debt claim in Kansas

1988In Misco, the court set forth the following definition of a lien: “A lien is a hold or claim which one has upon the property of another as security for a debt or charge, as a tie that binds the property to a debt or claim for its satisfaction, as a right to possess and retain property until a charge attaching to it is paid or discharged, as a charge imposed upon specific property by which it is made security for the performance of an act, and as being synonymous with a charge or encumbrance upon a thing.” 235 Kan. at 962 (citing Assembly of God v. Sangster, 178 Kan. 678, 680 , 290 P.2d 1057 [1

1988In Misco, the court set forth the following definition of a lien: “A lien is a hold or claim which one has upon the property of another as security for a debt or charge, as a tie that binds the property to a debt or claim for its satisfaction, as a right to possess and retain property until a charge attaching to it is paid or discharged, as a charge imposed upon specific property by which it is made security for the performance of an act, and as being synonymous with a charge or encumbrance upon a thing.” 235 Kan. at 962 (citing Assembly of God v. Sangster, 178 Kan. 678, 680 , 290 P.2d 1057 [1

1991Assembly of God v. Sangster, 178 Kan. 678, 680 , 290 P.2d 1057 (1955).” Misco Industries, Inc. v. Board of Sedgwick County Comm’rs, 235 Kan. 958, 962 , 685 P.2d 866 (1984).

1988In Misco, the court set forth the following definition of a lien: “A lien is a hold or claim which one has upon the property of another as security for a debt or charge, as a tie that binds the property to a debt or claim for its satisfaction, as a right to possess and retain property until a charge attaching to it is paid or discharged, as a charge imposed upon specific property by which it is made security for the performance of an act, and as being synonymous with a charge or encumbrance upon a thing.” 235 Kan. at 962 (citing Assembly of God v. Sangster, 178 Kan. 678, 680 , 290 P.2d 1057 [1

1959(Bisby v. Quinby, 92 Kan. 86 , 140 Pac. 635 .) For additional authorities on equitable liens see, Fitzgerald v. Fitzgerald, 97 Kan. 408 , 155 Pac. 791 ; Bank v. Pickering, 111 Kan. 132 , 205 Pac. 1110 ; Farmers State Bank v. St.

1959(Bisby v. Quinby, 92 Kan. 86 , 140 Pac. 635 .) For additional authorities on equitable liens see, Fitzgerald v. Fitzgerald, 97 Kan. 408 , 155 Pac. 791 ; Bank v. Pickering, 111 Kan. 132 , 205 Pac. 1110 ; Farmers State Bank v. St.

2001It has on principal been extended to the relief of junior lien-holders who, to protect their own interests, have been compelled to pay off prior liens, and to other cases where natural justice required its application and where no violence was done to the legal rights of others.” (Emphasis added.) 74 Kan. at 459 .

1988In the present case, the Bank relies heavily upon Hall v. Hamilton, 233 Kan. 880 , 667 P.2d 350 (1983).

1988In the present case, the Bank relies heavily upon Hall v. Hamilton, 233 Kan. 880 , 667 P.2d 350 (1983).

1987Ford v. Guarantee Abstract & Title Co., 220 Kan. 244, 272-73 , 553 P.2d 254 (1976).; Hill v. Hill, 185 Kan. at 397-98 .

1987Ford v. Guarantee Abstract & Title Co., 220 Kan. 244, 272-73 , 553 P.2d 254 (1976).; Hill v. Hill, 185 Kan. at 397-98 .

1987Ford v. Guarantee Abstract & Title Co., 220 Kan. 244, 272-73 , 553 P.2d 254 (1976).; Hill v. Hill, 185 Kan. at 397-98 .

1959(Charpie v. Stout, 88 Kan. 318 , 128 Pac. 396 .) It is said of an equitable hen that it is not a right of property in the subject matter of the lien nor a right of action therefor, nor does *398 it depend upon possession; but is merely a right to have the property subjected to the payment of a debt or claim, and it applies as well to charges arising by express engagement of the owner of property as to a duty or intention implied on his part to make the property answerable for a specific debt or engagement.

1959(Charpie v. Stout, 88 Kan. 318 , 128 Pac. 396 .) It is said of an equitable hen that it is not a right of property in the subject matter of the lien nor a right of action therefor, nor does *398 it depend upon possession; but is merely a right to have the property subjected to the payment of a debt or claim, and it applies as well to charges arising by express engagement of the owner of property as to a duty or intention implied on his part to make the property answerable for a specific debt or engagement.

1959(Bisby v. Quinby, 92 Kan. 86 , 140 Pac. 635 .) For additional authorities on equitable liens see, Fitzgerald v. Fitzgerald, 97 Kan. 408 , 155 Pac. 791 ; Bank v. Pickering, 111 Kan. 132 , 205 Pac. 1110 ; Farmers State Bank v. St.

1959(Bisby v. Quinby, 92 Kan. 86 , 140 Pac. 635 .) For additional authorities on equitable liens see, Fitzgerald v. Fitzgerald, 97 Kan. 408 , 155 Pac. 791 ; Bank v. Pickering, 111 Kan. 132 , 205 Pac. 1110 ; Farmers State Bank v. St.

1959(Bisby v. Quinby, 92 Kan. 86 , 140 Pac. 635 .) For additional authorities on equitable liens see, Fitzgerald v. Fitzgerald, 97 Kan. 408 , 155 Pac. 791 ; Bank v. Pickering, 111 Kan. 132 , 205 Pac. 1110 ; Farmers State Bank v. St.

1959(Bisby v. Quinby, 92 Kan. 86 , 140 Pac. 635 .) For additional authorities on equitable liens see, Fitzgerald v. Fitzgerald, 97 Kan. 408 , 155 Pac. 791 ; Bank v. Pickering, 111 Kan. 132 , 205 Pac. 1110 ; Farmers State Bank v. St.

1955(Mendenhall v. Burnette, 58 Kan. 355, 363 , 49 Pac. 93 ; Bisby v. Quinby, 92 Kan. 86 , 140 Pac. 635 ; 33 Am.

1955(Mendenhall v. Burnette, 58 Kan. 355, 363 , 49 Pac. 93 ; Bisby v. Quinby, 92 Kan. 86 , 140 Pac. 635 ; 33 Am.

1953(Roniger v. McIntosh, 91 Kan. 368 , 137 Pac. 792 ; Morlan v. Hutchinson, 116 Kan. 86 , 225 Pac. 739 ; Hines v. Roberts Bros., 117 Kan. 589 , 232 Pac. 1050 .) It is not the function of this court at this time to decide whether the defense of settlement, as pleaded by defendant, can be proved on the trial of the action, but rather whether it was available as a defense.

1953(Roniger v. McIntosh, 91 Kan. 368 , 137 Pac. 792 ; Morlan v. Hutchinson, 116 Kan. 86 , 225 Pac. 739 ; Hines v. Roberts Bros., 117 Kan. 589 , 232 Pac. 1050 .) It is not the function of this court at this time to decide whether the defense of settlement, as pleaded by defendant, can be proved on the trial of the action, but rather whether it was available as a defense.

1953(Roniger v. McIntosh, 91 Kan. 368 , 137 Pac. 792 ; Morlan v. Hutchinson, 116 Kan. 86 , 225 Pac. 739 ; Hines v. Roberts Bros., 117 Kan. 589 , 232 Pac. 1050 .) It is not the function of this court at this time to decide whether the defense of settlement, as pleaded by defendant, can be proved on the trial of the action, but rather whether it was available as a defense.

1953(Roniger v. McIntosh, 91 Kan. 368 , 137 Pac. 792 ; Morlan v. Hutchinson, 116 Kan. 86 , 225 Pac. 739 ; Hines v. Roberts Bros., 117 Kan. 589 , 232 Pac. 1050 .) It is not the function of this court at this time to decide whether the defense of settlement, as pleaded by defendant, can be proved on the trial of the action, but rather whether it was available as a defense.

1953(Roniger v. McIntosh, 91 Kan. 368 , 137 Pac. 792 ; Morlan v. Hutchinson, 116 Kan. 86 , 225 Pac. 739 ; Hines v. Roberts Bros., 117 Kan. 589 , 232 Pac. 1050 .) It is not the function of this court at this time to decide whether the defense of settlement, as pleaded by defendant, can be proved on the trial of the action, but rather whether it was available as a defense.

1953(Roniger v. McIntosh, 91 Kan. 368 , 137 Pac. 792 ; Morlan v. Hutchinson, 116 Kan. 86 , 225 Pac. 739 ; Hines v. Roberts Bros., 117 Kan. 589 , 232 Pac. 1050 .) It is not the function of this court at this time to decide whether the defense of settlement, as pleaded by defendant, can be proved on the trial of the action, but rather whether it was available as a defense.

1938There was no waiver of interest by election, as in Turner v. George Rushton Baking Co., 139 Kan. 425 , 32 P. 2d 198 .

1916(Justh v. Bank, 56 N. Y. 478 ; Stephens v. Board of Education, 79 N. Y. 183 .) This doctrine goes upon the ground that money has no earmark; that in general it can not be identified as chattels may be, and that to permit in every case of the payment of a debt an inquiry as to the source from which the debtor derived the money, and a recovery if shown to have been dishonestly acquired, would disorganize all business operations and entail an amount of risk and uncertainty which no enterprise could bear.

1916(Justh v. Bank, 56 N. Y. 478 ; Stephens v. Board of Education, 79 N. Y. 183 .) This doctrine goes upon the ground that money has no earmark; that in general it can not be identified as chattels may be, and that to permit in every case of the payment of a debt an inquiry as to the source from which the debtor derived the money, and a recovery if shown to have been dishonestly acquired, would disorganize all business operations and entail an amount of risk and uncertainty which no enterprise could bear.

1898In the case of Elder v. Dyer, 26 Kan. 604 , section 24 (now section 18) of the code is construed with reference to -an acknowledgment of an existing liability on a debt. 'The cóurt said: “Tn Kansas, all that is necessary to take a cause of Action founded upon contract out of the operation of the statute is, that there should be an acknowledgment of ‘ an existing liability ’ on the original debt or claim ; and' then when the action is brought, it is brought not upon the acknowledgment, nor upon any new promise, but it is-brought upon the original debt or claim.” In the case of Devereaux v. Henr

1898In the case of Elder v. Dyer, 26 Kan. 604 , section 24 (now section 18) of the code is construed with reference to -an acknowledgment of an existing liability on a debt. 'The cóurt said: “Tn Kansas, all that is necessary to take a cause of Action founded upon contract out of the operation of the statute is, that there should be an acknowledgment of ‘ an existing liability ’ on the original debt or claim ; and' then when the action is brought, it is brought not upon the acknowledgment, nor upon any new promise, but it is-brought upon the original debt or claim.” In the case of Devereaux v. Henr

1892(Zane v. Zane, 5 Kas. 134 ; Stanclift v. Norton, 11 id. 218 .) If there had been no revivor of the judgment in Ohio, we suppose it would be conceded, even if the judgment had not become dormant under the statutes of that state, that no recovery could be had upon the judgment in this state, if Mr. Moore had been an actual resident of this state for five years (the full time of our limitation) after the rendition of the judgment.

1892(Zane v. Zane, 5 Kas. 134 ; Stanclift v. Norton, 11 id. 218 .) If there had been no revivor of the judgment in Ohio, we suppose it would be conceded, even if the judgment had not become dormant under the statutes of that state, that no recovery could be had upon the judgment in this state, if Mr. Moore had been an actual resident of this state for five years (the full time of our limitation) after the rendition of the judgment.

1892(Civil Code, §18; Burnes v. Simpson, 9 Kas. 658 ; Mawhinney v. Doane, 40 id. 676 .) Where it is apparent from the face of the petition that the debt or claim is barred, a demurrer is properly sustained.

1892(Civil Code, §18; Burnes v. Simpson, 9 Kas. 658 ; Mawhinney v. Doane, 40 id. 676 .) Where it is apparent from the face of the petition that the debt or claim is barred, a demurrer is properly sustained.