” Weinstein v. Bradford, 423 U.S. 147, 149 (1975). 2014One of the exceptions to the general rule is when a claim is “capable of repetition, yet evading review.” The United States Supreme Court has said that “the ‘capable of repetition but evading review’ doctrine [is] limited to the situation where two elements combine: (1) the challenged action was in its duration too short to be fully litigated prior to its cessation or expiration, and (2) there was a reasonable expectation that the same complaining party would be subjected to the same action again.” Weinstein v. Bradford, 423 U.S. 147, 149 (1975). | 2 | 2 |
Piazza v. City of Grangergreen2 sentences2012See Piazza v. City of Granger, 909 S.W.2d 529, 533 (Tex.App.-Austin 1995, no writ) (holding that the city did not clearly identify the emergency when its reason for the emergency was “lack of confidence” in a police officer and when the notice did not give any further explanation as to why “lack of confidence” in an officer would give rise to an emergency). 2012See Piazza v. City of Granger, 909 S.W.2d 529, 533 (Tex. App.—Austin 1995, no writ) (holding that the city did not clearly identify the emergency when its reason for the emergency was “lack of confidence” in a police officer and when the notice did not give any further explanation as to why “lack of confidence” in an officer would give rise to an emergency). | 2 | 2 |
Knebel v. Capital National Bank in Austingreen2 sentences2008See generally Knebel v. Capital Nat'l Bank, 518 S.W.2d 795, 799 (Tex. 1974) (explaining how the "common fund" doctrine relates to attorney's fees). 2008See generally Knebel v. Capital Nat'l Bank, 518 S.W.2d 795, 799 (Tex. 1974) (explaining how the “common fund” doctrine relates to attorney’s fees). | 2 | 2 |
Hicks v. Stategreen2 sentences2004See Hicks , 18 S.W.3d at 744 . 2002See Hicks , 18 S.W.3d at 744 . | 2 | 2 |
Rodriguez v. Stategreen2 sentences1989Rodriguez v. State, 486 S.W.2d 355, 358 (Tex.Cr.App.1972). 1980Rodriguez v. State, 486 S.W.2d 355 (Tex.Cr.App.1972). | 1 | 3 |
Fountain v. Stategreen2 sentences1975See Shepherd v. State, 143 Tex.Cr.R. 387 , 158 S.W.2d 1010, 1011 (1942), citing with approval Fountain v. State, 90 Tex.Cr.R. 474 , 241 S.W. 489 (1921); Denton v. State, 42 Tex.Cr.R. 427 , 60 S.W. 670 (1901), and Nichols v. State, 138 Tex.Cr.R. 324 , 136 S.W.2d 221 (1940). 1975See Shepherd v. State, 143 Tex.Cr.R. 387 , 158 S.W.2d 1010, 1011 (1942), citing with approval Fountain v. State, 90 Tex.Cr.R. 474 , 241 S.W. 489 (1921); Denton v. State, 42 Tex.Cr.R. 427 , 60 S.W. 670 (1901), and Nichols v. State, 138 Tex.Cr.R. 324 , 136 S.W.2d 221 (1940). | 1 | 2 |
In Re Gabbaigreen1 sentence2015See id. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Rossgreen1 sentence2014See State v. Ross, 32 S.W.3d 853 , 855–56 (Tex. Crim. | 1 | 1 |
Dotson v. Grand Prairie Independent School Districtgreen1 sentence2013See Dotson, 161 S.W.3d at 291–92. | 1 | 1 |
Sanchez v. Stategreen1 sentence2012See Sanchez v. State, 112 S.W.3d 311, 312 (Tex. App. -- Corpus Christi 2003, no pet.); Everett v. State, 82 S.W.3d 735 , 735 (Tex. App. -- Waco 2002, pet dism'd.) Because this appeal does not fall within the exceptions to the general rule that appeal may be taken only from a final judgment of conviction, we have no jurisdiction. | 1 | 1 |
McKown v. Stategreen1 sentence2012See id. | 1 | 1 |
Bamburg v. Townsendgreen1 sentence2005See generally Bamburg, 35 S.W.3d at 89-90 (discussing exceptions to this general rule). | 1 | 1 |
| Coffin v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Rodriguez v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Shepherd v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Industrial Generating Co. v. Jenkinsgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Texas General Indemnity Company v. Bottomgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Texas. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Haas v. Dodson
green
2 sentences2009See, e.g. , In re Whitcomb , 35 S.W.3d 220 (Tex. App.--Corpus Christi 2000, no pet.); cf. Haas v. Dodson , 589 S.W.2d 193 (Tex. App.--Waco 1979, no writ) (an order appointing two coguardians of the estate who do not fall within the exceptions to the general rule of having a single guardian is void); St. 2007See, e.g., In re Whitcomb, 35 S.W.3d 220 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 2000, no pet.); cf. Haas v. Dodson, 589 S.W.2d 193 (Tex.App.-Waco 1979, no writ) (an order appointing two coguardians of the estate who do not fall within the exceptions to the general rule of having a single guardian is void); St. | 3 | 2007–2009 |
St. Paul Sanitarium v. Crim
neutral
2 sentences2009Paul Sanitarium v. Crim , 84 S.W. 1114 (Tex. Civ. 2007Paul Sanitarium v. Crim, 38 Tex.Civ.App. 1 , 84 S.W. 1114 (Tex.Civ.App. 1905, writ refd) (actions of subsequently appointed guardian void when first-appointed guardian never removed). | 3 | 2007–2009 |
Stephens v. State
green
2 sentences1980Hughes v. State, 563 S.W.2d 581 (Tex.Cr.App.1978); Cherry v. State, 488 S.W.2d 744 (Tex.Cr.App.1972); Rodriguez v. State, 486 S.W.2d 355 (Tex.Cr.App.1972); Stephens v. State, 147 Tex.Cr.R. 510 , 182 S.W.2d 707 (Tex.Cr.App.1944). 1980Hughes v. State, 563 S.W.2d 581 (Tex.Cr.App.1978); Cherry v. State, 488 S.W.2d 744 (Tex.Cr.App.1972); Rodriguez v. State, 486 S.W.2d 355 (Tex.Cr.App.1972); Stephens v. State, 147 Tex.Cr.R. 510 , 182 S.W.2d 707 (Tex.Cr.App.1944). | 2 | 1972–1980 |
Johnson v. United States
green
2 sentences1974The mere fact that probable cause exists will not obviate the necessity for procuring a warrant, unless the search falls within one of the exceptions to the general rule. ‘Any assumption that evidence sufficient to support a magistrate’s disinterested determination to issue a search warrant will justify the officers in making a search without a warrant would reduce the Amendment to a nullity . .’ Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 , 68 S.Ct. 367, 369 , 92 L.Ed.2d 436 (1948). ‘Belief, however well founded, that an article sought is concealed in a dwelling house, furnishes no justificatio 1974The mere fact that probable cause exists will not obviate the necessity for procuring a warrant, unless the search falls within one of the exceptions to the general rule. ‘Any assumption that evidence sufficient to support a magistrate’s disinterested determination to issue a search warrant will justify the officers in making a search without a warrant would reduce the Amendment to a nullity . .’ Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 , 68 S.Ct. 367, 369 , 92 L.Ed.2d 436 (1948). ‘Belief, however well founded, that an article sought is concealed in a dwelling house, furnishes no justificatio | 2 | 1972–1974 |
City of Dallas v. Shackelford
green
2 sentences1973In 1, Orgel on Valuation Under Eminent Domain, § 99a, the exceptions to the general rule are stated as ‘ * * * cases in which the land taken was not within the original scope of the project, but was needed for expansion or for the purposes which might be regarded as incidental to the project;’ and ‘cases in which the general location of the project is fixed, but the exact location or the extent thereof is uncertain.’ “Texas recognized these exceptions in City of Dallas v. Shackelford, 145 Tex. 528 , 199 S.W.2d 503 (1947) .... 1973In 1, Orgel on Valuation Under Eminent Domain, § 99a, the exceptions to the general rule are stated as ‘ * * * cases in which the land taken was not within the original scope of the project, but was needed for expansion or for the purposes which might be regarded as incidental to the project;’ and ‘cases in which the general location of the project is fixed, but the exact location or the extent thereof is uncertain.’ “Texas recognized these exceptions in City of Dallas v. Shackelford, 145 Tex. 528 , 199 S.W.2d 503 (1947) .... | 2 | 1969–1973 |
Mahon v. Cotton
neutral
2 sentences1923App. 239 , 35 S. W. 869 : “One who sues the defendant in another county than in that in which he resides, must bring his case clearly within one of the exceptions to the general rule.” See Cohen v. Munson, 59 Tex. 237 ; Malloy v. Industrial Cotton Oil Properties (Tex. Civ. 1918Mahon v. Cotton, 13 Tex. Civ. | 2 | 1918–1923 |
Cohen v. Munson
neutral
2 sentences1919The right to sue in another than the county of domicile is for the benefit of the plaintiff, and he must present the facts necessary to show that his case comes within the countenance and support of the exceptions to the general rule that no person who is an inhabitant of this state shall be sued out of the county in which he has his domicile. “ ‘To entitle a plaintiff to sue in a county other than the residence of the defendant, he must bring his case clearly within one of the exceptions of the statute.’ Cohen v. Munson, 59 Tex. 236 ; Lindheim v. Muschamp, 72 Tex. 33 , 12 S. W. 125 . 1912"To entitle a plaintiff to sue in a county other than the residence of the defendant, he must bring his case clearly within one of the exceptions of the statute." Cohen v. Munson, 59 Tex. 236 ; Lindheim v. Muschamp, 72 Tex. 33 , 12 S.W. 125 . | 2 | 1912–1919 |
Max Lindheim & Bro. v. Muschamp
green
2 sentences1919The right to sue in another than the county of domicile is for the benefit of the plaintiff, and he must present the facts necessary to show that his case comes within the countenance and support of the exceptions to the general rule that no person who is an inhabitant of this state shall be sued out of the county in which he has his domicile. “ ‘To entitle a plaintiff to sue in a county other than the residence of the defendant, he must bring his case clearly within one of the exceptions of the statute.’ Cohen v. Munson, 59 Tex. 236 ; Lindheim v. Muschamp, 72 Tex. 33 , 12 S. W. 125 . 1919The right to sue in another than the county of domicile is for the benefit of the plaintiff, and he must present the facts necessary to show that his case comes within the countenance and support of the exceptions to the general rule that no person who is an inhabitant of this state shall be sued out of the county in which he has his domicile. “ ‘To entitle a plaintiff to sue in a county other than the residence of the defendant, he must bring his case clearly within one of the exceptions of the statute.’ Cohen v. Munson, 59 Tex. 236 ; Lindheim v. Muschamp, 72 Tex. 33 , 12 S. W. 125 . | 2 | 1912–1919 |
Thornley v. State
neutral
2 sentences1919Thornley v. State, 36 Tex. Cr. 1919Thornley v. State, 36 Texas Crim. | 2 | 1919–1919 |
Marin v. State
green
1 sentence2025The exceptions to the general rule of preservation are set out in Marin v. State, 851 S.W. 2d 275 (Tex. Crim. | 1 | 2025–2025 |
State v. Mungia
green
1 sentence2024Analysis Despite the State addressing the merits of Vasquez’s motion and making several arguments before the trial court, including that Vasquez failed to perform in accordance with the agreement, on appeal the State summarily argues that the trial court was without authority to dismiss because “[n]one of the exceptions to the general rule are applicable herein.” Although a trial court’s ability to dismiss a case is limited, the State is incorrect that the trial court’s ability is bound by the confines of the aforementioned listed “exceptions to the general rule.” See Mungia, 119 S.W.3d at 816 | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Johnson v. Brewer & Pritchard, P.C.
green
1 sentence2020Johnson, 73 S.W.3d at 202 . | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Everett v. State
green
1 sentence2012See Sanchez v. State, 112 S.W.3d 311, 312 (Tex. App. -- Corpus Christi 2003, no pet.); Everett v. State, 82 S.W.3d 735 , 735 (Tex. App. -- Waco 2002, pet dism'd.) Because this appeal does not fall within the exceptions to the general rule that appeal may be taken only from a final judgment of conviction, we have no jurisdiction. | 1 | 2012–2012 |
Cox Enterprises v. Bd. of Tr. of Austin ISD
green
1 sentence2011Id. | 1 | 2011–2011 |
| Davis v. Marshall green | 1 | 1992–1992 |
| Freeman v. Texas Compensation Insurance Co. green | 1 | 1990–1990 |
| Williams v. State green | 1 | 1985–1985 |
| Barefoot v. State green | 1 | 1981–1981 |
| Cherry v. State green | 1 | 1980–1980 |
| Hughes v. State green | 1 | 1980–1980 |
| Denton v. State green | 1 | 1975–1975 |
| Nichols v. State green | 1 | 1975–1975 |
| Agnello v. United States green | 1 | 1974–1974 |
| Coolidge v. New Hampshire green | 1 | 1974–1974 |
| Gunn v. Cavanaugh green | 1 | 1972–1972 |
| Summers v. State green | 1 | 1972–1972 |
| Miller v. State neutral | 1 | 1972–1972 |
| Stalcup v. State green | 1 | 1972–1972 |
| Hafti v. State green | 1 | 1969–1969 |
| Ambassador Oil Corporation v. Robertson green | 1 | 1967–1967 |
| Williams v. State neutral | 1 | 1967–1967 |
| Cage v. State green | 1 | 1967–1967 |
| McGee v. State green | 1 | 1967–1967 |
| McGuire v. City of Dallas green | 1 | 1963–1963 |
| Springfield Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Wm. Cameron & Co. green | 1 | 1963–1963 |
| McGuire v. City of Dallas green | 1 | 1963–1963 |
| Wissman v. Boucher green | 1 | 1962–1962 |
| Cannel Coal Co. v. Luna green | 1 | 1940–1940 |
| Dittman v. Model Baking Co. green | 1 | 1938–1938 |
| Central Power & Light Co. v. Purvis green | 1 | 1938–1938 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.