oral instruction in Connecticut

2018In resolving this claim, we note that "[r]eviewing courts are especially hesitant in reversing a conviction on the basis of an inaccuracy in a trial court's oral instruction if the jury was provided with accurate written instructions." *195 State v. Holley , 174 Conn. App. 488 , 497, 167 A.3d 1000 (2017), cert. denied, 327 Conn. 907 , 170 A.3d 3 (2017), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 138 S.Ct. 1012 , 200 L.Ed.2d 275 (2018).

2018In resolving this claim, we note that "[r]eviewing courts are especially hesitant in reversing a conviction on the basis of an inaccuracy in a trial court's oral instruction if the jury was provided with accurate written instructions." *195 State v. Holley , 174 Conn. App. 488 , 497, 167 A.3d 1000 (2017), cert. denied, 327 Conn. 907 , 170 A.3d 3 (2017), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 138 S.Ct. 1012 , 200 L.Ed.2d 275 (2018).

2018In resolving this claim, we note that ‘‘[r]eviewing courts are especially hesitant in reversing a conviction on the basis of an inaccuracy in a trial court’s oral instruction if the jury was provided with accurate written instructions.’’ State v. Holley, 174 Conn. App. 488, 497 , 167 A.3d 1000 (2017), cert. denied, 327 Conn. 907 , 170 A.3d 3 (2017), cert. denied, U.S. , 138 S. Ct. 1012 , 200 L.

2018In resolving this claim, we note that "[r]eviewing courts are especially hesitant in reversing a conviction on the basis of an inaccuracy in a trial court's oral instruction if the jury was provided with accurate written instructions." *195 State v. Holley , 174 Conn. App. 488 , 497, 167 A.3d 1000 (2017), cert. denied, 327 Conn. 907 , 170 A.3d 3 (2017), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 138 S.Ct. 1012 , 200 L.Ed.2d 275 (2018).

2018In resolving this claim, we note that ‘‘[r]eviewing courts are especially hesitant in reversing a conviction on the basis of an inaccuracy in a trial court’s oral instruction if the jury was provided with accurate written instructions.’’ State v. Holley, 174 Conn. App. 488, 497 , 167 A.3d 1000 (2017), cert. denied, 327 Conn. 907 , 170 A.3d 3 (2017), cert. denied, U.S. , 138 S. Ct. 1012 , 200 L.

2018In resolving this claim, we note that "[r]eviewing courts are especially hesitant in reversing a conviction on the basis of an inaccuracy in a trial court's oral instruction if the jury was provided with accurate written instructions." *195 State v. Holley , 174 Conn. App. 488 , 497, 167 A.3d 1000 (2017), cert. denied, 327 Conn. 907 , 170 A.3d 3 (2017), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 138 S.Ct. 1012 , 200 L.Ed.2d 275 (2018).

2018In resolving this claim, we note that ‘‘[r]eviewing courts are especially hesitant in reversing a conviction on the basis of an inaccuracy in a trial court’s oral instruction if the jury was provided with accurate written instructions.’’ State v. Holley, 174 Conn. App. 488, 497 , 167 A.3d 1000 (2017), cert. denied, 327 Conn. 907 , 170 A.3d 3 (2017), cert. denied, U.S. , 138 S. Ct. 1012 , 200 L.

2018In resolving this claim, we note that "[r]eviewing courts are especially hesitant in reversing a conviction on the basis of an inaccuracy in a trial court's oral instruction if the jury was provided with accurate written instructions." *195 State v. Holley , 174 Conn. App. 488 , 497, 167 A.3d 1000 (2017), cert. denied, 327 Conn. 907 , 170 A.3d 3 (2017), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 138 S.Ct. 1012 , 200 L.Ed.2d 275 (2018).

2017See, e.g., State v. Warren, 118 Conn.App. 456 , 464, 984 A.2d 81 (2009) (no constitutional violation where trial court's oral charge suggested written instructions should be used "only ... as a guide" because "the [ written ] copy of the charge itself correctly guided the jury by stating ... that the jury was obligated to accept the law as provided by the court" [emphasis added] ), cert. denied, 294 Conn. 933 , 987 A.2d 1029 (2010) ; United States v. Rodriguez, 651 Fed.Appx. 44 , 48 (2d Cir. 2016) ("In this case, there is no indication that the jurors were confused by the court's misreading of

2016He later noted in the memorandum of decision that "because of the abundance of evidence that the restraint was far more than incidental," an appeal based on State v. Salamon , supra, 287 Conn. 509 , 949 A.2d 1092 , would not have succeeded.

2016He later noted in the memorandum of decision that "because of the abundance of evidence that the restraint was far more than incidental," an appeal based on State v. Salamon , supra, 287 Conn. 509 , 949 A.2d 1092 , would not have succeeded.

2013This evidence does not qualify Lucas’ actions as ministerial because, to the extent that any standards or directives existed in this case, Lucas still was required to use his judgment in their execution, and “[determinations as to what is reasonable or proper under a particular set of circumstances necessarily involve the exercise of judgment and are, therefore, discretionary in nature.” Segreto v. Bristol, 71 Conn. App. 844, 857 , 804 A.2d 928 , cert. denied, 261 Conn. 941 , 808 A.2d 1132 (2002).

2013This evidence does not qualify Lucas’ actions as ministerial because, to the extent that any standards or directives existed in this case, Lucas still was required to use his judgment in their execution, and “[determinations as to what is reasonable or proper under a particular set of circumstances necessarily involve the exercise of judgment and are, therefore, discretionary in nature.” Segreto v. Bristol, 71 Conn. App. 844, 857 , 804 A.2d 928 , cert. denied, 261 Conn. 941 , 808 A.2d 1132 (2002).

2013This evidence does not qualify Lucas’ actions as ministerial because, to the extent that any standards or directives existed in this case, Lucas still was required to use his judgment in their execution, and “[determinations as to what is reasonable or proper under a particular set of circumstances necessarily involve the exercise of judgment and are, therefore, discretionary in nature.” Segreto v. Bristol, 71 Conn. App. 844, 857 , 804 A.2d 928 , cert. denied, 261 Conn. 941 , 808 A.2d 1132 (2002).

2013This evidence does not qualify Lucas’ actions as ministerial because, to the extent that any standards or directives existed in this case, Lucas still was required to use his judgment in their execution, and “[determinations as to what is reasonable or proper under a particular set of circumstances necessarily involve the exercise of judgment and are, therefore, discretionary in nature.” Segreto v. Bristol, 71 Conn. App. 844, 857 , 804 A.2d 928 , cert. denied, 261 Conn. 941 , 808 A.2d 1132 (2002).

2012Unisys Corp. v. Dept. of Labor, supra, at 691, 600 A.2d 1019 .

2012The court held that standing was appropriate in Spiniello Construction Co. v. Manchester, 189 Conn. 539, 545 , 456 A.2d 1199 (1983), for example, because the defendant allegedly had accepted an irregular bid based on an oral rule addendum communicated only to one bidder, precluding other bidders from competing on equal terms.

2012The court held that standing was appropriate in Spiniello Construction Co. v. Manchester, 189 Conn. 539, 545 , 456 A.2d 1199 (1983), for example, because the defendant allegedly had accepted an irregular bid based on an oral rule addendum communicated only to one bidder, precluding other bidders from competing on equal terms.

2008First, the dissent decides this case on a legal theory that never has been advanced by the plaintiff, namely, that this court should overrule our holding in Gadbois v. Planning Commission, supra, 257 Conn. at 604 , 778 A.2d 896 .

2008First, the dissent decides this case on a legal theory that never has been advanced by the plaintiff, namely, that this court should overrule our holding in Gadbois v. Planning Commission, supra, 257 Conn. at 604 , 778 A.2d 896 .

2007If a protest is filed, the commissioner shall reconsider the proposed disallowance and, if the claimant has so requested, may grant or deny the claimant or the claimant’s authorized representatives an oral hearing. “(C) The commissioner shall mail notice of his determination to the claimant, which notice shall set forth briefly the commissioner’s findings of fact and the basis of decision in each case decided in whole or in part adversely to the claimant. “(D) The action of the commissioner on the claimant’s protest shall be final upon the expiration of one month from the date on which he mail

2007If a protest is filed, the commissioner shall reconsider the proposed disallowance and, if the claimant has so requested, may grant or deny the claimant or the claimant’s authorized representatives an oral hearing. “(C) The commissioner shall mail notice of his determination to the claimant, which notice shall set forth briefly the commissioner’s findings of fact and the basis of decision in each case decided in whole or in part adversely to the claimant. “(D) The action of the commissioner on the claimant’s protest shall be final upon the expiration of one month from the date on which he mail

2007With respect to classical aggrievement, the defendant contended that, because the subject matter in the appeal was the original transaction and the plaintiff was neither the retailer of the motor vehicle nor otherwise a party thereto, it did not have the requisite “specific personal and legal interest in the subject matter . . . .” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Edgewood Village, Inc. v. Housing Authority, 265 Conn. 280, 288 , 828 A.2d 52 (2003), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1180 , 124 S. Ct. 1416 , 158 L.

2007With respect to classical aggrievement, the defendant contended that, because the subject matter in the appeal was the original transaction and the plaintiff was neither the retailer of the motor vehicle nor otherwise a party thereto, it did not have the requisite “specific personal and legal interest in the subject matter . . . .” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Edgewood Village, Inc. v. Housing Authority, 265 Conn. 280, 288 , 828 A.2d 52 (2003), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1180 , 124 S. Ct. 1416 , 158 L.

2007With respect to classical aggrievement, the defendant contended that, because the subject matter in the appeal was the original transaction and the plaintiff was neither the retailer of the motor vehicle nor otherwise a party thereto, it did not have the requisite “specific personal and legal interest in the subject matter . . . .” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Edgewood Village, Inc. v. Housing Authority, 265 Conn. 280, 288 , 828 A.2d 52 (2003), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1180 , 124 S. Ct. 1416 , 158 L.

2007With respect to classical aggrievement, the defendant contended that, because the subject matter in the appeal was the original transaction and the plaintiff was neither the retailer of the motor vehicle nor otherwise a party thereto, it did not have the requisite “specific personal and legal interest in the subject matter . . . .” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Edgewood Village, Inc. v. Housing Authority, 265 Conn. 280, 288 , 828 A.2d 52 (2003), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1180 , 124 S. Ct. 1416 , 158 L.

2007With respect to classical aggrievement, the defendant contended that, because the subject matter in the appeal was the original transaction and the plaintiff was neither the retailer of the motor vehicle nor otherwise a party thereto, it did not have the requisite “specific personal and legal interest in the subject matter . . . .” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Edgewood Village, Inc. v. Housing Authority, 265 Conn. 280, 288 , 828 A.2d 52 (2003), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1180 , 124 S. Ct. 1416 , 158 L.

2006See, e.g., State v. Whitaker, 215 Conn. 739, 756 , 578 A.2d 1031 (1990); State v. Kuskowski, 200 Conn. 82, 86-88 , 510 A.2d 172 (1986).

2006See, e.g., State v. Whitaker, 215 Conn. 739, 756 , 578 A.2d 1031 (1990); State v. Kuskowski, 200 Conn. 82, 86-88 , 510 A.2d 172 (1986).

1996See State v. Whitaker, supra, 215 Conn. 756 ; State v. Bartee, 167 Conn. 309, 313 , 355 A.2d 250 (1974) (defendant’s oral statement given to police officer at hospital bedside was admissible after defendant, according to officer’s testimony, had orally waived rights).

1996See State v. Whitaker, supra, 215 Conn. 756 ; State v. Bartee, 167 Conn. 309, 313 , 355 A.2d 250 (1974) (defendant’s oral statement given to police officer at hospital bedside was admissible after defendant, according to officer’s testimony, had orally waived rights).

1954Chapin v. Popilowski, 139 Conn. 84 , 87 .