clear and convincing evidence standard in Wisconsin

2025The clear and convincing evidence standard is the “so-called middle burden of proof” in civil actions, Michels v. Lyons, 2019 WI 57, ¶34 , 387 Wis. 2d 1 , 927 N.W.2d 486 , and requires proof “to a reasonable certainty by 20 No. 2023AP1764 evidence that is clear, satisfactory, and convincing,” Marquez v. Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC, 2012 WI 57, ¶36 , 341 Wis. 2d 119 , 815 N.W.2d 314 , decision clarified on denial of reconsideration, 2012 WI 74 , 342 Wis. 2d 254 , 823 N.W.2d 266 . ¶46 At most, Vasquez proved that he received ineffective assistance of counsel and that there were potential weaknesses i

2025The clear and convincing evidence standard is the “so-called middle burden of proof” in civil actions, Michels v. Lyons, 2019 WI 57, ¶34 , 387 Wis. 2d 1 , 927 N.W.2d 486 , and requires proof “to a reasonable certainty by 20 No. 2023AP1764 evidence that is clear, satisfactory, and convincing,” Marquez v. Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC, 2012 WI 57, ¶36 , 341 Wis. 2d 119 , 815 N.W.2d 314 , decision clarified on denial of reconsideration, 2012 WI 74 , 342 Wis. 2d 254 , 823 N.W.2d 266 . ¶46 At most, Vasquez proved that he received ineffective assistance of counsel and that there were potential weaknesses i

2025The clear and convincing evidence standard is the “so-called middle burden of proof” in civil actions, Michels v. Lyons, 2019 WI 57, ¶34 , 387 Wis. 2d 1 , 927 N.W.2d 486 , and requires proof “to a reasonable certainty by 20 No. 2023AP1764 evidence that is clear, satisfactory, and convincing,” Marquez v. Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC, 2012 WI 57, ¶36 , 341 Wis. 2d 119 , 815 N.W.2d 314 , decision clarified on denial of reconsideration, 2012 WI 74 , 342 Wis. 2d 254 , 823 N.W.2d 266 . ¶46 At most, Vasquez proved that he received ineffective assistance of counsel and that there were potential weaknesses i

2025The clear and convincing evidence standard is the “so-called middle burden of proof” in civil actions, Michels v. Lyons, 2019 WI 57, ¶34 , 387 Wis. 2d 1 , 927 N.W.2d 486 , and requires proof “to a reasonable certainty by 20 No. 2023AP1764 evidence that is clear, satisfactory, and convincing,” Marquez v. Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC, 2012 WI 57, ¶36 , 341 Wis. 2d 119 , 815 N.W.2d 314 , decision clarified on denial of reconsideration, 2012 WI 74 , 342 Wis. 2d 254 , 823 N.W.2d 266 . ¶46 At most, Vasquez proved that he received ineffective assistance of counsel and that there were potential weaknesses i

2025The clear and convincing evidence standard is the “so-called middle burden of proof” in civil actions, Michels v. Lyons, 2019 WI 57, ¶34 , 387 Wis. 2d 1 , 927 N.W.2d 486 , and requires proof “to a reasonable certainty by 20 No. 2023AP1764 evidence that is clear, satisfactory, and convincing,” Marquez v. Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC, 2012 WI 57, ¶36 , 341 Wis. 2d 119 , 815 N.W.2d 314 , decision clarified on denial of reconsideration, 2012 WI 74 , 342 Wis. 2d 254 , 823 N.W.2d 266 . ¶46 At most, Vasquez proved that he received ineffective assistance of counsel and that there were potential weaknesses i

2025The clear and convincing evidence standard is the “so-called middle burden of proof” in civil actions, Michels v. Lyons, 2019 WI 57, ¶34 , 387 Wis. 2d 1 , 927 N.W.2d 486 , and requires proof “to a reasonable certainty by 20 No. 2023AP1764 evidence that is clear, satisfactory, and convincing,” Marquez v. Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC, 2012 WI 57, ¶36 , 341 Wis. 2d 119 , 815 N.W.2d 314 , decision clarified on denial of reconsideration, 2012 WI 74 , 342 Wis. 2d 254 , 823 N.W.2d 266 . ¶46 At most, Vasquez proved that he received ineffective assistance of counsel and that there were potential weaknesses i

2019As recognized by the Troxel court, a fit parent's interest in the care, custody, and control of his or her child "is perhaps the oldest of the fundamental liberty interests recognized by [the United States Supreme] Court." Troxel , 530 U.S. at 65 , 120 S. Ct. 2054 .

2019As recognized by the Troxel court, a fit parent's interest in the care, custody, and control of his or her child "is perhaps the oldest of the fundamental liberty interests recognized by [the United States Supreme] Court." Troxel , 530 U.S. at 65 , 120 S. Ct. 2054 .

2019Harris , 326 Wis. 2d 685 , ¶¶35, 45. ¶13 For the purposes of this appeal, the State concedes that "using trial counsel's restitution argument to form a judgment about Young's character would be an improper sentencing factor." Therefore, we need address only whether the circuit court properly determined Young failed to demonstrate actual reliance on that factor by clear and convincing evidence. ¶14 Young first points out that there is no "artificial line" between comments a circuit court makes before pronouncing sentence and after doing so.

2019See, e.g., Polasek v. Omura, 136 P.3d 519, 523 (Mt. 2006) (reasoning that the close scrutiny that applies to any infringement on a person's right to parent a child requires a clear and convincing standard); N.F. v. R.A., 137 P.3d 318, 319 (Colo. 2006) (maintaining that the clear and convincing evidence standard will accord due process to parents as it does in the parental rights termination context); Vibbert v. Vibbert, 144 S.W.3d 292, 295 (Ky. Ct. App. 2004) (noting that the clear and convincing evidence standard applies because "'the individual interests at stake . . . are both particularly

2019See, e.g., Polasek v. Omura, 136 P.3d 519, 523 (Mt. 2006) (reasoning that the close scrutiny that applies to any infringement on a person's right to parent a child requires a clear and convincing standard); N.F. v. R.A., 137 P.3d 318, 319 (Colo. 2006) (maintaining that the clear and convincing evidence standard will accord due process to parents as it does in the parental rights termination context); Vibbert v. Vibbert, 144 S.W.3d 292, 295 (Ky. Ct. App. 2004) (noting that the clear and convincing evidence standard applies because "'the individual interests at stake . . . are both particularly

2018The clear and convincing evidence standard is not used in negligence actions, or regarding causation, but is reserved for "the class of cases involving *481 fraud, of which undue influence is a specie, gross negligence, and civil actions involving criminal acts." Wangen v. Ford Motor Co. , 97 Wis.2d 260 , 299, 294 N.W.2d 437 (1980) (quoting Kuehn , 11 Wis.2d at 26 , 104 N.W.2d 138 ). ¶95 The elements of a private nuisance cause of action based on negligent conduct need not be proven (or pled) to the standard of clear and convincing evidence.

2018The clear and convincing evidence standard is not used in negligence actions, or regarding causation, but is reserved for "the class of cases involving *481 fraud, of which undue influence is a specie, gross negligence, and civil actions involving criminal acts." Wangen v. Ford Motor Co. , 97 Wis.2d 260 , 299, 294 N.W.2d 437 (1980) (quoting Kuehn , 11 Wis.2d at 26 , 104 N.W.2d 138 ). ¶95 The elements of a private nuisance cause of action based on negligent conduct need not be proven (or pled) to the standard of clear and convincing evidence.

2018Walberg , 109 Wis. 2d at 102 .

2018The clear and convincing evidence standard is not used in negligence actions, or regarding causation, but is reserved for "the class of cases involving *481 fraud, of which undue influence is a specie, gross negligence, and civil actions involving criminal acts." Wangen v. Ford Motor Co. , 97 Wis.2d 260 , 299, 294 N.W.2d 437 (1980) (quoting Kuehn , 11 Wis.2d at 26 , 104 N.W.2d 138 ). ¶95 The elements of a private nuisance cause of action based on negligent conduct need not be proven (or pled) to the standard of clear and convincing evidence.

2018The clear and convincing evidence standard is not used in negligence actions, or regarding causation, but is reserved for "the class of cases involving *481 fraud, of which undue influence is a specie, gross negligence, and civil actions involving criminal acts." Wangen v. Ford Motor Co. , 97 Wis.2d 260 , 299, 294 N.W.2d 437 (1980) (quoting Kuehn , 11 Wis.2d at 26 , 104 N.W.2d 138 ). ¶95 The elements of a private nuisance cause of action based on negligent conduct need not be proven (or pled) to the standard of clear and convincing evidence.

2018That burden is said to mean "clear weight of the evidence" or "clearly more probable than not." Klipstein v. Raschein , 117 Wis. 248 , 94 N.W. 63 (1903).

2018That burden is said to mean "clear weight of the evidence" or "clearly more probable than not." Klipstein v. Raschein , 117 Wis. 248 , 94 N.W. 63 (1903).

2014See Westerheide v. State, 831 So. 2d 93, 97, 109-10 (Fla. 2002); In re Detention of Samuelson, 727 N.E.2d 228, 231, 237 (111. 2000); State v. Golston, 67 So. 3d 452, 454-55, 464 (La. 2011); Commonwealth v. Knapp, 804 N.E.2d 885, 887 , 893 & n.14 (Mass. 2004); People v. Williams, 580 N.W.2d 438, 439-40, 442 (Mich. Ct. App. 1998); In re Van Orden, 271 S.W.3d 579, 581, 584-86 (Mo. 2008); State v. Harris, 463 N.W.2d 829, 831, 834-35 (Neb. 1990); State v. Ploof, 34 A.3d 563, 567, 573-75 (N.H. 2011); State v. Farnsworth, 75 A.D.3d 14 , 900 N.Y.S.2d 548, 550, 555, 556-59 (N.Y.

2014We apply the clear and convincing evidence standard in the present case. 9 No. 2012AP2044-CR ¶37 There are several ways a defendant may demonstrate manifest injustice.7 One way is to show that the defendant did not enter the plea knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily.8 A plea that was "not entered knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently violates fundamental due process, and a defendant therefore may withdraw the plea as a matter of right."9 ¶38 Whether a defendant's plea was entered knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily is a question of constitutional fact.10 An appellate court uphol

2014We apply the clear and convincing evidence standard in the present case. 9 No. 2012AP2044-CR ¶37 There are several ways a defendant may demonstrate manifest injustice.7 One way is to show that the defendant did not enter the plea knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily.8 A plea that was "not entered knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently violates fundamental due process, and a defendant therefore may withdraw the plea as a matter of right."9 ¶38 Whether a defendant's plea was entered knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily is a question of constitutional fact.10 An appellate court uphol

2014"Findings of fact include 'the circumstances of the case and the counsel's conduct and strategy.'"29 An appellate court independently determines whether those historical facts demonstrate that defense counsel's performance met the constitutional standard for ineffective assistance of counsel, benefiting from the analyses of the circuit court and court of appeals.30 ¶87 We first explore whether trial counsel's performance was deficient. ¶88 The test for deficiency of performance is objective: Under the totality of the circumstances, did trial counsel's performance fall "outside the wide range o

2014"Findings of fact include 'the circumstances of the case and the counsel's conduct and strategy.'"29 An appellate court independently determines whether those historical facts demonstrate that defense counsel's performance met the constitutional standard for ineffective assistance of counsel, benefiting from the analyses of the circuit court and court of appeals.30 ¶87 We first explore whether trial counsel's performance was deficient. ¶88 The test for deficiency of performance is objective: Under the totality of the circumstances, did trial counsel's performance fall "outside the wide range o

2014We apply the clear and convincing evidence standard in the present case. 9 No. 2012AP2044-CR ¶37 There are several ways a defendant may demonstrate manifest injustice.7 One way is to show that the defendant did not enter the plea knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily.8 A plea that was "not entered knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently violates fundamental due process, and a defendant therefore may withdraw the plea as a matter of right."9 ¶38 Whether a defendant's plea was entered knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily is a question of constitutional fact.10 An appellate court uphol

2014We apply the clear and convincing evidence standard in the present case. 9 No. 2012AP2044-CR ¶37 There are several ways a defendant may demonstrate manifest injustice.7 One way is to show that the defendant did not enter the plea knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily.8 A plea that was "not entered knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently violates fundamental due process, and a defendant therefore may withdraw the plea as a matter of right."9 ¶38 Whether a defendant's plea was entered knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily is a question of constitutional fact.10 An appellate court uphol

2014We apply the clear and convincing evidence standard in the present case. 9 No. 2012AP2044-CR ¶37 There are several ways a defendant may demonstrate manifest injustice.7 One way is to show that the defendant did not enter the plea knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily.8 A plea that was "not entered knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently violates fundamental due process, and a defendant therefore may withdraw the plea as a matter of right."9 ¶38 Whether a defendant's plea was entered knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily is a question of constitutional fact.10 An appellate court uphol

2014We apply the clear and convincing evidence standard in the present case. 9 No. 2012AP2044-CR ¶37 There are several ways a defendant may demonstrate manifest injustice.7 One way is to show that the defendant did not enter the plea knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily.8 A plea that was "not entered knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently violates fundamental due process, and a defendant therefore may withdraw the plea as a matter of right."9 ¶38 Whether a defendant's plea was entered knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily is a question of constitutional fact.10 An appellate court uphol

2014We apply the clear and convincing evidence standard in the present case. 9 No. 2012AP2044-CR ¶37 There are several ways a defendant may demonstrate manifest injustice.7 One way is to show that the defendant did not enter the plea knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily.8 A plea that was "not entered knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently violates fundamental due process, and a defendant therefore may withdraw the plea as a matter of right."9 ¶38 Whether a defendant's plea was entered knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily is a question of constitutional fact.10 An appellate court uphol

2014We apply the clear and convincing evidence standard in the present case. 9 No. 2012AP2044-CR ¶37 There are several ways a defendant may demonstrate manifest injustice.7 One way is to show that the defendant did not enter the plea knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily.8 A plea that was "not entered knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently violates fundamental due process, and a defendant therefore may withdraw the plea as a matter of right."9 ¶38 Whether a defendant's plea was entered knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily is a question of constitutional fact.10 An appellate court uphol