oral hearing in Texas

2026Martin v. Martin, Martin & Richards, Inc., 989 S.W.2d 357, 359 (Tex. 1998) (per curiam); see Long v. Yurrick, 319 S.W.3d 944, 948 (Tex. App.—Austin 2010, no pet.) (“Due process does not require an oral hearing on a motion for summary judgment . . . .”).

2026P. 166a(c) (requiring summary-judgment motion 6 to be served on opposing party at least twenty-one days before time specified for hearing). 3 Although Rule 166a(c) of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure calls for a hearing on a summary- judgment motion, “an oral hearing is not mandatory.” Martin v. Martin, Martin & Richards, Inc., 989 S.W.2d 357, 359 (Tex. 1998) (per curiam) (noting that Rule 166a(c) prohibits oral testimony at hearing); see Long v. Yurrick, 319 S.W.3d 944, 948 (Tex. App.—Austin 2010, no pet.) (“Due process does not require an oral hearing on a motion for summary judgment . . .

2015The Texas Supreme Court has held that it is “not within the discretion of the trial court to fail to hold an oral hearing on the motion to reinstate.” Thordson v. City of Houston, 815 S.W.2d 550, 550 (Tex. 1991) (per curiam); see also Dueitt, 180 S.W.3d at 740 (“The rule is mandatory, and the trial court has no discretion about whether to set a hearing on the motion.”).

2015The Texas Supreme Court has held that “‘it is clear that an oral hearing is required on any timely filed motion to reinstate under rule 165a.’” Thordson v. City of Houston, 815 S.W.2d 550, 550 (Tex. 1991) (quoting Gulf Coast Inv.

2024Ctr., 754 S.W.2d 152, 153 (Tex. 1988) (“Unless required by the express language or the context of the particular rule . . . the term ‘hearing’ does not necessarily contemplate either a personal appearance before the court or an oral presentation to the court.”); see also Gordon v. Ward, 822 S.W.2d 90, 93 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1991, writ denied) (“Applying the holding in Gulf Coast, we cannot say that the word ‘hearing,’ as used in rule 166a, requires an oral hearing.”). 9 Unless the judge requires it, oral argument is not always necessary or desirable in summary judgment proceedings b

2022See 754 S.W.2d 152, 153 (Tex. 1988) (per curiam) (holding trial court abused its discretion by refusing to hold an oral hearing on a rule 165a motion to reinstate an action dismissed for want of prosecution).

2026Co., No. 14-19-00607-CV, 2021 WL 4472479 , at *1 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Sept. 30, 2021, no pet.) (mem. op.) (noting that Texas Supreme Court in context “directly analogous” to Rule 13 has held that “Rule [of Civil Procedure] 215.3’s authorization of sanctions ‘after notice and hearing’ does not indicate a requirement of an oral hearing.”) (citing Cire, 134 S.W.3d at 844 .

2025Indeed, the Texas Supreme Court in a context “directly analogous” to Rule 13 recently held that “Rule [of Civil Procedure] 215.3’s authorization of sanctions ‘after notice and hearing’ does not indicate a requirement of an oral hearing.” Nguyen v. Aventus Ins., No. 14-19-00607-CV, 2021 WL 4472479 , at *1 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Sept. 30, 2021, no pet.) (mem. op.) (citing Cire v. Cummings, 134 S.W.3d 835, 844 (Tex. 2004)); see Tex. R.

2024“The decision whether to grant an oral hearing on a summary judgment motion is purely within the discretion of the trial judge.” Giese v. NCNB Tex. Forney Banking Ctr., 881 S.W.2d 776, 783 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1994, no pet.) (citing Adamo v. State Farm Lloyds Co., 853 S.W.2d 673, 677 (Tex. App.— Houston [14th Dist.] 1993, writ denied)).

2015See Stelly v. Papania, 927 S.W.2d 620, 622 (Tex. 1996) (per curiam) (“An appellate court should set aside the trial court’s ruling only if, after reviewing the entire record, it is clear that the trial court abused its discretion.”); Landers v. State Farm Lloyds, 257 S.W.3d 740, 747 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2008, no pet.) (“We review the grant or denial of a motion for continuance for an abuse of discretion.”); Adamo v. State Farm Lloyds Co., 853 S.W.2d 673, 677 (Tex. App.— Houston [14th Dist.] 1993, writ denied) (“[T]he decision whether to grant an oral hearing on a summary judgment mot

2024“The decision whether to grant an oral hearing on a summary judgment motion is purely within the discretion of the trial judge.” Giese v. NCNB Tex. Forney Banking Ctr., 881 S.W.2d 776, 783 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1994, no pet.) (citing Adamo v. State Farm Lloyds Co., 853 S.W.2d 673, 677 (Tex. App.— Houston [14th Dist.] 1993, writ denied)).

2020The third case, Giese v. NCNB Texas Forney Banking Center, addresses whether a trial court must conduct an oral hearing on a motion for summary judgment. 881 S.W.2d 776, 783 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1994, no writ).

2013In Franklin , the court, after discussing the existence of both Rule 165a and a court’s inherent power as bases for a dismissal for want of prosecution, stated: “Regardless of the grounds for dismissal, however, the trial court ordinarily is required to provide notice of a hearing and conduct an oral hearing prior to dismissal.” 53 S.W.3d at 401 (emphasis added).

2013In Franklin, the court, after discussing the existence of both Rule 165a and a court’s inherent power as bases for a dismissal for want of prosecution, stated: “Regardless of the grounds for dismissal, however, the trial court ordinarily is required to provide notice of a hearing and conduct an oral hearing prior to dismissal.” 53 S.W.3d at 401 (emphasis added).

2024Ctr., 754 S.W.2d 152, 153 (Tex. 1988) (“Unless required by the express language or the context of the particular rule . . . the term ‘hearing’ does not necessarily contemplate either a personal appearance before the court or an oral presentation to the court.”); see also Gordon v. Ward, 822 S.W.2d 90, 93 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1991, writ denied) (“Applying the holding in Gulf Coast, we cannot say that the word ‘hearing,’ as used in rule 166a, requires an oral hearing.”). 9 Unless the judge requires it, oral argument is not always necessary or desirable in summary judgment proceedings b

2020Rule 166a does not mandate an oral hearing in all cases, Gordon v. Ward, 822 S.W.2d 90, 93 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1991, writ denied), 2 therefore the primary purpose of the notice required by rule 166a(c) is to allow the non-movant to calculate the date by which he must file a written response or opposing affidavits.

2022P. 165a(3); Mortell v. Pruett, No. 02-19-00123-CV, 2019 WL 5608236 , at *1 n.1 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Oct. 31, 2019, no pet.) (mem. op.); Smith v. McKee, 145 S.W.3d 299, 305 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2004, no pet.) (“It is not within the discretion of the trial court to fail to hold an oral hearing on a timely-filed, properly verified motion to reinstate [under Rule 165a].”).

2019“It is not within the discretion of the trial court to fail to hold an oral hearing on a timely- filed, properly verified motion to reinstate [under Rule 165a].” Smith v. McKee, 145 S.W.3d 299, 305 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2004, no pet.). 2 on Mortell’s motion to reinstate.

2026If a party “represents to the court that he waives a ground or objection that he has previously asserted in a written motion or response and agrees that a certain issue is the only issue before the court,” Rule 11 is satisfied “if the oral waiver or agreement made in open court is described in the judgment or an order[.]” Id.

2013See City of Houston v. Clear Creek Basin Auth., 589 S.W.2d 671, 677 (Tex.1979) (“[Rjule 11 is satisfied if the oral waiver or agreement made in open court is described in the judgment.”).

2025“It is well settled that a requirement to hold a ‘hearing,’ whether imposed by rule or statute, does not necessarily obligate the trial court to hold an oral hearing.” Enriquez v. Livingston, 400 S.W.3d 610, 616 (Tex. App.—Austin 2013, pet. denied) (citing Gulf Coast Inv.

2020The opportunity to be heard required by due process “must be granted at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.” Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965); see Enriquez v. Livingston, 400 S.W.3d 610, 617 (Tex. App.—Austin 2013, pet. denied) (due process does not require an oral hearing on a motion but only an opportunity to respond at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner).

2020See Wilson, 224 S.W.3d at 863 ; Current, 877 S.W.2d at 839 - 40.

2013Ex parte Wilson, 224 S.W.3d at 863 ; Ex parte Current, 877 S.W.2d 833, 839 (Tex. App.—Waco 1994, no writ).1 A trial court may rule on an expunction petition without conducting an oral hearing and without the consideration of live testimony, if it has at its disposal all the information it needs to resolve the issues raised by the petition.

2026Martin v. Martin, Martin & Richards, Inc., 989 S.W.2d 357, 359 (Tex. 1998) (per curiam); see Long v. Yurrick, 319 S.W.3d 944, 948 (Tex. App.—Austin 2010, no pet.) (“Due process does not require an oral hearing on a motion for summary judgment . . . .”).

2026P. 166a(c) (requiring summary-judgment motion 6 to be served on opposing party at least twenty-one days before time specified for hearing). 3 Although Rule 166a(c) of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure calls for a hearing on a summary- judgment motion, “an oral hearing is not mandatory.” Martin v. Martin, Martin & Richards, Inc., 989 S.W.2d 357, 359 (Tex. 1998) (per curiam) (noting that Rule 166a(c) prohibits oral testimony at hearing); see Long v. Yurrick, 319 S.W.3d 944, 948 (Tex. App.—Austin 2010, no pet.) (“Due process does not require an oral hearing on a motion for summary judgment . . .

2009In effect, the option to hold an oral hearing or merely act upon written submissions remains with the trial court, see Meek v. Bishop, Peterson & Sharp, P.C. , supra , and McKinney did not change that.

2002In effect, the option to hold an oral hearing or merely act upon written submissions remains with the trial court, see Meek v. Bishop, Peterson & Sharp, P.C., supra, and McKinney did not change that.

2020See Kelly v. Cunningham, 848 S.W.2d 370, 371 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1993, no writ) (“The Texas Supreme Court has made it clear that when a party requests an oral hearing on a timely filed, properly verified, motion to reinstate, it is an abuse of discretion for the trial court to refuse to hold an oral hearing.”); Cabrera v. Cedarapids, Inc., 834 S.W.2d 615, 618 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1992, writ denied) (observing that Rule 165a(1) provides for a hearing on a motion to reinstate following dismissal for want of prosecution if requested by movant).

1993Cf. Kelly v. Cunningham, 848 S.W.2d 370, 371 (Tex.App.— Houston [1st Dist.] 1993, no writ) (movant, by voluntarily placing the motion on the court’s submission docket, was estopped from complaining of the trial court’s failure to hold an oral hearing).

2021Blevins, 2017 Tex. App. LEXIS 3524 , at *22-24 (citing Jackson v. Reardon, 14 S.W.3d 816, 819 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2000, no pet.) (stating that “[a]rticle 4590i [the predecessor to chapter 74] does not expressly require an oral hearing on a motion to dismiss”).

2018Simmons, 2012 WL 6677672 , at *2; see Jackson, 14 S.W.3d at 819 ; (stating that “[a]rticle 4590i [the predecessor to Chapter 74] does not expressly require an oral hearing on a motion to dismiss [ ]”).

2020See Kelly v. Cunningham, 848 S.W.2d 370, 371 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1993, no writ) (“The Texas Supreme Court has made it clear that when a party requests an oral hearing on a timely filed, properly verified, motion to reinstate, it is an abuse of discretion for the trial court to refuse to hold an oral hearing.”); Cabrera v. Cedarapids, Inc., 834 S.W.2d 615, 618 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1992, writ denied) (observing that Rule 165a(1) provides for a hearing on a motion to reinstate following dismissal for want of prosecution if requested by movant).

2013See Weir v. Abebe Baralci, No. 05-07-00223-CV, 2008 WL 588917 , at *1 (Tex.App.-Dallas Mar. 5, 2008, no pet.) (mem. op.) (single line in motion to reinstate asking for hearing was not sufficient to alert trial court that motion needed to be set for oral hearing; therefore, error not shown); Keough v. Cyrus USA, Inc., 204 S.W.3d 1 , 6 n. 3 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2006, pet. denied) (“Before trial court error can be found in the failure to set a hearing on a motion to reinstate, the movant must request a hearing.”); Johnson v. Sepulveda, 178 S.W.3d 117, 119 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.]

1993Had the judgment been for the claimant because of the insurer’s discovery abuse, not only would an oral hearing have been required, Braden v. Downey, 811 S.W.2d 922, 929 (Tex.1991, orig. proceeding), but the trial court’s detailing of specific factual findings justifying the judgment would have been well advised, see Chrysler Corp. v. Blackmon, 841 S.W.2d 844, 850 (Tex.1992), and de novo review by this Court of every detail of the trial court’s order would have been assured.

1993Had the judgment been for the claimant because of the insurer's discovery abuse, not only would an oral hearing have been required, Braden v. Downey, 811 S.W.2d 922, 929 (Tex.1991, orig. proceeding), but the trial court's detailing of specific factual findings justifying the judgment would have been well advised, see Chrysler Corp. v. Blackmon, 841 S.W.2d 844, 850 (Tex.1992), and de novo review by this Court of every detail of the trial court's order would have been assured.

2013Compare Brown v. Brookshires Grocery Store, 10 S.W.3d 351, 354 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1999, pet. denied) ("We also hold that the context of [Rule 165a(l)], which provides for notice of a specific date and place for the hearing, requires an oral hearing at which the opportunity for a personal appearance and oral presentation is afforded.”), with Comeaux, v. Gage, No. 09-11-00254-CV, 2012 WL 1249236 , at *2 (Tex.App.-Beaumont Apr. 12, 2012, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (in suit dismissed pursuant to Rule 165a(l), "the trial court was not required to hold an oral hearing or permit Comeaux to personally appe

2013Compare Brown v. Brookshires Grocery Store, 10 S.W.3d 351, 354 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1999, pet. denied) (“We also hold that the context of [Rule 165a(1)], which provides for notice of a specific date and place for the hearing, requires an oral hearing at which the opportunity for a personal appearance and oral presentation is afforded.”), with Comeaux v. Gage, No. 09-11-00254-CV, 2012 WL 1249236 , at *2 (Tex. App.—Beaumont Apr. 12, 2012, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (in suit dismissed pursuant to Rule 165a(1), “the trial court was not required to hold an oral hearing or permit Comeaux to personally app

2005O’Keefe v. State is similar to Rowland and Jessup, except that in O’Keefe, the appellant refused to sign the written statutory warning form that was given to him after he had already refused to give a specimen upon receiving the oral warnings. 981 S.W.2d 872, 875 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1998, no pet.).

2005O’Keefe v. State is similar to Rowland and Jessup , except that in O’Keefe, the appellant refused to sign the written statutory warning form that was given to him after he had already refused to give a specimen upon receiving the oral warnings. 981 S.W.2d 872, 875 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1998, no pet.).

2023See Villarreal, 994 S.W.2d at 630 , 631 n. 4.

2013Cited as support for this proposition were Villarreal, 994 S.W.2d at 630 , 631 n. 4, and Brown v. Brookshires Grocery Store, 10 S.W.3d 351, 354 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1999, pet. denied).

2016Dueitt, 180 S.W.3d at 741 , citing Manning, 82 S.W.3d at 715 ; Texas Sting, Ltd., 82 S.W.3d at 648-49. 1 Therefore, while the trial court had not held an oral hearing on the motion to reinstate, “all due process concerns were eliminated” because the dismissed parties still received “adequate notice and substance of the hearing on the motion to dismiss, and had the opportunity to respond at the hearing, which is all that due process requires.” Dueitt, 180 S.W.3d at 741 , citing Smith v. McKee, 145 S.W.3d 299, 302 (Tex.App.—Fort Worth 2004, no pet.); Texas Sting, Ltd., 82 S.W.3d at 648.

2016Dueitt, 180 S.W.3d at 741 , citing Manning, 82 S.W.3d at 715 ; Texas Sting, Ltd., 82 S.W.3d at 648-49. 1 Therefore, while the trial court had not held an oral hearing on the motion to reinstate, “all due process concerns were eliminated” because the dismissed parties still received “adequate notice and substance of the hearing on the motion to dismiss, and had the opportunity to respond at the hearing, which is all that due process requires.” Dueitt, 180 S.W.3d at 741 , citing Smith v. McKee, 145 S.W.3d 299, 302 (Tex.App.—Fort Worth 2004, no pet.); Texas Sting, Ltd., 82 S.W.3d at 648.

2026Ex parte Franklin, 310 S.W.3d 918, 922 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2010, no pet.).

2014See id. art. 11.072, § 6; Ex parte Gonzalez, 323 S.W.3d at 558 (stating that nothing in article 11.072 required the trial court to conduct a hearing on appellant’s habeas-corpus application); Ex parte Franklin, 310 S.W.3d 918, 922-23 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2010, no pet.) (stating that a trial court is not required to hold an oral hearing when determining whether to deny an article 11.072 application for writ of habeas corpus alleging ineffective assistance of counsel); Ex parte Cummins, 169 S.W.3d at 757 (holding that nothing in article 11.072 required the trial court to hear evidence and allow a

2022See Watts, 99 S.W.3d at 611 .

2004See Watts v. State, 99 S.W.3d 604 , 614 n. 26 (Tex.Crim.App.2003).

2013Ex parte Wilson, 224 S.W.3d at 863 ; Ex parte Current, 877 S.W.2d 833, 839 (Tex. App.—Waco 1994, no writ).1 A trial court may rule on an expunction petition without conducting an oral hearing and without the consideration of live testimony, if it has at its disposal all the information it needs to resolve the issues raised by the petition.

2013Ex parte Wilson, 224 S.W.3d at 863 . 1 In Gulf Coast Investment Corporation v. NASA 1 Business Center, the Texas Supreme Court held that an oral hearing was required on a motion to reinstate under rule 165a of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure. 754 S.W.2d 152, 153 (Tex. 1988).

2023Thordson v. City of Hous., 815 S.W.2d 550, 550 (Tex. 1991) (per curiam); Johnson, 178 S.W.3d at 119 .

2013See Weir v. Abebe Baralci, No. 05-07-00223-CV, 2008 WL 588917 , at *1 (Tex.App.-Dallas Mar. 5, 2008, no pet.) (mem. op.) (single line in motion to reinstate asking for hearing was not sufficient to alert trial court that motion needed to be set for oral hearing; therefore, error not shown); Keough v. Cyrus USA, Inc., 204 S.W.3d 1 , 6 n. 3 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2006, pet. denied) (“Before trial court error can be found in the failure to set a hearing on a motion to reinstate, the movant must request a hearing.”); Johnson v. Sepulveda, 178 S.W.3d 117, 119 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.]

2022See Ex parte Broadway, 301 S.W.3d 694, 699 (Tex. Crim.

2016The clerk’s record contains no documents establishing a bargained-for waiver, and the documents filed in this appeal do not support an oral waiver after appellant was sentenced on October 30, 2015.1 See Ex parte Broadway, 301 S.W.3d 694 , 697–99 (Tex. Crim.