61 Texas opinions name it 3 courts 1891–2023 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Texas courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Standard Constructors, Inc. v. Chevron Chemical Co.green2 sentences2021Co., 101 S.W.3d 619, 627 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2003, pet. denied)). 2018Co., 101 S.W.3d 619, 627 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2003, pet. denied). –19– Flores testified that she spoke with Haug in November 2013 seeking payment for the drywall materials, sent all of the outstanding invoices to Skyline, and never received payment. | 14 | 14 |
France v. American Indemnity Co.green2 sentences2021Co., 648 S.W.2d 283, 286 (Tex. 1983)). “[A]ll that is necessary is that a party show that its assertion of a debt or claim and a request for compliance was made to the opposing party, and the opposing party refused to pay the claim.” Id. (quoting Standard Constructors, Inc. v. Chevron Chem. 2021Co., 648 S.W.2d 283, 286 (Tex. 1983)). “[A]ll that is necessary is that a party show that its assertion of a debt or claim and a request for compliance was made to the opposing party, and the opposing party refused to pay the claim.” Id. (quoting Standard Constructors, Inc. v. Chevron Chem. | 5 | 5 |
Panizo v. YOUNG MEN'S ASS'Ngreen2 sentences2006Id. “[A]ll that is necessary is that a party show that its assertion of a debt or claim and a request for compliance was made to the opposing party, and the opposing party refused to pay the claim.” Standard Constructors, Inc. v. Chevron Chem. 2006Id. “[A]ll that is necessary is that a party show that its assertion of a debt or claim and a request for compliance was made to the opposing party, and the opposing party refused to pay the claim.” Standard Constructors, Inc. v. Chevron Chem. | 4 | 8 |
Jones v. Kelleygreen2 sentences2018Co., 648 S.W.2d 283, 286 (Tex. 1983); Jones, 614 S.W.2d at 100 . “[A]ll that is necessary is that a party show that its assertion of a debt or claim and a request for compliance was made to the opposing party, and the opposing party refused to pay the claim.” Standard Constructors, Inc. v. Chevron Chem. 2018Co., 648 S.W.2d 283, 286 (Tex. 1983); Jones, 614 S.W.2d at 100 . “[A]ll that is necessary is that a party show that its assertion of a debt or claim and a request for compliance was made to the opposing party, and the opposing party refused to pay the claim.” Standard Constructors, Inc. v. Chevron Chem. | 2 | 6 |
Ex Parte Yatesgreen2 sentences1984Ex parte Yates, 387 S.W.2d 377, 380 (Tex.1965); Ex parte Duncan, 462 S.W.2d 336, 338 (Tex.Civ.App. 1980Ex Parte Yates, 387 S.W.2d 377 (Tex.1965), Ex Parte Neff, 542 S.W.2d 268 (Tex.Civ.App.-Ft. | 2 | 3 |
Alan Gordon, Lauren Gordon, and IBL Construction & Design, LLC v. Dennis Leasman D/B/A Leasman Contractinggreen2 sentences2018Code Ann. § 38.002 (2)– (3); Gordon v. Leasman, 365 S.W.3d 109, 116 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2011, no pet.) (stating that presentment may be oral and that all that is “necessary is that a party show that its assertion of a debt or claim and a request for compliance was made to the opposing party, and the opposing party refused to pay the claim”); W. 2015See Gordon, 365 S.W.3d at 116 ; see also Belew v. Rector, 202 S.W.3d 849, 857 (Tex.App.-Eastland 2006, no pet.) (stating that presentment may be done orally or in writing and may be accomplished with.requests for admission, but that “[m]erely filing a breach of. contract claim, however, is insufficient”). “[A]ll that is necessary is that a party show that its assertion of a debt or claim and a request for-compliance was made to the opposing party, and the opposing party refused to pay the claim.” Gordon, 365 S.W.3d at 116 (quoting Standard Constructors, Inc. v. Chevron Chem. | 2 | 2 |
Amirsaleh v. Board of Trade of the City of New York, Inc.green2 sentences2018See Amirsaleh, 27 A.3d at 529–30; CitiSteel USA, 758 A.2d at 931 . 2018See Amirsaleh, 27 A.3d at 529–30; CitiSteel USA, 758 A.2d at 931 . | 2 | 2 |
Ex Parte Duncangreen2 sentences1984Ex parte Yates, 387 S.W.2d 377, 380 (Tex.1965); Ex parte Duncan, 462 S.W.2d 336, 338 (Tex.Civ.App. 1980Ex parte Yates, 387 S.W.2d 377, 380 (Tex.1965); Ex parte Duncan, 462 S.W.2d 336, 338 (Tex.Civ.App. | 2 | 2 |
Harrison v. Gemdrill International, Inc.green2 sentences2008Harrison , 981 S.W.2d at 719 . "[A] ll that is necessary is that a party show that its assertion of a debt or claim and a request for compliance was made to the opposing party, and the opposing party refused to pay the claim." Standard Constructors, Inc. v. Chevron Chem. 2008Harrison, 981 S.W.2d at 719 . “[A]ll that is necessary is that a party show that its assertion of a debt or claim and a request for compliance was made to the opposing party, and the opposing party refused to pay the claim.” Standard Constructors, Inc. v. Chevron Chem. | 1 | 3 |
Hoxie Implement Co., Inc. v. Bakergreen2 sentences2016Id. at 493 . “[T]he general rule [is] that paying part of a debt does not bar the further accrual of interest.” Hand & Wrist Ctr. of Houston, P.A. v. Republic Servs., Inc., 401 S.W.3d 712, 721 (Tex. App.— Houston [14th Dist.] 2013, no pet.) (citing Hoxie Implement Co., Inc. v. Baker, 65 S.W.3d 140, 156 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2001, pet. denied)); J.M. 2013Hoxie Implement Co., 65 S.W.3d at 156 . | 1 | 2 |
Williams v. Glashgreen1 sentence2023See Williams v. Glash, 789 S.W.2d 261, 264 (Tex. 1990). | 1 | 1 |
Anglo-Dutch Petroleum International, Inc., and Anglo-Dutch (Tenge), LLC v. Greenberg Peden, P.C., and Gerald J. Swonkegreen2 sentences2020Id. (citations omitted). 16 Anglo-Dutch, 522 S.W.3d at 490 (citation omitted). “[T]he general rule [is] that paying part of a debt does not bar the further accrual of interest.” Id. (citations omitted). 2020Id. (citations omitted). 16 Anglo-Dutch, 522 S.W.3d at 490 (citation omitted). “[T]he general rule [is] that paying part of a debt does not bar the further accrual of interest.” Id. (citations omitted). | 1 | 1 |
Hughes v. Mahaney & Higginsgreen1 sentence2019In each and every case we have applied Hughes tolling, the legal services providing the basis for the malpractice claim occurred directly in, and were integrally connected to, the prosecution or defense of a claim: 18 • drafting of an affidavit of voluntary relinquishment precedent to a termination suit and adoption proceeding;62 • allowing the statute of limitations to lapse after being retained to make a claim for asbestos-related personal injuries;63 • failing to provide sufficient notice when prosecuting a debt claim through a foreclosure sale;64 • trial counsel’s mishandling of an insuran | 1 | 1 |
Stanfield v. Neubaumgreen1 sentence2019Renda may have had a debt claim against Marine, but even assuming Erikson was simultaneously advising both sides of that loan transaction,61 the mere rendition of legal advice does not constitute “the prosecution or defense of a claim.” If it were sufficient, those words—which we have repeated in every articulation of the rule—would serve no purpose in 57 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY at 311 (11th ed. 2019). 58 Id. at 1476. 59 Id. at 528. 60 Id. 61 See Stanfield v. Neubaum, 494 S.W.3d 90, 96 (Tex. 2016) (to prevail on a legal-malpractice claim, a plaintiff must prove, among other things, that the att | 1 | 1 |
West Beach Marina, Ltd. v. Erdeljacgreen1 sentence2018Beach Marina, Ltd. v. Erdeljac, 94 S.W.3d 248, 269 (Tex. App.—Austin 2002, no pet.) (“Presentment does not require a party to follow a particular form—it may be informal or even oral.”). | 1 | 1 |
Hand & Wrist Center of Houston, P.A. and SCA Houston Hospital for Specialize Surgery, L.P. v. Republic Services, Inc.green1 sentence2016Id. at 493 . “[T]he general rule [is] that paying part of a debt does not bar the further accrual of interest.” Hand & Wrist Ctr. of Houston, P.A. v. Republic Servs., Inc., 401 S.W.3d 712, 721 (Tex. App.— Houston [14th Dist.] 2013, no pet.) (citing Hoxie Implement Co., Inc. v. Baker, 65 S.W.3d 140, 156 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2001, pet. denied)); J.M. | 1 | 1 |
Carr v. Austin Fortygreen2 sentences2015Co., 101 S.W.3d 619, 627 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2003, pet. denied)); see Carr, 744 S.W.2d at 271 (holding that letter notifying opposing party of termination of contract and requesting release of letter of credit constituted proper presentment because “[t]he elements.of notice, time and proof of amount are -all present”). 2015Co., 101 S.W.3d 619, 627 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2003, pet. denied)); see Carr, 744 S.W.2d at 271 (holding that letter notifying opposing party of termination of contract and requesting release of letter of credit constituted proper presentment because “[t]he elements of notice, time and proof of amount are all present”). | 1 | 1 |
Stine v. Stewartgreen1 sentence2015It provides that a person must bring suit on a debt claim “not later than four years after the day the cause of action accrues.” Id.; Stine v. Stewart, 80 S.W.3d 586, 592 (Tex. 2002). | 1 | 1 |
Helping Hands Home Care, Inc. D/B/A at Home Healthcare, Johnny James Grice v. Home Health of Tarrant County, Inc. D/B/A Home Health Specialtiesgreen2 sentences2015See Gordon, 365 S.W.3d at 116 (holding that, to prove presentment, “a party [must] show that its, assertion of a debt or claim and a request for compliance was'made to the opposing party”); see also Helping Hands Home Care, Inc., 393 S.W.3d at 516-17 (holding that agreed order for temporary injunction and agreed extension oí temporary restraining order do not meet presentment requirement because neither • document “says anything about the proof of the amount -owing” and neither document “contains a specific demand from [the defendant]-for payment”). 2015See Gordon, 365 S.W.3d at 116 (holding that, to prove presentment, “a party [must] show that its assertion of a debt or claim and a request for compliance was made to the opposing party”); see also Helping Hands Home Care, Inc., 393 S.W.3d at 516–17 (holding that agreed order for temporary injunction and agreed extension of temporary restraining order do not meet presentment requirement because neither document “says anything about the proof of the amount owing” and neither document “contains a specific demand from [the defendant] for payment”). | 1 | 1 |
Belew v. Rectorgreen2 sentences2015See Gordon, 365 S.W.3d at 116 ; see also Belew v. Rector, 202 S.W.3d 849, 857 (Tex.App.-Eastland 2006, no pet.) (stating that presentment may be done orally or in writing and may be accomplished with.requests for admission, but that “[m]erely filing a breach of. contract claim, however, is insufficient”). “[A]ll that is necessary is that a party show that its assertion of a debt or claim and a request for-compliance was made to the opposing party, and the opposing party refused to pay the claim.” Gordon, 365 S.W.3d at 116 (quoting Standard Constructors, Inc. v. Chevron Chem. 2015See Gordon, 365 S.W.3d at 116 ; see also Belew v. Rector, 202 S.W.3d 849, 857 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2006, no pet.) (stating that presentment may be done orally or in writing and may be accomplished with requests for admission, but that “[m]erely filing a breach of contract claim, however, is insufficient”). “[A]ll that is necessary is that a party show that its assertion of a debt or claim and a request for compliance was made to the opposing party, and the opposing party refused to 23 pay the claim.” Gordon, 365 S.W.3d at 116 (quoting Standard Constructors, Inc. v. Chevron Chem. | 1 | 1 |
Busch v. Hudson & Keyse, LLCgreen1 sentence2015Busch v. Hudson & Keyse, LLC, 312 S.W.3d 294, 300 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2010,' no pet.). | 1 | 1 |
Gary Wayne Jaster v. Comet II Construction, Inc., Joe H. Schneider, Laura H. Schneider, and Austin Design Groupgreen1 sentence2015See Jaster v. Comet II Const., Inc., 438 S.W.3d 556 , 564–65 (“claim” is assertion of legal right to payment or equitable remedy) (Tex. 2014) (plurality op.); Jones, 614 S.W.2d at 100 (“presentment” simply means demand or request for payment or performance); Ferch, 2009 WL 349149 , at *11 (claimant must show that its “assertion of a debt or claim and a request for compliance was made to the opposing party” (emphasis added)). | 1 | 1 |
| Nixon v. Mr. Property Management Co.green | 1 | 1 |
| Mills v. Robert W. Gottfried, Inc.green | 1 | 1 |
| Texas Turnpike Authority v. Shepperdgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Providence Institution for Savings v. Simsgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Texas. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
the Note Investment Group, Inc. v. Associates First Capital Corp., Successor by Merger to Associates Financial Services Company, Inc.
green
2 sentences2016“All that is necessary is that the party seeking attorney’s fees show that it made an assertion of a debt or claim and a request for compliance to the opposing party, and that the opposing party refused to pay the claim.” Id. 2016Id. at 493 . “[T]he general rule [is] that paying part of a debt does not bar the further accrual of interest.” Hand & Wrist Ctr. of Houston, P.A. v. Republic Servs., Inc., 401 S.W.3d 712, 721 (Tex. App.— Houston [14th Dist.] 2013, no pet.) (citing Hoxie Implement Co., Inc. v. Baker, 65 S.W.3d 140, 156 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2001, pet. denied)); J.M. | 3 | 2016–2016 |
CitiSteel USA, Inc. v. CONNELL LIMITED PARTNERSHIP
green
2 sentences2018See Amirsaleh, 27 A.3d at 529–30; CitiSteel USA, 758 A.2d at 931 . 2018See Amirsaleh, 27 A.3d at 529–30; CitiSteel USA, 758 A.2d at 931 . | 2 | 2018–2018 |
Fort Worth Cavalry Club, Inc. v. Sheppard
green
2 sentences1988Fort Worth Cavalry Club v. Sheppard, 83 S.W.2d 660 (Tex. 1935). 1988Port Worth Cavalrv Club v. SheDDard, 83 S.W.2d 660 (Tex. 1935). | 2 | 1988–1988 |
Charles Scribner's Sons v. S.M.N. Marrs
green
2 sentences1987SUMMARY Legislation authorizing state agencies to enter into contracts with third-party vendors for the installation, operation, and financing of cogeneration units to be repaid from energy savings that follows the guidelines in Texas Public Building Authority v. Mattox, 686 S.W.2d 924 (Tex. 1985) and Charles Scribner's Sons v. Marrs, 262 S.W. 722 (Tex. 1924), would not create a debt in violation of article III , section 49 , of the Texas Constitution. 1965In Attorney General's Opinion C-134 (1963), it was held that proposed contracts payable out of future revenues are in- valid, citing Section 49 of ArticlesIII of the Constitution of v. Marrs, 114 Tex. 11 , 262 S.W. j; In view of the foregoing, you are advised that you are not authorized to obligate future revenues of Texas Southern University since such obligation would create a debt in violation of Section 49 of Article III of the Constitutionof Texas. | 2 | 1965–1987 |
Rowland v. Moore
green
2 sentences1950The executor shall not be required to plead to any suit brought against him for money until after one year from the date of the probate of such will.” Referring to this and other articles of the same chapter, this court has said: “The statutes do not contemplate that the estate should be entirely withdrawn from the jurisdiction of the probate court, but that the appointment of an independent executor withdraws the estate from the supervision and control of the probate court, except in so far as some other statute may authorize the court to exercise its jurisdiction; and so long as it remains i 1950The executor shall not be required to plead to any suit brought against him for money until after one year from the date of the probate of such will.” Referring to this and other articles of the same chapter, this court has said: “The statutes do not contemplate that the estate should be entirely withdrawn from the jurisdiction of the probate court, but that the appointment of an independent executor withdraws the estate from the supervision and control of the probate court, except in so far as some other statute may authorize the court to exercise its jurisdiction; and so long as it remains i | 2 | 1950–1950 |
Long v. Castle Texas Production Ltd. Partnership
green
1 sentence2020Id. (citations omitted). 16 Anglo-Dutch, 522 S.W.3d at 490 (citation omitted). “[T]he general rule [is] that paying part of a debt does not bar the further accrual of interest.” Id. (citations omitted). | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Renda v. Erikson
green
2 sentences2019P. 41.3 (transferee court must apply the precedent of the transferring court). 15 547 S.W.3d at 910-11 . 7 transactional work or the prosecution or defense of claims” and whether “the group of clients to whom Erikson gave advice . . . encompassed Renda in his personal capacity.”16 Regarding the former, the court identified two distinct “claims” that could support Hughes tolling: (1) the Government’s debt claim against Marine and (2) Renda’s debt claim against Marine.17 According to the court, Renda’s malpractice claim would be amenable to Hughes tolling if Renda and the entities related to him 2019We granted Erikson’s petition for review to address the scope of the Hughes tolling rule, which we have had few occasions to revisit since its adoption nearly thirty years ago. 16 Id. at 911 . 17 Id. 18 Id. 19 Id. at 910-11 . 8 II. | 1 | 2019–2019 |
cluster 767008
green
1 sentence2015"A debt claim leads only to a money judgment and does not in its own right constitute an interest in specific property." Rahman, 198 F.3d at 496 . | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| Kevin Miller v. McCalla Raymer, Padrick, Cobb, Nichols, and Clark, L.L.C., and Echevarria, McCalla Raymer, Barrett, and Frappier green | 1 | 2010–2010 |
| Piro v. Piro green | 1 | 2007–2007 |
| Harris v. Dyer green | 1 | 2002–2002 |
| Adams v. Petrade International, Inc. green | 1 | 1999–1999 |
| Texas Public Building Authority v. Mattox green | 1 | 1987–1987 |
| Pacific American Gasoline Co. of Texas v. Miller green | 1 | 1987–1987 |
| Roylex, Inc. v. Langson Bros. Construction Co. green | 1 | 1987–1987 |
| Edinburg Meat Products Co. v. Vernon Co. green | 1 | 1983–1983 |
| Gipson v. Southwest Oil Co. of San Antonio green | 1 | 1983–1983 |
| Ex Parte Neff green | 1 | 1980–1980 |
| Ex Parte Helms green | 1 | 1980–1980 |
| Smith v. Bramhall green | 1 | 1980–1980 |
| Ex Parte Davis green | 1 | 1980–1980 |
| City of Big Spring v. Board of Control green | 1 | 1970–1970 |
| Platte v. Securities Inv. Co. green | 1 | 1968–1968 |
| Longoria v. Liddell neutral | 1 | 1940–1940 |
| R. L. White Co. v. Stout neutral | 1 | 1940–1940 |
| Whitmire v. May green | 1 | 1940–1940 |
| Allen v. Reilly neutral | 1 | 1940–1940 |
| Cole v. Lewis neutral | 1 | 1940–1940 |
| Lippincott v. Taylor green | 1 | 1940–1940 |
| Franklin Insurance v. Villeneuve green | 1 | 1931–1931 |
| School Trustees of District No. 25 v. Farmer green | 1 | 1922–1922 |
| Hopkins v. Howard green | 1 | 1919–1919 |
| Brunson v. Dawson State Bank neutral | 1 | 1916–1916 |
| Fievel v. Zuber green | 1 | 1906–1906 |
| Gouldy v. Metcalf green | 1 | 1906–1906 |
| Goldfrank, Frank & Co. v. Young green | 1 | 1906–1906 |
| Frost v. Erath Cattle Co. green | 1 | 1906–1906 |
| Berry v. Harnage neutral | 1 | 1891–1891 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.