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5 Arkansas opinions name it 2 courts 1915–2021 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Arkansas courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Wagner v. Mutual Life Insurancegreen2 sentences2011Co. of New York, 88 Conn. 536 , 91 A. 1012, 1015 (1914) (finding that “[t]he giving of security for a debt barred by the statute of limitations ... operates as an unequivocal acknowledgment of the existence of the debt, from which the law implies a promise to pay the debt”). 2011Co. of New York, 88 Conn. 536 , 91 A. 1012, 1015 (1914) (finding that “[t]he giving of security for a debt barred by the statute of limitations ... operates as an unequivocal acknowledgment of the existence of the debt, from which the law implies a promise to pay the debt”). | 1 | 1 |
Gazza v. United California Bank Internationalgreen2 sentences2011See Gazza v. United California Bank Int’l, 88 A.D.2d 968 , 451 N.Y.S.2d 806, 809 (1982) (recognizing that “the giving of security may constitute a sufficient acknowledgment of a debt so as to toll the Statute of Limitations.); In re Jorgensen’s Estate, 70 Ill.App.2d 398 , 217 N.E.2d 290, 292 (1966) (agreeing that 19the “decedent’s delivery to claimant ... of ... shares of stock ... as security of the debt constituted an unequivocal acknowledgment of the existence of the debt and a waiver of the defense of the Statute of Limitations.”); Wagner v. Mutual Life Ins. 2011See Gazza v. United California Bank Int’l, 88 A.D.2d 968 , 451 N.Y.S.2d 806, 809 (1982) (recognizing that “the giving of security may constitute a sufficient acknowledgment of a debt so as to toll the Statute of Limitations.); In re Jorgensen’s Estate, 70 Ill.App.2d 398 , 217 N.E.2d 290, 292 (1966) (agreeing that 19the “decedent’s delivery to claimant ... of ... shares of stock ... as security of the debt constituted an unequivocal acknowledgment of the existence of the debt and a waiver of the defense of the Statute of Limitations.”); Wagner v. Mutual Life Ins. | 1 | 1 |
In Re Estate of Jorgensengreen2 sentences2011See Gazza v. United California Bank Int’l, 88 A.D.2d 968 , 451 N.Y.S.2d 806, 809 (1982) (recognizing that “the giving of security may constitute a sufficient acknowledgment of a debt so as to toll the Statute of Limitations.); In re Jorgensen’s Estate, 70 Ill.App.2d 398 , 217 N.E.2d 290, 292 (1966) (agreeing that 19the “decedent’s delivery to claimant ... of ... shares of stock ... as security of the debt constituted an unequivocal acknowledgment of the existence of the debt and a waiver of the defense of the Statute of Limitations.”); Wagner v. Mutual Life Ins. 2011See Gazza v. United California Bank Int’l, 88 A.D.2d 968 , 451 N.Y.S.2d 806, 809 (1982) (recognizing that “the giving of security may constitute a sufficient acknowledgment of a debt so as to toll the Statute of Limitations.); In re Jorgensen’s Estate, 70 Ill.App.2d 398 , 217 N.E.2d 290, 292 (1966) (agreeing that 19the “decedent’s delivery to claimant ... of ... shares of stock ... as security of the debt constituted an unequivocal acknowledgment of the existence of the debt and a waiver of the defense of the Statute of Limitations.”); Wagner v. Mutual Life Ins. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Arkansas. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Fields v. Jarnagin
neutral
2 sentences2021Fields v. Jarnagin, 210 Ark. 1054 , 199 S.W.2d 961 (1947); Bisbee v. Decatur State Bank, 2010 Ark. 2021Fields v. Jarnagin, 210 Ark. 1054 , 199 S.W.2d 961 (1947); Bisbee v. Decatur State Bank, 2010 Ark. | 2 | 2010–2021 |
Bisbee v. Decatur State Bank
green
1 sentence2021Fields v. Jarnagin, 210 Ark. 1054 , 199 S.W.2d 961 (1947); Bisbee v. Decatur State Bank, 2010 Ark. | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Carter v. Adamson
green
1 sentence1947Thus, unless the case comes within such exceptions, no action lies upon a satisfied judgment, and no further execution can issue, even with the consent of the parties, until the satisfaction is vacated and a new execution awarded by an order of the court in which the judgment was rendered.’'’ Our own cases of Carter v. Adamson, 21 Ark. 287 , and Lewis v. St. | 1 | 1947–1947 |
Boos v. Morgan
green
2 sentences1947“The rule which governs in such matters is thus stated in 23 Cye. 1495: ‘The payment and satisfaction of a judgment operate to extinguish it and to put an end to its validity for all purposes whatsoever, and also to extinguish the original debt or claim, except where the satisfaction was obtained wrongfully or fraudulently, in which case, on its being revoked or vacated, the judgment will again be in force. ’ ' “Many authorities are cited as sustaining the rule thus announced, among which see Boos v. Morgan et al., 130 Ind. 305 , 30 N. E. 141 , 30 Am. 1947“The rule which governs in such matters is thus stated in 23 Cye. 1495: ‘The payment and satisfaction of a judgment operate to extinguish it and to put an end to its validity for all purposes whatsoever, and also to extinguish the original debt or claim, except where the satisfaction was obtained wrongfully or fraudulently, in which case, on its being revoked or vacated, the judgment will again be in force. ’ ' “Many authorities are cited as sustaining the rule thus announced, among which see Boos v. Morgan et al., 130 Ind. 305 , 30 N. E. 141 , 30 Am. | 1 | 1947–1947 |
Hatch v. Fourth National Bank
green
1 sentence1915The reason on which the rule is •founded is stated by the New York Court of Appeals in the case of Hatch v. National Bank, 147 N. Y. 184 , as follows : “This doctrine goes upon the ground that money has no earmark, that in general it can not be identified as chattels may he, and that to permit in every case of the payment of a debt an inquiry as to the source from which the debtor derived the money land a recovery if shown to (have been dishonestly (acquired, would disorganize all business operations, and entail an .amount of risk and uncertainty which no enterprise could bear. | 1 | 1915–1915 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.