debt claim in New York

1930(Nassoiy v. Tomlinson, 148 N. Y. 326 .) In Simons v. American Legion of Honor ( 178 N. Y. 263 ) the Court of Appeals stated the rule (at p. 265) as follows: “ Now it is the settled law of this State that if a debt or claim be disputed or contingent at the time of payment, the payment, when accepted, of a part of the whole debt is a good satisfaction and it matters not that there was no solid foundation for the dispute.” (See, also, Hettrick Mfg.

1914(Nassoiy v. Tomlinson, 148 N. Y. 326 ; Auerbach v. Curie, 126 App. Div. 836 ; Jaffray v. Davis, 124 N. Y. 164 .) It is the settled law of this state that if a debt or claim be disputed or contingent at the time of payment the payment when accepted of a part óf the whole debt is a good satisfaction, and it matters not that there was no solid foundation for the dispute.

1972The defendant herein relies heavily on the general rule that an attorney has authority to receive payment of a debt or claim which he is employed to collect, citing McCoy case ( 250 App. Div. 682 , supra) which involved an action to cancel and discharge a mortgage of record.

1971Perhaps because the proposition is so basic to the attorney-client relationship, there has been scant occasion for the courts to comment on the fact that, absent any special limitations, an attorney has full authority to receive payment of a debt or claim which he is employed to recover by suit or to collect (McCoy v. Barclay, 250 App. Div. 682 ).

1958Co., 270 App. Div. 472 ; Pearce v. Kenney, 152 App. Div. 638 ) and judgment dismissing the complaint, as against the owner, in an action for work, labor and services is likewise no bar, since it is not necessary that the owner of the fee be personally liable for the indebtedness to give validity to the lien or to any action for the foreclosure thereof.

1946(Pearce v. Kenney, 152 App. Div. 638 .) In the interests of justice we are constrained to reverse the order and judgment of dismissal of the complaint herein, and to permit the plaintiff to amend the same, if he is so advised, within twenty days after the entry of an order of reversal, with leave to the defendant to answer within twenty days after the service of such amended complaint.

1932It is true that in the case of Penoyar v. Kelsey ( 150 N. Y. 77 ), in speaking of common-law attachment, the Court of Appeals used this language: “ It was part of the service of process in a civil action through a species of distress, in which the goods attached were the ancient vadii or pledges. {Bond v. Ward, 7 Mass. 123, 128 ; Gilbert’s Law of Distress, 24.) As was said in the case last cited, ' the practice of attaching the effects of a defendant and holding them to satisfy a judgment, which the plaintiff may recover, when, perhaps, judgment may be for the defendant, is unknown to the comm

1911So far as they affect property in the State they are substantially proceedings in rem in -the broader sense which we have mentioned.” In Penoyar v.. Kelsey ( 150 N. Y. 77 ) the court, in speaking of .the effect of a warrant of attachment upon which a levy has been made, said: “ Its present purpose is not to compel appearance by the debtor, but to secure the debt or claim of the creditor.' It is a proceeding in rem, and the process may issue in certain eases whether the defendant has been served with a summons or not, although inability to serve through the fault of the defendant, is a ground u

1930(Nassoiy v. Tomlinson, 148 N. Y. 326 .) In Simons v. American Legion of Honor ( 178 N. Y. 263 ) the Court of Appeals stated the rule (at p. 265) as follows: “ Now it is the settled law of this State that if a debt or claim be disputed or contingent at the time of payment, the payment, when accepted, of a part of the whole debt is a good satisfaction and it matters not that there was no solid foundation for the dispute.” (See, also, Hettrick Mfg.

1924In such cases the acceptance of a less sum than is the creditor’s due, will not of itself discharge the debt, even if a receipt in full is given.” And in Simons v. Supreme Council American Legion of Honor ( 178 N. Y. 263, 265 ) the point was stated in these words: “ Now it is the settled law of this state that if a debt or claim be disputed or contingent at the time of payment, the payment, when accepted, of a part of the whole debt is a good satisfaction and it matters not that there was no solid foundation for the dispute.” And in Eames Vacuum Brake Co. v. Prosser ( 157 N. Y. 289, 301 ) this

1915In Hamilton v. Van Rensselaer ( 43 N. Y. 244, 246 ) it is stated generally that when interest is only recoverable as damages after default in the payment of the principal, the receipt of the principal debt is a bar to the claim for such interest; but as Jacot v. Emmett (supra) is cited as authority for the proposition it must be regarded as subject to the same proviso implied in that case, to wit, that it operates as a bar only where there was no reservation of the right to claim interest afterwards.

1883In Tittotson v. Preston (supra), the court say, “if the plaintiff accepted the principal he cannot afterward bring an action for the interest.” In Hamilton v. Van Rensselaer ( 43 N. Y. 244 ), it is said that when interest is only recoverable as damages after default in the payment of the principal, the receipt of the principal debt is a bar to the claim for such interest.

2011We have explained that "to permit in every case of the payment of a debt an inquiry as to the source from which the debtor derived the money, and a recovery if shown to have been dishonestly acquired, would disorganize all business operations and entail an amount of risk and uncertainty which no enterprise could bear" ( id. [internal quotation marks and citation omitted]).

1995The Supreme Court reaffirmed this doctrine in Mobil Oil Exploration v United Distrib. ( 498 US 211, 228 ): "Time and again, '[t]he Court has recognized that even where an agency’s enabling statute expressly requires it to hold a hearing, the agency may rely on its rulemaking authority to determine issues that do not require case-by-case consideration.’ Heckler v. Campbell, [ 461 US 458, 467 ]; Permian Basin, [ 390 US 747, 774-777 ]; FPC v. Texaco Inc., 377 U. S. 33, 41-44 (1964); United States v. Storer Broadcasting Co., 351 U. S. 192, 205 (1956).

1995The Supreme Court reaffirmed this doctrine in Mobil Oil Exploration v United Distrib. ( 498 US 211, 228 ): "Time and again, '[t]he Court has recognized that even where an agency’s enabling statute expressly requires it to hold a hearing, the agency may rely on its rulemaking authority to determine issues that do not require case-by-case consideration.’ Heckler v. Campbell, [ 461 US 458, 467 ]; Permian Basin, [ 390 US 747, 774-777 ]; FPC v. Texaco Inc., 377 U. S. 33, 41-44 (1964); United States v. Storer Broadcasting Co., 351 U. S. 192, 205 (1956).

1995The Supreme Court reaffirmed this doctrine in Mobil Oil Exploration v United Distrib. ( 498 US 211, 228 ): "Time and again, '[t]he Court has recognized that even where an agency’s enabling statute expressly requires it to hold a hearing, the agency may rely on its rulemaking authority to determine issues that do not require case-by-case consideration.’ Heckler v. Campbell, [ 461 US 458, 467 ]; Permian Basin, [ 390 US 747, 774-777 ]; FPC v. Texaco Inc., 377 U. S. 33, 41-44 (1964); United States v. Storer Broadcasting Co., 351 U. S. 192, 205 (1956).

1995The Supreme Court reaffirmed this doctrine in Mobil Oil Exploration v United Distrib. ( 498 US 211, 228 ): "Time and again, '[t]he Court has recognized that even where an agency’s enabling statute expressly requires it to hold a hearing, the agency may rely on its rulemaking authority to determine issues that do not require case-by-case consideration.’ Heckler v. Campbell, [ 461 US 458, 467 ]; Permian Basin, [ 390 US 747, 774-777 ]; FPC v. Texaco Inc., 377 U. S. 33, 41-44 (1964); United States v. Storer Broadcasting Co., 351 U. S. 192, 205 (1956).

1995Assn. v Whalen, 54 NY2d 486, 495 ).

1995Assn. v Whalen, 54 NY2d 486, 495 ).

1995Petitioners have made no showing that "the burden imposed on commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits” (Pike v Bruce Church, 397 US 137, 142 ), and their bare allegation that the DEBT rule imposed an undue burden on interstate commerce is insufficient to render the rule unconstitutional (see, Pharmaceutical Mfrs.

1995Petitioners have made no showing that "the burden imposed on commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits” (Pike v Bruce Church, 397 US 137, 142 ), and their bare allegation that the DEBT rule imposed an undue burden on interstate commerce is insufficient to render the rule unconstitutional (see, Pharmaceutical Mfrs.

1995The Appellate Division modified, declaring that 6 NYCRR 326.2 (b) (10), the DEBT rule, "has not been shown to be invalid.” Although the Court concluded that DEC must comply with title 7 when cancelling registrations of noncomplying products, it held that registrants "cannot challenge the validity of the DEBT regulation” in the title 7 proceedings ( 197 AD2d 314, 320 ).

1995The Appellate Division modified, declaring that 6 NYCRR 326.2 (b) (10), the DEBT rule, "has not been shown to be invalid.” Although the Court concluded that DEC must comply with title 7 when cancelling registrations of noncomplying products, it held that registrants "cannot challenge the validity of the DEBT regulation” in the title 7 proceedings ( 197 AD2d 314, 320 ).

1995The Supreme Court reaffirmed this doctrine in Mobil Oil Exploration v United Distrib. ( 498 US 211, 228 ): "Time and again, '[t]he Court has recognized that even where an agency’s enabling statute expressly requires it to hold a hearing, the agency may rely on its rulemaking authority to determine issues that do not require case-by-case consideration.’ Heckler v. Campbell, [ 461 US 458, 467 ]; Permian Basin, [ 390 US 747, 774-777 ]; FPC v. Texaco Inc., 377 U. S. 33, 41-44 (1964); United States v. Storer Broadcasting Co., 351 U. S. 192, 205 (1956).

1995The Supreme Court reaffirmed this doctrine in Mobil Oil Exploration v United Distrib. ( 498 US 211, 228 ): "Time and again, '[t]he Court has recognized that even where an agency’s enabling statute expressly requires it to hold a hearing, the agency may rely on its rulemaking authority to determine issues that do not require case-by-case consideration.’ Heckler v. Campbell, [ 461 US 458, 467 ]; Permian Basin, [ 390 US 747, 774-777 ]; FPC v. Texaco Inc., 377 U. S. 33, 41-44 (1964); United States v. Storer Broadcasting Co., 351 U. S. 192, 205 (1956).

1995The primary purpose of SEQRA is "to inject environmental considerations directly into governmental decision making” (Matter of Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v Board of Estimate, 72 NY2d 674, 679 ).

1991Bank ( 147 NY 184, 192 ) that "to permit in every case of the payment of a debt an inquiry as to the source from which the debtor derived the money, and a recovery if shown to have been dishonestly acquired, would disorganize all business operations and entail an amount of risk and uncertainty which no enterprise could bear”.

1991A consequence of this concern has been the adoption of a rule which precludes recovery from a third person, who as the result of the mistake of one or both of the parties to an original transaction receives payment by one of them in good faith in the ordinary course of business and for a valuable consideration (see, Ball v Shepard, 202 NY 247 , supra).

1985(See, e.g., Matter of Leopold, 259 NY 274 , compromising an action against decedent pending at the time of death; Matter of Barber, 205 Misc 596 , affd 283 App Div 785 , compromise of estate taxes; Matter of Dana, 206 Misc 1038 , compromise of loan of money to decedent; Matter of Rappoport, supra, settlement of judgment pending appeal.) But even assuming, the statute can be utilized in the matter before the court, it cannot apply to the claim of the coexecutor son which is proscribed by the limitations of SCPA 1805.

1985(See, e.g., Matter of Leopold, 259 NY 274 , compromising an action against decedent pending at the time of death; Matter of Barber, 205 Misc 596 , affd 283 App Div 785 , compromise of estate taxes; Matter of Dana, 206 Misc 1038 , compromise of loan of money to decedent; Matter of Rappoport, supra, settlement of judgment pending appeal.) But even assuming, the statute can be utilized in the matter before the court, it cannot apply to the claim of the coexecutor son which is proscribed by the limitations of SCPA 1805.

1985(See, e.g., Matter of Leopold, 259 NY 274 , compromising an action against decedent pending at the time of death; Matter of Barber, 205 Misc 596 , affd 283 App Div 785 , compromise of estate taxes; Matter of Dana, 206 Misc 1038 , compromise of loan of money to decedent; Matter of Rappoport, supra, settlement of judgment pending appeal.) But even assuming, the statute can be utilized in the matter before the court, it cannot apply to the claim of the coexecutor son which is proscribed by the limitations of SCPA 1805.

1985(Matter of Rappoport, 102 Misc 2d 910 .) SCPA 1813 (1) relates to a debt or claim where a relationship of debtor and creditor are involved rather than a dispute involving the construction of the will and the amount of a legacy to be received thereunder.

1985(See, e.g., Matter of Leopold, 259 NY 274 , compromising an action against decedent pending at the time of death; Matter of Barber, 205 Misc 596 , affd 283 App Div 785 , compromise of estate taxes; Matter of Dana, 206 Misc 1038 , compromise of loan of money to decedent; Matter of Rappoport, supra, settlement of judgment pending appeal.) But even assuming, the statute can be utilized in the matter before the court, it cannot apply to the claim of the coexecutor son which is proscribed by the limitations of SCPA 1805.

1985(See, e.g., Matter of Leopold, 259 NY 274 , compromising an action against decedent pending at the time of death; Matter of Barber, 205 Misc 596 , affd 283 App Div 785 , compromise of estate taxes; Matter of Dana, 206 Misc 1038 , compromise of loan of money to decedent; Matter of Rappoport, supra, settlement of judgment pending appeal.) But even assuming, the statute can be utilized in the matter before the court, it cannot apply to the claim of the coexecutor son which is proscribed by the limitations of SCPA 1805.

1972In its decision, the court said (p. 684): “ The authority of an attorney to receive the payment of a debt or claim which he is employed to recover * * * is well settled.” (citing Stratton v. Graham, 164 App. Div. 348 ).

1966R. [N. S.] 349, 6 F. Supp. 547 .” Further, “ Section 11a provides that a suit may be stayed which ‘ is founded upon a claim from which a discharge would be a release.’ This dischargeability of the debt, as covered by § 17 of the Act, is made the basis of jurisdiction and there should be no stay granted unless the debt or claim involved will be discharged under the provisions of the Act, even though the claimant is listed as a creditor in the bankrupt’s schedule.” (Collier, Bankruptcy Manual, p. 162.) It is therefore obvious that the purpose of the stay is to prevent the harassment of a bankrup

1958Co., 270 App. Div. 472 ; Pearce v. Kenney, 152 App. Div. 638 ) and judgment dismissing the complaint, as against the owner, in an action for work, labor and services is likewise no bar, since it is not necessary that the owner of the fee be personally liable for the indebtedness to give validity to the lien or to any action for the foreclosure thereof.

1956He is not charged with importing or exporting women or girls from the State for immoral purposes in violation of subdivision 1; nor with inducing or attempting to induce or procure any woman or girl to enter a house of prostitution under subdivision 3 (the word “ or ” has been written out of this subdivision by People v. Draper, supra, p. 490 ); nor with receiving money for placing a woman in a house of prostitution in violation of subdivision 4 ; nor with paying money to acquire a woman for this purpose in violation of subdivision 5; nor with receiving money to place a woman in the custody of