clear and convincing evidence standard in Pennsylvania

2023In re L.Z.[, supra at 360, 111 A.3d at 1174 ] (“a petitioning party must demonstrate the existence of child abuse by the clear and convincing evidence standard applicable to most dependency determinations, 42 Pa.C.S.[A.] § 6341(c)”).

2023“While a petitioning party must demonstrate the existence of child abuse by the clear and convincing evidence standard applicable to most dependency determinations . . . the identity of the abuser need only be established through prima facie evidence[.]” In re L.Z., 111 A.3d at 1174 .

2025See Matter of Adoption of Charles E.D.M., II, 708 A.2d at 91 (recognizing that an appellate court reviewing a termination decision must consider whether competent evidence supports the trial court’s decree and reversing a termination decision due to lack of competent record evidence).

2019The clear and convincing evidence standard requires evidence that is "so clear, direct, weighty and convincing as to enable the trier of fact to come to a clear conviction, without hesitance, of the truth of the precise facts in issue." Matter of Adoption of Charles E.D.M., II, 708 A.2d at 91 (quoting Adoption of Atencio, 650 A.2d 1064, 1066 (Pa. 1994)).

2025Accordingly, we only defer to trial judges if “the factual findings are supported by the record and the court’s legal conclusions are not the result of an error of law or an abuse of discretion.” In re Adoption of C.M., 255 A.3d at 362 (quoting In re Adoption of S.P., 47 A.3d 817, 826-27 (Pa. 2012)).

2025Accordingly, we only defer to trial judges if “the factual findings are supported by the record and the court’s legal conclusions are not the result of an error of law or an abuse of discretion.” In re Adoption of C.M., 255 A.3d at 362 (quoting In re Adoption of S.P., 47 A.3d 817, 826-27 (Pa. 2012)).

2026Thus, the clear and convincing evidence test “has been described as an ‘intermediate’ test, which is more exacting than a preponderance of the evidence test, but less exacting than proof beyond a reasonable doubt.” Commonwealth v. Meals, 912 A.2d 213, 219 (Pa. 2006).

2021Thus, the clear and convincing evidence test “has been described as an ‘intermediate’ test, which is more exacting than a preponderance of the evidence test, but less exacting than proof beyond a reasonable doubt.” Commonwealth v. Meals, [ 590 Pa. 110 ,] 912 A.2d 213, 219 (2006).

2025To satisfy the clear and convincing evidence standard, the petitioner must present evidence that is “so clear, direct, weighty, and convincing as to enable the trier of fact to come to a clear conviction, without hesitance, of the truth of the precise facts in issue.” Id. at 56-57 (citation omitted).

2025To satisfy the clear and convincing evidence standard, the petitioner must present evidence that is “so clear, direct, weighty, and convincing as to enable the trier of fact to come to a clear conviction, without hesitance, of the truth of the precise facts in issue.” Id. at 56-57 (citation omitted).

2017The clear and convincing evidence standard is the highest standard of proof utilized in civil proceedings, requiring “evidence that is so clear, direct, weighty, and convincing as to enable the [trier of fact] to come to a clear conviction, without hesitancy, of the truth of the precise facts [in] issue.” Commonwealth v. Maldonado, 576 Pa. 101 , 838 A.2d 710, 715 (2003) (alterations in the original; internal quotation marks and citation omitted). [2] 2.

2017The clear and convincing evidence standard is the highest standard of proof utilized in civil proceedings, requiring “evidence that is so clear, direct, weighty, and convincing as to enable the [trier of fact] to come to a clear conviction, without hesitancy, of the truth of the precise facts [in] issue.” Commonwealth v. Maldonado, 576 Pa. 101 , 838 A.2d 710, 715 (2003) (alterations in the original; internal quotation marks and citation omitted). [2] 2.

2022See, e.g., In re N.B.-A., 224 A.3d 661 (Pa. 2020); see also In re J.M., 166 A.3d 408 (Pa. Super. 2017).

2017Trial Ct. Op., 3/13/17, at 2-3 (unpaginated); see In Interest of J.M., 166 A.3d 408, 427 (Pa.Super. 2017) (“Clear and convincing evidence requires that a finding be based on testimony by credible witnesses who clearly relate facts that are ‘so clear, direct, weighty, and convincing as to enable the trier of fact to come to a clear conviction, without hesitancy, of the truth of the precise facts in issue.’”) (quoting In re Novosielski, 992 A.2d 89, 107 (Pa. 2010)).

2020The panel further held that, because Act 21 directs the trial court to employ a clear-and- convincing-evidence standard in determining whether the statute’s provisions apply to an individual, it is unconstitutional under Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000) (holding that, other than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury and proven beyond a reasonable doubt), and Alleyne v. United States, 570 U.S. 99, 106 (2013) (holding that “facts that increase mandatory minimum sentences must

2020The panel further held that, because Act 21 directs the trial court to employ a clear-and- convincing-evidence standard in determining whether the statute’s provisions apply to an individual, it is unconstitutional under Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000) (holding that, other than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury and proven beyond a reasonable doubt), and Alleyne v. United States, 570 U.S. 99, 106 (2013) (holding that “facts that increase mandatory minimum sentences must

2016Under the clear and convincing evidence standard, the trial court as fact-finder must "be 'able to come to clear 13 conviction, without hesitancy, of the truth of the precise fact in issue." Weissberger v. Myers, 90 A.3d 730, 735 (Pa. Super.

2015“Clear and convincing evidence is the highest burden in our civil law and requires that the fact-finder be able to come to clear conviction, without hesitancy, of the truth of the precise fact in issue.” Weissberger v. Myers, 90 A.3d 730, 735 (Pa.Super.2014) (citations omitted).

2006See also Commonwealth v. Kopicz, 840 A.2d 342, 348 (Pa.Super.2003); Commonwealth v. Rhoads, 836 A.2d 159, 162 (Pa.Super.2003). ¶ 51 Also, in Commonwealth v. Fleming, 801 A.2d 1234, 1238 (Pa.Super.2002), we concluded that "there is no violation of any ex post facto provision in requiring registration when the acts underlying an individual's conviction occurred prior to the effective date of the registration requirements." See also Benner, 853 A.2d at 1071 (indicating that "existence of some punitive element is a prerequisite to any determination that a law is ex post facto " and registration, n

2006See also Commonwealth v. Kopicz, 840 A.2d 342, 348 (Pa.Super.2003); Commonwealth v. Rhoads, 836 A.2d 159, 162 (Pa.Super.2003). ¶ 51 Also, in Commonwealth v. Fleming, 801 A.2d 1234, 1238 (Pa.Super.2002), we concluded that “there is no violation of any ex post facto provision in requiring registration when the acts underlying an individual’s conviction occurred prior to the effective date of the registration requirements.” See also Benner, 853 A.2d at 1071 (indicating that “existence of some punitive element is a prerequisite to any determination that a law is ex post facto ” and registration, n

2006See also Commonwealth v. Kopicz, 840 A.2d 342, 348 (Pa.Super.2003); Commonwealth v. Rhoads, 836 A.2d 159, 162 (Pa.Super.2003). ¶ 51 Also, in Commonwealth v. Fleming, 801 A.2d 1234, 1238 (Pa.Super.2002), we concluded that "there is no violation of any ex post facto provision in requiring registration when the acts underlying an individual's conviction occurred prior to the effective date of the registration requirements." See also Benner, 853 A.2d at 1071 (indicating that "existence of some punitive element is a prerequisite to any determination that a law is ex post facto " and registration, n

2006See also Commonwealth v. Kopicz, 840 A.2d 342, 348 (Pa.Super.2003); Commonwealth v. Rhoads, 836 A.2d 159, 162 (Pa.Super.2003). ¶ 51 Also, in Commonwealth v. Fleming, 801 A.2d 1234, 1238 (Pa.Super.2002), we concluded that “there is no violation of any ex post facto provision in requiring registration when the acts underlying an individual’s conviction occurred prior to the effective date of the registration requirements.” See also Benner, 853 A.2d at 1071 (indicating that “existence of some punitive element is a prerequisite to any determination that a law is ex post facto ” and registration, n

2006See also Commonwealth v. Kopicz, 840 A.2d 342, 348 (Pa.Super.2003); Commonwealth v. Rhoads, 836 A.2d 159, 162 (Pa.Super.2003). ¶ 51 Also, in Commonwealth v. Fleming, 801 A.2d 1234, 1238 (Pa.Super.2002), we concluded that "there is no violation of any ex post facto provision in requiring registration when the acts underlying an individual's conviction occurred prior to the effective date of the registration requirements." See also Benner, 853 A.2d at 1071 (indicating that "existence of some punitive element is a prerequisite to any determination that a law is ex post facto " and registration, n

2006See also Commonwealth v. Kopicz, 840 A.2d 342, 348 (Pa.Super.2003); Commonwealth v. Rhoads, 836 A.2d 159, 162 (Pa.Super.2003). ¶ 51 Also, in Commonwealth v. Fleming, 801 A.2d 1234, 1238 (Pa.Super.2002), we concluded that “there is no violation of any ex post facto provision in requiring registration when the acts underlying an individual’s conviction occurred prior to the effective date of the registration requirements.” See also Benner, 853 A.2d at 1071 (indicating that “existence of some punitive element is a prerequisite to any determination that a law is ex post facto ” and registration, n

2006See also Commonwealth v. Kopicz, 840 A.2d 342, 348 (Pa.Super.2003); Commonwealth v. Rhoads, 836 A.2d 159, 162 (Pa.Super.2003). ¶ 51 Also, in Commonwealth v. Fleming, 801 A.2d 1234, 1238 (Pa.Super.2002), we concluded that "there is no violation of any ex post facto provision in requiring registration when the acts underlying an individual's conviction occurred prior to the effective date of the registration requirements." See also Benner, 853 A.2d at 1071 (indicating that "existence of some punitive element is a prerequisite to any determination that a law is ex post facto " and registration, n

2006See also Commonwealth v. Kopicz, 840 A.2d 342, 348 (Pa.Super.2003); Commonwealth v. Rhoads, 836 A.2d 159, 162 (Pa.Super.2003). ¶ 51 Also, in Commonwealth v. Fleming, 801 A.2d 1234, 1238 (Pa.Super.2002), we concluded that “there is no violation of any ex post facto provision in requiring registration when the acts underlying an individual’s conviction occurred prior to the effective date of the registration requirements.” See also Benner, 853 A.2d at 1071 (indicating that “existence of some punitive element is a prerequisite to any determination that a law is ex post facto ” and registration, n

2020Id. at 1024 ; see also In re L.Z., 631 A.3d at 361, 111 A.3d at 1174 .

2018Id. [T]he clear and convincing evidence necessary to find dependency, has been imposed by the Legislature as the standard which the Juvenile Court must apply in deciding abuse cases. . . . - 13 - J-A22036-18 There is no conflict, constitutional or otherwise, with the clear and convincing evidence standard imposed by the Act to establish child abuse.

2006See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 754-57 , 102 S.Ct. 1388 , 71 L.Ed.2d 599 (1982) (discussing standards of proof, and stating, among other things, that the clear and convincing evidence standard is appropriate “when the individual interests at stake in a state proceeding are both ‘particularly important’ and ‘more substantial than mere loss of money’ ”).

2006See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 754-57 , 102 S.Ct. 1388 , 71 L.Ed.2d 599 (1982) (discussing standards of proof, and stating, among other things, that the clear and convincing evidence standard is appropriate “when the individual interests at stake in a state proceeding are both ‘particularly important’ and ‘more substantial than mere loss of money’ ”).

2020“When balancing the needs of the state in protecting mentally ill persons and others in society against the liberty interests of the individual sought to be committed, we find that due process protections demand the -6- J-A14041-20 application of the clear and convincing evidence standard of proof in cases pursuant to [section 303].” In re Hancock, 719 A.2d at 1058 .

2015In re Hancock, 719 A.2d 1053, 1055-1057 (Pa.Super.1998).

2025Although some jurisdictions have adopted it in the DNA context, 49 other jurisdictions construing their own statutes have instead favored a clear-and-convincing-evidence standard. 50 In our 49 Rhoades v. State, 220 P.3d 1066, 1072 (Idaho 2009); People v. Edwards, 969 N.E.2d 829, 836 (Ill. 2012); Riley v. State, 819 N.W.2d 162, 170 (Minn. 2012); State ex rel.

2025Although some jurisdictions have adopted it in the DNA context, 49 other jurisdictions construing their own statutes have instead favored a clear-and-convincing-evidence standard. 50 In our 49 Rhoades v. State, 220 P.3d 1066, 1072 (Idaho 2009); People v. Edwards, 969 N.E.2d 829, 836 (Ill. 2012); Riley v. State, 819 N.W.2d 162, 170 (Minn. 2012); State ex rel.