debt claim (Indiana) · Go Syfert
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debt claim in Indiana

15 Indiana opinions name it 2 courts 1862–2006 0 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by Indiana courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (6)

CaseFollowedCited
Home Owners' Loan Corporation v. Hensongreen
ind · 1940 · cited in 4 Indiana opinions naming this issue, 1997–2002
2 sentences

2002See also State v. Cowdell, 421 N.E.2d 667, 671 (Ind.Ct.App.1981) ("The right of sub-rogation has consistently been defined as follows: 'The right of subrogation is not founded upon contract, expressed or implied, but upon principles of equity and justice, and includes every instance in which one party, not a mere volunteer, pays a debt for another, primarily liable, and which, in good conscience, should have been paid by the latter.'" (Quoting Home Owners' Loan Corp. v. Henson, 217 Ind. 554, 561 , 29 N.E.2d 873, 875 (1940).

2002See also State v. Cowdell, 421 N.E.2d 667, 671 (Ind.Ct.App.1981) ("The right of sub-rogation has consistently been defined as follows: 'The right of subrogation is not founded upon contract, expressed or implied, but upon principles of equity and justice, and includes every instance in which one party, not a mere volunteer, pays a debt for another, primarily liable, and which, in good conscience, should have been paid by the latter.'" (Quoting Home Owners' Loan Corp. v. Henson, 217 Ind. 554, 561 , 29 N.E.2d 873, 875 (1940).

44
Beiger Heritage Corp. v. Montandongreen
indctapp · 1998 · cited in 3 Indiana opinions naming this issue, 2006–2006
2 sentences

2006As the Court of Appeals has observed: Barring any qualifying expression, in common usage the word “due” means that “the debt or claim in question is now (presently or immediately) matured and enforceable.” When qualified by the expression “payable” the word “due” means that the debt or claim “is fixed and certain but the day appointed for its payment has not yet arrived.” . . . [I]n the context of a real or personal property tax, the term has long been used to refer to the “day appointed for its payment.” Beiger Heritage Corp. v. Montandon, 691 N.E.2d 1334, 1337 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998) (internal

2006As the Court of Appeals has observed: Barring any qualifying expression, in common usage the word “due” means that “the debt or claim in question is now (presently or immediately) matured and enforceable.” When qualified by the expression “payable” the word “due” means that the debt or claim “is fixed and certain but the day appointed for its payment has not yet arrived.” ... [I]n the context of a real or personal property tax, the term has long been used to refer to the “day appointed for its payment.” Beiger Heritage Corp. v. Montandon, 691 N.E.2d 1334, 1337 (Ind.Ct.App.1998) (internal citat

23
Chadwick, Treasurer v. City of Crawfordsvillegreen
ind · 1940 · cited in 2 Indiana opinions naming this issue, 1998–1998
2 sentences

1998There are no Indiana cases on point defining the term "due and payable." However, in the context of a real or personal property tax, the term has long been used to refer to the "day appointed for its payment." See , e.g ., Board of Comm’rs v. Millikan , 207 Ind. 142, 145 , 190 N.E 185, 186 (1934) (action against board for refund of taxes allegedly wrongfully paid referring to the "collection of taxes for 1919, due and payable in 1920"); Chadwick v. City of Crawfordsville , 216 Ind. 399, 413 , 24 N.E.2d 937, 944 (1940) (action to enjoin county Treasurer from collecting taxes for the year 1938 r

1998There are no Indiana cases on point defining the term "due and payable." However, in the context of a real or personal property tax, the term has long been used to refer to the "day appointed for its payment." See , e.g ., Board of Comm’rs v. Millikan , 207 Ind. 142, 145 , 190 N.E 185, 186 (1934) (action against board for refund of taxes allegedly wrongfully paid referring to the "collection of taxes for 1919, due and payable in 1920"); Chadwick v. City of Crawfordsville , 216 Ind. 399, 413 , 24 N.E.2d 937, 944 (1940) (action to enjoin county Treasurer from collecting taxes for the year 1938 r

22
Board of Commissioners v. Millikangreen
ind · 1934 · cited in 2 Indiana opinions naming this issue, 1998–1998
2 sentences

1998There are no Indiana cases on point defining the term "due and payable." However, in the context of a real or personal property tax, the term has long been used to refer to the "day appointed for its payment." See , e.g ., Board of Comm’rs v. Millikan , 207 Ind. 142, 145 , 190 N.E 185, 186 (1934) (action against board for refund of taxes allegedly wrongfully paid referring to the "collection of taxes for 1919, due and payable in 1920"); Chadwick v. City of Crawfordsville , 216 Ind. 399, 413 , 24 N.E.2d 937, 944 (1940) (action to enjoin county Treasurer from collecting taxes for the year 1938 r

1998There are no Indiana cases on point defining the term “due and payable.” However, in the context of a real or personal property tax, the term has long been used to refer to the “day appointed for its payment.” See, e.g., Board of Comm’rs v. Millikan, 207 Ind. 142, 145 , 190 N.E. 185, 186 (1934) (action against board for refund of taxes allegedly wrongfully paid referring to the “collection of taxes for 1919, due and payable in 1920”); Chadwick v. City of Crawfordsville, 216 Ind. 399, 413 , 24 N.E.2d 937, 944 (1940) (action to enjoin county Treasurer from collecting taxes for the year 1938 refe

12
State v. Cowdellgreen
indctapp · 1981 · cited in 1 Indiana opinions naming this issue, 2002–2002
1 sentence

2002See also State v. Cowdell, 421 N.E.2d 667, 671 (Ind.Ct.App.1981) ("The right of sub-rogation has consistently been defined as follows: 'The right of subrogation is not founded upon contract, expressed or implied, but upon principles of equity and justice, and includes every instance in which one party, not a mere volunteer, pays a debt for another, primarily liable, and which, in good conscience, should have been paid by the latter.'" (Quoting Home Owners' Loan Corp. v. Henson, 217 Ind. 554, 561 , 29 N.E.2d 873, 875 (1940).

11
Mechanics Laundry & Supply, Inc. v. Wilder Oil Co.green
indctapp · 1992 · cited in 1 Indiana opinions naming this issue, 1997–1997
1 sentence

1997Cf. Mechanics Laundry & Supply, Inc. v. Wilder Oil Co., 596 N.E.2d 248, 254 (Ind.Ct.App.1992) (an uncontested instrument can be admitted into evidence without proving its execution).

11

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

CaseNegativeCited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Indiana. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (8)

CaseCitedYears
Fetz v. Phillips green
indctapp · 1992
2 sentences

1998When qualified by the expression “payable” the word “due” means that the debt or claim “is fixed and certain but the day appointed for its payment has not yet arrived.” Id.

1998When qualified by the expression “payable” the word “due” means that the debt or claim “is fixed and certain but the day appointed for its payment has not yet arrived.” Id.

11998–1998
Capps v. Klebs green
indctapp · 1978
1 sentence

1992Similarly, we have stated that subrogation is “a legal fiction through which a person, who not as a volunteer or in his own wrong, and in the absence of outstanding and superior equities, pays the debts of another, is substituted to all rights and remedies of the other.” Capps, 382 N.E.2d at 950 ; See also Norris v. United States Fidelity and Guar.

11992–1992
Weidenhammer v. McAdams green
indctapp · 1912
2 sentences

1967Weidenhammer v. McAdams (1912), 52 Ind. App. 98 , 98 N. E. 883 .

1967Weidenhammer v. McAdams (1912), 52 Ind. App. 98 , 98 N. E. 883 .

11967–1967
Boos v. Morgan green
ind · 1892
1 sentence

1923The rule which governs in such matters is thus stated in 28 Cyc 1495: “The payment and satisfaction of a judgment operates to extinguish it and to put an end ,to its validity for all purposes whatsoever, and also to extinguish the original debt or claim, except where the satisfaction was obtained wrongfully or fraudulently, in which case, on its being revoked or vacated, the judgment will again be in force.” Many authorities are cited as sustaining the rule thus announced, among which see — Boos v. Morgan (1892), 130 Ind. 305 ; Stout v. Vankirk (1854), 10 N. J.

11923–1923
Cotter v. O'Connell neutral
iowa · 1878
1 sentence

1923Eq. 78; Cotter v. O’Connell (1878), 48 Iowa 552 .

11923–1923
Bullard v. Hascall neutral
mich · 1872
1 sentence

1883Of the numerous cases cited by the author we content ourselves with a reference to the following only: Bullard v. Hascall, 25 Mich. 132 ; Mason v. Waite, 17 Mass. 560 ; Beardsley v. Root, 11 Johns. 464 ( 6 Am.

11883–1883
Murray v. House neutral
nysupct · 1814
1 sentence

1883Of the numerous cases cited by the author we content ourselves with a reference to the following only: Bullard v. Hascall, 25 Mich. 132 ; Mason v. Waite, 17 Mass. 560 ; Beardsley v. Root, 11 Johns. 464 ( 6 Am.

11883–1883
Town of Guilford v. Cornell neutral
nysupct · 1854
1 sentence

1862It is contended by the relators that questions of a similar character have been adjudged in their favor, both in the supreme court and the court of appeals; and in support of these views they cite the case of The Town of Guilford v. Super visors of Chenango, ( 18 Barb. 615 , and 3 Kern. 143,) and the case of the People v. Supervisors of New York, ( 11 Abb. 114 .) But these cases, and many others of a similar character which might have been cited, related not to the right or power of the legislature to compel an individual or corporation to pay a debt or claim, but to the power of the legislatu

11862–1862

Where else courts name it

IL 71 (1878–2026) TX 61 (1891–2023) CA 47 (1894–2024) NY 39 (1863–2011) MO 17 (1873–2013) KS 16 (1892–2002) IN 15 (1862–2006) MS 15 (1844–2020) PA 15 (1832–2017) GA 14 (1885–2015) MI 13 (1898–2014) WA 12 (1925–2024) LA 11 (1941–2013) MT 11 (1934–2016) OK 9 (1934–2016) FL 9 (1941–2017) CO 9 (1908–2006) MA 9 (1890–2013) AL 9 (1900–2005) WV 8 (1900–2017) KY 8 (1874–2011) VA 8 (1876–2022) MD 8 (1886–2007) IA 7 (1909–1999) AZ 7 (1966–2015) ID 7 (1968–2018) VT 7 (1881–2025) UT 6 (1908–2022) WY 6 (1879–2023) WI 5 (1881–2025) OH 5 (1998–2024) DE 5 (1935–2024) AR 5 (1915–2021) SC 4 (1906–2022) MN 4 (1920–1977) CT 4 (1902–1999) NE 4 (1985–2022) NJ 4 (1971–2003) OR 3 (1891–1975) ME 3 (1897–1985) ND 3 (1909–2014) NC 3 (1899–1983) AK 2 (1968–2025) HI 2 (2000–2015) SD 2 (1924–1997) VI 2 (2016–2017) RI 2 (1980–1998)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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