81 Washington opinions name it 2 courts 1994–2026 48 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Washington courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Donald Saucier v. Elliot M. Katz and in Defense of Animalsred2 sentences2011Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201, 121 S.Ct. 2151 . 2011Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201, 121 S.Ct. 2151 . | 6 | 6 |
cluster 728954green2 sentences2005Trevino v. Gates, 99 F.3d 911, 917 (9th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1117 (1997). ¶69 Gausvik asserts that the trial court erred when it granted summary judgment to Abbey based on qualified immunity. 2005Trevino v. Gates, 99 F.3d 911, 917 (9th Cir.1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1117 , 117 S.Ct. 1249 , 137 L.Ed.2d 330 (1997). ¶ 69 Gausvik asserts that the trial court erred when it granted summary judgment to Abbey based on qualified immunity. | 4 | 4 |
City of Seattle v. Edwardsgreen2 sentences2004In so doing, we stated: “An implicit element of [willful violation of a protective order] is the existence of a valid order at the time of the alleged violation, a fact that the City must prove beyond a reasonable doubt.” Edwards, 87 Wn. 2004In so doing, we stated: "An implicit element of [willful violation of a protective order] is the existence of a valid order at the time of the alleged violation, a fact that the City must prove beyond a reasonable doubt." Edwards at 308, 941 P.2d 697 . | 3 | 4 |
In re the Personal Restraint of Davisgreen2 sentences2025App. 2d 687 , 705, 553 P.3d 71 (2024) (“where no case law indicates an error, conduct by defense counsel that is later found to be contrary is not deficient performance”); Davis, 152 Wn.2d at 674 (we evaluate the reasonableness of counsel’s performance from counsel’s perspective at the time of the alleged error). 2024We accept the concession, as the reasonableness of trial counsel’s effectiveness is evaluated “ ‘from counsel’s perspective at the time of the alleged error.’ ” Davis, 152 Wn.2d at 673 (quoting Kimmelman, 477 U.S. at 384 ). 7 No. 86183-2-I/8 171). “ ‘Good reason for the issuance of a search warrant does not necessarily mean proof of criminal activity but merely probable cause to believe it may have occurred.’ ” State v. Chenoweth, 160 Wn.2d 454, 476 , 158 P.3d 595 (2007) (quoting State v. Gunwall, 106 Wn.2d 54, 73 , 720 P.2d 808 (1986) (internal quotation marks omitted)). | 2 | 18 |
Bowman v. Webstergreen2 sentences2014See Bowman v. Webster, 44 Wn.2d 667, 669 , 269 P.2d 960 (1954) (“The right, advantage, or benefit must exist at the time of the alleged waiver.”); Tjart v. Smith Barney, Inc., 107 Wn. 2014See Bowman v. Webster, 44 Wn.2d 667, 669 , 269 P.2d 960 (1954) (“The right, advantage, or benefit must exist at the time of the alleged waiver.”); Tjart v. Smith Barney, Inc., 107 Wn. | 2 | 3 |
cluster 655550green2 sentences2004Trevino v. Gates, 99 F.3d 911, 917 (9th Cir. 1996); see also Figueroa v. United States, 7 F.3d 1405, 1409 (9th Cir. 1993). 2004Trevino v. Gates, 99 F.3d 911, 917 (9th Cir.1996); see also Figueroa v. United States, 7 F.3d 1405, 1409 (9th Cir.1993). | 2 | 2 |
Kimmelman v. Morrisongreen2 sentences2026“The reasonableness of counsel’s performance is to be evaluated from counsel’s perspective at the time of the alleged error and in light of all the circumstances.” Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 384 , 106 S. Ct. 2574 , 91 L. 2026“The reasonableness of counsel’s performance is to be evaluated from counsel’s perspective at the time of the alleged error and in light of all the circumstances.” Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 384 , 106 S. Ct. 2574 , 91 L. | 1 | 47 |
In Re Davisgreen2 sentences2021Restraint of Davis, 152 Wn.2d 647, 673 , 101 P.3d 1 (2004) (“‘The reasonableness of counsel’s performance is to be evaluated from counsel’s perspective at the time of the alleged error and in light of all the circumstances.’”) (quoting Kimmelman v. 12 No. 81600-4-I/13 Here, Pheth claims that he told his counsel that he had concerns about his ability to understand the interpreters but that his counsel “threatened to withdraw if [he] told the judge or caused delay in the trial.”41 But the only evidence Pheth provides in support of his argument is his own self-serving affidavit which is limited t 2018Restraint of Davis, 152 Wn.2d 647, 673 , 101 P.3d 1 (2004). -4- No. 75381-9-1 / 5 was not sound strategy."16 This court evaluates the reasonableness of counsel's performance from "'counsel's perspective at the time of the alleged error and in light of all the circumstances." We examine an attorney's action or inaction according to what that attorney knew and what was reasonable at the time the attorney made her choices.12 To satisfy the prejudice prong, the defendant must show a reasonable probability that the result of the trial would have been different without the attorney's deficient perfo | 1 | 12 |
Tjart v. Smith Barney, Inc.green2 sentences2014App. 885, 899 , 28 P.3d 823 (2001) ("Washington courts recognize that a contracting party cannot waive a statutory right before the right exists."). 2014App. 885, 899 , 28 P.3d 823 (2001) (‘Washington courts recognize that a contracting party cannot waive a statutory right before the right exists.”). | 1 | 2 |
Tjart v. Smith Barney, Inc.green2 sentences2014Federal law, through the Aviation Safety Noise Abatement Act of 1979 (ASNAA), imposes a general limitation on recovery of damages caused by noise once a person has actual or constructive notice that noise exposure maps have been 38 See Bowman v. Webster. 44 Wn.2d 667, 669 , 269 P.2d 960 (1954) ("The right, advantage, or benefit must exist at the time of the alleged waiver."); Tiart v. Smith Barney, Inc., 107 Wn. 2014See Bowman v. Webster, 44 Wn.2d 667, 669 , 269 P.2d 960 (1954) (“The right, advantage, or benefit must exist at the time of the alleged waiver.”); Tjart v. Smith Barney, Inc., 107 Wn. | 1 | 2 |
State Of Washington, V. Christopher Fieldsgreen1 sentence2025App. 2d 687 , 705, 553 P.3d 71 (2024) (“where no case law indicates an error, conduct by defense counsel that is later found to be contrary is not deficient performance”); Davis, 152 Wn.2d at 674 (we evaluate the reasonableness of counsel’s performance from counsel’s perspective at the time of the alleged error). | 1 | 1 |
| Moran v. State Of Washingtongreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Washington. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State of Washington v. Steven David Stotts
neutral
2 sentences2026App. 2d 154 , 165, 527 P.3d 842 (2023). 2026App. 2d 154 , 165, 527 P.3d 842 (2023). | 2 | 2026–2026 |
Harlow v. Fitzgerald
green
2 sentences2011Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, ___ U.S. ___, 131 S.Ct. 2074, 2080-83 , 179 L.Ed.2d 1149 (2011); Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 , 102 S.Ct. 2727 , 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982). 2011Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, ___ U.S. ___, 131 S.Ct. 2074, 2080-83 , 179 L.Ed.2d 1149 (2011); Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 , 102 S.Ct. 2727 , 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982). | 2 | 1994–2011 |
Ashcroft v. al-Kidd
green
2 sentences2011Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, ___ U.S. ___, 131 S.Ct. 2074, 2080-83 , 179 L.Ed.2d 1149 (2011); Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 , 102 S.Ct. 2727 , 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982). 2011Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, ___ U.S. ___, 131 S.Ct. 2074, 2080-83 , 179 L.Ed.2d 1149 (2011); Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 , 102 S.Ct. 2727 , 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982). | 2 | 2011–2011 |
State v. Boyer
green
2 sentences2005E.g., Boyer, 91 Wn.2d at 344 ; Hall, 54 Wash. at 144 . ¶13 Miller primarily rests his argument that the validity of a no-contact order is an element of the crime upon several Court of Appeals cases which deemed validity an “implied element.” Because we conclude that validity is not an element, and out of respect for the opinions of the Court of Appeals (which, we believe, came to a correct result in both instances), we turn to a closer examination of those cases. ¶14 In Edwards, Division One reversed a felony conviction for violation of a no-contact order on the grounds that the duration of th 2005E.g., Boyer, 91 Wash.2d at 344 , 588 P.2d 1151 ; Hall, 54 Wash. at 144 , 102 P. 888 . ¶ 13 Miller primarily rests his argument that the validity of a no-contact order is an element of the crime upon several Court of Appeals cases which deemed validity an "implied element." Because we conclude that validity is not an element and out of respect for the opinions of the Court of Appeals (which, we believe, came to a correct result in both instances), we turn to a closer examination of those cases. ¶ 14 In Edwards, Division One reversed a felony conviction for violation of a no-contact order on the | 2 | 2005–2005 |
State v. Hall
green
2 sentences2005E.g., Boyer, 91 Wn.2d at 344 ; Hall, 54 Wash. at 144 . ¶13 Miller primarily rests his argument that the validity of a no-contact order is an element of the crime upon several Court of Appeals cases which deemed validity an “implied element.” Because we conclude that validity is not an element, and out of respect for the opinions of the Court of Appeals (which, we believe, came to a correct result in both instances), we turn to a closer examination of those cases. ¶14 In Edwards, Division One reversed a felony conviction for violation of a no-contact order on the grounds that the duration of th 2005E.g., Boyer, 91 Wash.2d at 344 , 588 P.2d 1151 ; Hall, 54 Wash. at 144 , 102 P. 888 . ¶ 13 Miller primarily rests his argument that the validity of a no-contact order is an element of the crime upon several Court of Appeals cases which deemed validity an "implied element." Because we conclude that validity is not an element and out of respect for the opinions of the Court of Appeals (which, we believe, came to a correct result in both instances), we turn to a closer examination of those cases. ¶ 14 In Edwards, Division One reversed a felony conviction for violation of a no-contact order on the | 2 | 2005–2005 |
State v. Miller
neutral
2 sentences2005See RCW 26.50.110; State v. Miller, 123 Wn. 2005See RCW 26.50.110; State v. Miller, 123 Wash.App. 92, 97 , 96 P.3d 1001 (2004). | 2 | 2005–2005 |
Paragon Properties Co. v. City of Novi
green
2 sentences2005Trevino v. Gates, 99 F.3d 911, 917 (9th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1117 (1997). ¶69 Gausvik asserts that the trial court erred when it granted summary judgment to Abbey based on qualified immunity. 2005Trevino v. Gates, 99 F.3d 911, 917 (9th Cir.1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1117 , 117 S.Ct. 1249 , 137 L.Ed.2d 330 (1997). ¶ 69 Gausvik asserts that the trial court erred when it granted summary judgment to Abbey based on qualified immunity. | 2 | 2005–2005 |
Snyder v. Sotta
green
2 sentences2002Snyder v. Sotta, 3 Wash.App. 190, 194 , 473 P.2d 213 (1970) (plaintiff's refusal to accept offer of mistrial equated to permanent waiver of issue). 2002Snyder v. Sotta, 3 Wn. | 2 | 2002–2002 |
State v. Gunwall
green
2 sentences2024We accept the concession, as the reasonableness of trial counsel’s effectiveness is evaluated “ ‘from counsel’s perspective at the time of the alleged error.’ ” Davis, 152 Wn.2d at 673 (quoting Kimmelman, 477 U.S. at 384 ). 7 No. 86183-2-I/8 171). “ ‘Good reason for the issuance of a search warrant does not necessarily mean proof of criminal activity but merely probable cause to believe it may have occurred.’ ” State v. Chenoweth, 160 Wn.2d 454, 476 , 158 P.3d 595 (2007) (quoting State v. Gunwall, 106 Wn.2d 54, 73 , 720 P.2d 808 (1986) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 2024We accept the concession, as the reasonableness of trial counsel’s effectiveness is evaluated “ ‘from counsel’s perspective at the time of the alleged error.’ ” Davis, 152 Wn.2d at 673 (quoting Kimmelman, 477 U.S. at 384 ). 7 No. 86183-2-I/8 171). “ ‘Good reason for the issuance of a search warrant does not necessarily mean proof of criminal activity but merely probable cause to believe it may have occurred.’ ” State v. Chenoweth, 160 Wn.2d 454, 476 , 158 P.3d 595 (2007) (quoting State v. Gunwall, 106 Wn.2d 54, 73 , 720 P.2d 808 (1986) (internal quotation marks omitted)). | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Bainbridge Island Police Guild v. City of Puyallup
green
1 sentence2024The one against whom waiver is claimed must have actual or constructive knowledge of the existence of the right.’” - 13 - No. 84825-9-I/14 Bainbridge Island Police Guild v. City of Puyallup, 172 Wn.2d 398, 410 , 259 P.3d 190 (2011) (quoting Bowman v. Webster, 44 Wn.2d 667, 669 , 269 P.2d 960 (1954)). | 1 | 2024–2024 |
State v. Chenoweth
green
1 sentence2024We accept the concession, as the reasonableness of trial counsel’s effectiveness is evaluated “ ‘from counsel’s perspective at the time of the alleged error.’ ” Davis, 152 Wn.2d at 673 (quoting Kimmelman, 477 U.S. at 384 ). 7 No. 86183-2-I/8 171). “ ‘Good reason for the issuance of a search warrant does not necessarily mean proof of criminal activity but merely probable cause to believe it may have occurred.’ ” State v. Chenoweth, 160 Wn.2d 454, 476 , 158 P.3d 595 (2007) (quoting State v. Gunwall, 106 Wn.2d 54, 73 , 720 P.2d 808 (1986) (internal quotation marks omitted)). | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Dombrosky v. Farmers Ins. Co. of Wash.
green
1 sentence2024App. 245, 255 , 928 P.2d 1127 (1996)). “‘The right, advantage, or benefit must exist at the time of the alleged waiver. | 1 | 2024–2024 |
State v. Chenoweth
green
1 sentence2024We accept the concession, as the reasonableness of trial counsel’s effectiveness is evaluated “ ‘from counsel’s perspective at the time of the alleged error.’ ” Davis, 152 Wn.2d at 673 (quoting Kimmelman, 477 U.S. at 384 ). 7 No. 86183-2-I/8 171). “ ‘Good reason for the issuance of a search warrant does not necessarily mean proof of criminal activity but merely probable cause to believe it may have occurred.’ ” State v. Chenoweth, 160 Wn.2d 454, 476 , 158 P.3d 595 (2007) (quoting State v. Gunwall, 106 Wn.2d 54, 73 , 720 P.2d 808 (1986) (internal quotation marks omitted)). | 1 | 2024–2024 |
BAINBRIDGE POLICE GUILD v. City of Puyallup
green
1 sentence2024The one against whom waiver is claimed must have actual or constructive knowledge of the existence of the right.’” - 13 - No. 84825-9-I/14 Bainbridge Island Police Guild v. City of Puyallup, 172 Wn.2d 398, 410 , 259 P.3d 190 (2011) (quoting Bowman v. Webster, 44 Wn.2d 667, 669 , 269 P.2d 960 (1954)). | 1 | 2024–2024 |
State v. Sandoval
green
1 sentence2021To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, the defendant must show “first, objectively unreasonable performance, and second, prejudice to the defendant.” Sandoval, 171 Wn.2d at 169 . “‘The reasonableness of counsel’s performance is to be evaluated from counsel’s perspective at the time of the alleged error and in light of all the circumstances.’” In re Pers. | 1 | 2021–2021 |
In re the Personal Restraint of Crace
green
2 sentences2018Restraint of Crace, 174 Wn.2d 835, 846-47 , 280 P.3d 1102 (2012). -4- No. 76509-4-1/ 5 This court approaches an ineffective assistance of counsel claim with a strong presumption that counsel provided effective representation.1° A petitioner can "'rebut this presumption by proving that his attorney's representation was unreasonable under prevailing professional norms and that the challenged action was not sound strategy.'"11 This court evaluates the reasonableness of counsel's performance from "counsel's perspective at the time of the alleged error and in light of all the circumstances.'"12 To 2018Restraint of Crace, 174 Wn.2d 835, 846-47 , 280 P.3d 1102 (2012). -4- No. 76509-4-1/ 5 This court approaches an ineffective assistance of counsel claim with a strong presumption that counsel provided effective representation.1° A petitioner can "'rebut this presumption by proving that his attorney's representation was unreasonable under prevailing professional norms and that the challenged action was not sound strategy.'"11 This court evaluates the reasonableness of counsel's performance from "counsel's perspective at the time of the alleged error and in light of all the circumstances.'"12 To | 1 | 2018–2018 |
State v. Maurice
green
1 sentence2017The defense attorney presented testimony on a determinative issue from an expert whom the attorney knew would be unpersuasive.28 The attorney did this under the false impression that Alabama law authorized no more than $1,000 for expert witness fees.29 The Court reasoned that such strategic choices "are reasonable precisely to the extent that reasonable professional judgments support the limitations on investigation."36 The Court noted Hinton's attorney's ignorance about a point of law crucial to his case and his failure to 24 Davis, 152 Wn.2d at 673 (quoting Kimmelman, 477 U.S. at 384 ). 25 S | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Feis v. KING COUNTY SHERIFF'S DEPT.
green
1 sentence2016Feis, 165 Wn. | 1 | 2016–2016 |
In re the Personal Restraint of Monschke
green
1 sentence2016Monschke, 160 Wn. | 1 | 2016–2016 |
| State v. Miller neutral | 1 | 2005–2005 |
| McLemore v. Branch Banking & Trust Co. green | 1 | 2005–2005 |
| Crawford v. Lungren green | 1 | 2005–2005 |
| United States v. Casciano green | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.