9 Massachusetts opinions name it 2 courts 1926–2016 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Massachusetts courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Gallo v. Commonwealthgreen2 sentences1997In Gallo v. Commonwealth, 343 Mass. 397 (1961), the case upon which the defendant relies to argue that his oral waiver of a jury trial should be considered ineffectual because it was unaccompanied by a written waiver signed and filed with the court, an oral waiver by counsel of the defendant’s right to twelve jurors was held to be ineffectual because it was unaccompanied by a written waiver. 1982See Gallo v. Commonwealth, 343 Mass. 397, 402 (1961). 7 We note also that under Rule 3 of the District Court Department Supplemental Rules of Criminal Procedure (effective February 1,1981), cited by the Commonwealth, “[t]he court shall not. . . make a finding of guilty upon the defendant admitting to a finding of facts sufficient to warrant the same, unless it is satisfied that there is a factual basis for such . . . finding.” In light of the third District Court judge’s statement that he was unable to ascertain what, if anything, was presented to the second judge prior to the continuance with | 1 | 2 |
Commonwealth v. Osbornegreen1 sentence2008While a written waiver (of a jury trial) is an important procedural safeguard deemed necessary by the Legislature to preserve trial by jury as a “basic and fundamental right in our judicial system,” Commonwealth v. Osborne, 445 Mass. 776, 780 (2006) (citing G. | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Colladogreen1 sentence2006It argues, however, that neither prescribes a remedy for violations of the requirement of a written waiver, and urges us to adopt the same “substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice” standard for reversal that we adopted in Commonwealth v. Collado, supra at 678 (“in noncapital cases, an unintentional violation of either G. | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Hilairegreen1 sentence2003See Commonwealth v. Hilaire, supra at 815 . | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Sotogreen2 sentences2002The oral warning given during the colloquy did not satisfy the statute’s requirements, as the judge merely told the defendant that “a finding of guilty in these cases could affect [his] status.” In Commonwealth v. Soto, 431 Mass. 340, 342 (2000), we held that “[i]t is incumbent on the judge to notify a defendant that there are three specific consequences to a plea: (1) deportation; (2) exclusion of admission to the United States; and (3) denial of naturalization. 2002A defendant must be advised of all three consequences of his plea.” In that case, the defendant, who had pleaded guilty to a narcotics charge in 1990, moved to vacate his plea seven years later after the INS initiated proceedings to exclude him from the United States as an “arriving alien.” Id. at 341 . | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Duquettered1 sentence1997See Commonwealth v. Duquette, 386 Mass. 834 , 840 n.6 (1982) (an oral waiver by a defendant of his right to a jury trial will not be valid in the face of the method for waiver prescribed by statute). | 1 | 1 |
Glassman v. Barrongreen1 sentence1984See Glassman v. Barron, 277 Mass. 376, 382 (1931); 6 Wig- *673 more, Evidence § 1770 (Chadbourn rev. 1976); Liacos, Handbook of Massachusetts Evidence 265 (5th ed. 1981); McCormick, Evidence § 249 (2d ed. 1972); Hughes, Evidence § 453(1) (1961). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Massachusetts. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Reddish v. Bowen
green
1 sentence2016In a decision denying the parties’ cross motions for summary judgment, the motion judge, relying on comments made in Reddish v. Bowen, 66 Mass. App. Ct. 621 , 625 n.10 (2006), ruled that a jury could conclude that Chutehall’s violation of the code was not knowing or intentional if they found that Chutehall had relied on statements from Christopher Downey that there was only one layer of roofing on the roof. 5 At trial, the Downeys filed a motion in limine, seeking to exclude evidence of Christopher Downey’s alleged representations concerning the roof as well as his instructions to Chutehall no | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Ciummei v. Commonwealth
green
1 sentence1997In Ciummei, supra at 507-509 , the court recognized and reaffirmed the statutory requirement of a signed written waiver. | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Kyte v. Commercial Union Assurance Co.
green
1 sentence1926The case at bar is distinguishable in its facts from Kyte v. Commercial Union Assurance Co. 144 Mass. 43 , Rockwell v. Hamburg-Bremen Fire Ins. | 1 | 1926–1926 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.