oral hearing in Georgia

2019See also Kelley , 256 Ga. at 623 , 351 S.E.2d 443 (trial court has power to order hearing on its own motion); Landsberg , 278 Ga. App. at 15 , 627 S.E.2d 922 (plaintiff's failure to file a response to defendant's motion for summary judgment did not waive plaintiff's right to an oral hearing: "[N]otwithstanding USCR 6.2's 30-day requirement, OCGA § 9-11-56 (c) entitled [plaintiff] to file opposing affidavits until the day before the hearing [-] even if held more than 30 days after service of the motion").

2019See also Kelley , 256 Ga. at 623 , 351 S.E.2d 443 (trial court has power to order hearing on its own motion); Landsberg , 278 Ga. App. at 15 , 627 S.E.2d 922 (plaintiff's failure to file a response to defendant's motion for summary judgment did not waive plaintiff's right to an oral hearing: "[N]otwithstanding USCR 6.2's 30-day requirement, OCGA § 9-11-56 (c) entitled [plaintiff] to file opposing affidavits until the day before the hearing [-] even if held more than 30 days after service of the motion").

2024As we have explained, “[a] hearing is required in order to enter an award of attorney fees . . . . because an oral hearing gives the party opposing attorney fees an 13 opportunity to confront and challenge testimony with regard to the need for, and value of, legal services.” Evers v. Evers, 277 Ga. 132, 132 (1) (587 SE2d 22) (2003) (emphasis supplied).

2024As we have explained, “[a] hearing is required in order to enter an award of attorney fees . . . . because an oral hearing gives the party opposing attorney fees an 13 opportunity to confront and challenge testimony with regard to the need for, and value of, legal services.” Evers v. Evers, 277 Ga. 132, 132 (1) (587 SE2d 22) (2003) (emphasis supplied).

2024“Uniform Superior Court Rule 6.3 requires, unless otherwise ordered by the court, that a motion for new trial in a civil action shall be decided by the trial court only after an oral hearing, even if the moving party does not request such a hearing.” (Punctuation omitted; emphasis supplied.) Triola v. Triola, 292 Ga. 808, 808 ( 741 SE2d 650 ) (2013). “[I]f the trial court denies a motion for new trial in a civil case without issuing an order excepting the motion from this procedural requirement, and without holding the mandatory hearing, the error will not be deemed harmless on appeal; instead

2024“Uniform Superior Court Rule 6.3 requires, unless otherwise ordered by the court, that a motion for new trial in a civil action shall be decided by the trial court only after an oral hearing, even if the moving party does not request such a hearing.” (Punctuation omitted; emphasis supplied.) Triola v. Triola, 292 Ga. 808, 808 ( 741 SE2d 650 ) (2013). “[I]f the trial court denies a motion for new trial in a civil case without issuing an order excepting the motion from this procedural requirement, and without holding the mandatory hearing, the error will not be deemed harmless on appeal; instead

2017See Mitchell v. 3280 Peachtree 1, LLC, 285 Ga. 576, 576 (1) ( 678 SE2d 880 ) (2009) (affirming the trial court’s grant of a motion to dismiss when it did not hold an oral hearing on the motion because the appellant was given “ample notice and opportunity to respond” to the motion such that his due process rights were not violated); Grant v. Kooby, 310 Ga. App. 483, 486 ( 713 SE2d 685 ) (2011) (holding that a hearing on a motion to dismiss an appeal is not required if the parties are given an opportunity to respond on the record); Lemmons v. Newton, 269 Ga. App. 880, 882 ( 605 SE2d 626 ) (2004)

2017See Mitchell v. 3280 Peachtree 1, LLC, 285 Ga. 576, 576 (1) ( 678 SE2d 880 ) (2009) (affirming the trial court’s grant of a motion to dismiss when it did not hold an oral hearing on the motion because the appellant was given “ample notice and opportunity to respond” to the motion such that his due process rights were not violated); Grant v. Kooby, 310 Ga. App. 483, 486 ( 713 SE2d 685 ) (2011) (holding that a hearing on a motion to dismiss an appeal is not required if the parties are given an opportunity to respond on the record); Lemmons v. Newton, 269 Ga. App. 880, 882 ( 605 SE2d 626 ) (2004)

2014Comm., 287 Ga. 876, 877 (1) ( 700 SE2d 554 ) (2010) (“[Georgia’s] appellate courts have consistently held that once a party has filed a [timely] written request for oral argument of a summary judgment motion [pursuant to Uniform Superior Court Rule 6.3], the trial court is obligated to hold an oral hearing and the failure to do so cannot be harmless.”) (citations omitted); Kelley v. First Franklin Financial Corp., 256 Ga. 622, 623 ( 351 SE2d 443 ) (1987) (“[Uniform Superior Court] Rule 6.3 insures a right to oral argument of a summary judgment motion by declaring it shall be permitted upon wri

2014Comm., 287 Ga. 876, 877 (1) ( 700 SE2d 554 ) (2010) (“[Georgia’s] appellate courts have consistently held that once a party has filed a [timely] written request for oral argument of a summary judgment motion [pursuant to Uniform Superior Court Rule 6.3], the trial court is obligated to hold an oral hearing and the failure to do so cannot be harmless.”) (citations omitted); Kelley v. First Franklin Financial Corp., 256 Ga. 622, 623 ( 351 SE2d 443 ) (1987) (“[Uniform Superior Court] Rule 6.3 insures a right to oral argument of a summary judgment motion by declaring it shall be permitted upon wri

2013In Balbosa, supra, the State’s only evidence of waiver was an oral waiver by counsel in appellant’s presence. 275 Ga. at 575 (1).

2013In Balbosa, supra, the State’s only evidence of waiver was an oral waiver by counsel in appellant’s presence. 275 Ga. at 575 (1).

2010In Body of Christ Overcoming Church of God, Inc. v. Brinson, 285 Ga. 613 ( 680 SE2d 856 ) (2009), we reversed the trial court’s grant of summary judgment to Brinson because the court failed to hold an oral hearing, as requested by the Church, before ruling on Brinson’s motion.

2010In Body of Christ Overcoming Church of God, Inc. v. Brinson, 285 Ga. 613 ( 680 SE2d 856 ) (2009), we reversed the trial court’s grant of summary judgment to Brinson because the court failed to hold an oral hearing, as requested by the Church, before ruling on Brinson’s motion.

1989Ga. Prac. & Proc., supra. "`A respondent is "heard" when he files a response, since "hearing" does not necessitate an oral hearing but "contemplates notice to the respondent that the matter will be heard and taken under advisement as of a certain day. . . ."'" Tandy, supra; Jacobsen, supra at 382-383 .

1989Ga. Prac. & Proc., supra. “ ‘A respondent is “heard” when he files a response, since “hearing” does not necessitate an oral hearing but “contemplates notice to the respondent that the matter will be heard and taken under advisement as of a certain day. . . .” ’ ” Tandy, supra; Jacobsen, supra at 382-383 .

2019See also Kelley , 256 Ga. at 623 , 351 S.E.2d 443 (trial court has power to order hearing on its own motion); Landsberg , 278 Ga. App. at 15 , 627 S.E.2d 922 (plaintiff's failure to file a response to defendant's motion for summary judgment did not waive plaintiff's right to an oral hearing: "[N]otwithstanding USCR 6.2's 30-day requirement, OCGA § 9-11-56 (c) entitled [plaintiff] to file opposing affidavits until the day before the hearing [-] even if held more than 30 days after service of the motion").

2019See also Kelley , 256 Ga. at 623 , 351 S.E.2d 443 (trial court has power to order hearing on its own motion); Landsberg , 278 Ga. App. at 15 , 627 S.E.2d 922 (plaintiff's failure to file a response to defendant's motion for summary judgment did not waive plaintiff's right to an oral hearing: "[N]otwithstanding USCR 6.2's 30-day requirement, OCGA § 9-11-56 (c) entitled [plaintiff] to file opposing affidavits until the day before the hearing [-] even if held more than 30 days after service of the motion").

1986Appellant contends that Citizens' motion for summary judgment should not have been granted because an oral hearing was not held and no 30-day notice of hearing was given, citing OCGA § 9-11-56 and Ferguson v. Miller, 160 Ga. App. 436 ( 287 SE2d 363 ) (1981).

1986Appellant contends that Citizens' motion for summary judgment should not have been granted because an oral hearing was not held and no 30-day notice of hearing was given, citing OCGA § 9-11-56 and Ferguson v. Miller, 160 Ga. App. 436 ( 287 SE2d 363 ) (1981).

2024More recently, our Supreme Court held, “Uniform Superior Court Rule 6.3 requires a trial court to hold an oral hearing on all motions for new trial in civil cases, unless otherwise specifically ordered by the court.” Brown v. Brown, 294 Ga. 475, 476 ( 754 SE2d 362 ) (2014) (footnote 2 omitted).

2024More recently, our Supreme Court held, “Uniform Superior Court Rule 6.3 requires a trial court to hold an oral hearing on all motions for new trial in civil cases, unless otherwise specifically ordered by the court.” Brown v. Brown, 294 Ga. 475, 476 ( 754 SE2d 362 ) (2014) (footnote 2 omitted).

2023See Jones, 302 Ga. at 897-898 (3) (any error in particular instruction was harmless within context of jury charge as a whole and in light of “very strong” evidence of defendant’s guilt).

2023See Jones, 302 Ga. at 897-898 (3) (any error in particular instruction was harmless within context of jury charge as a whole and in light of “very strong” evidence of defendant’s guilt).

2018See Crist , 341 Ga.App. at 416 , 801 S.E.2d at 548-549 (even though a trial court's oral instruction omitted the elements of sexual battery, the written charge was correct in light of the indictment, which required proof of a child's lack of consent, as well as the remainder of the charge); King v. State , 346 Ga. App. 362 (3), 816 S.E.2d 390 (2018) (even though a trial court's oral instruction stated that a child was "unable to consent" to intercourse, a reinstruction and the remainder of the charge properly "required the State to prove lack of consent and made no mention of an underage victi

2018See Crist , 341 Ga.App. at 416 , 801 S.E.2d at 548-549 (even though a trial court's oral instruction omitted the elements of sexual battery, the written charge was correct in light of the indictment, which required proof of a child's lack of consent, as well as the remainder of the charge); King v. State , 346 Ga. App. 362 (3), 816 S.E.2d 390 (2018) (even though a trial court's oral instruction stated that a child was "unable to consent" to intercourse, a reinstruction and the remainder of the charge properly "required the State to prove lack of consent and made no mention of an underage victi

2017See Mitchell v. 3280 Peachtree 1, LLC, 285 Ga. 576, 576 (1) ( 678 SE2d 880 ) (2009) (affirming the trial court’s grant of a motion to dismiss when it did not hold an oral hearing on the motion because the appellant was given “ample notice and opportunity to respond” to the motion such that his due process rights were not violated); Grant v. Kooby, 310 Ga. App. 483, 486 ( 713 SE2d 685 ) (2011) (holding that a hearing on a motion to dismiss an appeal is not required if the parties are given an opportunity to respond on the record); Lemmons v. Newton, 269 Ga. App. 880, 882 ( 605 SE2d 626 ) (2004)

2017See Mitchell v. 3280 Peachtree 1, LLC, 285 Ga. 576, 576 (1) ( 678 SE2d 880 ) (2009) (affirming the trial court’s grant of a motion to dismiss when it did not hold an oral hearing on the motion because the appellant was given “ample notice and opportunity to respond” to the motion such that his due process rights were not violated); Grant v. Kooby, 310 Ga. App. 483, 486 ( 713 SE2d 685 ) (2011) (holding that a hearing on a motion to dismiss an appeal is not required if the parties are given an opportunity to respond on the record); Lemmons v. Newton, 269 Ga. App. 880, 882 ( 605 SE2d 626 ) (2004)

2017See Mitchell v. 3280 Peachtree 1, LLC, 285 Ga. 576, 576 (1) ( 678 SE2d 880 ) (2009) (affirming the trial court’s grant of a motion to dismiss when it did not hold an oral hearing on the motion because the appellant was given “ample notice and opportunity to respond” to the motion such that his due process rights were not violated); Grant v. Kooby, 310 Ga. App. 483, 486 ( 713 SE2d 685 ) (2011) (holding that a hearing on a motion to dismiss an appeal is not required if the parties are given an opportunity to respond on the record); Lemmons v. Newton, 269 Ga. App. 880, 882 ( 605 SE2d 626 ) (2004)

2017See Mitchell v. 3280 Peachtree 1, LLC, 285 Ga. 576, 576 (1) ( 678 SE2d 880 ) (2009) (affirming the trial court’s grant of a motion to dismiss when it did not hold an oral hearing on the motion because the appellant was given “ample notice and opportunity to respond” to the motion such that his due process rights were not violated); Grant v. Kooby, 310 Ga. App. 483, 486 ( 713 SE2d 685 ) (2011) (holding that a hearing on a motion to dismiss an appeal is not required if the parties are given an opportunity to respond on the record); Lemmons v. Newton, 269 Ga. App. 880, 882 ( 605 SE2d 626 ) (2004)

2015See generally Mitchell v. 3280 Peachtree 1, LLC, 285 Ga. 576 (1) ( 678 SE2d 880 ) (2009) (no reversible error in failing to hold oral hearing on motion to dismiss appeal where opposing party was given notice and opportunity to respond to the motion); Bell v. Waffle House, 331 Ga. App. 443, 446 ( 771 SE2d 132 ) (2015) (finding that appellant who received notice and opportunity to respond to request for attorney fees waived the right to a hearing by failing to request such a hearing in his written response and by raising only an issue that did not require a hearing); Jacobsen v. Muller, 181 Ga.

2015See generally Mitchell v. 3280 Peachtree 1, LLC, 285 Ga. 576 (1) ( 678 SE2d 880 ) (2009) (no reversible error in failing to hold oral hearing on motion to dismiss appeal where opposing party was given notice and opportunity to respond to the motion); Bell v. Waffle House, 331 Ga. App. 443, 446 ( 771 SE2d 132 ) (2015) (finding that appellant who received notice and opportunity to respond to request for attorney fees waived the right to a hearing by failing to request such a hearing in his written response and by raising only an issue that did not require a hearing); Jacobsen v. Muller, 181 Ga.

2015Here, Waffle House has demonstrated that it is entitled to reasonable attorney fees pursuant to this sub-section. 5 (Citation omitted; emphasis in original.) Evers v. Evers, 277 Ga. 132, 132 (1) ( 587 SE2d 22 ) (2003), citing Green v. McCart, 273 Ga. 862, 863 (1) ( 548 SE2d 303 ) (2001).

2015Here, Waffle House has demonstrated that it is entitled to reasonable attorney fees pursuant to this sub-section. 5 (Citation omitted; emphasis in original.) Evers v. Evers, 277 Ga. 132, 132 (1) ( 587 SE2d 22 ) (2003), citing Green v. McCart, 273 Ga. 862, 863 (1) ( 548 SE2d 303 ) (2001).

2014Nor has he cited any statutory provision automatically entitling him to an oral hearing on his exceptions. 4 See Fountain v. DeKalb County, 238 Ga. 14, 15 ( 231 SE2d 49 ) (1976) (holding that where issues of value remain pending before the trial court, review of rulings upon non-value issues is generally not authorized without a certificate of immediate review). 2 permanent injunction.” In his motion, Ennis reasserted his non-value exceptions and maintained he was entitled to an oral hearing thereon.

2014Nor has he cited any statutory provision automatically entitling him to an oral hearing on his exceptions. 4 See Fountain v. DeKalb County, 238 Ga. 14, 15 ( 231 SE2d 49 ) (1976) (holding that where issues of value remain pending before the trial court, review of rulings upon non-value issues is generally not authorized without a certificate of immediate review). 2 permanent injunction.” In his motion, Ennis reasserted his non-value exceptions and maintained he was entitled to an oral hearing thereon.

2014Ennis next challenged the January 4 order by filing on January 16, 2013 a “motion to set aside the order of condemnation and for an interlocutory and 2 See Styers v. Atlanta Gas Light Co., 263 Ga. 856, 858-860 (2) ( 439 SE2d 640 ) (1994) (distinguishing that the filing of exceptions to non-value issues passed on by the special master is the means by which judicial review of those issues may be had, whereas the filing of an appeal to the superior court is the means by which a jury trial on the issue of value may be had); Ga. Power Co. v. Stowers, 282 Ga. App. 695, 696 ( 639 SE2d 605 ) (2006) (s

2014Ennis next challenged the January 4 order by filing on January 16, 2013 a “motion to set aside the order of condemnation and for an interlocutory and 2 See Styers v. Atlanta Gas Light Co., 263 Ga. 856, 858-860 (2) ( 439 SE2d 640 ) (1994) (distinguishing that the filing of exceptions to non-value issues passed on by the special master is the means by which judicial review of those issues may be had, whereas the filing of an appeal to the superior court is the means by which a jury trial on the issue of value may be had); Ga. Power Co. v. Stowers, 282 Ga. App. 695, 696 ( 639 SE2d 605 ) (2006) (s

2014Ennis next challenged the January 4 order by filing on January 16, 2013 a “motion to set aside the order of condemnation and for an interlocutory and 2 See Styers v. Atlanta Gas Light Co., 263 Ga. 856, 858-860 (2) ( 439 SE2d 640 ) (1994) (distinguishing that the filing of exceptions to non-value issues passed on by the special master is the means by which judicial review of those issues may be had, whereas the filing of an appeal to the superior court is the means by which a jury trial on the issue of value may be had); Ga. Power Co. v. Stowers, 282 Ga. App. 695, 696 ( 639 SE2d 605 ) (2006) (s

2014Ennis next challenged the January 4 order by filing on January 16, 2013 a “motion to set aside the order of condemnation and for an interlocutory and 2 See Styers v. Atlanta Gas Light Co., 263 Ga. 856, 858-860 (2) ( 439 SE2d 640 ) (1994) (distinguishing that the filing of exceptions to non-value issues passed on by the special master is the means by which judicial review of those issues may be had, whereas the filing of an appeal to the superior court is the means by which a jury trial on the issue of value may be had); Ga. Power Co. v. Stowers, 282 Ga. App. 695, 696 ( 639 SE2d 605 ) (2006) (s

2014Under Georgia law, Harvey was therefore absolutely entitled to an oral hearing before 1 Green v. Raw Deal, 290 Ga. App. 464, 465-466 (1) ( 659 SE2d 856 ) (2008). the court ruled on the motion, as Freeman concedes.2 Moreover, we discern no basis for finding that any conduct of Harvey waived its right to a hearing.

2014Under Georgia law, Harvey was therefore absolutely entitled to an oral hearing before 1 Green v. Raw Deal, 290 Ga. App. 464, 465-466 (1) ( 659 SE2d 856 ) (2008). the court ruled on the motion, as Freeman concedes.2 Moreover, we discern no basis for finding that any conduct of Harvey waived its right to a hearing.

2013Bevington did not file a response to the summary judgment motion, nor did he request a hearing. “[U]nder Uniform Superior Court Rule 6.3, a trial court may decide a motion for summary judgment without an oral hearing in the absence of a written request for one by either party.”3 “In the absence of such a request, it was not error for the trial court to rule on the motion for summary judgment without a hearing.” 4 3 Rose v. Household Finance Corp. II, 316 Ga. App. 282, 286, n.3 ( 728 SE2d 879 ) (2012). 4 Aniebue v. Jaguar Credit Corp., 308 Ga. App. 1, 7 (3) ( 708 SE2d 4 ) (2011). 4 3.

2013Bevington did not file a response to the summary judgment motion, nor did he request a hearing. “[U]nder Uniform Superior Court Rule 6.3, a trial court may decide a motion for summary judgment without an oral hearing in the absence of a written request for one by either party.”3 “In the absence of such a request, it was not error for the trial court to rule on the motion for summary judgment without a hearing.” 4 3 Rose v. Household Finance Corp. II, 316 Ga. App. 282, 286, n.3 ( 728 SE2d 879 ) (2012). 4 Aniebue v. Jaguar Credit Corp., 308 Ga. App. 1, 7 (3) ( 708 SE2d 4 ) (2011). 4 3.

2013Bevington did not file a response to the summary judgment motion, nor did he request a hearing. “[U]nder Uniform Superior Court Rule 6.3, a trial court may decide a motion for summary judgment without an oral hearing in the absence of a written request for one by either party.”3 “In the absence of such a request, it was not error for the trial court to rule on the motion for summary judgment without a hearing.” 4 3 Rose v. Household Finance Corp. II, 316 Ga. App. 282, 286, n.3 ( 728 SE2d 879 ) (2012). 4 Aniebue v. Jaguar Credit Corp., 308 Ga. App. 1, 7 (3) ( 708 SE2d 4 ) (2011). 4 3.

2013Bevington did not file a response to the summary judgment motion, nor did he request a hearing. “[U]nder Uniform Superior Court Rule 6.3, a trial court may decide a motion for summary judgment without an oral hearing in the absence of a written request for one by either party.”3 “In the absence of such a request, it was not error for the trial court to rule on the motion for summary judgment without a hearing.” 4 3 Rose v. Household Finance Corp. II, 316 Ga. App. 282, 286, n.3 ( 728 SE2d 879 ) (2012). 4 Aniebue v. Jaguar Credit Corp., 308 Ga. App. 1, 7 (3) ( 708 SE2d 4 ) (2011). 4 3.