time of the alleged violation in Massachusetts

2024"A right is only clearly established if, at the time of the alleged violation, 'the contours of the right allegedly 8 violated [were] sufficiently definite so that a reasonable official would appreciate that the conduct in question was unlawful.'" LaChance v. Commissioner of Correction, 463 Mass. 767, 777 (2012), S.C., 475 Mass. 757 (2016), quoting Longval v. Commissioner of Correction, 448 Mass. 412, 419 (2007).

2023More specifically, "[a] right is only clearly established if, at the time of the alleged violation, 'the contours of the right allegedly violated [were] sufficiently definite so that a reasonable official would appreciate that the conduct in question was unlawful.'" LaChance, supra, quoting Longval v. Commissioner of Correction, 448 Mass. 412, 419 (2007).

2025Cf. Sandin, 515 U.S. at 486 ("[C]onfinement did not exceed similar, but totally discretionary, confinement in either duration or degree of restriction ... [where] conditions ... involve[d] significant amounts of 'lockdown time' even for inmates in the general population."). [12] Read in proper context, the reference in LaChance to "administrative segregation" plainly applies to solitary confinement and the "substantially similar" restrictions employed at the time. 463 Mass. at 772 .

2024"A right is only clearly established if, at the time of the alleged violation, 'the contours of the right allegedly 8 violated [were] sufficiently definite so that a reasonable official would appreciate that the conduct in question was unlawful.'" LaChance v. Commissioner of Correction, 463 Mass. 767, 777 (2012), S.C., 475 Mass. 757 (2016), quoting Longval v. Commissioner of Correction, 448 Mass. 412, 419 (2007).

2025Cf. Sandin, 515 U.S. at 486 ("[C]onfinement did not exceed similar, but totally discretionary, confinement in either duration or degree of restriction ... [where] conditions ... involve[d] significant amounts of 'lockdown time' even for inmates in the general population."). [12] Read in proper context, the reference in LaChance to "administrative segregation" plainly applies to solitary confinement and the "substantially similar" restrictions employed at the time. 463 Mass. at 772 .

2025See ,ern, 94 F.4th at 146 (court may "bypass the first step if we conclude that the right was not clearly established at the time of its alleged violation"). "[A] right is only clearly established if, at the time of the alleged violation, the contours ... were sufficiently definite so that a reasonable official would appreciate that the conduct in -------------------------------------------- likelihood and duration of incarceration in the SAU.

2024See Guy, 441 Mass. at 101 . 5 supported the conclusion that he could not have immediately noticed the complainant is unavailing.

2023Nevertheless, "it is not necessary for the courts to have previously considered a particular situation identical to the one faced by the government official." Caron v. Silvia, 32 Mass. App. Ct. 271, 273 (1992).

2014Edge v. Commonwealth, 451 Mass. 74, 76 (2008).

2007See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, supra at 815-816 (subjective standard incompatible with policy rationale of precluding insubstantial lawsuits from proceeding to trial); Clancy v. McCabe, 441 Mass. 311, 322-323 (2004), quoting Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635 , 640 n.2 (1987) (objective standard promotes policy that “insubstantial claims against government officials be resolved prior to discovery and on summary judgment if possible”). 10 In order to overcome an asserted defense of qualified immunity, the right must be clearly established at the time of the alleged violation.

2007See Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226, 232 (1991).

2007See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, supra at 815-816 (subjective standard incompatible with policy rationale of precluding insubstantial lawsuits from proceeding to trial); Clancy v. McCabe, 441 Mass. 311, 322-323 (2004), quoting Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635 , 640 n.2 (1987) (objective standard promotes policy that “insubstantial claims against government officials be resolved prior to discovery and on summary judgment if possible”). 10 In order to overcome an asserted defense of qualified immunity, the right must be clearly established at the time of the alleged violation.

2005Hope v. Peltzer, 536 U.S. 730, 736-39 (2002).

2004As to Sabree’s claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000), the defense of qualified immunity invokes a three-part inquiry: “first, whether a constitutional violation has been alleged if plaintifffs] allegations are established as true; second, whether the law was clearly established at the time of the alleged violation; and last, whether a reasonable official, similarly situated would understand that the challenged conduct violated a constitutional norm.” Rivera-Jimenez v. Pierluisi, 362 F.3d 87, 93 (1st Cir. 2004).

2004See Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194 , 201-202 (2001).

2003See Doe v. New York City Dept. of Social Servs., 649 F.2d 134 , 139-141 (2d Cir. 1981) (girl left in foster home for two years after child abuse expert told placement agency that foster father was sexually involved with child and recommended her immediate removal from foster home).

2001For reasons set forth in Smith v. Joyce, 421 Mass. 520, 521 (1995), we do not consider the defendant’s claims to be moot, and affirm the judgment.

2000Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 639 (1987). 17 In considering the constitutional issues, 18 we follow the prescript of Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 609 (1999), requiring us to “first determine whether the plaintiff has alleged the deprivation of an actual constitutional right at all,” before proceeding “ ‘to determine whether that right was clearly established at the time of the alleged violation.’ Conn. v. Gabbert, [ 526 U.S. 286 ,] 290 [(1999)].” Ibid.

1999See Commonwealth v. Delaney, 425 Mass. 587, 595-597 (1997).

1996Matthews v. Rakiey, 38 Mass. App. Ct. 490, 493 (1995). 7 Accordingly, qualified immunity must be decided according to the law in effect at the time of the alleged violation.

1996Since “[e]ven defendants who violate constitutional rights enjoy a qualified immunity that protects them from liability for damages unless it is further demonstrated that their conduct was unreasonable under the applicable standard,” Davis v Scherer, 468 U.S. 183, 190 (1984), and since resolution of the constitutional question under current law presents difficult questions unnecessary to our decision, we proceed directly to the questions raised by the qualified immunity defense, without deciding what notice or hearing is constitutionally required under current law.