clear and convincing evidence standard in Ohio

2016Butler No. CA2005-10-426, 2006-Ohio-2401, ¶ 4 ; State v. Tyson, 3d Dist.

2015Butler No. CA2005-10-426, 2006-Ohio-2401 , ¶ -3- Case No. 7-15-02 4; State v. Tyson, 3d Dist.

2024Based on his quotations without corresponding analysis, we infer he contends the trial court should have employed the clear and convincing evidence standard when determining whether he was a vexatious litigator. {¶31} The clear and convincing evidence standard requires the evidence “produce in the mind of the trier of facts a firm belief or conviction as to the facts sought to be established.” In re Adoption of Holcomb, 18 Ohio St.3d 361, 368 , 481 N.E.2d 613 (1985).

2024Based on his quotations without corresponding analysis, we infer he contends the trial court should have employed the clear and convincing evidence standard when determining whether he was a vexatious litigator. {¶31} The clear and convincing evidence standard requires the evidence “produce in the mind of the trier of facts a firm belief or conviction as to the facts sought to be established.” In re Adoption of Holcomb, 18 Ohio St.3d 361, 368 , 481 N.E.2d 613 (1985).

2005State v. Williams, 88 Ohio St.3d 513 , 2000-Ohio-428 ; State v. Lockney, 11th Dist.

2004Since the Ohio Supreme Court has addressed each of these arguments in State v. Williams, 88 Ohio St.3d 513 , 2000-Ohio-428 , for purposes of judicial economy, all of the these arguments will be addressed together. {¶ 22} "Because neither a suspect class nor a fundamental constitutional right is implicated [by the sexual predator provision], a rational basis analysis is appropriate." Id. at 531 (citation omitted).

2000In this case, the clear- and-convincing-evidence standard require[s] the state to present evidence that would give the court a firm belief or conviction that [a] defendant [is] likely to commit another sexually oriented offense in the future.” Ward, 130 Ohio App.3d at 569 , 720 N.E.2d at 616 .

2000In this case, the clear- and-convincing-evidence standard require[s] the state to present evidence that would give the court a firm belief or conviction that [a] defendant [is] likely to commit another sexually oriented offense in the future.” Ward, 130 Ohio App.3d at 569 , 720 N.E.2d at 616 .

2014In re Wise, 96 Ohio App.3d 619, 626 , (9th Dist.1994). {¶26} As an initial matter, we note that “[i]t is well recognized that the right to raise a child is an ‘essential’ and ‘basic’ civil right.” In re Franklin, 3d Dist.

2013In re Wise, 96 Ohio App.3d 619, 626 , (9th Dist.1994). {¶20} In reaching its determinations regarding permanent custody, the trial court must safeguard certain fundamental rights of parents.

2007R.C. 2950.09 (B)(4). *Page 19 {¶ 53} In State v. Eppinger , 91 Ohio St.3d 158 , 164 , 2001-Ohio-247 , 743 N.E.2d 881 , the Ohio Supreme Court defined the clear and convincing evidence standard as follows: "Clear and convincing evidence is that measure or degree of proof which will produce in the mind of the trier of facts a firm belief or conviction as to the allegations sought to be established.

2006R.C. 2950.09 (B)(4). {¶ 71} In State v. Eppinger, 91 Ohio St.3d 158 , 164 , 2001-Ohio-247 , 743 N.E.2d 881 , the Ohio Supreme Court defined the clear and convincing evidence standard as follows: {¶ 72} "Clear and convincing evidence is that measure or degree of proof which will produce in the mind of the trier of facts a firm belief or conviction as to the allegations sought to be established.

2018Id., citing R.C. 2152.14(A)(2)(b) and (B)(2). {¶14} “[U]nder R.C. 2152.14(E)(2), the juvenile court has the discretion to ‘modify the adult sentence the court invokes to consist of any lesser prison term that could be imposed for the offense.’” In re C.P., 131 Ohio St.3d 513 , 2012-Ohio- 1446, ¶ 81. {¶15} “The clear-and-convincing-evidence standard allowed by R.C. 2152.14(E)(1) is less rigorous [than the beyond-a-reasonable doubt standard required in criminal trials], though stronger than a mere preponderance-of-the- evidence standard.” In re J.V., 134 Ohio St.3d 1 , 2012-Ohio-4961, at ¶ 20 .

2018Id., citing R.C. 2152.14(A)(2)(b) and (B)(2). {¶14} “[U]nder R.C. 2152.14(E)(2), the juvenile court has the discretion to ‘modify the adult sentence the court invokes to consist of any lesser prison term that could be imposed for the offense.’” In re C.P., 131 Ohio St.3d 513 , 2012-Ohio- 1446, ¶ 81. {¶15} “The clear-and-convincing-evidence standard allowed by R.C. 2152.14(E)(1) is less rigorous [than the beyond-a-reasonable doubt standard required in criminal trials], though stronger than a mere preponderance-of-the- evidence standard.” In re J.V., 134 Ohio St.3d 1 , 2012-Ohio-4961, at ¶ 20 .

2016Santosky has been characterized as "requiring a clear and convincing evidence standard for termination of parental rights because the parent's interest is fundamental but the State has no legitimate interest in termination unless the parent is unfit, and finding that the State's interest in finding the best home for the child does not arise until the parent has been found unfit." Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dept. of Health (1990), - 10 - Butler CA2016-09-185 497 U.S. 261, 319 , 110 S.Ct. 2841 , 111 L.Ed.2d 224 (Brennan, J., dissenting).

2016Santosky has been characterized as "requiring a clear and convincing evidence standard for termination of parental rights because the parent's interest is fundamental but the State has no legitimate interest in termination unless the parent is unfit, and finding that the State's interest in finding the best home for the child does not arise until the parent has been found unfit." Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dept. of Health (1990), - 10 - Butler CA2016-09-185 497 U.S. 261, 319 , 110 S.Ct. 2841 , 111 L.Ed.2d 224 (Brennan, J., dissenting).

2002Con-tex Inc. v. Consolidated Technologies, Inc. (1988), 40 Ohio App.3d 94 , 531 N.E.2d 1353 .

2002Con-tex Inc. v. Consolidated Technologies, Inc. (1988), 40 Ohio App.3d 94 , 531 N.E.2d 1353 .

2001"Clear and convincing evidence" is: "That measure or degree of proof which is more than a mere `preponderance of the evidence,' but not to the extent of such certainty as is required `beyond a reasonable doubt' in criminal cases, and which will provide in the mind of the trier of facts a firm belief or conviction as to the facts sought to be established." [In re Mental Illness of Thomas (1996), 108 Ohio App.3d 697 , 700 , quoting Cincinnati Bar Assn. v. Massengale (1991), 58 Ohio St.3d 121 , 122 .] In reviewing a matter under this standard, a reviewing court must examine the record to determin

1999Cincinnati Bar Assn. v. Massengale (1991), 58 Ohio St.3d 121, 122 , 568 N.E.2d 1222, 1223 .

2026Whether the agency’s evidence satisfies the clear-and-convincing evidence standard, the Ohio Supreme Court has stated: “Clear and convincing evidence is that measure or degree of proof which is more than a mere ‘preponderance of the evidence,’ but not to the extent of such certainty as is required ‘beyond a reasonable doubt’ in criminal cases, and which will produce in the mind of the trier of facts a firm belief or conviction as to the facts sought to be established.” In re Z.C., 2023-Ohio-4703, ¶ 7 , quoting Cross v. Ledford, 161 Ohio St. 469 (1954), paragraph three of the syllabus. “‘Where

2025Regarding whether evidence satisfies the clear-and-convincing evidence standard, the Ohio Supreme Court has stated: “Clear and convincing evidence is that measure or degree of proof which is more than a mere ‘preponderance of the evidence,’ but not to the extent of such certainty as is required ‘beyond a reasonable doubt’ in criminal cases, and which will produce in the mind of the trier of facts a firm belief or conviction as to the facts sought to be established.” In re Z.C., 2023-Ohio-4703, ¶ 7 , quoting Cross v. Ledford, 161 Ohio St. 469 (1954), paragraph three of the syllabus.

2023The appellate court may take any action authorized by this division if it clearly and convincingly finds either of the following: 8. (a) That the record does not support the sentencing court’s findings under division (B) or (D) of section 2929.13, division (B)(2)(e) or (C)(4) of section 2929.14, or division (I) of section 2929.20 of the Revised Code, whichever, if any, is relevant; (b) That the sentence is otherwise contrary to law. {¶ 21} In State v. Gwynn, 2022-Ohio-4607 , --N.E.3d--, the Ohio Supreme Court held that the legislature’s use of the clear and convincing evidence standard showed

2023(First emphasis added.) Gwynne, __ Ohio St.3d __, 2022-Ohio-4607 , __ N.E.3d __, at ¶ 18-23. {¶ 72} Indeed, the lead opinion undermines its position that R.C. 2953.08(G)(2)’s language requires appellate-court deference to the trial court’s findings when it agrees that the clear-and-convincing-evidence standard in R.C. 2953.08(G)(2) necessarily requires that an appellate court serve in a role as a trier of fact and not in the traditional role of a reviewing court.

2010Because adoption terminates fundamental rights of the natural parents, "we have held that '* * * [a]ny exception to the requirement of parental consent [to adoption] must be strictly construed so as to protect the right of natural parents to raise and nurture their children.' " In re Adoption of Masa, 23 Ohio St.3d at 165 , 23 OBR 330, 492 N.E.2d 140 , quoting In re Schoeppner (1976), 46 Ohio St.2d 21, 24 , 75 O.O.2d 12 , 345 N.E.2d 608 .

2010Because adoption terminates fundamental rights of the natural parents, "we have held that '* * * [a]ny exception to the requirement of parental consent [to adoption] must be strictly construed so as to protect the right of natural parents to raise and nurture their children.' " In re Adoption of Masa, 23 Ohio St.3d at 165 , 23 OBR 330, 492 N.E.2d 140 , quoting In re Schoeppner (1976), 46 Ohio St.2d 21, 24 , 75 O.O.2d 12 , 345 N.E.2d 608 .

2010Because adoption terminates fundamental rights of the natural parents, "we have held that '* * * [a]ny exception to the requirement of parental consent [to adoption] must be strictly construed so as to protect the right of natural parents to raise and nurture their children.' " In re Adoption of Masa, 23 Ohio St.3d at 165 , 23 OBR 330, 492 N.E.2d 140 , quoting In re Schoeppner (1976), 46 Ohio St.2d 21, 24 , 75 O.O.2d 12 , 345 N.E.2d 608 .

2010Because adoption terminates fundamental rights of the natural parents, "we have held that '* * * [a]ny exception to the requirement of parental consent [to adoption] must be strictly construed so as to protect the right of natural parents to raise and nurture their children.' " In re Adoption of Masa, 23 Ohio St.3d at 165 , 23 OBR 330, 492 N.E.2d 140 , quoting In re Schoeppner (1976), 46 Ohio St.2d 21, 24 , 75 O.O.2d 12 , 345 N.E.2d 608 .

2008Spencer cites State v. Serrano , 164 Ohio App.3d 103 , 2005-Ohio-5606 and State v. Cantrell , 2d Dist.

2008Spencer cites State v. Serrano , 164 Ohio App.3d 103 , 2005-Ohio-5606 and State v. Cantrell , 2d Dist.

2008While the clear-and-convincing-evidence standard may be used to find that an individual is a mentally ill person subject to hospitalization by court order, Addington v. Texas (1979), 441 U.S. 418 , 99 S.Ct. 1804 , 60 L.Ed.2d 323 , and R.C. 2945.39, the additional finding that a person has committed a criminal offense must be made beyond a reasonable doubt.

2008While the clear-and-convincing-evidence standard may be used to find that an individual is a mentally ill person subject to hospitalization by court order, Addington v. Texas (1979), 441 U.S. 418 , 99 S.Ct. 1804 , 60 L.Ed.2d 323 , and R.C. 2945.39, the additional finding that a person has committed a criminal offense must be made beyond a reasonable doubt.