debt claim in Louisiana

2013Harrington v. Aetna Life and Casualty Company, 441 So.2d 1255, 1256 (La.App. 1st Cir.1983); McClelland v. Security Industrial | ^Insurance Company, 426 So.2d 665, 669-670 (La.App. 1st Cir.1982), writ denied, 430 So.2d 94 (La.1983).

2010See Porter, 99-2542 at p. 3, 771 So.2d at 295 ; cf. Clark, 00-3010 at pp. 16-18, 785 So.2d at 790-91 .

2010Frances correctly argues there is no requirement that the healthcare provider intervene into an action to either assert its privilege or to receive its payment and that La.R.S. 9:4752 does not contain a prescriptive period, this court has long recognized that “a lien or privilege is only an accessory right to the claim or debt, providing security and payment by preference, it has. a life coextensive with that of the debt it is intended to secure, the result being that when the debt or claim is extinguished by prescription the privilege becomes extinct also.” Toomer v. City of Lake Charles, 392

2010Frances correctly argues there is no requirement that the healthcare provider intervene into an action to either assert its privilege or to receive its payment and that La.R.S. 9:4752 does not contain a prescriptive period, this court has long recognized that “a lien or privilege is only an accessory right to the claim or debt, providing security and payment by preference, it has. a life coextensive with that of the debt it is intended to secure, the result being that when the debt or claim is extinguished by prescription the privilege becomes extinct also.” Toomer v. City of Lake Charles, 392

2006C.C. art. 1989. [3] As held by the supreme court in Alexander v. Burroughs Corporation, 359 So.2d 607 (La. 1978), a debt or claim for the payment of money or damages under a contract is ascertainable and becomes due on the date an active violation occurred or the date the obligor was put in default, which can be earlier but never later than judicial demand, and legal interest runs from that date.

1997Similarly, the Supreme Court, in Trans-Global Alloy Ltd. v. First National Bank of Jefferson Parish, 583 So.2d 443 (La.1991), held that interest should run from the date of judicial demand on a judgment in a breach of fiduciary duty and wrongful misrepresentation case, overturning the trial court's award of interest from the date of judgment because the damages were not ascertainable until that time.

1996Poirier contended that such assignment is absolutely null and void in that it authorizes a lay entity to take legal action to enforce a debt in violation of the prohibition against the unauthorized practice of law, citing Andrus v. Guillot, 160 So.2d 804 (La.App. 3rd Cir.1964).

1971This ruling was correct.” (Collier v. Administrator, Succession of Blevins, 136 So.2d 774 , 777 — Emphasis supplied) In the Succession of De' Loach, 204 La. 805 , 16 So.2d 361 (1943), cited by appellee the same exception based on the foregoing statutory provision was filed by the defendant and overruled by the trial court.

1971This ruling was correct.” (Collier v. Administrator, Succession of Blevins, 136 So.2d 774 , 777 — Emphasis supplied) In the Succession of De' Loach, 204 La. 805 , 16 So.2d 361 (1943), cited by appellee the same exception based on the foregoing statutory provision was filed by the defendant and overruled by the trial court.

1971This ruling was correct.” (Collier v. Administrator, Succession of Blevins, 136 So.2d 774 , 777 — Emphasis supplied) In the Succession of De' Loach, 204 La. 805 , 16 So.2d 361 (1943), cited by appellee the same exception based on the foregoing statutory provision was filed by the defendant and overruled by the trial court.

1967As the plaintiff failed to plead his discharge in bankruptcy in the action against him to obtain a deficiency judgment prior to the rendition of the judgment, he is considered to have waived it See Home Finance Service Washington Parish v. Taylor (La.App., 1966) 187 So.2d 778 .

1959The text leaves no room for any other view, * * *.” In commenting upon the holding, in Chapman v. Forsyth, 2 How. 202 , 11 L.Ed. 236 , that, although a claim was excluded from the law if brought in by the voluntary act of the creditor and he thereby participated in the distribution, the creditor, by such election, waived his right to be treated as not bound by the statute' and, consequently, the debt or claim was discharged, the court further stated: “The act of 1867, presumably to correct the injustice which arose from excluding from all participation in the distribution of assets those credi

1959The text leaves no room for any other view, * * *.” In commenting upon the holding, in Chapman v. Forsyth, 2 How. 202 , 11 L.Ed. 236 , that, although a claim was excluded from the law if brought in by the voluntary act of the creditor and he thereby participated in the distribution, the creditor, by such election, waived his right to be treated as not bound by the statute' and, consequently, the debt or claim was discharged, the court further stated: “The act of 1867, presumably to correct the injustice which arose from excluding from all participation in the distribution of assets those credi

1941Folse v. Dale et al., 197 La. 511 , 2 So.2d 6 .

1941Folse v. Dale et al., 197 La. 511 , 2 So.2d 6 .