clear and convincing evidence standard in Alabama

2026App. 2006). "… [F]or trial courts ruling … in civil cases to which a clear-and-convincing-evidence standard of proof applies, 'the judge must view the evidence presented through the prism of the substantive evidentiary burden[,]' [Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986)]; thus, the appellate court must also look through a prism to determine whether there was substantial evidence before the trial court to support a factual finding, based upon the trial court's weighing of the evidence, that would 'produce in the mind [of the trial court] a firm conviction as to each element of

2025App. 2006)]. 22 CL-2025-0101, CL-2025-0102, CL-2025-0103, CL-2025-0104, and CL-2025-0105 " '... [F]or trial courts ruling ... in civil cases to which a clear-and-convincing-evidence standard of proof applies, "the judge must view the evidence presented through the prism of the substantive evidentiary burden[,]" [Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 254 [, 106 S.Ct. 2505 , 91 L.Ed.2d 202 ] (1986); thus, the appellate court must also look through a prism to determine whether there was substantial evidence before the trial court to support a factual finding, based upon the trial court's

2026App. 2006). "… [F]or trial courts ruling … in civil cases to which a clear-and-convincing-evidence standard of proof applies, 'the judge must view the evidence presented through the prism of the substantive evidentiary burden[,]' [Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986)]; thus, the appellate court must also look through a prism to determine whether there was substantial evidence before the trial court to support a factual finding, based upon the trial court's weighing of the evidence, that would 'produce in the mind [of the trial court] a firm conviction as to each element of

2025App. 2006)]. " '… [F]or trial courts ruling … in civil cases to which a clear-and-convincing-evidence standard of proof applies, "the judge must view the evidence 17 CL-2024-0854 and CL-2024-0855 presented through the prism of the substantive evidentiary burden[,]" [Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 254 , 106 S. Ct. 2505 , 91 L.

2016“To analogize the test set out ... by Judge Prettyman [in Curley v. United States, 160 F.2d 229, 232-33 (D.C.Cir. 1947),] for trial courts ruling on motions for a summary judgment in civil cases to which a clear-and-convincing-evidence standard of proof applies, ‘the judge must view the evidence presented through the prism of the substantive evidentiary burden’; thus, the appellate court must also look through a prism to determine whether there was substantial evidence before the trial court to support a factual finding, based upon the trial court’s weighing of the evidence, that would ‘produc

2016“To analogize the test set out ... by Judge Prettyman [in Curley v. United States, 160 F.2d 229, 232-33 (D.C.Cir. 1947),] for trial courts ruling on motions for a summary judgment in civil cases to which a clear-and-convincing-evidence standard of proof applies, ‘the judge must view the evidence presented through the prism of the substantive evidentiary burden’; thus, the appellate court must also look through a prism to determine whether there was substantial evidence before the trial court to support a factual finding, based upon the trial court’s weighing of the evidence, that would ‘produc

2012See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Kennedy, 799 So.2d 188 (Ala.Civ.App.2001) (holding that the clear-and-convincing-evidence standard applied to the claim of an injured worker who asserted that she had acquired carpal tunnel syndrome from repetitively using a cane and walker while convalescing from work-related hip injuries); and Sistrunk v. Sikorsky Support Servs., Inc., 961 So.2d 166 (Ala.Civ.App.2007) (applying clear-and-convincing-evidence standard to claim that worker injured left shoulder due to overuse following work-related right-shoulder injury)..

2010See Walart Stores, Inc. v. Kennedy, 799 So.2d 188 (Ala.Civ.App.2001) (holding that the clear-and-convincing-evidence standard applied to the claim of an injured worker who asserted that she had acquired carpal tunnel syndrome from repetitively using a cane and walker while convalescing from work-related hip injuries); and Sistrunk v. Sikorsky Support Servs., Inc., 961 So.2d 166 (Ala.Civ.App.2007) (applying clear-and-convincing-evidence standard to claim that worker injured left shoulder due to overuse following work-related right-shoulder injury).

2008See Ex parte State Dep’t of Human Res., 834 So.2d at 122 .

2007See Ex parte State Dep't of Human Res., 834 So.2d at 122 . [10] Because appellate courts do not weigh evidence, particularly when "the assessment of the credibility of witnesses is involved," Knight, 820 So.2d at 102 , we defer to the trial court's factual findings.

2007See L.B.S. v. L.M.S., 826 So.2d 178, 186 (Ala.Civ.App.2002); see also Dodd v. Burleson, 932 So.2d 912 (Ala.Civ.

2007See L.B.S. v. L.M.S., 826 So.2d 178, 186 (Ala.Civ.App.2002); see also Dodd v. Burleson, 932 So.2d 912 (Ala.Civ.App.2005), and Dodd v. Burleson, 967 So.2d 715 (Ala.Civ.App.2007) (main opinions indicating that our legislature has rejected substantial harm as a precondition for a grandparental-visitation judgment).

2007See L.B.S. v. L.M.S., 826 So.2d 178, 186 (Ala.Civ.App.2002); see also Dodd v. Burleson, 932 So.2d 912 (Ala.Civ.

2007See L.B.S. v. L.M.S., 826 So.2d 178, 186 (Ala.Civ.App.2002); see also Dodd v. Burleson, 932 So.2d 912 (Ala.Civ.App.2005), and Dodd v. Burleson, 967 So.2d 715 (Ala.Civ.App.2007) (main opinions indicating that our legislature has rejected substantial harm as a precondition for a grandparental-visitation judgment).

2003Oden v. Gulf States Steel, Inc., 797 So.2d 1093, 1094 (Ala.Civ.App.2001).

2003Oden v. Gulf States Steel, Inc. , 797 So.2d 1093 , 1094 (Ala.Civ.App. 2001).

1993See D.D.P. v. State, 595 So.2d at 539 (“[t]estimo-ny regarding the seriousness of the offenses, the apparent inefficacy of [the juvenile’s] past treatment efforts, and [the juvenile’s] membership and ongoing recruitment efforts for his ‘gang,’ met the clear and convincing evidence standard [necessary] to uphold th[e] transfer order”).

1993See D.D.P. v. State, 595 So.2d at 539 ("[t]estimony regarding the seriousness of the offenses, the apparent inefficacy of [the juvenile's] past treatment efforts, and [the juvenile's] membership and ongoing recruitment efforts for his `gang,' met the clear and convincing evidence standard [necessary] to uphold th[e] transfer order").

2007See Ex parte Russell Corp., 725 So.2d 264 (Ala. 1998). [2] In its summary-judgment order, the trial court actually referenced both the clear-and-convincing-evidence standard and the substantial-evidence standard. [3] In her brief, the dependent argues that Dr. Smith did indicate on pages 52-53 of his deposition that it was more probable than not that the employee's job duties contributed to the rupture.

2007See Ex parte Russell Corp., 725 So.2d 264 (Ala. 1998). [2] In its summary-judgment order, the trial court actually referenced both the clear-and-convincing-evidence standard and the substantial-evidence standard. [3] In her brief, the dependent argues that Dr. Smith did indicate on pages 52-53 of his deposition that it was more probable than not that the employee's job duties contributed to the rupture.

2015Judge Moore concluded that the “constitutional concerns implicated in every termination-of-parental-rights case command stricter scrutiny than the ore tenus rule provides.” 986 So.2d at 1199 .

2015Judge Moore discussed this issue thoroughly in his special concurrence in J.C. v. State Department of Human Resources, 986 So.2d 1172, 1197-1202 (Ala.Civ.App.2007) (analyzing Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 102 S.Ct. 1388 , 71 L.Ed.2d 599 (1982), which adopted the clear-and-convincing evidence standard of proof in termination-of-parental-rights eases).

2014“Applying that standard of review, we address the question whether the juvenile court could have concluded that the children’s dependency had been established by clear and convincing evidence.” P.D. v. S.S., 67 So.3d 128, 132 (Ala.Civ.

2012See Wal-Mart Stores v. Orr, supra; Sistrunk, supra. In Harris v. Russell Petroleum Corp., 55 So.3d 1225 (Ala.Civ.App.2010), this court explained: “If the worker asserts that the original compensable injury caused the worker to gradually acquire a successive injury due to cumulative trauma, then the clear-and-convincing-evidence standard applies to that claim.

2012See Wal-Mart Stores v. Orr, supra; Sistrunk, supra. In Harris v. Russell Petroleum Corp., 55 So.3d 1225 (Ala.Civ.App.2010), this court explained: “If the worker asserts that the original compensable injury caused the worker to gradually acquire a successive injury due to cumulative trauma, then the clear-and-convincing-evidence standard applies to that claim.

2012See Ex parte Perkins, 646 So.2d 46, 47 (Ala.1994) (explaining that an appellate court, once it determines that a trial court has improperly applied a higher burden of proof to an issue, must “reverse! ] the judgment and remand! ] the cause to allow the trial court to make its determination from the disputed evidence, using the correct standard”).

2009See, generally, Ex parte Discount Foods, Inc., 789 So.2d 842 , 846 n. 4 (Ala.2001) ("Generally, the law-of-the-case doctrine provides that when a court decides upon a rule of law, that rule should continue to govern the same issues in subsequent stages in the same case.”); see also Stockton v. CKPD Dev.

2009See, generally, Ex parte Discount Foods, Inc., 789 So.2d 842 , 846 n. 4 (Ala. 2001) ("Generally, the law-of-the-case doctrine provides that when a court decides upon a rule of law, that rule should continue to govern the same issues in subsequent stages in the same case."); see also Stockton v. CKPD Dev.

2009See Brown v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 864 So.2d 1100, 1104 (Ala.Civ.App.2002) (holding that appellant waives issue by failing to first raise it before the trial court).

2008Stated specifically in the context of a substantial-evidence standard of review required in a proceeding like the one before us, a cumulative-physical-stress/gradual-deterioration worker’s compensation case, the burden that an employee must bear was accurately stated by then Judge Mur-dock in his special concurrence: “[T]he evidence necessary for appellate affirmance of a judgment based on a factual finding in the context of a case in which the ultimate standard for a factual decision by the trial court is clear and convincing evidence is evidence that a fact-finder reasonably could find to cl

2008Stated specifically in the context of a substantial-evidence standard of review required in a proceeding like the one before us, a cumulative-physical-stress/gradual-deterioration worker's compensation case, the burden that an employee must bear was accurately stated by then Judge Murdock in his special concurrence: "[T]he evidence necessary for appellate affirmance of a judgment based on a factual finding in the context of a case in which the ultimate standard for a factual decision by the trial court is clear and convincing evidence is evidence that a fact-finder reasonably could find to cle

2008Then Judge Murdock explained, in his special writing, the substantial-evidence standard of review in the context of the heightened clear-and-convincing evidentiary standard as follows: “[Substantial evidence is] ‘evidence of such weight and quality that fair-minded persons in the exercise of impartial judgment can reasonably infer the existence of the fact sought to be proved.’ E.g., West v. Founders Life Assurance Co. of Florida, 547 So.2d 870, 871 (Ala.1989) (quoted with approval in Ex parte Southern Energy Homes, Inc., 873 So.2d [1116] at 1122 [ (Ala.2003) ]).

2008Then Judge Murdock explained, in his special writing, the substantial-evidence standard of review in the context of the heightened clear-and-convincing evidentiary standard as follows: "[Substantial evidence is] `evidence of such weight and quality that fair-minded persons in the exercise of impartial judgment can reasonably infer the existence of the fact sought to be proved.' E.g., West v. Founders Life Assurance *774 Co. of Florida, 547 So.2d 870, 871 (Ala. 1989) (quoted with approval in Ex parte Southern Energy Homes, Inc., 873 So.2d [1116] at 1122 [(Ala.2003)]).

2008Proof by clear and convincing evidence requires a level of proof greater than a preponderance of the evidence or the substantial weight of the evidence, but less than beyond a reasonable doubt.” “ ‘§ 6 — 11—20[ (b) ](4), Ala.Code 1975.’ “L.M. v. D.D.F., 840 So.2d 171, 179 (Ala. Civ.App.2002) .... [[Image here]] “... [I]n cases involving the termination of parental rights our appellate courts do not apply the clear-and-convincing-evidence standard of proof utilized by trial courts but, instead, use a settled standard of appellate review— the ore tenus rule.

2008See, e.g., Ex parte T.V., 971 So.2d 1 (Ala.2007).

2007As part of its analysis, the Supreme Court noted that Alabama was among the majority of states that required trial courts to use the clear-and-convincing-evidence standard of proof in deciding whether to terminate parental rights. 455 U.S. at 749 n. 3, 102 S.Ct. 1388 (citing Dale County *1184 Dep't of Pensions & Sec. v. Robles, 368 So.2d 39, 42 (Ala.Civ.App.1979)).

2007Robles, supra, the custody case that the United States Supreme Court cited in Santosky regarding Alabama's use of the clear-and-convincing-evidence standard of proof, explains the manner in which our courts consider the rights of parents and their children. "`Where the dispute over custody of a child is between the child's natural parent and a party who is not the child's natural parent, the natural parent has a prima facie right to the child's custody.