clear and convincing evidence standard in California

2026(See People v. Jasso (2025) 17 Cal.5th 646 , 685 [Corroborating evidence is evidence that “tends to connect the defendant with the crime.”]; People v. Baskins (1946) 72 Cal.App.2d 728, 731 [Corroborating evidence “need not be strong.”]; In re Angelia P. (1981) 28 Cal.3d 908, 919 [“Clear and convincing” evidence requires a finding of high probability]; Conservatorship of Maria B. (2013) 218 Cal.App.4th 514, 529 [“the clear and convincing evidence standard is higher than the preponderance of the evidence standard”]; and CALCRIM 19 Nos. 334, 335, 376, 441, 1111, 2240, 2241, 3450, 3453.) Thus, the

2024(Geoffrey S., supra, 86 Cal.App.5th at p. 575, citing Technology Credit Union v. Rafat (2022) 82 Cal.App.5th 314 , 323.) In conducting that review, “we must take into account the clear and convincing evidence standard of 30 proof mandated by [section 18175, subd. (b)].” (Geoffrey S., supra, at p. 575, citing Conservatorship of O.B. (2020) 9 Cal.5th 989 , 1011–1012 (O.B.).) “Clear and convincing evidence requires a finding of high probability.” (In re Angelia P. (1981) 28 Cal.3d 908, 919 .) “ ‘When reviewing a finding that a fact has been proved by clear and convincing evidence, the question be

2018Decades ago, Santosky v. Kramer (1982) 455 U.S. 745 , 102 S.Ct. 1388 , 71 L.Ed.2d 599 held the clear and convincing evidence standard was essential as a matter of due process where termination of parental rights was concerned. ( Id. at pp. 747-748, 102 S.Ct. 1388 .) In so holding it emphasized that the clear and convincing evidence standard "conveys to the factfinder the level of subjective certainty about his factual conclusions necessary to satisfy due process." ( Id. at p. 769, 102 S.Ct. 1388 .) It thereby impresses upon the factfinder the gravity of the decision he or she is called upon to

2018Decades ago, Santosky v. Kramer (1982) 455 U.S. 745 , 102 S.Ct. 1388 , 71 L.Ed.2d 599 held the clear and convincing evidence standard was essential as a matter of due process where termination of parental rights was concerned. ( Id. at pp. 747-748, 102 S.Ct. 1388 .) In so holding it emphasized that the clear and convincing evidence standard "conveys to the factfinder the level of subjective certainty about his factual conclusions necessary to satisfy due process." ( Id. at p. 769, 102 S.Ct. 1388 .) It thereby impresses upon the factfinder the gravity of the decision he or she is called upon to

2025(In re D.D. (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 985, 996 .) “The juvenile court has broad discretion to determine what would best serve and protect the child’s interest and to fashion a dispositional order.” (In re Javier G. (2006) 137 Cal.App.4th 453, 462 [applying § 361, subd. (c) within the context of a § 387 removal].) When reviewing removal findings, “ ‘[w]e review the record in the light most favorable to the trial court’s order to determine whether there is substantial evidence from which a reasonable trier of fact could make the necessary findings based on the clear and convincing evidence standard.

2024The focus of the statute is on averting harm to the child.” (In re T.W., supra, 214 Cal.App.4th at p. 1163 .) “The juvenile court has broad discretion to determine what would best serve and protect the child’s interest and to fashion a dispositional order.” (In re Javier G. (2006) 137 Cal.App.4th 453, 462 [applying § 361, subd. (c) within context of a § 387 removal].) 6 When reviewing removal findings, “ ‘[w]e review the record in the light most favorable to the trial court’s order to determine whether there is substantial evidence from which a reasonable trier of fact could make the necessary

2020(See, e.g., Heller v. Doe (1993) 509 U.S. 312 , 330–332 [concerning state procedures for involuntary commitment of mentally retarded persons]; Washington v. Harper (1990) 494 U.S. 210, 213 , 229–231 [addressing whether a judicial hearing must precede 21 forcible administration of antipsychotic medication to state prison inmates]; Addington, supra, 441 U.S. 418, 425 [concluding the indefinite civil commitment of mentally ill patients requires a clear and convincing evidence standard of proof].) B.

2020(See, e.g., Heller v. Doe (1993) 509 U.S. 312 , 330–332 [concerning state procedures for involuntary commitment of mentally retarded persons]; Washington v. Harper (1990) 494 U.S. 210, 213 , 229–231 [addressing whether a judicial hearing must precede 21 forcible administration of antipsychotic medication to state prison inmates]; Addington, supra, 441 U.S. 418, 425 [concluding the indefinite civil commitment of mentally ill patients requires a clear and convincing evidence standard of proof].) B.

2025(In re D.D. (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 985, 996 .) “The juvenile court has broad discretion to determine what would best serve and protect the child’s interest and to fashion a dispositional order.” (In re Javier G. (2006) 137 Cal.App.4th 453, 462 [applying § 361, subd. (c) within the context of a § 387 removal].) When reviewing removal findings, “ ‘[w]e review the record in the light most favorable to the trial court’s order to determine whether there is substantial evidence from which a reasonable trier of fact could make the necessary findings based on the clear and convincing evidence standard.

2025Before the juvenile court may set a section 366.26 permanency planning hearing, it must find by “clear and convincing evidence that reasonable services were provided or offered to the parent . . . .” (§ 366.21, subd. (g)(1)(C)(ii).) On review of the juvenile court’s finding that reasonable services were provided to mother, we determine “ ‘whether there is substantial evidence from which a reasonable trier of fact could make the necessary findings based on the clear and convincing evidence standard.’ ” (T.J. v. Superior Court (2018) 21 Cal.App.5th 1229, 1239 , italics omitted, disapproved on ot

2001(See In re Marquis D. (1995) 38 Cal.App.4th 1813, 1827 [ 46 Cal.Rptr.2d 198 ]; In re Cheryl H. (1984) 153 Cal.App.3d 1098, 1114 [ 200 Cal.Rptr. 789 ].) Moreover, “ ‘ “[i]t is a settled rule of statutory construction that where a statute, with reference to one subject[,] contains a given provision, the omission of such provision from a similar statute concerning a related subject is significant to show that a different legislative intent existed with reference to the different statutes.” ’ ” (In re Marriage of Corman (1997) 59 Cal.App.4th 1492, 1499 [ 69 Cal.Rptr.2d 880 ], quoting In re Jose A.

2001(See In re Marquis D. (1995) 38 Cal.App.4th 1813, 1827 [ 46 Cal.Rptr.2d 198 ]; In re Cheryl H. (1984) 153 Cal.App.3d 1098, 1114 [ 200 Cal.Rptr. 789 ].) Moreover, “ ‘ “[i]t is a settled rule of statutory construction that where a statute, with reference to one subject[,] contains a given provision, the omission of such provision from a similar statute concerning a related subject is significant to show that a different legislative intent existed with reference to the different statutes.” ’ ” (In re Marriage of Corman (1997) 59 Cal.App.4th 1492, 1499 [ 69 Cal.Rptr.2d 880 ], quoting In re Jose A.

2025(Ann S., supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 1127, fn. 9 .) The question is whether the record as a whole contains substantial evidence from which a reasonable fact finder could have found it highly probable that the fact was true.

2024(Guardianship of Ann S., supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 1127, fn. 9 .) At issue is “whether the record as a whole contains substantial evidence from which a reasonable fact finder could have found it highly probable that the fact was true.” (Conservatorship of O.B. (2020) 9 Cal.5th 989 , 1011.) We “must view the record in the light most favorable to the prevailing party below and give appropriate deference to how the trier of fact may have evaluated the credibility of witnesses, resolved conflicts in the evidence, and drawn reasonable inferences from the evidence.” (Id. at pp. 1011–1012.) 12 B.

1995(In re Carmaleta B. (1978) 21 Cal.3d 482, 489 [ 146 Cal.Rptr. 623 , 579 P.2d 514 ]; see also Santosky v. Kramer, supra, 455 U.S. at p. 753 [ 71 L.Ed.2d at p. 606 ]; Stanley v. Illinois (1972) 405 U.S. 645, 651 [ 31 L.Ed.2d 551, 558-559 , 92 S.Ct. 1208 ].) When individual interests are at stake which are particularly important and more substantial than the mere loss of money, a clear and convincing evidence standard has been required.

1995(In re Carmaleta B. (1978) 21 Cal.3d 482, 489 [ 146 Cal.Rptr. 623 , 579 P.2d 514 ]; see also Santosky v. Kramer, supra, 455 U.S. at p. 753 [ 71 L.Ed.2d at p. 606 ]; Stanley v. Illinois (1972) 405 U.S. 645, 651 [ 31 L.Ed.2d 551, 558-559 , 92 S.Ct. 1208 ].) When individual interests are at stake which are particularly important and more substantial than the mere loss of money, a clear and convincing evidence standard has been required.

2025By creating a presumption in favor of placement with a noncustodial parent, the statute “furthers the legislative goals to . . . place a child in the care of a parent when safe for the child, strengthen the child’s relationship with siblings and other relatives, and avoid the child’s placement in foster care.” (In re Nickolas T. (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 1492 , 1505–1506.) Moreover, “[t]o comport with due process, the detriment finding must be made under the clear and convincing evidence standard.” (In re C.M. (2014) 232 Cal.App.4th 1394, 1401 .) It is undisputed the juvenile court erred by faili

2024(In re C.M. (2014) 232 Cal.App.4th 1394, 1402 .) The clear and convincing evidence standard requires the party with the burden of proof to convince the trier of fact that it is “highly probable” the facts which he asserts are true.

2020(Doolittle v. Exchange Bank, supra, 241 Cal.App.4th at p. 545 .) “The default standard of proof in civil cases is the preponderance of the evidence. [Citation.] Nevertheless, courts have applied the clear and convincing evidence standard when necessary to protect important rights.” (Conservatorship of Wendland (2001) 26 Cal.4th 519, 546 .) We need not resolve the parties’ dispute as to the standard of proof because, even if the preponderance of the evidence standard applies, Tammy did not meet her burden of proving mental incapacity, as explained post. 27 C Substantial Evidence Supports The Tr

2020(Doolittle v. Exchange Bank, supra, 241 Cal.App.4th at p. 545 .) “The default standard of proof in civil cases is the preponderance of the evidence. [Citation.] Nevertheless, courts have applied the clear and convincing evidence standard when necessary to protect important rights.” (Conservatorship of Wendland (2001) 26 Cal.4th 519, 546 .) We need not resolve the parties’ dispute as to the standard of proof because, even if the preponderance of the evidence standard applies, Tammy did not meet her burden of proving mental incapacity, as explained post. 27 C Substantial Evidence Supports The Tr

2026(See People v. Jasso (2025) 17 Cal.5th 646 , 685 [Corroborating evidence is evidence that “tends to connect the defendant with the crime.”]; People v. Baskins (1946) 72 Cal.App.2d 728, 731 [Corroborating evidence “need not be strong.”]; In re Angelia P. (1981) 28 Cal.3d 908, 919 [“Clear and convincing” evidence requires a finding of high probability]; Conservatorship of Maria B. (2013) 218 Cal.App.4th 514, 529 [“the clear and convincing evidence standard is higher than the preponderance of the evidence standard”]; and CALCRIM 19 Nos. 334, 335, 376, 441, 1111, 2240, 2241, 3450, 3453.) Thus, the

2022(See Conservatorship of Maria B. (2013) 218 Cal.App.4th 514, 533 [finding no prejudice where appellant “failed to explain how the result would have been any different if the trial court had applied the clear and convincing evidence standard of proof instead of the preponderance of the evidence standard”].) Accordingly, we find no reversible error in the court’s application of the standard of proof. 11 DISPOSITION The judgment and protective order are affirmed.

2026Vieira noted that Brewer v. Murphy emanated from Stromerson v. Averill (1943) 22 Cal.2d 808 , which cited the clear and convincing evidence standard when reversing judgment quieting title based on allegations of constructive fraud.

1950(Viner v. Untrecht, 26 Cal.2d 261, 267 [ 158 P.2d 3 ] ; Stromerson v. Averill, 22 Cal.2d 808, 815 [ 141 P.2d 732 ].) The trial court filed a memorandum order for judgment which recited: ‘1 The court finds that the defendant sustained the burden of proof that the decedent, Edwin D.

2020(In re D’Anthony D., supra, 230 Cal.App.4th at p. 295.) In contrast to the jurisdictional findings, which are made by a preponderance of the evidence, the juvenile court is required to assess detriment under a clear and convincing evidence standard.

2016If that parent requests custody, the court shall place the child with the parent unless it finds that placement with that parent would be detrimental to the safety, protection, or physical or emotional well-being of the child.” Section 361.2, subdivision (c) further requires the court to make “a finding either in writing or on the record of the basis for its determination under subdivisions (a).” Although the statute does not specify the burden of proof necessary to deny a noncustodial parent’s custody request, our courts have held that “[t]o comport with due process, the detriment finding [un

2015If that parent requests custody, the court shall place the child with the parent unless it finds that placement with that parent would be detrimental to the safety, protection, or physical or emotional well-being of the child.” (§ 361.2, subd. (a); see In re Maya L. (2014) 232 Cal.App.4th 81, 97 [ 180 Cal.Rptr.3d 426 ] (Maya L.).) “To comport with due process, the detriment finding must be made under the clear and convincing evidence standard.” (In re C.M. (2014) 232 Cal.App.4th 1394, 1401 [ 182 Cal.Rptr.3d 206 ] (C.M); see In re Marquis D. (1995) 38 Cal.App.4th 1813, 1829 [ 46 Cal.Rptr.2d 198

2015If that parent requests custody, the court shall place the child with the parent unless it finds that placement with that parent would be detrimental to the safety, protection, or physical or emotional well-being of the child.” (§ 361.2, subd. (a); see In re Maya L. (2014) 232 Cal.App.4th 81, 97 [ 180 Cal.Rptr.3d 426 ] (Maya L.).) “To comport with due process, the detriment finding must be made under the clear and convincing evidence standard.” (In re C.M. (2014) 232 Cal.App.4th 1394, 1401 [ 182 Cal.Rptr.3d 206 ] (C.M); see In re Marquis D. (1995) 38 Cal.App.4th 1813, 1829 [ 46 Cal.Rptr.2d 198

2013Code, § 115.) ... [f] We applied the clear and convincing evidence standard, for example, in Conservatorship of Valerie N. [(1985)] 40 Cal.3d 143, 168 [ 219 Cal.Rptr. 387 , 707 P.2d 760 ], to ensure that a conservator’s decision to authorize sterilization of a developmentally disabled conservatee was truly in the latter’s best interests.

2013Code, § 115.) ... [f] We applied the clear and convincing evidence standard, for example, in Conservatorship of Valerie N. [(1985)] 40 Cal.3d 143, 168 [ 219 Cal.Rptr. 387 , 707 P.2d 760 ], to ensure that a conservator’s decision to authorize sterilization of a developmentally disabled conservatee was truly in the latter’s best interests.

2025(In re Brooke C. (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 377, 382 .) “We review the record in the light most favorable to the trial court’s order to determine whether there is substantial evidence from which a reasonable trier of fact could make the necessary findings based on the clear and convincing evidence standard.” (In re Isayah C. (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 684, 694 , italics omitted.) Here, it was undisputed that Father had been convicted of second degree robbery, a violent felony as defined in Penal Code, section 667.5, subdivision (c)(9).

2025(In re Brooke C. (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 377, 382 .) “We review the record in the light most favorable to the trial court’s order to determine whether there is substantial evidence from which a reasonable trier of fact could make the necessary findings based on the clear and convincing evidence standard.” (In re Isayah C. (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 684, 694 , italics omitted.) 1.

2014(Jason K., supra, 188 Cal.App.4th at p. 1557 , quoting Jones v. United States (1983) 463 U.S. 354, 367 [ 77 L.Ed.2d 694, 707 ].) Although the clear and convincing evidence standard is more typically applied in cases that are civil in nature that implicate important rights, the nature of the proceeding itself is not dispositive.

2014(Jason K., supra, 188 Cal.App.4th at p. 1557 , quoting Jones v. United States (1983) 463 U.S. 354, 367 [ 77 L.Ed.2d 694, 707 ].) Although the clear and convincing evidence standard is more typically applied in cases that are civil in nature that implicate important rights, the nature of the proceeding itself is not dispositive.

1994(See In re Stephanie M., supra, 1 Cal.4th at p. 317; In re Audrey D. (1974) 100 Cal.App.3d 34, 45 [ 160 Cal.Rptr. 802 ].) In an abundance of caution, the referee stated that the court was applying a clear and convincing evidence standard.

1994(See In re Stephanie M., supra, 1 Cal.4th at p. 317; In re Audrey D. (1974) 100 Cal.App.3d 34, 45 [ 160 Cal.Rptr. 802 ].) In an abundance of caution, the referee stated that the court was applying a clear and convincing evidence standard.

2015The evidence showed Deanna lacked insight regarding her past conduct and had not participated in services or taken any steps to ameliorate the risk of future harm to her sons. 13 On an appeal from a judgment required to be based upon clear and convincing evidence, " ' "the clear and convincing evidence test disappears . . . [and] the usual rule of conflicting evidence is applied, giving full effect to the respondent's evidence, however slight, and disregarding the appellant's evidence, however strong." [Citation.]' [Citations.] 'We have no power to judge the effect or value of the evidence, to

2014(In re T.W. (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 1154, 1161 ; In re Lana S. (2012) 207 Cal.App.4th 94, 105 .) On appeal from an order subject to a clear and convincing evidence standard “‘“the clear and convincing test disappears . . . [and] the usual rule of conflicting evidence is applied, giving full effect to the respondent’s evidence, however slight, and disregarding the appellant’s evidence, however strong.” [Citation.]’ [Citation.] ‘We have no power to judge the effect or value of the evidence, to weigh the evidence [or] to consider the credibility of witnesses . . . .’” (In re Mark L. (2001) 94 Cal.

2018Hence, "[w]e review the record in the light most favorable to the trial court's order to determine whether there is substantial evidence from which a reasonable trier of fact could make the necessary findings based on the clear and convincing evidence standard ." ( *1240 In re Isayah C. , supra , 118 Cal.App.4th at p. 694 , 13 Cal.Rptr.3d 198 ; see also In re William B. (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 1220 , 1229, 78 Cal.Rptr.3d 91 ; In re Luke M. (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 1412 , 1426, 132 Cal.Rptr.2d 907 ; In re Victoria M. (1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 1317 , 1326, 255 Cal.Rptr. 498 ( Victoria M. ) [under Civ.

2018Hence, "[w]e review the record in the light most favorable to the trial court's order to determine whether there is substantial evidence from which a reasonable trier of fact could make the necessary findings based on the clear and convincing evidence standard ." ( *1240 In re Isayah C. , supra , 118 Cal.App.4th at p. 694 , 13 Cal.Rptr.3d 198 ; see also In re William B. (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 1220 , 1229, 78 Cal.Rptr.3d 91 ; In re Luke M. (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 1412 , 1426, 132 Cal.Rptr.2d 907 ; In re Victoria M. (1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 1317 , 1326, 255 Cal.Rptr. 498 ( Victoria M. ) [under Civ.

2025(See Conservatorship of O.B. (2020) 9 Cal.5th 989 , 1011.) 13 To support a finding that reasonable services were offered or provided to the parent, “‘the record should show that the supervising agency identified the problems leading to the loss of custody, offered services designed to remedy those problems, maintained reasonable contact with the parents during the course of the service plan, and made reasonable efforts to assist the parents in areas where compliance proved difficult.’” (In re A.G. (2017) 12 Cal.App.5th 994, 1001 , citing In re Riva M. (1991) 235 Cal.App.3d 403, 414 .) Reunific

2022(See In re Riva M. (1991) 235 Cal.App.3d 403, 411-412 [“By failing to object, [appellant] waived any error in using the clear and convincing evidence standard of proof”]; see also Rubinstein v. Fakheri (2020) 49 Cal.App.5th 797 , 808 [“[a]lthough [appellant] asserted the statute of limitations as an affirmative defense in his answer, he did not raise it at trial.

2025But as DPSS points out, if the standard of proof “is well settled, it is presumed that the trial judge applied the appropriate standard and no articulation is required.” (In re Bernadette C. (1982) 127 Cal.App.3d 618, 625 .) Bypass 29 of reunification services has been governed by the clear and convincing evidence standard for over 20 years (Assem.

2025But as DPSS points out, if the standard of proof “is well settled, it is presumed that the trial judge applied the appropriate standard and no articulation is required.” (In re Bernadette C. (1982) 127 Cal.App.3d 618, 625 .) Bypass 29 of reunification services has been governed by the clear and convincing evidence standard for over 20 years (Assem.

2015(In re Manuel L. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 229, 232 (Manuel L.).) 4 Penal Code section 26, paragraph One establishes a “ ‘presumption of a minor’s incapacity.’ ” (People v. Lewis (2001) 26 Cal.4th 334, 378 (Lewis).) “However, ‘the presumption of a minor’s incapacity [may] be rebutted by clear and convincing evidence’ that the minor defendant knew the act’s wrongfulness.” (Ibid.) The People bear the burden of proof to satisfy the clear and convincing evidence standard of proof.

2014He acknowledges that the California Supreme Court held in In re Manuel L. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 229 (Manuel L.) that the clear and convincing evidence standard is the appropriate standard of proof for knowledge of wrongfulness, but Joseph maintains that the reasoning of Manuel L. is no longer valid.