17 Maryland opinions name it 2 courts 1908–2014 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Maryland courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Mathews v. Eldridgegreen2 sentences2011See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 , 96 S.Ct. 893, 902 , 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976). 2011See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 , 96 S.Ct. 893, 902 , 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976). | 2 | 2 |
Faber v. Wolfegreen2 sentences1999See Faber v. Wolfe, 41 Md.App. 458 , 397 A.2d 270 (1979), holding that an oral exception must be reduced to writing within a “reasonable time.” Compare Thomas v. Ford, supra, 63 Md. [346] at 348 [(1885)]. 1999See Faber v. Wolfe, 41 Md.App. 458 , 397 A.2d 270 (1979), holding that an oral exception must be reduced to writing within a “reasonable time.” Compare Thomas v. Ford, supra, 63 Md. [346] at 348 [(1885)]. | 2 | 2 |
Washabaugh v. Washabaughgreen2 sentences1999Aware of these problems and taking cognizance of the footnote penned by this Court in Washabaugh [v. Washabaugh], supra, 285 Md. [393] at 399, n. 6, 404 A.2d 1027 [(1979)], the Rules Committee of this Court recommended substantial revision of Rule 510 so that the procedure for taking an in banc appeal would parallel, to. the extent possible, the procedure in taking an appeal to the Court of Special Appeals. 1999Aware of these problems and taking cognizance of the footnote penned by this Court in Washabaugh [v. Washabaugh], supra, 285 Md. [393] at 399, n. 6, 404 A.2d 1027 [(1979)], the Rules Committee of this Court recommended substantial revision of Rule 510 so that the procedure for taking an in banc appeal would parallel, to the extent possible, the procedure in taking an appeal to the Court of Special Appeals. | 1 | 2 |
Attorney Grievance Commission v. Gordongreen2 sentences2014Att’y Grievance Comm’n v. Gordon, 413 Md. 46, 54-55 , 991 A.2d 51, 56 (2010); see Md. 2014Att’y Grievance Comm’n v. Gordon, 413 Md. 46, 54-55 , 991 A.2d 51, 56 (2010); see Md. | 1 | 1 |
ADM Partnership v. Martingreen2 sentences2012When Respondent argued that the jury should not consider assumption of the risk because Respondent did not “believe there’s any indication [Respondent] voluntarily chose [to assume the risk],” the trial judge disagreed, stating that whether Respondent assumed the risk of her injuries is “going to be the issue [for the jury to decide].” Additionally, when Petitioner moved for a judgment at the end of Respondent’s case based on assumption of the risk, the trial judge responded that the court would not grant judgment based on the defense, but told Petitioner that “[i]t’s a matter you can argue to 2012When Respondent argued that the jury should not consider assumption of the risk because Respondent did not “believe there’s any indication [Respondent] voluntarily chose [to assume the risk],” the trial judge disagreed, stating that whether Respondent assumed the risk of her injuries is “going to be the issue [for the jury to decide].” Additionally, when Petitioner moved for a judgment at the end of Respondent’s case based on assumption of the risk, the trial judge responded that the court would not grant judgment based on the defense, but told Petitioner that “[i]t’s a matter you can argue to | 1 | 1 |
People v. Toolesgreen2 sentences2010See People v. Tooles, 177 Ill.2d 462 , 227 Ill.Dec. 125 , 687 N.E.2d 48, 49-50, 53 (1997) (where statute required that jury trial waiver be “in writing,” court held “that the failure to procure defendants’ written jury waivers does not necessitate reversal of their convictions because the record otherwise evidences that defendants’ jury waivers were understanding^ made”); Loveless v. State, 21 S.W.3d 582, 584 (Tex.App.2000) (where no written jury trial waiver was obtained as required by statute, error was harmless because “there was sufficient evidence of an oral waiver of a jury trial”). 2010See People v. Tooles, 177 Ill.2d 462 , 227 Ill.Dec. 125 , 687 N.E.2d 48, 49-50, 53 (1997) (where statute required that jury trial waiver be “in writing,” court held “that the failure to procure defendants’ written jury waivers does not necessitate reversal of their convictions because the record otherwise evidences that defendants’ jury waivers were understanding^ made”); Loveless v. State, 21 S.W.3d 582, 584 (Tex.App.2000) (where no written jury trial waiver was obtained as required by statute, error was harmless because “there was sufficient evidence of an oral waiver of a jury trial”). | 1 | 1 |
Loveless v. Stategreen1 sentence2010See People v. Tooles, 177 Ill.2d 462 , 227 Ill.Dec. 125 , 687 N.E.2d 48, 49-50, 53 (1997) (where statute required that jury trial waiver be “in writing,” court held “that the failure to procure defendants’ written jury waivers does not necessitate reversal of their convictions because the record otherwise evidences that defendants’ jury waivers were understanding^ made”); Loveless v. State, 21 S.W.3d 582, 584 (Tex.App.2000) (where no written jury trial waiver was obtained as required by statute, error was harmless because “there was sufficient evidence of an oral waiver of a jury trial”). | 1 | 1 |
People v. Moslygreen2 sentences2010In Mosly , the appellate court determined that the trial court's failure to *284 conduct an oral waiver colloquy on the record did not require reversal because "the record establish[ed] that defendant nonetheless understood that he had a right to a trial by jury and voluntarily chose to waive that right." Id. at 901. 2010In Mosly , the appellate court determined that the trial court’s failure to conduct an oral waiver colloquy on the record did not require reversal because “the record establish[ed] that defendant nonetheless understood that he had a right to a trial by jury and voluntarily chose to waive that right.” Id. at 901. | 1 | 1 |
Monumental Health Plan, Inc. v. Department of Health & Human Servicesgreen1 sentence1996Ass’n, 496 F.2d 174, 178 (4th Cir.1974), even if she was not afforded an oral hearing (and we do not so hold), it does not necessarily mean that she was denied due process, Monumental Health Plan, Inc. v. Department of Health & Human Servs., 510 F.Supp. 244, 248 (D.Md.1981). *26 Though the opportunity to be heard is commonly considered a procedural right, its denial vel non must be determined “by the substance of things, and not by mere form.” Simon v. Craft, 182 U.S. 427, 436 , 21 S.Ct. 836, 839 , 45 L.Ed. 1165 (1901). | 1 | 1 |
Stuart M. Christhilf, Jr., M.D. v. The Annapolis Emergency Hospital Association, Inc.green1 sentence1996Ass’n, 496 F.2d 174, 178 (4th Cir.1974), even if she was not afforded an oral hearing (and we do not so hold), it does not necessarily mean that she was denied due process, Monumental Health Plan, Inc. v. Department of Health & Human Servs., 510 F.Supp. 244, 248 (D.Md.1981). *26 Though the opportunity to be heard is commonly considered a procedural right, its denial vel non must be determined “by the substance of things, and not by mere form.” Simon v. Craft, 182 U.S. 427, 436 , 21 S.Ct. 836, 839 , 45 L.Ed. 1165 (1901). | 1 | 1 |
Phillips v. Venkergreen2 sentences1994See Venker, 316 Md. at 217 , 557 A.2d 1338 . 1994See Venker, 316 Md. at 217 , 557 A.2d 1338 . | 1 | 1 |
Thomas v. Fordgreen2 sentences1987See Faber v. Wolfe, 41 Md.App. 458 , 397 A.2d 270 (1979), holding that an oral exception must be reduced to writing within a “reasonable time.” Compare Thomas v. Ford, supra, 63 Md. at 348 . 1987App. 458 , 397 A.2d 270 (1979), holding that an oral exception must be reduced to writing within a "reasonable time." Compare Thomas v. Ford, supra, 63 Md. at 348 . | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Maryland. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Bull Steamship Lines v. Fisher
green
2 sentences2001Maryland Rule 554 c provides that: “An oral instruction need not comply with the technical rules as to prayers.” Judge Morris A. Soper, one of the most eminent and distinguished jurists of our time, in discussing Maryland Rule 554 said: “Nor will it be too difficult for the judge * * * to state the law of the case in plain and simple terms far more helpful and intelligible to the jury than the technical, hypothetical and sometimes verbose instructions with which for the past century Maryland jurors have been served. * * * The jury will more easily understand and more readily apply the rules of 2001Maryland Rule 554 c provides that: “An oral instruction need not comply with the technical rules as to prayers.” Judge Morris A. Soper, one of the most eminent and distinguished jurists of our time, in discussing Maryland Rule 554 said: “Nor will it be too difficult for the judge * * * to state the law of the case in plain and simple terms far more helpful and intelligible to the jury than the technical, hypothetical and sometimes verbose instructions with which for the past century Maryland jurors have been served. * * * The jury will more easily understand and more readily apply the rules of | 2 | 1964–2001 |
West v. Belle Isle Cab Co.
green
2 sentences2001Maryland Rule 554 c provides that: “An oral instruction need not comply with the technical rules as to prayers.” Judge Morris A. Soper, one of the most eminent and distinguished jurists of our time, in discussing Maryland Rule 554 said: “Nor will it be too difficult for the judge * * * to state the law of the case in plain and simple terms far more helpful and intelligible to the jury than the technical, hypothetical and sometimes verbose instructions with which for the past century Maryland jurors have been served. * * * The jury will more easily understand and more readily apply the rules of 2001Maryland Rule 554 c provides that: “An oral instruction need not comply with the technical rules as to prayers.” Judge Morris A. Soper, one of the most eminent and distinguished jurists of our time, in discussing Maryland Rule 554 said: “Nor will it be too difficult for the judge * * * to state the law of the case in plain and simple terms far more helpful and intelligible to the jury than the technical, hypothetical and sometimes verbose instructions with which for the past century Maryland jurors have been served. * * * The jury will more easily understand and more readily apply the rules of | 2 | 1964–2001 |
Davis v. United States
green
2 sentences2011According to the State, the officer was permitted under Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452 , 114 S.Ct. 2350 , 129 L.Ed.2d 362 (1994), to ask clarifying questions to an ambiguous response and to confirm that appellant understood his Spanish when appellant was asked to complete the Advice of Rights form. 2011According to the State, the officer was permitted under Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452 , 114 S.Ct. 2350 , 129 L.Ed.2d 362 (1994), to ask clarifying questions to an ambiguous response and to confirm that appellant understood his Spanish when appellant was asked to complete the Advice of Rights form. | 1 | 2011–2011 |
United States v. Amnon Saadya, United States of America v. Marco Abkasis
green
2 sentences2010Id. at 1421 . 2010Id. at 1421 . | 1 | 2010–2010 |
Thompson v. State
green
1 sentence2009“Having held that the Circuit Court erred by failing to give [Blake] an opportunity to respond to the State’s motion to dismiss the petition, we [did] not reach the issue of whether, and if so under what circumstances, a § 8-201 petitioner is entitled to an oral hearing.” Id. at 229 n. 12, 909 A.2d at 1029 n. 12. | 1 | 2009–2009 |
Arey v. State
green
2 sentences2009In Arey v. State, 400 Md. 491 , 929 A.2d 501 (2007), we again addressed whether a circuit court should hold a hearing when the State asserts that DNA evidence no longer exists. 2009In Arey v. State, 400 Md. 491 , 929 A.2d 501 (2007), we again addressed whether a circuit court should hold a hearing when the State asserts that DNA evidence no longer exists. | 1 | 2009–2009 |
Simon v. Craft
green
2 sentences1996Ass’n, 496 F.2d 174, 178 (4th Cir.1974), even if she was not afforded an oral hearing (and we do not so hold), it does not necessarily mean that she was denied due process, Monumental Health Plan, Inc. v. Department of Health & Human Servs., 510 F.Supp. 244, 248 (D.Md.1981). *26 Though the opportunity to be heard is commonly considered a procedural right, its denial vel non must be determined “by the substance of things, and not by mere form.” Simon v. Craft, 182 U.S. 427, 436 , 21 S.Ct. 836, 839 , 45 L.Ed. 1165 (1901). 1996Ass’n, 496 F.2d 174, 178 (4th Cir.1974), even if she was not afforded an oral hearing (and we do not so hold), it does not necessarily mean that she was denied due process, Monumental Health Plan, Inc. v. Department of Health & Human Servs., 510 F.Supp. 244, 248 (D.Md.1981). *26 Though the opportunity to be heard is commonly considered a procedural right, its denial vel non must be determined “by the substance of things, and not by mere form.” Simon v. Craft, 182 U.S. 427, 436 , 21 S.Ct. 836, 839 , 45 L.Ed. 1165 (1901). | 1 | 1996–1996 |
Abrams v. Eckenrode
green
2 sentences1962AVhile a contract which is required by the statute of frauds to be in writing may not ordinarily be modified by a subsequent oral agreement, Abrams v. Eckenrode, 136 Md. 244 , 110 Atl. 468 (1920), the law is well settled that an optionor may, by his words or conduct, waive strict compliance by the optionee *500 of the terms of the option as to a condition precedent, and it is immaterial that the option is a part of the instrument which is required to be in writing under the statute of frauds. 1962AVhile a contract which is required by the statute of frauds to be in writing may not ordinarily be modified by a subsequent oral agreement, Abrams v. Eckenrode, 136 Md. 244 , 110 Atl. 468 (1920), the law is well settled that an optionor may, by his words or conduct, waive strict compliance by the optionee *500 of the terms of the option as to a condition precedent, and it is immaterial that the option is a part of the instrument which is required to be in writing under the statute of frauds. | 1 | 1962–1962 |
Rosenkovitz v. United Railways & Electric Co.
green
2 sentences1942The use of oral instructions was discouraged in the case of Rosenkovitz v. United Rys. & Electric Co., 1908, 108 Md. 306, 316 , 70 A. 108, 112 , where it was said: “While it is clear that the power exists in the courts of submitting an oral instruction in cases where it applies, or may be considered necessary, yet it is a power that should be cautiously exercised, and will be found in practice a dangerous one, and open to abuse. 1942The use of oral instructions was discouraged in the case of Rosenkovitz v. United Rys. & Electric Co., 1908, 108 Md. 306, 316 , 70 A. 108, 112 , where it was said: “While it is clear that the power exists in the courts of submitting an oral instruction in cases where it applies, or may be considered necessary, yet it is a power that should be cautiously exercised, and will be found in practice a dangerous one, and open to abuse. | 1 | 1942–1942 |
Downey v. Forrester
green
1 sentence1908In Downey v. Forrester, 35 Md. 117 , it was held to be competent for the Court by an oral instruction to make an explanation, ex mero motu of written instructions previously granted by the Court. | 1 | 1908–1908 |
Hussey v. Ryan
green
1 sentence1908And in Hussey v. Brown, 64 Md. 426 , it is said, so far as defendant’s exception to this last instruction rests upon its being voluntary or an explanation of the prayer to which it relates, it is well settled that the Court may give instructions of its own or explain the effect of those granted at the instance of the parties, provided they are not inconsistent therewith. | 1 | 1908–1908 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.