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34 Florida opinions name it 2 courts 1883–2026 4 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Florida courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Tucker v. Stategreen2 sentences2026Tucker challenged the sufficiency of an oral waiver because Rule 3.260 provides that “[a] defendant may in writing waive a jury trial with the consent of the state.” Id. 2018See Tucker v. State, 559 So. 2d 218, 219-20 (Fla. 1990) (approving district court’s opinion affirming the defendant’s conviction after an oral waiver of the jury trial right because it was made knowingly and intelligently, and “[t]echnical noncompliance with a rule of procedure is permissible if there is no harm to the defendant”). 3 specifies that the right of trial by jury shall be secure to all and remain inviolate. | 3 | 8 |
Sansom v. Stategreen2 sentences2025“Although a defendant’s oral waiver may suffice, it must follow a colloquy in which the court establishes that the waiver is knowingly and intelligently made.” Sansom v. State, 642 So. 2d 631, 632 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994). 2025“Although a defendant’s oral waiver may suffice, it must follow a colloquy in which the court establishes that the waiver is knowingly and intelligently made.” Sansom v. State, 642 So. 2d 631, 632 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994). | 2 | 2 |
Bradley v. Sanchezgreen2 sentences2019See Bradley v. Sanchez, 943 So. 2d 218, 222 (Fla. 3d DCA 2006) (finding a contract provision that provided “[m]odifications of this Contract will not be binding unless in writing, signed and delivered by the party to be bound” was language that prevented an oral waiver or modification to the written contract). 2013I would instead exercise jurisdiction based on conflict with Bradley v. Sanchez, 943 So.2d 218, 222 (Fla. 3d DCA 2006), which held that an oral waiver regarding the timely performance of a contract requirement was invalid because “the statute of frauds prohibits the oral modification of a contract for the sale of land under the doctrine of promissory estoppel.” On the merits, I agree with the analysis employed by the Fourth District Court. | 2 | 2 |
Johnson v. Stategreen2 sentences2009Johnson v. State, 994 So.2d 960 (Fla.2008); Smith v. State, 9 So.3d 702, 704 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009) (“A valid waiver of a criminal defendant’s right to a jury trial requires either a written waiver signed by the defendant or the defendant’s oral waiver after a proper colloquy with the trial judge.”). 2009Johnson v. State, 994 So.2d 960, 963 (Fla.2008). | 2 | 2 |
RM v. Stategreen2 sentences1997R.M. v. State, 664 So.2d 42, 43 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995.) Neither does it appear that Appellant ever executed a written waiver of his right to be represented by an attorney and his consent to be represented by a certified legal intern. 1996R.M. v. State, 664 So.2d 42, 48 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995.) Neither does it appear that Appellant ever executed a written waiver of his right to be represented by an attorney and his consent to be represented by a certified legal intern. | 2 | 2 |
Michael Stevens Owens v. Asa D. Kelley, Jr., Etc.green2 sentences1996Owens v. Kelley, 681 F.2d 1362, 1365-66 (11th Cir.1982) (holding that a probation condition requiring a defendant to participate in an oral instruction component of an "Emotional Maturity Instruction" program, which the defendant claims contains religious components, precludes summary judgment on First Amendment issues). 1996Owens v. Kelley, 681 F.2d 1362, 1365-66 (11th Cir.1982) (holding that a probation condition requiring a defendant to participate in an oral instruction component of an “Emotional Maturity Instruction” program, which the defendant claims contains religious components, precludes summary judgment on First Amendment issues). | 2 | 2 |
Sinkfield v. Stategreen2 sentences2026There, the defendant there orally waived his right to a jury trial, but the record showed no appropriate colloquy or inquiry into the defendant’s oral waiver to ensure that such waiver was “‘voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently made.’” Id. (quoting Sinkfield v. State, 681 So. 2d 838, 838 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996)). 2000See Tucker v. State, 559 So.2d 218 (Fla.1990); Hyler v. State, 732 So.2d 1208 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999); Sinkfield v. State, 681 So.2d 838 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996). | 1 | 2 |
Henley v. MacDonaldgreen1 sentence2019See Henley v. MacDonald, 971 So. 2d 998, 1001 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008) (concluding that the language of a similar provision precluded an oral waiver or modification of the closing date). | 1 | 1 |
Valentine v. Stategreen1 sentence2013See Stone v. State, 899 So.2d 421, 422 (Fla. 5th DCA 2005) (improper oral instruction on the elements of burglary constituted fundamental error even though a correct written copy of the instructions was furnished to the jury); Valentine v. State, 774 So.2d 934, 936-37 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001) (holding that it cannot be assumed that the jury disregarded the erroneous oral instruction even though correct written instructions were given to the jury) (per Griffin, J., with one judge concurring in result only). | 1 | 1 |
Stone v. Stategreen1 sentence2013See Stone v. State, 899 So.2d 421, 422 (Fla. 5th DCA 2005) (improper oral instruction on the elements of burglary constituted fundamental error even though a correct written copy of the instructions was furnished to the jury); Valentine v. State, 774 So.2d 934, 936-37 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001) (holding that it cannot be assumed that the jury disregarded the erroneous oral instruction even though correct written instructions were given to the jury) (per Griffin, J., with one judge concurring in result only). | 1 | 1 |
Racine v. Stategreen1 sentence2010“For a waiver of the right to jury trial to be valid, a waiver form must be signed by the defendant or the defendant must orally waive that right after a proper colloquy with the trial court.” Racine v. State, 16 So.3d 955, 956 (Fla. 5th DCA 2009). | 1 | 1 |
Smith v. Stategreen1 sentence2009Johnson v. State, 994 So.2d 960 (Fla.2008); Smith v. State, 9 So.3d 702, 704 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009) (“A valid waiver of a criminal defendant’s right to a jury trial requires either a written waiver signed by the defendant or the defendant’s oral waiver after a proper colloquy with the trial judge.”). | 1 | 1 |
Lawrence v. Stategreen1 sentence2001More significantly, the oral instruction, as well as the written one in those cases, did not require the jury to find the defendant intended to commit a specific crime, as did the instruction in this case; i.e., "intent to commit the offense of burglary with an assault or battery in that conveyance. " See Lawrence v. State, 746 So.2d 1252 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999) ("at the time of entering or remaining in the structure [Defendant] had a fully-formed conscious intent to commit the offense of a burglary of a structure"); Harrison v. State, 743 So.2d 178 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999) (jury instructed it had to fi | 1 | 1 |
| Eli M. Spark v. The Catholic University of Americagreen | 1 | 1 |
| Francis A. Kibort v. Robert E. Hamptongreen | 1 | 1 |
| In re motion of Frankgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Florida. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Goley v. State
green
2 sentences2012Id. 2012Id. | 1 | 2012–2012 |
Otis v. State
green
1 sentence2008We acknowledge that in Zeigler v. State, 647 So.2d 292 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994), and Otis v. State, 444 So.2d 1177 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984), we held that the defendant's oral waiver of the right to jury trial was invalid where the trial court conducted a colloquy substantially similar to the colloquy conducted by the trial court in the instant case. | 1 | 2008–2008 |
Zeigler v. State
neutral
1 sentence2008We acknowledge that in Zeigler v. State, 647 So.2d 292 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994), and Otis v. State, 444 So.2d 1177 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984), we held that the defendant's oral waiver of the right to jury trial was invalid where the trial court conducted a colloquy substantially similar to the colloquy conducted by the trial court in the instant case. | 1 | 2008–2008 |
State v. Upton
green
1 sentence2008This Court has required that either a written waiver, which is signed by the defendant (not merely defense counsel), pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.260, see Upton, 658 So.2d at 87 , or an oral waiver, which is preceded by a proper colloquy during which the trial judge focuses on the value of a jury trial and provides a full explanation of the consequences of a waiver, see Tucker, 559 So.2d at 220 , is necessary to constitute a sufficient waiver. | 1 | 2008–2008 |
Viveros v. State
green
2 sentences2001More significantly, the oral instruction, as well as the written one in those cases, did not require the jury to find the defendant intended to commit a specific crime, as did the instruction in this case; i.e., "intent to commit the offense of burglary with an assault or battery in that conveyance. " See Lawrence v. State, 746 So.2d 1252 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999) ("at the time of entering or remaining in the structure [Defendant] had a fully-formed conscious intent to commit the offense of a burglary of a structure"); Harrison v. State, 743 So.2d 178 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999) (jury instructed it had to fi 2001NOTES [1] See also Harrison v. State, 743 So.2d 178 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999) (finding in burglary prosecution that it was fundamental error to instruct jury that offense of burglary required "fully formed conscious intent to commit the offense of burglary in [the] structure"); Davis v. State, 736 So.2d 27 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999) (finding in attempted burglary prosecution that it was error to instruct jury that at time of entering or remaining in structure, defendant had "fully informed [sic] conscious intent to commit the offense of burglary in that structure"); Viveros v. State, 699 So.2d 822 (Fla. 4th | 1 | 2001–2001 |
Davis v. State
green
2 sentences2001More significantly, the oral instruction, as well as the written one in those cases, did not require the jury to find the defendant intended to commit a specific crime, as did the instruction in this case; i.e., "intent to commit the offense of burglary with an assault or battery in that conveyance. " See Lawrence v. State, 746 So.2d 1252 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999) ("at the time of entering or remaining in the structure [Defendant] had a fully-formed conscious intent to commit the offense of a burglary of a structure"); Harrison v. State, 743 So.2d 178 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999) (jury instructed it had to fi 2001NOTES [1] See also Harrison v. State, 743 So.2d 178 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999) (finding in burglary prosecution that it was fundamental error to instruct jury that offense of burglary required "fully formed conscious intent to commit the offense of burglary in [the] structure"); Davis v. State, 736 So.2d 27 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999) (finding in attempted burglary prosecution that it was error to instruct jury that at time of entering or remaining in structure, defendant had "fully informed [sic] conscious intent to commit the offense of burglary in that structure"); Viveros v. State, 699 So.2d 822 (Fla. 4th | 1 | 2001–2001 |
Harrison v. State
green
2 sentences2001More significantly, the oral instruction, as well as the written one in those cases, did not require the jury to find the defendant intended to commit a specific crime, as did the instruction in this case; i.e., "intent to commit the offense of burglary with an assault or battery in that conveyance. " See Lawrence v. State, 746 So.2d 1252 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999) ("at the time of entering or remaining in the structure [Defendant] had a fully-formed conscious intent to commit the offense of a burglary of a structure"); Harrison v. State, 743 So.2d 178 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999) (jury instructed it had to fi 2001NOTES [1] See also Harrison v. State, 743 So.2d 178 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999) (finding in burglary prosecution that it was fundamental error to instruct jury that offense of burglary required "fully formed conscious intent to commit the offense of burglary in [the] structure"); Davis v. State, 736 So.2d 27 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999) (finding in attempted burglary prosecution that it was error to instruct jury that at time of entering or remaining in structure, defendant had "fully informed [sic] conscious intent to commit the offense of burglary in that structure"); Viveros v. State, 699 So.2d 822 (Fla. 4th | 1 | 2001–2001 |
Hyler v. State
green
1 sentence2000See Tucker v. State, 559 So.2d 218 (Fla.1990); Hyler v. State, 732 So.2d 1208 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999); Sinkfield v. State, 681 So.2d 838 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996). | 1 | 2000–2000 |
Turco v. Leon
green
1 sentence1991All Bank analogizes this situation to the one in Turco v. Leon, 559 So.2d 1199 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990), rev. denied, 574 So.2d 141 (Fla.1990), where it was held to be error to admit into evidence a copy of the “careless driving” statute and to permit the jury to read the statute during its deliberations. | 1 | 1991–1991 |
Kolovrat v. State
green
1 sentence1991We are called upon to determine whether the violation meets the willful and substantial test of Kolovrat v. State, 574 So.2d 294 (Fla. 5th DCA 1991), and whether Goley violated his probation in any material respect so as to support revocation under section 948.06, Florida Statutes (1989). | 1 | 1991–1991 |
Dumas v. State
green
1 sentence1989Moreover, in Dumas v. State, 439 So.2d 246 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983), rev. denied, 462 So.2d 1105 (Fla. 1985), the third district upheld an oral waiver, and also did so in Smith v. State, 539 So.2d 601 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989). | 1 | 1989–1989 |
Smith v. State
green
1 sentence1989Moreover, in Dumas v. State, 439 So.2d 246 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983), rev. denied, 462 So.2d 1105 (Fla. 1985), the third district upheld an oral waiver, and also did so in Smith v. State, 539 So.2d 601 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989). | 1 | 1989–1989 |
Dumas v. State
green
1 sentence1989Moreover, in Dumas v. State, 439 So.2d 246 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983), rev. denied, 462 So.2d 1105 (Fla. 1985), the third district upheld an oral waiver, and also did so in Smith v. State, 539 So.2d 601 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989). | 1 | 1989–1989 |
United States v. John Henry Harris
green
1 sentence1988It is an a fortiori proposition that an oral inquiry, which is much less intrusive than an invasion of the offender's person, was thoroughly justified. [5] As the court said in United States v. Harris, 528 F.2d 914 (4th Cir.1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1075 , 96 S.Ct. 860 , 47 L.Ed.2d 86 (1976), [I]t is undisputed that the agents could have walked directly up to Harris, detained him, and frisked him. | 1 | 1988–1988 |
Quillen v. United States
neutral
1 sentence1988It is an a fortiori proposition that an oral inquiry, which is much less intrusive than an invasion of the offender's person, was thoroughly justified. [5] As the court said in United States v. Harris, 528 F.2d 914 (4th Cir.1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1075 , 96 S.Ct. 860 , 47 L.Ed.2d 86 (1976), [I]t is undisputed that the agents could have walked directly up to Harris, detained him, and frisked him. | 1 | 1988–1988 |
Harris v. United States
green
1 sentence1988It is an a fortiori proposition that an oral inquiry, which is much less intrusive than an invasion of the offender's person, was thoroughly justified. [5] As the court said in United States v. Harris, 528 F.2d 914 (4th Cir.1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1075 , 96 S.Ct. 860 , 47 L.Ed.2d 86 (1976), [I]t is undisputed that the agents could have walked directly up to Harris, detained him, and frisked him. | 1 | 1988–1988 |
Craft v. Louisiana
green
1 sentence1988It is an a fortiori proposition that an oral inquiry, which is much less intrusive than an invasion of the offender's person, was thoroughly justified. [5] As the court said in United States v. Harris, 528 F.2d 914 (4th Cir.1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1075 , 96 S.Ct. 860 , 47 L.Ed.2d 86 (1976), [I]t is undisputed that the agents could have walked directly up to Harris, detained him, and frisked him. | 1 | 1988–1988 |
| Edwards v. Arizona green | 1 | 1985–1985 |
| Johnson v. Zerbst green | 1 | 1985–1985 |
| Bennett v. State green | 1 | 1983–1983 |
| Jones v. State green | 1 | 1977–1977 |
| United States v. Maynard Francis Hayes green | 1 | 1976–1976 |
| Warren v. Waterville Urban Renewal Authority green | 1 | 1976–1976 |
| Leonard v. Susco Car Rental System of Florida green | 1 | 1972–1972 |
| Sands v. . Hughes green | 1 | 1883–1883 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.