time of the alleged error in Utah

2021The performance is ―evaluated from counsel‘s perspective at the time of the alleged error and in light of all the circumstances.‖ Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 384 (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689 ).

2011As to the first prong, Archuleta's assertions do not sufficiently "peg[ ] adequacy to 'counsel's perspective at the time' investigative decisions [were] made." Rompilla, 545 U.S. at 381 , 125 S.Ct. 2456 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689 , 104 S.Ct. 2052 ); see also Kimmelman, 477 U.S. at 381 , 106 S.Ct. 2574 ("The reasonableness of counsel's performance is to be evaluated from counsel's perspective at the time of the alleged error and in light of all the cireumstances....").

2025Absent a complete colloquy, we “look at any evidence in the record which shows a defendant’s actual awareness of the risks of proceeding pro se,” Frampton, 737 P.2d 20221004 -CA 13 2025 UT App 111 State v. Levering at 187, with the validity of the waiver “assessed at the time of the alleged waiver,” Lee, 2024 UT App 2, ¶ 12 (cleaned up). ¶24 Although the trial court conducted most of the Frampton colloquy here, it was nonetheless incomplete.

2025But we need not resolve that inconsistency here, because even examining the entire record, including conduct that occurred after the purported waiver, there is insufficient indication that Horrocks made a waiver that was knowing and intelligent. 20230322-CA 16 2025 UT App 157 State v. Horrocks with evidence indicating that [the defendant] understood his role along with the limited role of standby counsel,” id. ¶ 46.

2022By rule, such jurisdiction extends broadly to “any lawyer admitted to practice law in Utah,” to “any lawyer admitted but currently not properly licensed to practice in Utah,” and to “any formerly admitted lawyer” who violates a rule of professional conduct “where the attorney was licensed to practice or was practicing law at the time of the alleged violation.” Id.

2019And Thomas points to no authority otherwise suggesting that the law regarding including or 20180644-CA 20 2019 UT App 177 State v. Thomas excising the Catchall Variant was sufficiently settled at the time of the alleged error.

2019And Thomas points to no authority otherwise suggesting that the law regarding including or 20180644-CA 20 2019 UT App 177 State v. Thomas excising the Catchall Variant was sufficiently settled at the time of the alleged error.

2015See State v. Murray, 116 Hawaii 3 , 169 P.3d 955 (2007); Ferguson v. State, 362 Ark. 547 , 210 S.W.3d 53 (2005); State v. Evans, 210 W.Va. 229 , 557 S.E.2d 283 (2001). , ¶ 11 As just mentioned, to invoke the plain error exception to our preservation rules, Roman needs to demonstrate that the law governing the error was clear at the time of the alleged error.

2015See State v. Murray, 116 Hawaii 3 , 169 P.3d 955 (2007); Ferguson v. State, 362 Ark. 547 , 210 S.W.3d 53 (2005); State v. Evans, 210 W.Va. 229 , 557 S.E.2d 283 (2001). , ¶ 11 As just mentioned, to invoke the plain error exception to our preservation rules, Roman needs to demonstrate that the law governing the error was clear at the time of the alleged error.

2015See State v. Murray, 116 Hawaii 3 , 169 P.3d 955 (2007); Ferguson v. State, 362 Ark. 547 , 210 S.W.3d 53 (2005); State v. Evans, 210 W.Va. 229 , 557 S.E.2d 283 (2001). , ¶ 11 As just mentioned, to invoke the plain error exception to our preservation rules, Roman needs to demonstrate that the law governing the error was clear at the time of the alleged error.

2015See State v. Murray, 116 Hawaii 3 , 169 P.3d 955 (2007); Ferguson v. State, 362 Ark. 547 , 210 S.W.3d 53 (2005); State v. Evans, 210 W.Va. 229 , 557 S.E.2d 283 (2001). , ¶ 11 As just mentioned, to invoke the plain error exception to our preservation rules, Roman needs to demonstrate that the law governing the error was clear at the time of the alleged error.

2011As to the first prong, Archuleta's assertions do not sufficiently "peg[ ] adequacy to 'counsel's perspective at the time' investigative decisions [were] made." Rompilla, 545 U.S. at 381 , 125 S.Ct. 2456 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689 , 104 S.Ct. 2052 ); see also Kimmelman, 477 U.S. at 381 , 106 S.Ct. 2574 ("The reasonableness of counsel's performance is to be evaluated from counsel's perspective at the time of the alleged error and in light of all the cireumstances....").

2011As to the first prong, Archuleta's assertions do not sufficiently "peg[ ] adequacy to 'counsel's perspective at the time' investigative decisions [were] made." Rompilla, 545 U.S. at 381 , 125 S.Ct. 2456 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689 , 104 S.Ct. 2052 ); see also Kimmelman, 477 U.S. at 381 , 106 S.Ct. 2574 ("The reasonableness of counsel's performance is to be evaluated from counsel's perspective at the time of the alleged error and in light of all the cireumstances....").