clear and convincing evidence standard in Alaska

1990See D.H. v. State, 723 P.2d at 1278 (Rabinowitz, C J., joined by Matthews, J., dissenting) (in cases of less than complete curtailment of visitation, supreme court review is limited to a determination whether the superior court's order is supported by a preponderance of the evidence); K.T.E. v. State, 689 P.2d at 478 n. 11 (holding that the clear and convincing evidence standard applies when parental visitation is completely eliminated, but reserving by implication the preponderance of the evidence standard for cases in which visitation is merely curtailed) (citing In re Pablo C., 108 Misc.2d

1990See D.H. v. State, 723 P.2d at 1278 (Rabinowitz, C.J., joined by Matthews, J., dissenting) (in cases of less than complete curtailment of visitation, supreme court review is limited to a determination whether the superior court's order is supported by a preponderance of the evidence); K.T.E. v. State, 689 P.2d at 478 n. 11 (holding that the clear and convincing evidence standard applies when parental visitation is completely eliminated, but reserving by implication the preponderance of the evidence standard for cases in which visitation is merely curtailed) (citing In re Pablo C., 108 Misc.2d

1990See D.H. v. State, 723 P.2d at 1278 (Rabinowitz, C.J., joined by Matthews, J., dissenting) (in cases of less than complete curtailment of visitation, supreme court review is limited to a determination whether the superior court's order is supported by a preponderance of the evidence); K.T.E. v. State, 689 P.2d at 478 n. 11 (holding that the clear and convincing evidence standard applies when parental visitation is completely eliminated, but reserving by implication the preponderance of the evidence standard for cases in which visitation is merely curtailed) (citing In re Pablo C., 108 Misc.2d

1990See D.H. v. State, 723 P.2d at 1278 (Rabinowitz, C.J., joined by Matthews, J., dissenting) (in cases of less than complete curtailment of visitation, supreme court review is limited to a determination whether the superior court's order is supported by a preponderance of the evidence); K.T.E. v. State, 689 P.2d at 478 n. 11 (holding that the clear and convincing evidence standard applies when parental visitation is completely eliminated, but reserving by implication the preponderance of the evidence standard for cases in which visitation is merely curtailed) (citing In re Pablo C., 108 Misc.2d

1997Then, still guided by the clear and convincing evidence standard, the court undertakes an additional two-step inquiry, asking, first, whether the child is a child in need of aid “as a result of parental conduct” and, second, whether that conduct “is likely to continue to exist.” Id. at 440 (quoting AS 47.10.080(c)(3)); A.M. v. State, 891 P.2d 815, 819 (Alaska 1995), overruled in part by In re S.A., 912 P.2d at 1241 .

1997Then, still guided by the clear and convincing evidence standard, the court undertakes an additional two-step inquiry, asking, first, whether the child is a child in need of aid "as a result of parental conduct" and, second, whether that conduct "is likely to continue to exist." Id. at 440 (quoting AS 47.10.080(c)(3)); A.M. v. State, 891 P.2d 815, 819 (Alaska 1995), overruled in part by In re S.A., 912 P.2d at 1241 .

1997Then, still guided by the clear and convincing evidence standard, the court undertakes an additional two-step inquiry, asking, first, whether the child is a child in need of aid “as a result of parental conduct” and, second, whether that conduct “is likely to continue to exist.” Id. at 440 (quoting AS 47.10.080(c)(3)); A.M. v. State, 891 P.2d 815, 819 (Alaska 1995), overruled in part by In re S.A., 912 P.2d at 1241 .

1997Then, still guided by the clear and convincing evidence standard, the court undertakes an additional two-step inquiry, asking, first, whether the child is a child in need of aid "as a result of parental conduct" and, second, whether that conduct "is likely to continue to exist." Id. at 440 (quoting AS 47.10.080(c)(3)); A.M. v. State, 891 P.2d 815, 819 (Alaska 1995), overruled in part by In re S.A., 912 P.2d at 1241 .

1990See D.H. v. State, 723 P.2d at 1278 (Rabinowitz, C.J., joined by Matthews, J., dissenting) (in cases of less than complete curtailment of visitation, supreme court review is limited to a determination whether the superior court's order is supported by a preponderance of the evidence); K.T.E. v. State, 689 P.2d at 478 n. 11 (holding that the clear and convincing evidence standard applies when parental visitation is completely eliminated, but reserving by implication the preponderance of the evidence standard for cases in which visitation is merely curtailed) (citing In re Pablo C., 108 Misc.2d

1990See D.H. v. State, 723 P.2d at 1278 (Rabinowitz, C.J., joined by Matthews, J., dissenting) (in cases of less than complete curtailment of visitation, supreme court review is limited to a determination whether the superior court's order is supported by a preponderance of the evidence); K.T.E. v. State, 689 P.2d at 478 n. 11 (holding that the clear and convincing evidence standard applies when parental visitation is completely eliminated, but reserving by implication the preponderance of the evidence standard for cases in which visitation is merely curtailed) (citing In re Pablo C., 108 Misc.2d

2014Safety, 92 P.3d 398, 404 (Alaska 2004). 86 State, Dep’t of Health & Soc.

2014Safety, 92 P.3d 398, 404 (Alaska 2004). 87 State, Dep’t of Health & Soc.

2014This is because there simply is no ‘preference’ to apply if no alternative party that is eligible to be preferred under § 1915(a) has come forward.”69 In Baby Girl, the child’s biological father (Biological Father) and biological mother (Birth Mother) broke off their engagement after Birth Mother became pregnant but would not accommodate Biological Father’s request to move up the wedding.70 Biological Father had no meaningful contact with Birth Mother following the couple’s separation and sent her a text message indicating that he wished to relinquish his parental rights.71 Birth Mother decide

2014This is because there simply is no ‘preference’ to apply if no alternative party that is eligible to be preferred under § 1915(a) has come forward.”69 In Baby Girl, the child’s biological father (Biological Father) and biological mother (Birth Mother) broke off their engagement after Birth Mother became pregnant but would not accommodate Biological Father’s request to move up the wedding.70 Biological Father had no meaningful contact with Birth Mother following the couple’s separation and sent her a text message indicating that he wished to relinquish his parental rights.71 Birth Mother decide

2014This is because there simply is no ‘preference’ to apply if no alternative party that is eligible to be preferred under § 1915(a) has come forward.”69 In Baby Girl, the child’s biological father (Biological Father) and biological mother (Birth Mother) broke off their engagement after Birth Mother became pregnant but would not accommodate Biological Father’s request to move up the wedding.70 Biological Father had no meaningful contact with Birth Mother following the couple’s separation and sent her a text message indicating that he wished to relinquish his parental rights.71 Birth Mother decide

2014This is because there simply is no ‘preference’ to apply if no alternative party that is eligible to be preferred under § 1915(a) has come forward.”69 In Baby Girl, the child’s biological father (Biological Father) and biological mother (Birth Mother) broke off their engagement after Birth Mother became pregnant but would not accommodate Biological Father’s request to move up the wedding.70 Biological Father had no meaningful contact with Birth Mother following the couple’s separation and sent her a text message indicating that he wished to relinquish his parental rights.71 Birth Mother decide

1998See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 769 , 102 S.Ct. 1388 , 71 L.Ed.2d 599 (1982).

1998See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 769 , 102 S.Ct. 1388 , 71 L.Ed.2d 599 (1982).

1997Then, still guided by the clear and convincing evidence standard, the court undertakes an additional two-step inquiry, asking, first, whether the child is a child in need of aid “as a result of parental conduct” and, second, whether that conduct “is likely to continue to exist.” Id. at 440 (quoting AS 47.10.080(c)(3)); A.M. v. State, 891 P.2d 815, 819 (Alaska 1995), overruled in part by In re S.A., 912 P.2d at 1241 .

1997Then, still guided by the clear and convincing evidence standard, the court undertakes an additional two-step inquiry, asking, first, whether the child is a child in need of aid "as a result of parental conduct" and, second, whether that conduct "is likely to continue to exist." Id. at 440 (quoting AS 47.10.080(c)(3)); A.M. v. State, 891 P.2d 815, 819 (Alaska 1995), overruled in part by In re S.A., 912 P.2d at 1241 .

2014Our decision in the placement appeal in Tununak I and the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Baby Girl We issued our decision in the placement appeal on June 21, 2013.64 In that opinion we reversed and remanded the superior court’s adoptive placement decision.65 We concluded that ICWA requires a heightened clear and convincing evidence standard of proof be applied to the § 1915(a) good cause determination.66 Because the superior court’s placement decision was decided under a preponderance of the evidence standard, we remanded for the superior court to undertake a new good cause determin

2014Our decision in the placement appeal in Tununak I and the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Baby Girl We issued our decision in the placement appeal on June 21, 2013.64 In that opinion we reversed and remanded the superior court’s adoptive placement decision.65 We concluded that ICWA requires a heightened clear and convincing evidence standard of proof be applied to the § 1915(a) good cause determination.66 Because the superior court’s placement decision was decided under a preponderance of the evidence standard, we remanded for the superior court to undertake a new good cause determin

1987See W.M.F. v. State, 723 P.2d 1298, 1301-02 (Alaska App.1986). 2 M.K. next argues that the trial court erred in not applying the clear and convincing evidence standard to determine amenability to juvenile treatment.

1986In W.M.F. v. State, 723 P.2d 1298 (Alaska App.1986), however, we rejected an argument identical to the one advanced by D.E.P. here.

2019The State certainly “has authority under its police power to protect the community from the dangerous tendencies of [those] who are mentally ill,”24 but in order to exercise this power and confine Luciano against his will, I would hold that the State was required to show that Luciano had “demonstrated the affirmative ability or inclination to inflict harm to . . . another person.”25 In this case, the State’s showing was not sufficient under a clear and convincing evidence standard to satisfy this requirement. 23 Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 427 (1979).

1984When adopting the clear and convincing evidence standard in Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 427 , 99 S.Ct. 1804, 1810 , 60 L.Ed.2d 323 (1978), the Supreme Court stated "[t]he individual should not be asked to share equally with society the risk of error when the possible injury to the individual is significantly greater than any possible harm to the state." The dispositive inquiry thus becomes whether the potential injury to the attorney from an incorrect determination of a violation of the disciplinary rules is "significantly greater" than the possible harm to the state caused by: (1) an in

2017Evans, 88 P.3d at 1081 (quoting Buness v. Gillen, 781 P.2d 985, 988 (Alaska 1989), overruled on other grounds by Evans, 88 P.3d at 1085 n.34 (requiring the clear and convincing evidence standard in third-party custody cases)). 19 .

2017Evans, 88 P.3d at 1081 (quoting Buness v. Gillen, 781 P.2d 985, 988 (Alaska 1989), overruled on other grounds by Evans, 88 P.3d at 1085 n.34 (requiring the clear and convincing evidence standard in third-party custody cases)). 19 .

2025The court relied on Czech’s testimony that a permethrin treatment “may miss” any active lice that were embedded in Lila’s hair mats, but the court also acknowledged that “[i]f shampoo alone would kill the active lice, the court would not conclude that API’s proposed treatment was least 23 In re Sergio F., 529 P.3d at 80. 24 Id. (quoting In re Hospitalization of Vern H., 486 P.3d 1123 , 1131 n.31 (Alaska 2021)). 25 In re Lucy G., 448 P.3d at 882 (quoting Bigley v. Alaska Psychiatric Inst., 208 P.3d 168, 185 (Alaska 2009)). -11- 7763 restrictive.” Czech testified that a permethrin treatment “sho

2025The court relied on Czech’s testimony that a permethrin treatment “may miss” any active lice that were embedded in Lila’s hair mats, but the court also acknowledged that “[i]f shampoo alone would kill the active lice, the court would not conclude that API’s proposed treatment was least 23 In re Sergio F., 529 P.3d at 80. 24 Id. (quoting In re Hospitalization of Vern H., 486 P.3d 1123 , 1131 n.31 (Alaska 2021)). 25 In re Lucy G., 448 P.3d at 882 (quoting Bigley v. Alaska Psychiatric Inst., 208 P.3d 168, 185 (Alaska 2009)). -11- 7763 restrictive.” Czech testified that a permethrin treatment “sho

2025The court relied on Czech’s testimony that a permethrin treatment “may miss” any active lice that were embedded in Lila’s hair mats, but the court also acknowledged that “[i]f shampoo alone would kill the active lice, the court would not conclude that API’s proposed treatment was least 23 In re Sergio F., 529 P.3d at 80. 24 Id. (quoting In re Hospitalization of Vern H., 486 P.3d 1123 , 1131 n.31 (Alaska 2021)). 25 In re Lucy G., 448 P.3d at 882 (quoting Bigley v. Alaska Psychiatric Inst., 208 P.3d 168, 185 (Alaska 2009)). -11- 7763 restrictive.” Czech testified that a permethrin treatment “sho

2025But it found he did not meet his burden to prove, even by a preponderance of evidence, the existence of an oral grant to use the driveway.9 The court reiterated that Koponen’s testimony about an oral agreement between him and Frank was inadmissible hearsay that had been admitted for 6 Swift v. Kniffen, 706 P.2d 296, 301 (Alaska 1985) (“Under Alaska law, a private easement is created by estoppel only upon a showing of an oral grant and detrimental reliance.”). 7 See id. at 301 ; Freightways Terminal Co. v. Indus. & Com.

2025But it found he did not meet his burden to prove, even by a preponderance of evidence, the existence of an oral grant to use the driveway.9 The court reiterated that Koponen’s testimony about an oral agreement between him and Frank was inadmissible hearsay that had been admitted for 6 Swift v. Kniffen, 706 P.2d 296, 301 (Alaska 1985) (“Under Alaska law, a private easement is created by estoppel only upon a showing of an oral grant and detrimental reliance.”). 7 See id. at 301 ; Freightways Terminal Co. v. Indus. & Com.

2023Because the court made no finding about and did not even appear to consider the effect on Gene of changing caregivers, we cannot affirm the court’s ruling under the correct standard. 28 In re B.L.J., 717 P.2d 376, 380-81 (Alaska 1986). -12- 7641 for the meaning the statutory language conveys to others.” 29 “Interpretation of a statute begins with its text.” 30 We give unambiguous statutory language its “ordinary and common meaning.” 31 We will also “look to legislative history as a guide to construing a statute’s words.”32 “Under our sliding scale approach to statutory interpretation, ‘the pla

2023Servs., Off. of Child.’s Servs., 314 P.3d 518, 527, 534 (Alaska 2013); see also Mona J., 511 P.3d at 562-65 (explaining that “a parent’s actions have a place in the court’s determination of whether OCS’s efforts satisfy the ICWA standard” and describing the “ways that a parent’s unwillingness to cooperate can impact a court’s active efforts analysis”); Sylvia L. v. State, Dep’t of Health & Soc.

2023Because the court made no finding about and did not even appear to consider the effect on Gene of changing caregivers, we cannot affirm the court’s ruling under the correct standard. 28 In re B.L.J., 717 P.2d 376, 380-81 (Alaska 1986). -12- 7641 for the meaning the statutory language conveys to others.” 29 “Interpretation of a statute begins with its text.” 30 We give unambiguous statutory language its “ordinary and common meaning.” 31 We will also “look to legislative history as a guide to construing a statute’s words.”32 “Under our sliding scale approach to statutory interpretation, ‘the pla

2023Because the court made no finding about and did not even appear to consider the effect on Gene of changing caregivers, we cannot affirm the court’s ruling under the correct standard. 28 In re B.L.J., 717 P.2d 376, 380-81 (Alaska 1986). -12- 7641 for the meaning the statutory language conveys to others.” 29 “Interpretation of a statute begins with its text.” 30 We give unambiguous statutory language its “ordinary and common meaning.” 31 We will also “look to legislative history as a guide to construing a statute’s words.”32 “Under our sliding scale approach to statutory interpretation, ‘the pla

2023Servs., Off. of Child.’s Servs., 314 P.3d 518, 527, 534 (Alaska 2013); see also Mona J., 511 P.3d at 562-65 (explaining that “a parent’s actions have a place in the court’s determination of whether OCS’s efforts satisfy the ICWA standard” and describing the “ways that a parent’s unwillingness to cooperate can impact a court’s active efforts analysis”); Sylvia L. v. State, Dep’t of Health & Soc.

2023Because the court made no finding about and did not even appear to consider the effect on Gene of changing caregivers, we cannot affirm the court’s ruling under the correct standard. 28 In re B.L.J., 717 P.2d 376, 380-81 (Alaska 1986). -12- 7641 for the meaning the statutory language conveys to others.” 29 “Interpretation of a statute begins with its text.” 30 We give unambiguous statutory language its “ordinary and common meaning.” 31 We will also “look to legislative history as a guide to construing a statute’s words.”32 “Under our sliding scale approach to statutory interpretation, ‘the pla

2023Then, having concluded that Zander B.’s use of abuse of discretion 25 474 P.3d 1153, 1173-74 (Alaska 2020). -10- 7641 review was originally erroneous, we overrule it to the extent inconsistent with this opinion. 1.

2021A consulting psychologist from Central Peninsula testified that 20 See 324 P.3d 835, 838 (Alaska 2014) (“[W]e take this opportunity to stress that the assigned judicial officer should not hesitate to take appropriate action to expedite an evaluation if the respondent cannot be transported to the initially designated facility without delay.”). -6- 7525 “[Mabel’s] condition ha[d]n’t changed” and that the hospital had no reason to petition the court to withdraw the order.