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12 Pennsylvania opinions name it 6 courts 1938–2025 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Pennsylvania courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Brocker v. Brockergreen1 sentence2025See Brocker v. Brocker, 241 A.2d 336, 341 (Pa. 1968) (“While a [c]ustody [o]rder or [d]ecree is always subject to modification or complete change by the proper [c]ourt, [a]cting in the best interest and for the best welfare of the children, it cannot be ignored or violated by one of the parties at his (or her) whim[.]”). | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Freelandgreen1 sentence2025See Commonwealth v. Freeland, 106 A.3d 768, 777 (Pa. Super. 2014) (“[I]n the interest of justice we address the arguments that can reasonably be discerned from this defective brief.”) (citation omitted). -3- J-S36042-25 reasonable doubt that Appellant was on state park property at the time of the alleged violation. | 1 | 1 |
Kimmelman v. Morrisongreen2 sentences2006While recognizing that this Court subsequently foreclosed resort to relaxed waiver in the post-conviction context, see Commonwealth v. Albrecht, 554 Pa. 31, 44-45 , 720 A.2d 693, 700 (1998), Appellee views this change as irrelevant to the evaluation of appellate counsel’s performance, because “[t]he reasonableness of counsel’s performance is to be evaluated from counsel’s perspective at the time of the alleged error [.]” Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 381, 106 S.Ct. 2574, 2586 , 91 L.Ed.2d 305 (1986) (emphasis added). 2006While recognizing that this Court subsequently foreclosed resort to relaxed waiver in the post-conviction context, see Commonwealth v. Albrecht, 554 Pa. 31, 44-45 , 720 A.2d 693, 700 (1998), Appellee views this change as irrelevant to the evaluation of appellate counsel’s performance, because “[t]he reasonableness of counsel’s performance is to be evaluated from counsel’s perspective at the time of the alleged error [.]” Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 381, 106 S.Ct. 2574, 2586 , 91 L.Ed.2d 305 (1986) (emphasis added). | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Albrechtgreen2 sentences2006While recognizing that this Court subsequently foreclosed resort to relaxed waiver in the post-conviction context, see Commonwealth v. Albrecht, 554 Pa. 31, 44-45 , 720 A.2d 693, 700 (1998), Appellee views this change as irrelevant to the evaluation of appellate counsel’s performance, because “[t]he reasonableness of counsel’s performance is to be evaluated from counsel’s perspective at the time of the alleged error [.]” Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 381, 106 S.Ct. 2574, 2586 , 91 L.Ed.2d 305 (1986) (emphasis added). 2006While recognizing that this Court subsequently foreclosed resort to relaxed waiver in the post-conviction context, see Commonwealth v. Albrecht, 554 Pa. 31, 44-45 , 720 A.2d 693, 700 (1998), Appellee views this change as irrelevant to the evaluation of appellate counsel’s performance, because “[t]he reasonableness of counsel’s performance is to be evaluated from counsel’s perspective at the time of the alleged error [.]” Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 381, 106 S.Ct. 2574, 2586 , 91 L.Ed.2d 305 (1986) (emphasis added). | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. DiFrancescogreen2 sentences1976In Commonwealth v. DiFrancesco, 458 Pa. 188, at 193, n. 3 , 329 A.2d 204 , 207 n. 3 (1974), this court explained the characteristics of both inferences and presumptions: “ . . .an inference is merely a logical tool which permits the trier of fact to proceed from one fact to another. 1976In Commonwealth v. DiFrancesco, 458 Pa. 188, at 193, n. 3 , 329 A.2d 204 , 207 n. 3 (1974), this court explained the characteristics of both inferences and presumptions: “ . . .an inference is merely a logical tool which permits the trier of fact to proceed from one fact to another. | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Bursickgreen2 sentences1961See Commonwealth v. Bursick, 170 Pa. Superior Ct. 375 , 85 A. 2d 608 . 1961See Commonwealth v. Bursick, 170 Pa. Superior Ct. 375 , 85 A. 2d 608 . | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Wagnergreen1 sentence1953She testified that she cautioned petitioner “that’s fast enough.” Evidence of the speed violation is alone sufficient to justify suspension of an operator’s license, if, in the opinion of the court, from all the evidence taken at the hearing, the suspension is merited: Commonwealth v. Wagner, 364 Pa. 566, 572 (1950). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Pennsylvania. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Commonwealth v. Lopez
green
1 sentence1996We note that, although the terms have, in practice, been used interchangeably, see, e.g., Commonwealth v. Lopez, 415 Pa.Superior Ct. 252, 609 A.2d 177 , appeal denied, 533 Pa. 598 , 617 A.2d 1273 (1992), the "articulable and reasonable” grounds necessary to justify an investigative stop are less stringent than the "probable cause” necessary to make an arrest or conduct a search. | 1 | 1996–1996 |
Dean v. City of Harrisburg
green
2 sentences1995Dean v. City of Harrisburg, 128 Pa.Cmwlth. 431 , 563 A.2d 965 (1989), petition for allowance of appeal denied, 526 Pa. 640 , 584 A.2d 322 (1990). 1995Dean v. City of Harrisburg, 128 Pa.Cmwlth. 431 , 563 A.2d 965 (1989), petition for allowance of appeal denied, 526 Pa. 640 , 584 A.2d 322 (1990). | 1 | 1995–1995 |
Commonwealth v. Grace
green
2 sentences1978If at any hearing or proceeding, the owner shall testify, under oath or affirmation, that he was not operating the said vehicle or tractor at the time of the alleged violation of this act or any local ordinance, rule or regulation, and shall submit himself to an examination as to who at that time was operating such vehicle or tractor, and reveal the name of the person, if known to him, or, if the information is made in a county other than that of his own residence, shall forward to the magistrate an affidavit setting forth these facts, then the prima facie evidence arising from the registratio 1978If at any hearing or proceeding, the owner shall testify, under oath or affirmation, that he was not operating the said vehicle or tractor at the time of the alleged violation of this act or any local ordinance, rule or regulation, and shall submit himself to an examination as to who at that time was operating such vehicle or tractor, and reveal the name of the person, if known to him, or, if the information is made in a county other than that of his own residence, shall forward to the magistrate an affidavit setting forth these facts, then the prima facie evidence arising from the registratio | 1 | 1978–1978 |
Commonwealth v. Swanger
green
2 sentences1976It is true that in Commonwealth v. Swanger, 453 Pa. 107 , 307 A.2d 875 (1973), the Supreme Court held that before a police officer could stop a vehicle to determine whether there was a violation of The Vehicle Code, he must have probable cause indicating such a violation, and that in Commonwealth v. Meyung, 64 D. & C. 2d 350 (1973), the court in Monroe County reversed an order suspending defendant’s license for conviction of having altered his driving license on the theory that the stopping of a vehicle for excessive muffler noise was improper because only one officer was on the scene. 1976It is true that in Commonwealth v. Swanger, 453 Pa. 107 , 307 A.2d 875 (1973), the Supreme Court held that before a police officer could stop a vehicle to determine whether there was a violation of The Vehicle Code, he must have probable cause indicating such a violation, and that in Commonwealth v. Meyung, 64 D. & C. 2d 350 (1973), the court in Monroe County reversed an order suspending defendant’s license for conviction of having altered his driving license on the theory that the stopping of a vehicle for excessive muffler noise was improper because only one officer was on the scene. | 1 | 1976–1976 |
Commonwealth v. Bolger
green
2 sentences1970If at any hearing or proceeding, the owner shall testify, under oath or affirmation, that he was not operating the said vehicle or tractor at the time of the alleged violation of this act or any local ordinance, rule or regulation, and shall submit himself to an examination as to who at that time was operating such vehicle or tractor, and reveal the name of the person, if known to him, or, if the information is made in a county other than that of his own residence, shall forward to the magistrate an affidavit setting forth these facts, then the prima facie evidence arising from the registratio 1970If at any hearing or proceeding, the owner shall testify, under oath or affirmation, that he was not operating the said vehicle or tractor at the time of the alleged violation of this act or any local ordinance, rule or regulation, and shall submit himself to an examination as to who at that time was operating such vehicle or tractor, and reveal the name of the person, if known to him, or, if the information is made in a county other than that of his own residence, shall forward to the magistrate an affidavit setting forth these facts, then the prima facie evidence arising from the registratio | 1 | 1970–1970 |
Commonwealth v. Saurbaugh
green
2 sentences1970If at any hearing or proceeding, the owner shall testify, under oath or affirmation, that he was not operating the said vehicle or tractor at the time of the alleged violation of this act or any local ordinance, rule or regulation, and shall submit himself to an examination as to who at that time was operating such vehicle or tractor, and reveal the name of the person, if known to him, or, if the information is made in a county other than that of his own residence, shall forward to the magistrate an affidavit setting forth these facts, then the prima facie evidence arising from the registratio 1970If at any hearing or proceeding, the owner shall testify, under oath or affirmation, that he was not operating the said vehicle or tractor at the time of the alleged violation of this act or any local ordinance, rule or regulation, and shall submit himself to an examination as to who at that time was operating such vehicle or tractor, and reveal the name of the person, if known to him, or, if the information is made in a county other than that of his own residence, shall forward to the magistrate an affidavit setting forth these facts, then the prima facie evidence arising from the registratio | 1 | 1970–1970 |
Commonwealth v. Wolfgang
green
1 sentence1938Section 1002(d) of the amended act provides that when the rate of speed of any vehicle is timed on any highway within a business or residence district certain methods requiring the presence of two peace officers shall be required, and then follows with this provision: “Under all other conditions, the rate of speed shall be timed, for a distance of not less than one quarter (%) mile, by a peace officer using a motor vehicle equipped with a speedometer tested for accuracy within a period of thirty (30) days prior to the alleged violation.” Similar provisions were being considered by our Superior | 1 | 1938–1938 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.