clear and convincing evidence standard in Indiana

1991Co. v. Armstrong (1982), Ind., 442 N.E.2d 349 , where our supreme court adopted the clear and convincing evidence standard for proof of punitive damages.

1991Co. v. Armstrong (1982), Ind., 442 N.E.2d 349 , where our supreme court adopted the clear and convincing evidence standard for proof of punitive damages.

2003In R.G. v. State, 793 N.E.2d 238 (Ind.Ct.

2003In R.G. v. State, 793 N.E.2d 238 (Ind.Ct.App.2003), we recently defined the standard of review for sufficiency of the evidence supporting a decision to place a juvenile on a sex offender registry.

2026A fiduciary relationship exists when a party places such confidence in another that it results in “superiority and influence.” Kalwitz, 822 N.E.2d at 281 .

2020This action is prohibited “where the remedy of a will contest is available and would provide the injured party with adequate relief.” Id. [33] According to Eve, the trial court properly relied on Minton but failed to apply the clear and convincing evidence standard to the joint accounts, citing Womack v. Womack, 622 N.E.2d 481 (Ind. 1993).

2020Specifically, Eve directs us to the following language: “the party challenging the survivor’s right to the proceeds of the joint account must show by clear and convincing evidence that the decedent did not intend the survivor to receive the proceeds of the account without the benefit of a presumption of undue influence.” Id. at 483 ; see also Ind. Code § 32-17-11-18 (“Sums remaining on deposit at the death of a party to a joint account belong to the surviving party or parties as against the estate of the decedent unless there is clear and convincing evidence of a different intention at the tim

2018Vincent Hosp. and Health Care Ctr. , 909 N.E.2d 1063 , 1067 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009), disapproved on other grounds by T.K. , 27 N.E.3d at 274 ). [24] The Hospital argues that Dr. Puri's testimony is sufficient to meet the clear and convincing evidence standard.

2018Vincent Hosp. and Health Care Ctr. , 909 N.E.2d 1063 , 1067 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009), disapproved on other grounds by T.K. , 27 N.E.3d at 274 ). [24] The Hospital argues that Dr. Puri's testimony is sufficient to meet the clear and convincing evidence standard.

2015Davis, 869 N.E.2d at 1270 .

2004The clear and convincing evidence standard "requires a stricter degree of proof than a mere preponderance of the evidence." BJ.B., 805 N.E.2d at 873 (quoting KJ.P. v. State, 724 N.E.2d 612, 615 (Ind.Ct.App.2000), trans. denied sub nom.

2003Id. at 420 .

2000Estate of Reasor v. Putnam County, 635 N.E.2d 153 (Ind.1994).

1993Anderson, 477 U.S. 242 , 106 S.Ct. 2505 .

1993Anderson, 477 U.S. 242 , 106 S.Ct. 2505 .

1991In so doing, this court observed that “[fjailure to cooperate with those providing services coupled with failure to improve the unacceptable home conditions has been held to support a finding that there is a reasonable probability that the conditions that led to the children’s removal will not be remedied.” M.B., 570 N.E.2d at 82 .

1986In Orkin Exterminating Co. v. Traina (1986), Ind., 486 N.E.2d 1019 , a punitive damages case, Justice Prentice, speaking for a unanimous court [Shepard, J. not participating] said In Travelers Indemnity Co. v. Armstrong, [ (1982) Ind., 442 N.E.2d 349 ] supra, we established the "clear and convincing evidence" standard ... a standard which is but minutely below the "reasonable doubt" standard, because such actions are more akin to criminal actions than to civil suits,....

1986In Orkin Exterminating Co. v. Traina (1986), Ind., 486 N.E.2d 1019 , a punitive damages case, Justice Prentice, speaking for a unanimous court [Shepard, J. not participating] said In Travelers Indemnity Co. v. Armstrong, [(1982) Ind., 442 N.E.2d 349 ] supra, we established the "clear and convincing evidence" standard ... a standard which is but minutely below the "reasonable doubt" standard, because such actions are more akin to criminal actions than to civil suits, ... .

1983Recently, in Don Medow Motors, Inc. v. Grauman, (1983) Ind.App., 446 N.E.2d 651, 654 , we held that "enunciation of the common law through judicial opinions rendered in civil cases have retrospective as well as prospective effect, except where the enunciation would impair contracts made, or vested rights acquired in reliance on an earlier decision." We reversed and remanded on the issue of punitive damages in order to apply the clear and convincing evidence standard. 1 In the case at bar, we are also compelled to apply the clear and convincing evidence standard.

1983In the present case, the evidence did not meet the stature of the clear and convincing evidence standard as enunciated by the Supreme Court in Santosky v. Kramer, (1982) 455 U.S. 745 , 102 *347 S.Ct. 1388, 71 LEd.2d 599; see also Ellis v. Knox County Department of Public Welfare, (1982) Ind. App., 433 N.E.2d 847 .