Already have an account? Sign in instead.
You stay signed in for 30 days on this browser.
Continue with Google Continue with MicrosoftNo account yet? Create a free one.
We sent a six-digit code.
It expires in ten minutes, works once, and only in this browser. Five wrong tries void it. Send another code.
Your account is live and the Cloudflare checks are off for this browser.
9 Colorado opinions name it 2 courts 1908–2006 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Colorado courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Gude v. City of Lakewoodgreen2 sentences1995No. 1247, 193 Colo. 298, 305 , 566 P.2d 350, 355-56 (1977) (holding that H.B. 1247 did not constitute a debt in violation of Colorado Constitution Article XI, Section 3, which limits the state debt, because it did not pledge future state revenues nor did it create an obligation payable from general-purpose tax revenues); Gude, 636 P.2d at 697 (finding that Colorado Constitution Article XI, Section 6, requires voter approval for a local government's creation of general obligation debt, i.e., debt that the municipality is obligated to pay from its tax revenues). 1995No. 1247, 193 Colo. 298, 305 , 566 P.2d 350, 355-56 (1977) (holding that H.B. 1247 did not constitute a debt in violation of Colorado Constitution Article XI, Section 3, which limits the state debt, because it did not pledge future state revenues nor did it create an obligation payable from general-purpose tax revenues); Gude, 636 P.2d at 697 (finding that Colorado Constitution Article XI, Section 6, requires voter approval for a local government’s creation of general obligation debt, i.e., debt that the municipality is obligated to pay from its tax revenues). | 2 | 2 |
In Re Interrogatories by the Colorado State Senategreen2 sentences1995No. 1247, 193 Colo. 298, 305 , 566 P.2d 350, 355-56 (1977) (holding that H.B. 1247 did not constitute a debt in violation of Colorado Constitution Article XI, Section 3, which limits the state debt, because it did not pledge future state revenues nor did it create an obligation payable from general-purpose tax revenues); Gude, 636 P.2d at 697 (finding that Colorado Constitution Article XI, Section 6, requires voter approval for a local government's creation of general obligation debt, i.e., debt that the municipality is obligated to pay from its tax revenues). 1995No. 1247, 193 Colo. 298, 305 , 566 P.2d 350, 355-56 (1977) (holding that H.B. 1247 did not constitute a debt in violation of Colorado Constitution Article XI, Section 3, which limits the state debt, because it did not pledge future state revenues nor did it create an obligation payable from general-purpose tax revenues); Gude, 636 P.2d at 697 (finding that Colorado Constitution Article XI, Section 6, requires voter approval for a local government's creation of general obligation debt, i.e., debt that the municipality is obligated to pay from its tax revenues). | 2 | 2 |
Wilder v. Bakergreen2 sentences1982It ruled that such notice was not “notice to a duly authorized attorney in the sense that the bankruptcy statute requires so as to bind the creditor.” See In re Porter, 16 B.R. 229 (1981); see also Wilder v. Baker, 147 Colo. 92 , 362 P.2d 1045 (1961). 1982It ruled that such notice was not “notice to a duly authorized attorney in the sense that the bankruptcy statute requires so as to bind the creditor.” See In re Porter, 16 B.R. 229 (1981); see also Wilder v. Baker, 147 Colo. 92 , 362 P.2d 1045 (1961). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Colorado. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Browder v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co.
green
2 sentences2006Subrogation is defined as the substitution of "one person . . . in the place of another with reference to a lawful claim, demand or right of the other in relation to the debt or claim, and its rights, remedies or securities." See Browder, supra, 893 P.2d at 135 n. 4 (citing Black's Law Dictionary 1427 (6th ed.1990)). 2006Subrogation is defined as the substitution of "one person . . . in the place of another with reference to a lawful claim, demand or right of the other in relation to the debt or claim, and its rights, remedies or securities." See Browder, supra, 893 P.2d at 135 n. 4 (citing Black's Law Dictionary 1427 (6th ed.1990)). | 2 | 2006–2006 |
Porter v. Arrow Investment Corp. (In Re Porter)
green
1 sentence1982It ruled that such notice was not “notice to a duly authorized attorney in the sense that the bankruptcy statute requires so as to bind the creditor.” See In re Porter, 16 B.R. 229 (1981); see also Wilder v. Baker, 147 Colo. 92 , 362 P.2d 1045 (1961). | 1 | 1982–1982 |
Duncan v. Guillet
neutral
2 sentences1977Subrogation presupposes an actual payment and satisfaction of a debt or claim to which the party paying is subrogated, although the remedy is kept alive in equity for the benefit of the payor, while the assignment necessarily contemplates continued existence of the debt or claim assigned." See Duncan v. Guillet, 62 Colo. 220 , 161 P. 299 (1916); Kirkham v. Hickerson Bros. 1977Subrogation presupposes an actual payment and satisfaction of a debt or claim to which the party paying is subrogated, although the remedy is kept alive in equity for the benefit of the payor, while the assignment necessarily contemplates continued existence of the debt or claim assigned." See Duncan v. Guillet, 62 Colo. 220 , 161 P. 299 (1916); Kirkham v. Hickerson Bros. | 1 | 1977–1977 |
Kirkham v. Hickerson Bros. Truck Co.
green
2 sentences1977Truck Co., 29 Colo.App. 303 , 485 P.2d 513 (1971). 1977Truck Co., 29 Colo.App. 303 , 485 P.2d 513 (1971). | 1 | 1977–1977 |
McLain Co. v. Botleman
green
1 sentence1971One of the first of these was Froid v. Knowles, 95 Colo. 223 , 36 P.2d 156 , wherein the court said, "The law does not attempt in any way to abridge the remedies which an employee of one person may have at law against a third person for a tort which such third person commits against him." (Emphasis added) In Riss & Co. v. Anderson, 108 Colo. 78 , 114 P.2d 278 , the above statement was amplified as follows, "[The] statute * * * is not designed to relieve a third party from the consequences of injuries to another negligently inflicted, but merely affords a means of adjusting rights as between th | 1 | 1971–1971 |
Riss & Co. v. Anderson
green
2 sentences1971One of the first of these was Froid v. Knowles, 95 Colo. 223 , 36 P.2d 156 , wherein the court said, "The law does not attempt in any way to abridge the remedies which an employee of one person may have at law against a third person for a tort which such third person commits against him." (Emphasis added) In Riss & Co. v. Anderson, 108 Colo. 78 , 114 P.2d 278 , the above statement was amplified as follows, "[The] statute * * * is not designed to relieve a third party from the consequences of injuries to another negligently inflicted, but merely affords a means of adjusting rights as between th 1971One of the first of these was Froid v. Knowles, 95 Colo. 223 , 36 P.2d 156 , wherein the court said, "The law does not attempt in any way to abridge the remedies which an employee of one person may have at law against a third person for a tort which such third person commits against him." (Emphasis added) In Riss & Co. v. Anderson, 108 Colo. 78 , 114 P.2d 278 , the above statement was amplified as follows, "[The] statute * * * is not designed to relieve a third party from the consequences of injuries to another negligently inflicted, but merely affords a means of adjusting rights as between th | 1 | 1971–1971 |
Froid v. Knowles
green
1 sentence1971One of the first of these was Froid v. Knowles, 95 Colo. 223 , 36 P.2d 156 , wherein the court said, "The law does not attempt in any way to abridge the remedies which an employee of one person may have at law against a third person for a tort which such third person commits against him." (Emphasis added) In Riss & Co. v. Anderson, 108 Colo. 78 , 114 P.2d 278 , the above statement was amplified as follows, "[The] statute * * * is not designed to relieve a third party from the consequences of injuries to another negligently inflicted, but merely affords a means of adjusting rights as between th | 1 | 1971–1971 |
Reimer v. Town of Holyoke
green
2 sentences1934However, bonds payable by special assessments are everywhere held not to be debts of the municipality, so, we must regard this case as an authority in favor of plaintiff in error; but we follow Shields v. Loveland, City of Bowling Green v. Kirby and Winston v. Spokane, supra, and hold that the proposed bonds are not debts of the town.” The attorneys who attack the constitutionality of the act contend that the recent case of Reimer v. Town of Holyoke, 93 Colo. 571 , 27 P. (2d) 1032 , conclusively determines that the act before us contemplates the creation of a debt in violation of section 3 of 1934However, bonds payable by special assessments are everywhere held not to be debts of the municipality, so, we must regard this case as an authority in favor of plaintiff in error; but we follow Shields v. Loveland, City of Bowling Green v. Kirby and Winston v. Spokane, supra, and hold that the proposed bonds are not debts of the town.” The attorneys who attack the constitutionality of the act contend that the recent case of Reimer v. Town of Holyoke, 93 Colo. 571 , 27 P. (2d) 1032 , conclusively determines that the act before us contemplates the creation of a debt in violation of section 3 of | 1 | 1934–1934 |
Berdell v. Bissell
green
1 sentence1908Where' the claim settled is not a money demand, or, if so, is unliquidated, or if liquidated, is doubtful in fact or in law, any sum, however small, given and received in satisfaction of the demand, however large, will legally satisfy it.” (Citing Berdell v. Bissell, 6 Colo. 162 ; Union Pacific Railway Co. v. Anderson, 11 Colo. 293 , and a long list of cases.) Plaintiffs further contend that Exhibit 1 is expressly limited by its language to the contract of September 3, 1901, and that the court misconstrued this instrument in applying it to the matters alleged as the basis of plaintiffs ’ secon | 1 | 1908–1908 |
Union Pac. R. Co. v. Anderson
neutral
1 sentence1908Where' the claim settled is not a money demand, or, if so, is unliquidated, or if liquidated, is doubtful in fact or in law, any sum, however small, given and received in satisfaction of the demand, however large, will legally satisfy it.” (Citing Berdell v. Bissell, 6 Colo. 162 ; Union Pacific Railway Co. v. Anderson, 11 Colo. 293 , and a long list of cases.) Plaintiffs further contend that Exhibit 1 is expressly limited by its language to the contract of September 3, 1901, and that the court misconstrued this instrument in applying it to the matters alleged as the basis of plaintiffs ’ secon | 1 | 1908–1908 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.