debt claim in Michigan

1940The principle of law was stated in Bond v. Markstrum, 102 Mich. 11 , when the court said: “A former adjudication of the right of action, where the court had jurisdiction of the subject matter and of the parties, is unquestionably a bar to an *473 action for the same debt or claim, and is conclusive where the same subject matter is sought to be again litigated, no matter how, between the same parties.

1940“A former adjudication of the right of action, where the court had jurisdiction of the subject matter and of the parties, is unquestionably a bar to an action for the same debt or claim, and is conclusive where the same subject matter is sought to be again litigated, no matter how, between the same parties.” Bond v. Markstrum, 102 Mich. 11 .

1988Home Owners’ Loan Corporation v Baker, 299 Mass 158, 12 NE2d 199, 201 ; Gerken v Davidson Grocery Co, 57 Idaho 670 , 69 P2d 122, 126 .

1979Home Owners’ Loan Corporation v Baker, 299 Mass. 158 , 12 N.E.2d 199, 201 ; Gerken v Davidson Grocery Co., 57 Idaho 670 , 69 P.2d 122, 126 .

1988Home Owners’ Loan Corporation v Baker, 299 Mass 158, 12 NE2d 199, 201 ; Gerken v Davidson Grocery Co, 57 Idaho 670 , 69 P2d 122, 126 .

1988Home Owners’ Loan Corporation v Baker, 299 Mass 158, 12 NE2d 199, 201 ; Gerken v Davidson Grocery Co, 57 Idaho 670 , 69 P2d 122, 126 .

1936It would seem therefore that the legislature did not intend that it should be considered a debt of the deceased, for which claim could be filed in probate court (see In re Estate of Reynolds , 274 Mich. 354 , 361 ), but rather as a debt or claim to be enforced, if at all, by plenary suit in law or equity, against the estate.

1936It would seem therefore that the legislature did not intend that it should be considered a debt of the deceased, for which claim could be filed in probate court (see In re Estate of Reynolds, 274 Mich. 354, 361 ), but rather as a debt or claim to be enforced, if at all, by plenary suit in law or equity, against the estate.

1936The late Mr. Justice NELSON SHARPE in Lawrence v. De Boer, supra , said: "We * * * are of the opinion that when the stockholder dies before the assessment is made the obligation then becomes that of his estate and should be treated the same as any other indebtedness which matures after his death." The liability did not arise until the assessment was levied.

1936The late Mr. Justice Nelson Sharpe in Lawrence v. De Boer, supra, said: “We * * * are of the opinion that when the stockholder dies before the assessment is made the obligation then becomes that of his estate and should be treated the same as any other indebtedness which matures after his death.” The liability did not arise until the assessment was levied.

2014Wayne Co Social Servs Dir v Yates, 261 Mich App 152, 156 ; 681 NW2d 5 (2004); Alpena Friend of the Court v Durecki, 195 Mich App 635, 638 ; 491 NW2d 864 (1992).

2014Wayne Co Social Servs Dir v Yates, 261 Mich App 152, 156 ; 681 NW2d 5 (2004); Alpena Friend of the Court v Durecki, 195 Mich App 635, 638 ; 491 NW2d 864 (1992).

2004Rzadkowolski v Pefley, 237 Mich App 405, 411 ; 603 NW2d 646 (1999). 3 Partial payment of a child support obligation made after the expiration of the period of limitations is an acknowledgment of the debt and a waiver of the defense.

2004Rzadkowolski v Pefley, 237 Mich App 405, 411 ; 603 NW2d 646 (1999). 3 Partial payment of a child support obligation made after the expiration of the period of limitations is an acknowledgment of the debt and a waiver of the defense.

1988In Foremost Life Ins Co v Waters, 88 Mich App 599, 603 ; 278 NW2d 688 (1979), rev’d on other grounds 415 Mich 303 (1982), reh den 417 Mich 1103 (1983), this Court reviewed the general principles of subrogation and stated: Subrogation is defined as follows: "The substitution of one person in the place of another with reference to a lawful claim, demand or right, Whyel v Smith, 101 Fla 971, 134 So 552, 554; so that he who is substituted succeeds to the rights of the other in relation to the debt or claim, and its rights, remedies, or securities.

1988In Foremost Life Ins Co v Waters, 88 Mich App 599, 603 ; 278 NW2d 688 (1979), rev’d on other grounds 415 Mich 303 (1982), reh den 417 Mich 1103 (1983), this Court reviewed the general principles of subrogation and stated: Subrogation is defined as follows: "The substitution of one person in the place of another with reference to a lawful claim, demand or right, Whyel v Smith, 101 Fla 971, 134 So 552, 554; so that he who is substituted succeeds to the rights of the other in relation to the debt or claim, and its rights, remedies, or securities.

1988In Foremost Life Ins Co v Waters, 88 Mich App 599, 603 ; 278 NW2d 688 (1979), rev’d on other grounds 415 Mich 303 (1982), reh den 417 Mich 1103 (1983), this Court reviewed the general principles of subrogation and stated: Subrogation is defined as follows: "The substitution of one person in the place of another with reference to a lawful claim, demand or right, Whyel v Smith, 101 Fla 971, 134 So 552, 554; so that he who is substituted succeeds to the rights of the other in relation to the debt or claim, and its rights, remedies, or securities.

1988In Foremost Life Ins Co v Waters, 88 Mich App 599, 603 ; 278 NW2d 688 (1979), rev’d on other grounds 415 Mich 303 (1982), reh den 417 Mich 1103 (1983), this Court reviewed the general principles of subrogation and stated: Subrogation is defined as follows: "The substitution of one person in the place of another with reference to a lawful claim, demand or right, Whyel v Smith, 101 Fla 971, 134 So 552, 554; so that he who is substituted succeeds to the rights of the other in relation to the debt or claim, and its rights, remedies, or securities.

1979Subrogation is defined as follows: "The substitution of one person in the place of another with reference to a lawful claim, demand or right, Whyel v Smith, 101 Fla. 971 , 134 So. 552, 554 ; so that he who is substituted succeeds to the rights of the other in relation to the debt or claim, and its rights, remedies, or securities.

1979Subrogation is defined as follows: "The substitution of one person in the place of another with reference to a lawful claim, demand or right, Whyel v Smith, 101 Fla. 971 , 134 So. 552, 554 ; so that he who is substituted succeeds to the rights of the other in relation to the debt or claim, and its rights, remedies, or securities.

1940“Although a compromise parol agreement, if otherwise valid, may supersede or take the place of one theretofore entered into in writing, failure to make payment of the amount agreed upon leaves such agreement a mere executory accord without satisfaction, and as such it constitutes no bar to the enforcement of the original debt or claim.” Palmerlee v. Republic Acceptance Corp. (syllabus), 216 Mich. 692 .

1921Henderson v. McRae, 148 Mich. 324 ; Allswede v. Central Warehouse Co., 203 Mich. 368 .

1921Henderson v. McRae, 148 Mich. 324 ; Allswede v. Central Warehouse Co., 203 Mich. 368 .