time of the alleged violation in New York

2015We reject that contention inasmuch as, at the time of the alleged violation, the oral direction of the court had not been reduced to a written order and it is unclear on this record whether respondents were aware of the existence of the oral direction of the court at the time of the alleged violation (cf. Matter of Dashaun G. [Diana B.], 117 AD3d 1526 , 1527 [2014], lv dismissed 24 NY3d 951 [2014]).

2015We reject that contention inasmuch as, at the time of the alleged violation, the oral direction of the court had not been reduced to a written order and it is unclear on this record whether respondents were aware of the existence of the oral direction of the court at the time of the alleged violation (cf. Matter of Dashaun G. [Diana B.], 117 AD3d 1526 , 1527 [2014], lv dismissed 24 NY3d 951 [2014]).

2015We reject that contention inasmuch as, at the time of the alleged violation, the oral direction of the court had not been reduced to a written order and it is unclear on this record whether respondents were aware of the existence of the oral direction of the court at the time of the alleged violation (cf. Matter of Dashaun G. [Diana B.], 117 AD3d 1526 , 1527 [2014], lv dismissed 24 NY3d 951 [2014]).

2015We reject that contention inasmuch as, at the time of the alleged violation, the oral direction of the court had not been reduced to a written order and it is unclear on this record whether respondents were aware of the existence of the oral direction of the court at the time of the alleged violation (cf. Matter of Dashaun G. [Diana B.], 117 AD3d 1526 , 1527 [2014], lv dismissed 24 NY3d 951 [2014]).

2013We believe it self evident, under the facts here and despite the lack of state law on point, 10 that defendant could not, after Sparber and Garner, ever lawfully prosecute claimant on a parole violation that occurred before those decisions, where the PRS in effect at the time of the alleged violation was imposed by DOCS and was, as such, a nullity (see Matter of State of New York v Randy M., 57 AD3d at 1159 ).

2013We believe it self evident, under the facts here and despite the lack of state law on point, 10 that defendant could not, after Sparber and Garner, ever lawfully prosecute claimant on a parole violation that occurred before those decisions, where the PRS in effect at the time of the alleged violation was imposed by DOCS and was, as such, a nullity (see Matter of State of New York v Randy M., 57 AD3d at 1159 ).

2022Corp. , 56 NY2d at 184 ).

2014The Department of Building’s inspector who issued the notice of violation did not testify, and besides the notice itself, respondents did not introduce any evidence at the hearing to counter petitioner’s expert’s testimony, or to support the inspector’s apparent surmise and conjecture that petitioner made impermissible changes to the building (see Matter of Modiano Realty Inc. v Environmental Control Bd. of the City of N.Y., 106 AD3d 541 [1st Dept 2013]).

2010Furthermore, at the time of the alleged violation, defendant held a state license to provide group family day care at the premises, thus the People lacked the capacity to challenge the premises’ classification as a group family day-care home (see Matter of Adkins v Board of Appeals, 199 AD2d 261 [1993] [holding that since the state had preempted the regulation of adult-care facilities and the Department of Social Services had determined that the premises in question complied with the applicable regulations, the town zoning board was without power to conclude otherwise]).

2005(People v Peluso, 192 Misc 2d 33 [2002]; People v Bendter, 184 Misc 2d 374 [2000].) The instant motion presents the novel question of the level of corroboration required when a criminal contempt charge is based upon the defendant’s alleged disobedience of a subpoena.

2005(People v Peluso, 192 Misc 2d 33 [2002]; People v Bendter, 184 Misc 2d 374 [2000].) The instant motion presents the novel question of the level of corroboration required when a criminal contempt charge is based upon the defendant’s alleged disobedience of a subpoena.

1998The court in People v Murphy ( 154 Misc 2d 777 ) reached an opposite conclusion based on its analysis of the language of CPL 530.13 (1) which states that a temporary order of protection may “issue” from the court, “[w]hen any criminal action is pending”, which the court took to mean at any time “before the action has been terminated by a judgment of guilty or not guilty, or finally and favorably for the defendant dismissing the case” (supra, at 779).

1986Erickson v Municipality of Anchorage ( 662 P2d 963 [Alaska]); Lovell v State ( 283 Ark 425 , 678 SW2d 318 ); Coxe v State ( 281 A2d 606 [Del]); and State v Franco (96 Wn 2d 816, 639 P2d 1320 ) concerned statutes, like Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1192 (2), making it unlawful to drive with a .10 BAG "as shown by” or "as determined by” a chemical test within a specified time, while State v Tanner (15 Ohio St 3d 1, 472 NE2d 689 ) and State v Ulrich (17 Ohio App 3d 182, 478 NE2d 812 ) dealt with a statute the first subdivision of which was phrased like the California and Arizona statutes referred to

1986Since PERB’s interpretation is neither irrational nor unreasonable, it must be upheld (Matter of Incorporated Vil. of Lynbrook v New York State Public Employment Relations Bd., 48 NY2d 398, 404 ).

1986Erickson v Municipality of Anchorage ( 662 P2d 963 [Alaska]); Lovell v State ( 283 Ark 425 , 678 SW2d 318 ); Coxe v State ( 281 A2d 606 [Del]); and State v Franco (96 Wn 2d 816, 639 P2d 1320 ) concerned statutes, like Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1192 (2), making it unlawful to drive with a .10 BAG "as shown by” or "as determined by” a chemical test within a specified time, while State v Tanner (15 Ohio St 3d 1, 472 NE2d 689 ) and State v Ulrich (17 Ohio App 3d 182, 478 NE2d 812 ) dealt with a statute the first subdivision of which was phrased like the California and Arizona statutes referred to

1986Erickson v Municipality of Anchorage ( 662 P2d 963 [Alaska]); Lovell v State ( 283 Ark 425 , 678 SW2d 318 ); Coxe v State ( 281 A2d 606 [Del]); and State v Franco (96 Wn 2d 816, 639 P2d 1320 ) concerned statutes, like Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1192 (2), making it unlawful to drive with a .10 BAG "as shown by” or "as determined by” a chemical test within a specified time, while State v Tanner (15 Ohio St 3d 1, 472 NE2d 689 ) and State v Ulrich (17 Ohio App 3d 182, 478 NE2d 812 ) dealt with a statute the first subdivision of which was phrased like the California and Arizona statutes referred to

1986Erickson v Municipality of Anchorage ( 662 P2d 963 [Alaska]); Lovell v State ( 283 Ark 425 , 678 SW2d 318 ); Coxe v State ( 281 A2d 606 [Del]); and State v Franco (96 Wn 2d 816, 639 P2d 1320 ) concerned statutes, like Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1192 (2), making it unlawful to drive with a .10 BAG "as shown by” or "as determined by” a chemical test within a specified time, while State v Tanner (15 Ohio St 3d 1, 472 NE2d 689 ) and State v Ulrich (17 Ohio App 3d 182, 478 NE2d 812 ) dealt with a statute the first subdivision of which was phrased like the California and Arizona statutes referred to

1986Erickson v Municipality of Anchorage ( 662 P2d 963 [Alaska]); Lovell v State ( 283 Ark 425 , 678 SW2d 318 ); Coxe v State ( 281 A2d 606 [Del]); and State v Franco (96 Wn 2d 816, 639 P2d 1320 ) concerned statutes, like Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1192 (2), making it unlawful to drive with a .10 BAG "as shown by” or "as determined by” a chemical test within a specified time, while State v Tanner (15 Ohio St 3d 1, 472 NE2d 689 ) and State v Ulrich (17 Ohio App 3d 182, 478 NE2d 812 ) dealt with a statute the first subdivision of which was phrased like the California and Arizona statutes referred to

1986Erickson v Municipality of Anchorage ( 662 P2d 963 [Alaska]); Lovell v State ( 283 Ark 425 , 678 SW2d 318 ); Coxe v State ( 281 A2d 606 [Del]); and State v Franco (96 Wn 2d 816, 639 P2d 1320 ) concerned statutes, like Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1192 (2), making it unlawful to drive with a .10 BAG "as shown by” or "as determined by” a chemical test within a specified time, while State v Tanner (15 Ohio St 3d 1, 472 NE2d 689 ) and State v Ulrich (17 Ohio App 3d 182, 478 NE2d 812 ) dealt with a statute the first subdivision of which was phrased like the California and Arizona statutes referred to

1986Erickson v Municipality of Anchorage ( 662 P2d 963 [Alaska]); Lovell v State ( 283 Ark 425 , 678 SW2d 318 ); Coxe v State ( 281 A2d 606 [Del]); and State v Franco (96 Wn 2d 816, 639 P2d 1320 ) concerned statutes, like Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1192 (2), making it unlawful to drive with a .10 BAG "as shown by” or "as determined by” a chemical test within a specified time, while State v Tanner (15 Ohio St 3d 1, 472 NE2d 689 ) and State v Ulrich (17 Ohio App 3d 182, 478 NE2d 812 ) dealt with a statute the first subdivision of which was phrased like the California and Arizona statutes referred to

1984One cannot waive a right which did not exist at the time of the alleged waiver (Pearson v Pearson, 104 Misc 904 , affd 81 AD2d 291 ) or where the facts are not disclosed at that time or are changed thereafter (Matter of Kessler v Motor Vehicle Acc. Ind. Corp., 49 Misc 2d 547 ).

1984One cannot waive a right which did not exist at the time of the alleged waiver (Pearson v Pearson, 104 Misc 904 , affd 81 AD2d 291 ) or where the facts are not disclosed at that time or are changed thereafter (Matter of Kessler v Motor Vehicle Acc. Ind. Corp., 49 Misc 2d 547 ).

1958While People v. Duskin (supra) indicates that testimony as to the general scientific principles underlying the operation of the equipment may no longer be necessary, it is still necessary to prove that any particular instrument was in proper operating . order, had been properly tested, and was being properly operated at the time of the alleged violation.

1937Kurzynski v. Hunt, 250 App. Div. 378 .) It is idle to say that the respondent should have been tried as a parole violator at the time of his violation in accordance with the cited provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure because he was not in custody between the time of the alleged violation and the date on which those provisions were repealed.

1902Co. ( 116 N. Y. 106 ), it was decided that, to establish a waiver óf a forfeiture in a policy of insurance, the proof must show a distinct recognition of the validity of the policy after a knowledge of the forfeiture by the person by whom it is claimed such forfeiture was waived.” The evidence in the case at bar, assuming that a mere insurance adjuster would have the power to waive the conditions of the policy so as to give life and validity where there had been none up to the time of the alleged waiver, does not show a distinct recognition of the validity of the policy after a knowledge of th