clear and convincing evidence standard in Massachusetts

2026Adoption of Iris, 43 Mass. App. Ct. 95, 105 (1997), S.C., 427 Mass. 582 (1998).

2026Adoption of Iris, 43 Mass. App. Ct. 95, 105 (1997), S.C., 427 Mass. 582 (1998) (Iris).

2015See Stone v. Essex County Newspapers, Inc., 367 Mass. 849, 871 (1975).

2014The clear and convincing evidence standard is more demanding than the preponderance standard, but we do not accept the defendant’s characterization that it is either “amorphous” or “an enormously heavy burden of proof.” Clear and convincing evidence is required to hold a litigant in civil contempt, see Bir-chall, petitioner, 454 Mass. 837, 852-853 (2009); to find libel against a public official or public figure, see Stone v. Essex County Newspapers, Inc., 367 Mass. 849, 870 (1975); and to terminate parental rights, see Adoption of Helen, 429 Mass. 856, 859 (1999).

1998When “particularly important” interests are involved in a civil proceeding, whether or not physical restraint is threatened, the United States Supreme Court has mandated a clear and convincing evidence standard of proof and stated that, “Notwithstanding ‘the state’s “civil labels and good intentions,” ’ . . . this level of certainty [is deemed] necessary to preserve fundamental fairness in a variety of government-initiated proceedings that threaten the individual involved with ‘a significant deprivation of liberty’ or ‘stigma.’ ” Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 756 (1982) (requiring clear an

1991In establishing the clear and convincing evidence standard for civil commitments, [the Supreme Court, in Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 427 (1979),] held that commitment must be based on ‘something more serious than is demonstrated by idiosyncratic behavior.’ . . .

2018Doe No. 380316 , 473 Mass. at 314 , 41 N.E.3d 1058 .

2016So ordered. 1 We also remand for the entry of an order requiring the board to conduct a hearing consistent with the standard enunciated in Doe, Sex Offender Registry Bd. No. 380316 v. Sex Offender Registry Bd. 473 Mass. 297, 314-316 (2015).

1998When “particularly important” interests are involved in a civil proceeding, whether or not physical restraint is threatened, the United States Supreme Court has mandated a clear and convincing evidence standard of proof and stated that, “Notwithstanding ‘the state’s “civil labels and good intentions,” ’ . . . this level of certainty [is deemed] necessary to preserve fundamental fairness in a variety of government-initiated proceedings that threaten the individual involved with ‘a significant deprivation of liberty’ or ‘stigma.’ ” Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 756 (1982) (requiring clear an

1984The Appeals Court remanded the case to the trial judge to make findings in light of Santosky v. Kramer, supra (see Petition of the Dep’t of Social Servs. to Dispense with Consent to Adoption, 14 Mass. App. Ct. 1302 [1982] [summary disposition]), and thereafter the mother filed a brief in the Appeals Court in which she did not argue that the clear and convincing evidence standard was not the appropriate one, but only that it had not been met.

2025Matter of G.P., 473 Mass. 112, 122 (2015), abrogated on other grounds, Matter of a Minor, supra at 299.

2015See Commonwealth v. Bell, 356 Mass. 724, 724-725 (1969).

2015Bin and Gabriel Arias also exchanged telephone calls moments before the shooting occurred, and a call was placed from Bradley’s telephone to Bin’s telephone at 3:59 a.m. 26 Although the discovery of certain information before the illegal search of Bradley’s CSLI is sufficient to establish that information’s independence from the illegality, see Commonwealth v. Frodyma, 393 Mass. 438, 441-442 (1984), the Commonwealth also may rely on evidence obtained after the illegal search if it can show that the evidence was independently obtained.

2015See Jackson, 283 Conn, at 123-124 (jury unlikely to confuse firmly convinced standard with clear and convincing standard).

2014The clear and convincing evidence standard is more demanding than the preponderance standard, but we do not accept the defendant’s characterization that it is either “amorphous” or “an enormously heavy burden of proof.” Clear and convincing evidence is required to hold a litigant in civil contempt, see Bir-chall, petitioner, 454 Mass. 837, 852-853 (2009); to find libel against a public official or public figure, see Stone v. Essex County Newspapers, Inc., 367 Mass. 849, 870 (1975); and to terminate parental rights, see Adoption of Helen, 429 Mass. 856, 859 (1999).

2014The clear and convincing evidence standard is more demanding than the preponderance standard, but we do not accept the defendant’s characterization that it is either “amorphous” or “an enormously heavy burden of proof.” Clear and convincing evidence is required to hold a litigant in civil contempt, see Bir-chall, petitioner, 454 Mass. 837, 852-853 (2009); to find libel against a public official or public figure, see Stone v. Essex County Newspapers, Inc., 367 Mass. 849, 870 (1975); and to terminate parental rights, see Adoption of Helen, 429 Mass. 856, 859 (1999).

1998When “particularly important” interests are involved in a civil proceeding, whether or not physical restraint is threatened, the United States Supreme Court has mandated a clear and convincing evidence standard of proof and stated that, “Notwithstanding ‘the state’s “civil labels and good intentions,” ’ . . . this level of certainty [is deemed] necessary to preserve fundamental fairness in a variety of government-initiated proceedings that threaten the individual involved with ‘a significant deprivation of liberty’ or ‘stigma.’ ” Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 756 (1982) (requiring clear an

1998When “particularly important” interests are involved in a civil proceeding, whether or not physical restraint is threatened, the United States Supreme Court has mandated a clear and convincing evidence standard of proof and stated that, “Notwithstanding ‘the state’s “civil labels and good intentions,” ’ . . . this level of certainty [is deemed] necessary to preserve fundamental fairness in a variety of government-initiated proceedings that threaten the individual involved with ‘a significant deprivation of liberty’ or ‘stigma.’ ” Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 756 (1982) (requiring clear an

1998When “particularly important” interests are involved in a civil proceeding, whether or not physical restraint is threatened, the United States Supreme Court has mandated a clear and convincing evidence standard of proof and stated that, “Notwithstanding ‘the state’s “civil labels and good intentions,” ’ . . . this level of certainty [is deemed] necessary to preserve fundamental fairness in a variety of government-initiated proceedings that threaten the individual involved with ‘a significant deprivation of liberty’ or ‘stigma.’ ” Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 756 (1982) (requiring clear an

1985See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 *334 U.S. 745, 768-769 (1982); Custody of a Minor (No. 2), 392 Mass. 719, 725 (1984).

1984See Pomerleau v. United Parcel Serv., 464 A.2d 206 (Me. 1983), which applies a clear and convincing evidence standard to these types of injuries. 6 Although various approaches have been adopted to deal with this problem, the emerging trend seems to follow the so-called “Wisconsin rule” or “objective test.” To be compensable under this rule, the injury must result from gradual stimuli that are sufficiently more damaging to the employee than the day-to-day stresses which all employees must face.

1984In Custody of a Minor (No. 1), 377 Mass. 876, 877, 884 (1979), we discussed a *698 mother’s contention that a clear and convincing standard of proof should be adopted, even though in that case, also, the issue was raised on appeal for the first time.