debt claim in Georgia

1963See Zellner v. Hall, 210 Ga. 504 (3) ( 80 SE2d 787 ), where it was unanimously held: “When a grantee in a sales agreement, as a part of the consideration thereof, assumes and agrees to pay an outstanding indebtedness against the property thus conveyed, evidenced by a note and deed to secure debt, he takes upon himself the burden of the debt or claim secured by the deed, and, as between himself and his grantor, he becomes the principal and the latter merely a surety for the payment of the debt.” For like holdings, see Stapler v. Anderson, 177 Ga. 434, 436 ( 170 SE 498 ); Alropa Corp. v. Snyder,

1963See Zellner v. Hall, 210 Ga. 504 (3) ( 80 SE2d 787 ), where it was unanimously held: “When a grantee in a sales agreement, as a part of the consideration thereof, assumes and agrees to pay an outstanding indebtedness against the property thus conveyed, evidenced by a note and deed to secure debt, he takes upon himself the burden of the debt or claim secured by the deed, and, as between himself and his grantor, he becomes the principal and the latter merely a surety for the payment of the debt.” For like holdings, see Stapler v. Anderson, 177 Ga. 434, 436 ( 170 SE 498 ); Alropa Corp. v. Snyder,

2015See also Nations II, 256 Ga. at 160 (“It is clear a municipality may enter into a contract authorized by the intergovernmental contracts clause for the future expenditure of funds without violating the debt clause of Art.

1992Under this stringent provision, when property is received under such contract the *477 law does not raise an implied undertaking on the part of such municipality ... to pay therefor, as the enforcement of such implied undertaking would enable the city and the purchaser to evade this constitutional provision and would in effect render the same nugatory and void. [Cits.]” (Emphasis supplied.) Board of Lights &c. v. Niller, 155 Ga. 296, 303-304 (6) ( 116 SE 835 ) (1923); see also Decatur County v. Roberts, 159 Ga. 528 (2) ( 126 SE 460 ) (1925) (implied contract will not arise where express contra

1992Under this stringent provision, when property is received under such contract the *477 law does not raise an implied undertaking on the part of such municipality ... to pay therefor, as the enforcement of such implied undertaking would enable the city and the purchaser to evade this constitutional provision and would in effect render the same nugatory and void. [Cits.]” (Emphasis supplied.) Board of Lights &c. v. Niller, 155 Ga. 296, 303-304 (6) ( 116 SE 835 ) (1923); see also Decatur County v. Roberts, 159 Ga. 528 (2) ( 126 SE 460 ) (1925) (implied contract will not arise where express contra

1992Under this stringent provision, when property is received under such contract the *477 law does not raise an implied undertaking on the part of such municipality ... to pay therefor, as the enforcement of such implied undertaking would enable the city and the purchaser to evade this constitutional provision and would in effect render the same nugatory and void. [Cits.]” (Emphasis supplied.) Board of Lights &c. v. Niller, 155 Ga. 296, 303-304 (6) ( 116 SE 835 ) (1923); see also Decatur County v. Roberts, 159 Ga. 528 (2) ( 126 SE 460 ) (1925) (implied contract will not arise where express contra

1992Under this stringent provision, when property is received under such contract the *477 law does not raise an implied undertaking on the part of such municipality ... to pay therefor, as the enforcement of such implied undertaking would enable the city and the purchaser to evade this constitutional provision and would in effect render the same nugatory and void. [Cits.]” (Emphasis supplied.) Board of Lights &c. v. Niller, 155 Ga. 296, 303-304 (6) ( 116 SE 835 ) (1923); see also Decatur County v. Roberts, 159 Ga. 528 (2) ( 126 SE 460 ) (1925) (implied contract will not arise where express contra

1970In the Stegall case (p. 588), it was held: "While it has been held by some courts that housing authorities created under similar statutes are municipal corporations in the broad sense that their property might be treated as public property for the purpose of tax exemption, the regional authority here could not be correctly classified as a municipal corporation within the meaning of the foregoing debt clause of our Constitution." The author of that opinion wrote for the court in Culbreth v. Southwest Ga. Housing Authority, 199 Ga. 183, 188 ( 33 SE2d 684 ), with one Justice dissenting: "The Cons

1970In the Stegall case (p. 588), it was held: "While it has been held by some courts that housing authorities created under similar statutes are municipal corporations in the broad sense that their property might be treated as public property for the purpose of tax exemption, the regional authority here could not be correctly classified as a municipal corporation within the meaning of the foregoing debt clause of our Constitution." The author of that opinion wrote for the court in Culbreth v. Southwest Ga. Housing Authority, 199 Ga. 183, 188 ( 33 SE2d 684 ), with one Justice dissenting: "The Cons

1963See Zellner v. Hall, 210 Ga. 504 (3) ( 80 SE2d 787 ), where it was unanimously held: “When a grantee in a sales agreement, as a part of the consideration thereof, assumes and agrees to pay an outstanding indebtedness against the property thus conveyed, evidenced by a note and deed to secure debt, he takes upon himself the burden of the debt or claim secured by the deed, and, as between himself and his grantor, he becomes the principal and the latter merely a surety for the payment of the debt.” For like holdings, see Stapler v. Anderson, 177 Ga. 434, 436 ( 170 SE 498 ); Alropa Corp. v. Snyder,

1963See Zellner v. Hall, 210 Ga. 504 (3) ( 80 SE2d 787 ), where it was unanimously held: “When a grantee in a sales agreement, as a part of the consideration thereof, assumes and agrees to pay an outstanding indebtedness against the property thus conveyed, evidenced by a note and deed to secure debt, he takes upon himself the burden of the debt or claim secured by the deed, and, as between himself and his grantor, he becomes the principal and the latter merely a surety for the payment of the debt.” For like holdings, see Stapler v. Anderson, 177 Ga. 434, 436 ( 170 SE 498 ); Alropa Corp. v. Snyder,

1940A plaintiff may amend his petition by alleging a new promise to pay, made after the original debt or claim became barred [citing].” Sinclair Refining Co. v. Scott, 60 Ga. App. 76, 78 ( 2 S. E. 2d, 755 ).

1940A plaintiff may amend his petition by alleging a new promise to pay, made after the original debt or claim became barred [citing].” Sinclair Refining Co. v. Scott, 60 Ga. App. 76, 78 ( 2 S. E. 2d, 755 ).