time of the alleged error in Illinois

2006Indeed, in People v. Pomykala, 203 Ill. 2d 198, 209 (2003), our own supreme court struck down a portion of the reckless homicide statute that provided that, "[i]n cases involving reckless homicide, being under the influence of alcohol or any other drug or drugs at the time of the alleged violation shall be presumed to be evidence of a reckless act unless disproved by evidence to the contrary," because it could be read as shifting the burden to a defendant to disprove that he or she had been reckless (720 ILCS 5/9--3(b) (2000)).

2006Indeed, in People v. Pomykala, 203 Ill. 2d 198, 209 (2003), our own supreme court struck down a portion of the reckless homicide statute that provided that, “[i]n cases involving reckless homicide, being under the influence of alcohol or any other drug or drugs at the time of the alleged violation shall be presumed to be evidence of a reckless act unless disproved by evidence to the contrary,” because it could be read as shifting the burden to a defendant to disprove that he or she had been reckless (720 ILCS 5/9 — 3(b) (West 2000)).

2014People v. Kelley, 304 Ill.

2010People v. Kelley, 304 Ill.

2016“The reasonableness of counsel’s actions must be evaluated from counsel’s perspective at the time of the alleged error, and without hindsight, in light of the totality of the circumstances, and not just on the basis of isolated acts.” People v. Nowicki, 385 Ill.

2016“The reasonableness of counsel’s actions must be evaluated from counsel’s perspective at the time of the alleged error, and without hindsight, in light of the totality of the circumstances, and not just on the basis of isolated acts.” People v. Nowicki, 385 Ill.

1988Ed. 2d at 695 , 104 S. Ct. at 2066 .) As a reviewing court we must evaluate the reasonableness of trial counsel’s actions from trial counsel’s perspective at the time of the alleged error, without hindsight, in light of the totality of the circumstances. 466 U.S. at 689 , 80 L.

1988Ed. 2d at 695 , 104 S. Ct. at 2066 .) As a reviewing court we must evaluate the reasonableness of trial counsel’s actions from trial counsel’s perspective at the time of the alleged error, without hindsight, in light of the totality of the circumstances. 466 U.S. at 689 , 80 L.

2026The effectiveness of 17 counsel must be assessed against an “objective standard of reasonableness from the perspective of the time of the alleged error and without hindsight.” People v. Reed, 2014 IL App (1st) 122610 , ¶ 66.

2026“Counsel’s performance is measured by an objective standard of competence under prevailing professional norms.” Smith, 195 Ill. 2d at 188 . “[T]he effectiveness of *** counsel must be assessed against an objective standard of reasonableness from the perspective of the time of the alleged error and without 8 hindsight.” People v. Reed, 2014 IL App (1st) 122610 , ¶ 66. “[E]ffective assistance of counsel refers to competent, not perfect, representation.” People v. Palmer, 162 Ill. 2d 465, 476 (1994).

2020People v. Enoch, 122 Ill. 2d 176, 186 (1988).

2001People v. Enoch, 122 Ill. 2d 176, 186 , 522 N.E.2d 1124 (1988); People v. Williams, 173 Ill. 2d 48, 85 , 670 N.E.2d 638 (1996); People v. Reid, 136 Ill. 2d 27, 38 , 554 N.E.2d 174 (1990).

2012Finally, counsel might have strategically determined that additional efforts to distinguish between charged and uncharged incidents would have further highlighted the entirety of the evidence and would not have served defendant's interest. ¶ 68 Effective assistance refers to competent, not perfect, representation, and "[t]he reasonableness of counsel's actions must be evaluated from counsel's perspective at the time of the alleged error, and without hindsight, in light of the totality of circumstances, and not just on the basis of isolated acts." People v. Calhoun, 404 Ill.

2012Finally, counsel might have strategically determined that additional efforts to distinguish between charged and -18- uncharged incidents would have further highlighted the entirety of the evidence and would not have served defendant’s interest. ¶ 68 Effective assistance refers to competent, not perfect, representation, and “[t]he reasonableness of counsel’s actions must be evaluated from counsel’s perspective at the time of the alleged error, and without hindsight, in light of the totality of circumstances, and not just on the basis of isolated acts.” People v. Calhoun, 404 Ill.

1998In re D.M., 258 Ill.

1996In re D.M., 258 Ill.

2026“Counsel’s performance is measured by an objective standard of competence under prevailing professional norms.” Smith, 195 Ill. 2d at 188 . “[T]he effectiveness of *** counsel must be assessed against an objective standard of reasonableness from the perspective of the time of the alleged error and without 8 hindsight.” People v. Reed, 2014 IL App (1st) 122610 , ¶ 66. “[E]ffective assistance of counsel refers to competent, not perfect, representation.” People v. Palmer, 162 Ill. 2d 465, 476 (1994).

2026There is a “strong presumption that counsel’s performance fell within a wide range of reasonable professional assistance.” Id.

2025Schinkel v. Board of Fire & Police Comm’n, 262 Ill.

2025However, “strategic choices that are made after investigation of the law and the facts are virtually unassailable.” People v. Ramsey, 239 Ill. 2d 342, 433 (2010).

2024“Decisions concerning which witnesses to call at trial and what evidence to present on defendant’s behalf ultimately rest with trial counsel,” and are “matters of trial strategy.” People v. West, 187 Ill. 2d 418, 432 (1999).

2023“To prevail, a defendant must satisfy both the performance and prejudice prongs of Strickland.” People v. Evans, 209 Ill. 2d 194, 220 (2004). ¶ 16 As defendant points out, the appellate court decisions which trial counsel apparently referenced in his testimony as support for his position that the enhancement did not apply— People v. Blair, 2012 IL App (3d) 100743-U and People v. Gillespie, 2012 IL App (4th) 110151 )—did not exist until after defendant’s trial and could not have been the basis for his advice to defendant.

2023See People v. Reed, 2014 IL App (1st) 122610, ¶ 66 (“[T]he effectiveness of *** counsel must be assessed against an objective standard of reasonableness from the perspective of the time of the alleged error and without hindsight.”). ¶ 14 Further, although defendant argues that there was case law supporting the argument that the juvenile sentencing protections could apply to young adults, the case he cites—People v. House, 2015 IL App (1st) 110580 , ¶ 80—involved a mandatory natural life sentence, which is very different than defendant’s sentence of an agreed to 43 years’ imprisonment or even t

2022“The reasonableness of counsel’s actions must be evaluated from counsel’s perspective at the time of the alleged error, - 15 - and without hindsight, in light of the totality of circumstances, and not just on the basis of isolated acts.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) People v. Mabry, 398 Ill.

2022App. 3d 745, 753 , 926 N.E.2d 732, 739 (2010).

2015People v. Teague, 228 Ill.

2012Qualified Immunity ¶ 33 Defendants contend if we conclude the trial court erred in determining no issue of material fact exists, we should hold plaintiffs’ claims are barred by qualified immunity. ¶ 34 The United States Supreme Court “has identified two key inquiries for qualified immunity assertions: (1) whether the facts, taken in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs, show the defendants violated a constitutional right; and (2) whether that constitutional right was clearly established at the time of the alleged violation.” Gonzalez v. City of Elgin, 578 F.3d 526, 540 (7th Cir. 2009). ¶