clear and convincing evidence standard in Texas

2026In a legal sufficiency review of a trial court’s findings of fact where a clear and convincing evidence standard 27 applies, “‘[we] look at all the evidence in the light most favorable to the finding to determine whether a reasonable trier of fact could have formed a firm belief or conviction that its finding was true.’” In re Z.N., 602 S.W.3d 541 , 545 (Tex. 2020) (quoting In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d 256, 266 (Tex. 2002)).

2026In a legal sufficiency review of a trial court’s findings of fact where a clear and convincing evidence standard 27 applies, “‘[we] look at all the evidence in the light most favorable to the finding to determine whether a reasonable trier of fact could have formed a firm belief or conviction that its finding was true.’” In re Z.N., 602 S.W.3d 541 , 545 (Tex. 2020) (quoting In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d 256, 266 (Tex. 2002)).

2024When a clear and convincing evidence standard applies, a legal sufficiency review requires a court to “‘look at all the evidence in the light most favorable to the finding to determine whether a reasonable trier of fact could have formed a firm belief or conviction that its finding was true.’” In re J.L., 163 S.W.3d 79, 85 (Tex. 2005) (quoting In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d at 266 ).

2024Yet while the parties waived their right to appeal the associate judge’s rulings to the referring court, they expressly reserved their right to appeal from any final order or judgment that resulted from the ruling or recommendation of the associate judge. 16Id. § 161.001(b). 17Id. § 101.007; In re J.L., 163 S.W.3d 79, 84 (Tex. 2005). 20 witnesses are credible, how to weigh the testimony, and resolves any conflicts and inconsistencies that may exist in the testimony. 18 Yet even 1 7 F though a clear and convincing evidence standard applies to our review, “[a]ll evidentiary standards, including

2026In re R.D.S., 902 S.W.2d 714, 716 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 1995, no writ).

2025In re R.D.S., 902 S.W.2d 714, 716 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 1995, no writ).

2024Yet while the parties waived their right to appeal the associate judge’s rulings to the referring court, they expressly reserved their right to appeal from any final order or judgment that resulted from the ruling or recommendation of the associate judge. 16Id. § 161.001(b). 17Id. § 101.007; In re J.L., 163 S.W.3d 79, 84 (Tex. 2005). 20 witnesses are credible, how to weigh the testimony, and resolves any conflicts and inconsistencies that may exist in the testimony. 18 Yet even 1 7 F though a clear and convincing evidence standard applies to our review, “[a]ll evidentiary standards, including

2022The clear and convincing evidence standard is “that measure or degree of proof which will produce in the mind of the trier of fact a firm belief or conviction as to the truth of the allegations sought to be established.” In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d 17, 23 (Tex. 2002) (quoting State v. Addington, 588 S.W.2d 569, 570 (Tex. 1979)); see Tex. Fam.

2022The clear and convincing evidence standard is “that measure or degree of proof which will produce in the mind of the trier of fact a firm belief or conviction as to the truth of the allegations sought to be established.” In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d 17, 23 (Tex. 2002) (quoting State v. Addington, 588 S.W.2d 569, 570 (Tex. 1979)); see also Tex. Fam.

2022The clear and convincing evidence standard is “that measure or degree of proof which will produce in the mind of the trier of fact a firm belief or conviction as to the truth of the allegations sought to be established.” In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d 17, 23 (Tex. 2002) (quoting State v. Addington, 588 S.W.2d 569, 570 (Tex. 1979)); see Tex. Fam.

2015Due process requires the application of the clear and convincing evidence standard of proof in parental termination cases. [15] This Court has looked to the United States Supreme Court in articulating what the "clear and convincing evidence" standard means. [16] And, following Page 264 this Court's decision in In re G.M., 596 S.W.2d 846 (1980) the Legislature amended the Texas Family Code to change the burden of proof in termination cases from a preponderance of the evidence to clear and convincing evidence. [17] The Family Code defines clear and convincing evidence in the same manner that thi

2015Due process requires the application of the clear and convincing evidence standard of proof in parental termination cases. [15] This Court has looked to the United States Supreme Court in articulating what the "clear and convincing evidence" standard means. [16] And, following Page 264 this Court's decision in In re G.M., 596 S.W.2d 846 (1980) the Legislature amended the Texas Family Code to change the burden of proof in termination cases from a preponderance of the evidence to clear and convincing evidence. [17] The Family Code defines clear and convincing evidence in the same manner that thi

2026Accordingly, “[i]n parental termination cases, due process mandates a clear and convincing evidence standard of proof.” In re N.G., 577 S.W.3d 230, 235 (Tex. 2019); see also TEX.

2026Accordingly, “[i]n parental termination cases, due process mandates a clear and convincing evidence standard of proof.” In re N.G., 577 S.W.3d 230, 235 (Tex. 2019); see also TEX.

2019See In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d 256, 263 (Tex. 2002) (stating the due process requires the application of the clear and convincing evidence standard of proof in parental termination cases); see also Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 769-70 , 102 S. Ct. 1388 , 71 L.

2019See In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d 256, 263 (Tex. 2002) (stating the due process requires the application of the clear and convincing evidence standard of proof in parental termination cases); see also Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 769-70 , 102 S. Ct. 1388 , 71 L.

2023In re J.P.B., 180 S.W.3d 570, 573 (Tex. 2005). 1.

2022In re J.P.B., 180 S.W.3d 570, 573 (Tex. 2005).

2015See In re K.C.M., 4 S.W.3d 392 , 394–95 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1999, pet. denied) (evidence supporting termination found factually insufficient to establish best interest where mother developed relationship with child prior to incarceration for drugs, wrote numerous letters while incarcerated discussing her plans to reunite with child, did nothing to endanger child after she signed service plan, and had only seventy-five days before release from prison at time of termination trial).[3] The facts in this case parallel the facts in K.C.M.

2015See In re K.C.M., 4 S.W.3d 392 , 394–95 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1999, pet. denied) (evidence supporting termination found factually insufficient to establish best interest where mother developed relationship with child prior to incarceration for drugs, wrote numerous letters while incarcerated discussing her plans to reunite with child, did nothing to endanger child after she signed service plan, and had only seventy-five days before release from prison at time of termination trial).[3] The facts in this case parallel the facts in K.C.M.

2018“The clear and convincing evidence standard is generally ‘not satisfied by testimony that property ... is separate property when that testimony is contradicted or unsupported by documentary evidence tracing the asserted separate nature of the property.’” Roberts, 402 S.W.3d at 838 -39 (quoting Graves v. Tomlinson, 329 S.W.3d 128, 139 (Tex. App.— Houston [14th Dist.] 2010, pet. denied)).

2018See, e.g., Warriner, 394 S.W.3d at 248 (citing Viera, 331 S.W.3d at 207 ); see also Graves v. Tomlinson, 329 S.W.3d 128, 139 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2010, pet. denied) (the clear and convincing evidence standard is generally “not satisfied by testimony that property ... is separate property when that testimony is contradicted or unsupported by documentary evidence tracing the asserted separate nature of the property”); Zagorski v. Zagorski, 116 S.W.3d 309, 316 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2003, pet. denied) (mere testimony that property was purchased with separate property funds, wi

2014A. Legal Sufficiency In a case with a clear and convincing evidence standard, a legal sufficiency review requires a court to “look at all the evidence in the light most favorable to the finding to determine whether a reasonable trier of fact could have formed a firm belief or conviction that its finding was true.” J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d at 266 ; In re T.N.S., 230 S.W.3d 434, 438 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2007, no -2- 04-13-00901-CV pet.).

2014A. Legal Sufficiency In a case with a clear and convincing evidence standard, a legal sufficiency review requires a court to “look at all the evidence in the light most favorable to the finding to determine whether a reasonable trier of fact could have formed a firm belief or conviction that its finding was true.” J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d at 266 ; In re T.N.S., 230 S.W.3d 434, 438 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2007, no pet.).

2010See Tate v. Tate , 55 S.W.3d 1, 5 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2000, no pet.).

2010See Tate v. Tate, 55 S.W.3d 1, 5 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2000, no pet.).

2025Even when a clear and convincing evidence standard applies, “[a] court of appeals must nevertheless still provide due deference to the decisions of the factfinder, who, having full opportunity to observe witness testimony first-hand, is the sole arbiter when assessing the credibility and demeanor of witnesses.” In re A.B., 437 S.W.3d 498 , 503 15 (Tex. 2014); see also N. E.

2019See In re A.B. , 437 S.W.3d 498 , 502 (Tex. 2014) ; In re J.F.C. , 96 S.W.3d 256 , 263 (Tex. 2002) (citing Santosky v. Kramer , 455 U.S. 745 , 769, 102 S.Ct. 1388 , 71 L.Ed.2d 599 (1982) ).

2025Eichhorn v. Eichhorn, 2022 WL 1591709 , at *3 (Tex. App.—Austin May 20, 2022, no pet) (citing Barras v. Barras, 396 S.W.3d 154, 164 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2013, pet. denied)).

2025Eichhorn, 2022 WL 1591709 , at *3 (citing Barras v. Barras, 396 S.W.3d 154, 164 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2013, pet. denied)). 36 When a spouse fails to rebut the Family Code’s community-property presumption and the property is characterized as community property, it “is not a divestiture of separate property, but a necessary classification of property as set by the community presumption.” See Pearson, 332 S.W.3d at 364 .

2023See Magness v. Magness, 241 S.W.3d 910, 912 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2007, pet. denied).

2023See Magness v. Magness, 3 241 S.W.3d 910, 912 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2007, pet. denied).

2018The second prerequisite . . . is that termination must be in the child’s best interests[,] . . . [and] [d]ue process requires the application of the clear and convincing evidence standard of proof . . . .”) with In re P.M.G., 405 S.W.3d 406, 410 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2013, no pet.) (“[T]rial court’s decision to modify conservatorship [should be reviewed] under an abuse of discretion standard,” and “[u]nder this standard, legal and factual sufficiency are not independent grounds for asserting error, but are relevant factors in determining whether a trial court abused its discretion”).

2015Compare In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d 256, 261, 263 (Tex.2002) (“[T]here are two prerequisites for termination of parental rights under section 161.001 — The second prerequisite ... is that termination must be in the child’s best interests[,] ... [and] [d]ue process requires the application of the clear and convincing evidence standard of proof_”) with In re P.M.G., 405 S.W.3d 406, 410 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 2013, no pet.) (“[Tjrial court’s decision to modify conservatorship [should be reviewed] under an abuse of discretion standard,” and “[u]nder this standard, legal and factual sufficiency are not in

2015The standard has long been applied in 21 Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 255 (citations omitted). 22 Ante, 19 S.W.3d at 421 (citing Moffatt v. Brown, 751 P.2d 939, 944 (Alaska 1988) (quoting Dairy Stores, Inc. v. Sentinel Publishing Co., 104 N.J. 125 , 516 A.2d 220, 235-236 (N.J. 1986))). 23 Brill v. Guardian Life Ins.

2000Moffatt v. Brown, 751 P.2d 939, 943 (Alaska 1988). . 776 S.W.2d 551 (Tex.1989); cf. Channel 4, KGBT v. Briggs, 759 S.W.2d 939, 942 (Tex.1988) (Gonzalez, J., concurring) (urging application of the clear-and-convincing standard to summary judgment proceedings in defamation cases, although the Court found it unnecessary to address the issue). .

2012To support his argument that the trial court erred in instructing the jury on the preponderance of evidence standard of proof, Standley relies on Wentworth v. Meyer, 839 S.W.2d 766, 768 (Tex.1992).

2012To support his argument that the trial court erred in instructing the jury on the preponderance of evidence standard of proof, Standley relies on Wentworth v. Meyer, 839 S.W.2d 766, 768 (Tex. 1992).

2011In re K.D., 202 S.W.3d 860, 867-68 (Tex.App. -- Fort Worth 2006, no pet.).

2011In re K.D., 202 S.W.3d 860, 867-68 (Tex.App.—Fort Worth 2006, no pet.).

2021In re J.A.J., 243 S.W.3d at 616 .

2021J.A.J., 243 S.W.3d at 616 .

2024In reviewing a best-interest finding, we examine the record for the evidence that addressed the various, non-exclusive factors relevant to a child’s best interest against the nonexclusive factors the Texas 28In re H.R.M., 209 S.W.3d at 108 . 29See In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d at 266 . 30Id. at 267. 23 Supreme Court identified in Holley v. Adams. 31 Yet the factors set out in 3 0 F Holley aren’t exclusive, and the evidence in the record tied to the factfinder’s decision-making process in reaching its best-interest finding need not include evidence that addressed all nine Holley factors. 32 3 1 F 31S

2018Code § 161.001(b)(1)(A), (B), (C), (D), (E), (N), (O), & (Q). 7 See id. § 153.0071(c) ("On the written agreement of the parties or on the court's own motion, the court may refer a suit affecting the parent-child relationship to mediation."), (d) (making mediated settlement agreements binding on the parties if the agreement meets certain requirements, including signature by all parties and any counsel present at the time the agreement is signed). 8 See id. § 161.001(b)(1)(N)-(O), (2). 9 See id. § 153.0071(d) (specifying the terms under which a mediated settlement agreement is binding on the par

2023In K.E.W., our supreme court discussed the health and safety code’s “overt act” language3 and “agree[d] with the State” that “the statute does not require evidence of an act that either is actually harmful itself” or that demonstrates serious harm “is imminent.” K.E.W., 315 S.W.3d at 21 .

2022See K.E.W., 315 S.W.3d at 24 ; Rodriquez, 525 S.W.3d at 742 .

1994See State v. Addington, 588 S.W.2d 569, 570 (Tex.1979); In the Interest of G.M., 596 S.W.2d 846, 847 (Tex.1980) (relying on Addington, establishing that the clear and convincing evidence standard applies to the involuntary termination of parental rights); See also Brown v. Edwards Transfer Co., 764 S.W.2d 220, 223 (Tex. 1988) ("[f]or consistency," applying legislative commands in the Family and Probate Codes that paternity must be established by clear and convincing evidence to a claim under the wrongful death statute).

1994See State v. Addington, 588 S.W.2d 569, 570 (Tex.1979); In the Interest of G.M., 596 S.W.2d 846, 847 (Tex.1980) (relying on Addington, establishing that the clear and convincing evidence standard applies to the involuntary termination of parental rights); See also Brown v. Edwards Transfer Co., 764 S.W.2d 220, 223 (Tex.1988) (“[flor consistency,” applying legislative commands in the Family and Probate Codes that paternity must be established by clear and convincing evidence to a claim under the wrongful death statute).