451 Texas opinions name it 5 courts 1967–2026 33 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Texas courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Strickland v. Washingtongreen2 sentences2019App. 1999). 3 Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689 . 4 meritorious nature of the claim.4 Direct appeal is usually an inadequate vehicle for raising an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim because the record is generally undeveloped.5 In evaluating the effectiveness of counsel under the deficient- performance prong, we look to the totality of the representation and the particular circumstances of each case.6 The issue is whether counsel’s assistance was reasonable under all the circumstances and prevailing professional norms at the time of the alleged error.7 Review of counsel’s representation is hig 2018App. 2015) (citations omitted). 12 and that the deficiency prejudiced the defense.29 An ineffective-assistance-of- counsel claim must be “firmly founded in the record,” and “the record must affirmatively demonstrate” the meritorious nature of the claim.30 Direct appeal is usually an inadequate vehicle for raising an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim because the record is generally undeveloped.31 In evaluating the effectiveness of counsel under the deficient-performance prong, we look to the totality of the representation and the particular circumstances of each case. 32 The issue is whet | 317 | 402 |
Nava, Andres Maldonadogreen2 sentences2018App. 2015) (citations omitted). 12 and that the deficiency prejudiced the defense.29 An ineffective-assistance-of- counsel claim must be “firmly founded in the record,” and “the record must affirmatively demonstrate” the meritorious nature of the claim.30 Direct appeal is usually an inadequate vehicle for raising an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim because the record is generally undeveloped.31 In evaluating the effectiveness of counsel under the deficient-performance prong, we look to the totality of the representation and the particular circumstances of each case. 32 The issue is whet 2018App. 2015) (citations omitted). 12 and that the deficiency prejudiced the defense.29 An ineffective-assistance-of- counsel claim must be “firmly founded in the record,” and “the record must affirmatively demonstrate” the meritorious nature of the claim.30 Direct appeal is usually an inadequate vehicle for raising an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim because the record is generally undeveloped.31 In evaluating the effectiveness of counsel under the deficient-performance prong, we look to the totality of the representation and the particular circumstances of each case. 32 The issue is whet | 7 | 65 |
Thompson v. Stategreen2 sentences2019App. 1999). 3 Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689 . 4 meritorious nature of the claim.4 Direct appeal is usually an inadequate vehicle for raising an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim because the record is generally undeveloped.5 In evaluating the effectiveness of counsel under the deficient- performance prong, we look to the totality of the representation and the particular circumstances of each case.6 The issue is whether counsel’s assistance was reasonable under all the circumstances and prevailing professional norms at the time of the alleged error.7 Review of counsel’s representation is hig 2018App. 2012); Thompson, 9 S.W.3d at 813–14. 5 Thompson, 9 S.W.3d at 813 . 3 whether counsel’s assistance was reasonable under all the circumstances and prevailing professional norms at the time of the alleged error. 6 Review of counsel’s representation is highly deferential, and the reviewing court indulges a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct was not deficient.7 It is not appropriate for an appellate court to simply infer ineffective assistance based upon unclear portions of the record or when counsel’s reasons for failing to do something do not appear in the record. 8 Trial counsel “sho | 7 | 44 |
Butler v. Stategreen2 sentences2011Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 381 , 106 S.Ct. 2574, 2586 , 91 L.Ed.2d 305 (1986); see Butler v. State, 716 S.W.2d 48 (Tex.Crim.App. 1986). 2011Kimmelman v. Morrison , 477 U.S. 365, 381 , 106 S.Ct. 2574, 2586 , 91 L.Ed.2d 305 (1986); see Butler v. State , 716 S.W.2d 48 (Tex.Crim.App. 1986). | 5 | 5 |
Kimmelman v. Morrisongreen2 sentences2012See Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 381 , 106 S.Ct. 2574 , 91 L.Ed.2d 305 (1986) (noting that the reasonableness of counsel’s performance is to be evaluated from counsel’s perspective at the time of the alleged error and in light of all the circumstances, and that the standard of review is highly deferential). 2012See Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 381 , 106 S.Ct. 2574 , 91 L.Ed.2d 305 (1986) (noting that the reasonableness of counsel’s performance is to be evaluated from counsel’s perspective at the time of the alleged error and in light of all the circumstances, and that the standard of review is highly deferential). | 3 | 12 |
Hernandez v. Stategreen2 sentences2018App. 2015) (citations omitted). 12 and that the deficiency prejudiced the defense.29 An ineffective-assistance-of- counsel claim must be “firmly founded in the record,” and “the record must affirmatively demonstrate” the meritorious nature of the claim.30 Direct appeal is usually an inadequate vehicle for raising an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim because the record is generally undeveloped.31 In evaluating the effectiveness of counsel under the deficient-performance prong, we look to the totality of the representation and the particular circumstances of each case. 32 The issue is whet 2015App. 2013); Hernandez v. State, 988 S.W.2d 770, 770 (Tex. Crim. | 3 | 4 |
Mata v. Stategreen2 sentences2018However, “when no reasonable trial strategy could justify the trial counsel’s conduct, counsel’s performance falls below an objective standard of reasonableness as a matter of law, regardless of whether the record 6 See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688–89, 104 S. Ct. at 2065 ; Nava, 415 S.W.3d at 307 . 7 Nava, 415 S.W.3d at 307–08. 8 Menefield, 363 S.W.3d at 593 ; Mata v. State, 226 S.W.3d 425, 432 (Tex. Crim. 2009App. 1999). 3 … Thompson, 9 S.W.3d at 813 . 3 circumstances and prevailing professional norms at the time of the alleged error.4 Review of counsel’s representation is highly deferential, and the reviewing court indulges a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct fell within a wide range of reasonable representation.5 A reviewing court will rarely be in a position on direct appeal to fairly evaluate the merits of an ineffective assistance claim.6 “In the majority of cases, the record on direct appeal is undeveloped and cannot adequately reflect the motives behind trial counsel’s actions.” 7 To | 3 | 3 |
Pennzoil v. Socony Mobil Oil Companygreen2 sentences2005To constitute a waiver, the right or privilege alleged to have been waived must have been in existence at the time of the alleged waiver.” Pennzoil v. Socony Mobil Oil Co., 421 S.W.2d 416, 423 (Tex.Civ. 2005To constitute a waiver, the right or privilege alleged to have been waived must have been in existence at the time of the alleged waiver.” Pennzoil v. Socony Mobil Oil Co. , 421 S.W.2d 416, 423 (Tex. Civ. | 3 | 3 |
Salinas v. Stategreen2 sentences2011App. 1999). 3 In evaluating the effectiveness of counsel under the first prong, we look to the totality of the representation and the particular circumstances of each case. 3 The issue is whether counsel’s assistance was reasonable under all the circumstances and prevailing professional norms at the time of the alleged error. 4 Review of counsel’s representation is highly deferential, and the reviewing court indulges a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct fell within a wide range of reasonable representation.5 A reviewing court will rarely be in a position on direct appeal to fairly evalu 2011App. 1999). 3 In evaluating the effectiveness of counsel under the first prong, we look to the totality of the representation and the particular circumstances of each case. 3 The issue is whether counsel’s assistance was reasonable under all the circumstances and prevailing professional norms at the time of the alleged error. 4 Review of counsel’s representation is highly deferential, and the reviewing court indulges a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct fell within a wide range of reasonable representation.5 A reviewing court will rarely be in a position on direct appeal to fairly evalu | 2 | 4 |
Davis v. Stategreen2 sentences2012To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, an appellant must show by a preponderance of the evidence that his counsel’s representation fell below the standard of prevailing professional norms and that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s deficiency, the result of the trial would have been different. 12 In evaluating the effectiveness of counsel under the first prong, we look to the totality of the representation and the particular circumstances of each case.13 The issue is whether counsel’s assistance was reasonable under all the circumstances and prevailing professio 2012To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, the appellant must show by a preponderance of the evidence that his counsel’s representation fell below the standard of prevailing professional norms and that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s deficiency, the result of the trial would have 8 been different.2 In evaluating the effectiveness of counsel under the first prong, we look to the totality of the representation and the particular circumstances of each case.3 The issue is whether counsel’s assistance was reasonable under all the circumstances and prevailing professio | 2 | 2 |
Braugh v. Phillipsgreen2 sentences1995See Braugh v. Phillips, 557 S.W.2d 155, 158 (Tex.Civ.App.-Corpus Christi 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.); see also Sun Exploration & Prod. 1995See Braugh v. Phillips, 557 S.W.2d 155, 158 (Tex. Civ. | 2 | 2 |
Elder v. Hollowaygreen2 sentences1999Elder v. Holloway, 510 U.S. 510, 514-16 , 114 S.Ct. 1019 , 127 L.Ed.2d 344 (1994). 1999Elder v. Holloway, 510 U.S. 510, 514-16 , 114 S.Ct. 1019 , 127 L.Ed.2d 344 (1994). | 1 | 2 |
Robertson v. Stategreen1 sentence2026A defendant is not entitled to “errorless or perfect counsel whose competency of representation is to be judged by hindsight.” Robertson v. State, 187 S.W.3d 475, 483 (Tex. Crim. | 1 | 1 |
Ex Parte Chambersgreen1 sentence2025Ex Parte Chambers, 898 S.W.2d 257, 259 (Tex. 1995); Tex. Fam. | 1 | 1 |
Harvey v. Stategreen1 sentence2021See Harvey v. State, 78 S.W.3d 368, 372-73 (Tex. Crim. | 1 | 1 |
Garcia v. Stategreen1 sentence2019App. 2012) 4 See id. at 592 ; Thompson, 9 S.W.3d at 813 . 5 Menefield, 363 S.W.3d at 593 (quoting Garcia v. State, 57 S.W.3d 436, 440 (Tex. 6 Crim. | 1 | 1 |
Christopher Jodale Coffman v. Stategreen1 sentence2018App. 2015) (citations omitted). 12 and that the deficiency prejudiced the defense.29 An ineffective-assistance-of- counsel claim must be “firmly founded in the record,” and “the record must affirmatively demonstrate” the meritorious nature of the claim.30 Direct appeal is usually an inadequate vehicle for raising an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim because the record is generally undeveloped.31 In evaluating the effectiveness of counsel under the deficient-performance prong, we look to the totality of the representation and the particular circumstances of each case. 32 The issue is whet | 1 | 1 |
Realty Growth Investors v. Council of Unit Ownersgreen1 sentence2015Realty Growth Investors v. Council of Unit Owners, 453 A.2d 450, 456 (Del. 1982). “[E]stoppel is the effect of the voluntary conduct of a party whereby he is absolutely precluded ... from asserting rights which might perhaps have otherwise existed, ... as against another person, who has in good faith relied upon such conduct, and has been led thereby to change his position for the worse....” Vila v. BVWebTies LLC, 2010 WL 3866098 *10 n.73 (Del. | 1 | 1 |
Gardner v. Herringgreen1 sentence2014See Gardner v. Herring, 21 S.W.3d 767, 775 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2000, no pet.) (“Indeed, it would be quite specious to suggest that through silence one can waive a complaint regarding conduct about which he knew nothing or about which he was denied the opportunity to object. . . . | 1 | 1 |
Santosky v. Kramergreen2 sentences2012A parent’s right to “the companionship, care, custody, and management” of his child is a constitutional interest “far more precious than any property right.” Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 , 758–59, 102 S. Ct. 1388, 1397 (1982) (internal citation omitted). 2012A parent’s right to “the companionship, care, custody, and management” of his child is a constitutional interest “far more precious than any property right.” Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 , 758–59, 102 S. Ct. 1388, 1397 (1982) (internal citation omitted). | 1 | 1 |
| Beedy v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Otis Elevator Company v. Woodgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Maxwell v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Aaron Spann v. Police Officer A.G. Rainey, Aaron Spann v. A.G. Rainey, Police Officer, A.G. Rainey, Police Officergreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Texas. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Bone v. State
green
2 sentences2017Id. 2016Id. | 5 | 2015–2017 |
Menefield v. State
green
2 sentences2019Without such an opportunity, an appellate court should not find deficient performance unless the conduct at issue was clearly documented in the record and was “so outrageous that no competent attorney would have engaged in it.”6 In evaluating the effectiveness of counsel under the deficient-performance prong, we look to the totality of the representation and the particular circumstances of each case.7 The issue is whether counsel’s assistance was reasonable under all the circumstances and prevailing professional norms at the time of the alleged error.8 Menefield v. State, 363 S.W.3d 591 , 592– 2018App. 2015) (citations omitted). 12 and that the deficiency prejudiced the defense.29 An ineffective-assistance-of- counsel claim must be “firmly founded in the record,” and “the record must affirmatively demonstrate” the meritorious nature of the claim.30 Direct appeal is usually an inadequate vehicle for raising an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim because the record is generally undeveloped.31 In evaluating the effectiveness of counsel under the deficient-performance prong, we look to the totality of the representation and the particular circumstances of each case. 32 The issue is whet | 4 | 2016–2019 |
Mallett v. State
green
2 sentences2011App. 1999). 3 In evaluating the effectiveness of counsel under the first prong, we look to the totality of the representation and the particular circumstances of each case. 3 The issue is whether counsel’s assistance was reasonable under all the circumstances and prevailing professional norms at the time of the alleged error. 4 Review of counsel’s representation is highly deferential, and the reviewing court indulges a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct fell within a wide range of reasonable representation.5 A reviewing court will rarely be in a position on direct appeal to fairly evalu 2011App. 1999). 3 In evaluating the effectiveness of counsel under the first prong, we look to the totality of the representation and the particular circumstances of each case. 3 The issue is whether counsel’s assistance was reasonable under all the circumstances and prevailing professional norms at the time of the alleged error. 4 Review of counsel’s representation is highly deferential, and the reviewing court indulges a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct fell within a wide range of reasonable representation.5 A reviewing court will rarely be in a position on direct appeal to fairly evalu | 3 | 2009–2011 |
Donald Saucier v. Elliot M. Katz and in Defense of Animals
red
2 sentences2008Id. 2005Id. | 3 | 2005–2008 |
Wilson v. Layne
green
2 sentences2015Wilson, 526 U.S. at 603 . 2000Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 608 , 609, 119 S.Ct. 1692, 1697 , 143 L.Ed.2d 818 (1999). | 2 | 2000–2015 |
Morris v. Dearborne
green
2 sentences2010Id. at 665-66 . 2010Id. at 665-66 . | 2 | 2010–2010 |
Wiggins v. Smith, Warden
green
2 sentences2005Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 521 , 123 S.Ct. at 2535 ; Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688-89 , 104 S.Ct. at 2065 . “[C]ounsel is strongly presumed to have rendered adequate assistance and made all significant decisions in the exercise of reasonable professional judgment.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690 , 104 S.Ct. at 2066 . 2005Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 521 , 123 S.Ct. at 2535 ; Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688-89 , 104 S.Ct. at 2065 . “[C]ounsel is strongly presumed to have rendered adequate assistance and made all significant decisions in the exercise of reasonable professional judgment.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690 , 104 S.Ct. at 2066 . | 2 | 2005–2005 |
Michael Earitt White v. State
green
1 sentence2023In White v. State, the Texarkana Court of Appeals held that, “in order to show that a suspension period was in effect at the time of the alleged violation, the State must proffer competent evidence that it provided notice of the suspension to the licensee as required by [Chapter 521, Subchapter N].”4 458 S.W.3d at 192 ; see Mondy v. See Tex. Transp. | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Pearson v. Callahan
green
1 sentence2012Id. | 1 | 2012–2012 |
Barrow v. State
green
1 sentence2011A. Standard of Review To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, an appellant must show by a preponderance of the evidence that his counsel‘s representation fell below the standard of prevailing professional norms and that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel‘s deficiency, the result of the trial would have been different.5 In evaluating the effectiveness of counsel under the first prong, we look to the totality of the representation and the particular circumstances of each case. 6 The issue is whether counsel‘s assistance was reasonable under all the circumstances and | 1 | 2011–2011 |
| cluster 18033 green | 1 | 2002–2002 |
| Anderson v. Creighton green | 1 | 2002–2002 |
| Seals v. State neutral | 1 | 1973–1973 |
| Roberts v. Griffith green | 1 | 1967–1967 |
| Jacaman v. Fidelity & Guaranty Insurance Underwriters, Inc. neutral | 1 | 1967–1967 |
| Payne v. Beaumont green | 1 | 1967–1967 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.